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SLOVENIA AND THE SLOVENES

by Anthony J. Klančar

SLOVENIA is a beautiful country with a greatly diversified landscape. As it is so accessible from adjacent countries at its many geographical intersections, it is able to promote strong mutual bonds of friendship with the neighboring regions. The Alps, which are the most important European mountain chain, and the Kras world of the Dinaric mountain chain meet in Slovene territory. Toward the east the Alpine Valley opens upon the wide Pannonian Lowlands, in the west the Vipava and the Soča rivers lead into the Upper Italian Lowlands. Slovene territory also borders on the sea, where the Mediterranean Sea projects farthest into the European continent. In the Postojna reaches between the Alps and Kras may be found the easiest passage from the Mediterranean shores into the heart of Europe. Along the eastern edge of the Alps this path leads on the north toward the Danube and farther on toward the Oder and the Vistula. Since the Alps are the most passable mountain chain of Europe, the northeastern frontier of Slovenia is not less open, for paths along the Sava, the Drava and the Mura rivers, lead across watersheds and pass into the heart of the Alps and into the Fore-Alpine plains in the north.

Though this territory is equally accessible on all sides, the force of outside influence depends more upon the political factors and strength of Slovenia's neighbors than upon its geographical position. Slovene history proves that historical factors are much more important than geographical factors. The Alpine valleys open toward the southeast into the lowlands of Pannonia and into the Balkan peninsula. "Our rivers," as the historian Janez Krek has said, "flow towards Belgrade and the Black Sea, none of our rivers, for instance, flow towards Vienna." For many centuries the Slovenes were divided politically from the rest of the Yugoslavs. Soon after their settlement, the Slovenes were attracted to the Christian West which had more political activity and a higher cultural development. Under

its aegis they resisted the Avars and later the Magyars and the Turks, who threatened them from the east and south; they broke away from the West occasionally at times when it was politically weakened. The first of such instances is the union with the Croats and the Serbs at the time of Ljudevit Posavski, at the beginning of the ninth century. Similar tendencies may be seen toward the end of the Middle Ages in the policies of the Counts of Celje, but they are most clearly revealed in Napoleon's Illyria at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The political activity of the Southeast did not increase until after the fall of Turkey and the progress of liberated Serbia, a fact which is clearly shown in the case of the first Balkan War. At the same time also the rapidly increasing national liberation of the Serbs disturbed Slovene political ties with German Central Europe; and when Germany went down in defeat in the first World War, Slovene politics also had to follow the course of its rivers, and Slovenia was absorbed into Yugoslavia.

Slovene rivers do not really flow toward the north and west; rather they flow south. At the end of the sixth and the beginning of the seventh centuries, the ancestors of the Slovenes in their migrations swept along these rivers from the Pannonian plains up into the Alps, into the plains in front of the Alps, up to the Danube, and even beyond it. At the time of the Christianization of the Slovenes toward the end of the eighth century, the Bavarian duke, Tassilo, founded two monasteries, Kremsmünster on the Krems River in Upper Austria and the Innichenmünster in Italy, at the mouth of the Drave. Today, both monasteries show us approximately the western boundary of the Slovene territory at that time. The Slovenes came almost as far west as the Czechs and the Polabian Slavs. The first Slavonic state of King Samo in the seventh century embraced parts of all these Slavic races. This wide open lowland proved fatal for the Polabian Slavs, so that by the end of the Middle Ages they were conquered by the Germans. The German wave of migration also inundated the territory along the Danube where, from the beginning, the Slovenes were more thinly settled. The Slovenes, however, were met along the Litva River by the Magyars. The latter, near the end of the tenth century, destroyed the desirable union between the Great Moravian state and the Pannonian Slovenes. The Czech ruler, Rastislav, and the Slovene duke, Kocelj, hoped to revive Samo's kingdom in a more complete form, for the political union could be strengthened through the national church of the Pannonian Moravian archbishopric of St. Methodius. But the German-Magyar wedge finally split the Slovenes from the northern Slavs. In the first half of the thirteenth century there were no more Slovenes living along the Austrian Danube;

the northern and western portion of Carinthia were also already Germanized; while in the course of the thirteenth century the same thing occurred in Upper Styria. The German wave of migration also inundated the Czech frontiers, but in the geographically uniform Czech valley basin it left the German colonists on the edges. Germanism then overflowed freely into the Slovene valley, where the Germans had enough open space at their disposal among the thinly settled Slovene inhabitants. Thus Germanism spread without any linguistic boundaries into Slovene territory, in which the northern part, hollowed out from the inside, suddenly collapsed. Consequently the revived union of the Slovene provinces with the Czechs under Otakar Přemysl II in the second half of the thirteenth century was, above all, a feudalistic-dynastic state without regard to national aspirations. It lasted only for ten years, since a united front of Germans and Magyars under the leadership of Rudolph of Hapsburg destroyed it in 1278. The Hapsburgs henceforth remained in Austria and in turn acquired all the Slovene provinces as far as the Adriatic Sea and Furlania (Italian Friuli).

While the Slovene territory in the north had shrunk in a few centuries to very small proportions, the western frontier remained for the most part unchangeable up to the most recent times. With the settlement of the Slovenes in the beginning of the seventh century, the Longobardian military frontier with its strong fortresses stopped the Slovenes at the edge of the Furlanian plains where terminate the last peaks of the Alps and the Kras. Here ends the Slovene national frontier even to this day, but here too the political frontier was unstable. In general it is the fate of the Slovene lands that their national frontiers do not connect with the frontiers of the political units to which they belong. As an example of this we may take the southern frontiers reaching in the direction of Croatia, but here it is the political frontier that has created the national frontier. The blame for this is the geopolitical position of Slovenia which as its first poet put it, "lies in the heart of Europe." If Slovene territory is really the heart of Europe, it is itself without a heart, that is to say, without a central province around which could be formed a greater and more permanent political state. Consequently the Slovenes, more than other nations in the world, always have been divided and therefore it is comprehensible that their political program, as yet unachieved, became "A United Slovenia."

After the migration and settlement of the Slovenes, their territory became still more divided into separate parts because of the great number of forests and swamps. Under those conditions there was an acceleration of the political division, which under the Franco-German yoke had made such steady progress in the dynastic interest of the foreign feudal lords.

As soon as all of the Slovene territory was united into one state under Charlemagne, it was cut off by the frontier between the Eastern and Furlanian Mark which was located approximately along the Drave and Raab rivers. Still more radical changes were made after the unsuccessful rebellion led by Ljudevit Posavski. The Slovenes lost their domestic autonomy and came under the Frankish counts. As a protection against new rebellions and also as a defense against the warlike Bulgarians, King Ludwig, the German, in 828 reorganized the territory on the eastern Frankish frontier. He divided it into four provinces: Furlania, Istria, Posavia (later Carniola) and Lower Pannonia. Behind this frontier ring were Carantania and Upper Pannonia. Since Furlania and Istria were subject to Italy and the other marks to the East-Frankish state (later Germany), Slovenia was at first divided into two states. This may be seen when, twenty-nine years after the death of Charlemagne, the Frankish Empire was divided in 843 at Verdun among the emperor's three sons. It is interesting to note that the frontier between the Italian and German state extended almost to the same place as the present boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia. Fortunately the central Frankish state, including Italy and a narrow strip of provinces along the Rhone-Rhine line, did not endure for a long time. After its fall, Italy became a part of Germany in which almost all of the Slovenes were later on united. Meanwhile partitioned Slovenia was inundated by a wave of German colonization, which was stopped for a time by the liberation of the Pannonian Slovenes under Kocelj. He established the last independent Slovene state, which lasted for only ten years. Kocelj disappeared from the scene in 874, and the Germans returned to Pannonia, where they soon had to get out of the way of the Magyars.

The Magyar invasion and the settlement of the Magyars in 896 stopped for more than fifty years the terrifying Germanization. Guarded by its mountains, Carantania least felt the Magyar pressure, and after the defeat of the Magyars it took over the leadership of the militarily organized frontier ring formed by a series of marks along the Danube extending deep into Furlania. Greater Carantania belonged to this ring: the Carantanian Mark lying along the central Mure River (later called Styria), the Ptuj Mark, the Savina Mark, and the Carniola, Istria and Furlania marks. By this arrangement the Slovenes' destined frontier was bisected. The Slovenes living on the other side of the Mure remained in the Magyar state, being separated from the rest of the Slovenes for more than a thousand years, while on the other side of the Southeastern frontier the *Kajkavci* developed into Croats. In spite of all this, the Slovene territory remained united with Greater Carantania which was soon afterwards to

break away from Bavaria and receive its own independent duke. The time was not ripe to develop a Greater Slovenia from this state. The interests of the German states and their rulers had to oppose such a development, which was easy to do because Germanization progressed along with German colonization. When, at the beginning of the eleventh century, the German king separated the eastern marks from Carantania and placed them directly under the royal crown, the partition of the Slovene territory was complete. From these marks gradually developed independent provinces which broke away from the mother country, Carantania, so that the Slovenes became Carniolians, Carinthians, Styrians, etc. Similar was the political development in Furlania, Istria, and Kras where the principal masters were the Aquileian patriarchs and the counts of Gorica. Since these greater political territories were perforated with a number of more or less independent temporal and ecclesiastical estates, the partition of Slovene territory reached its peak in the later Middle Ages. Various lords tried to unite under their rule as much of this territory as possible. The Hapsburgs finally succeeded in doing so. These rulers extended the boundaries of the Slovene provinces, particularly Carniola, which toward the end of the Middle Ages extended with greater and newer acquisitions to the Soča and the Adriatic. Thus the Slovenes acquired one master. Only the western part of Slovenia was ruled by the Venetian Republic, which had usurped the temporal power of the Aquileian patriarchs.

At the beginning of the modern period the Slovenes were again threatened with the danger of partition into two states, with the frontier of the Italian part extending much farther than in the ninth century. When the great hereditary lands of the Hapsburgs were being divided into Spanish and German portions, Emperor Charles V bequeathed to his brother Ferdinand, at the first dismemberment at Worms in 1521, the Austrian provinces, that is, the Slovene Mark (part of present-day Lower Carniola), while Istria and Kras with Trieste and Fiume were to be joined to the Spanish possessions in Italy. The Carniolian Estates took a definite stand against this move and refused to promise fealty to the new ruler until parts of the partitioned land were returned to Carniola. The following year a new treaty of partition was signed in Brussels because the Slovene provinces now belonged entirely to Ferdinand.

During the succeeding centuries the political boundaries of Slovenia generally remained permanent. Only the tempestuous period of the Napoleonic Wars brought some fundamental changes. First, after the fall of the Republic, the Venetian Slovenes came under Austria for a short period from 1797 to 1805. Then the great secularization of 1803 shook off the

last traces of medieval dismemberment, when the Freising and Brixen ecclesiastical possessions in Upper Carniola fell into the hands of the Hapsburgs. Finally, in 1809, with the establishment of the Illyrian Provinces under Napoleon, the Slovenes were again divided. The eastern part of Carinthia and the whole of Styria remained part of Austria, while the rest of the Slovene territory was united with Croatia (on the right bank of the Save River), Istria and Dalmatia into one administrative unit. For the first time after long centuries the southeastern direction of the Slovene position was again of value, but only to a limited extent, for the Sava was now the boundary line. The fall of Napoleon also brought about the end of Illyria. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna returned all the Slovenes, including the Venetian Slovenes, to Austria for another century. With the rise of nationalism the Slovenes began to feel more and more the chains of provincial boundaries, and in "the summer of nations" in 1848 they demanded for the first time a "United Slovenia." But they lived to see only another partition. Thus, the dualism of 1867 made a sharper line of demarcation between the Yugoslav Slovenes and the Hungarian Croats; in short, it widened the dike between the Slovenes and Croats. The most dangerous loss was in the West where, in 1866, the Venetian Slovenes came completely under Italian domination. Demands were already being heard from this branch of the race all over Gorica and Trieste, a sign indicating the danger of the increasing political activity in the Apennine peninsula, which up to that time had been passive. This political activity became fatal for them when the external defeats and internal dissensions of the Slavic nations destroyed the Hapsburg empire. In the autumn of 1918 the ancient frontiers of the former Frankish provinces and the Austrian crownlands crumbled to pieces, and all of the Slovene territory was joined to the National Government in Ljubljana. The idea of a United Slovenia within the new Yugoslavia had so influenced the people that the revolution meant for them the solution of all their territorial demands. In the first moment of enthusiasm this solution did not seem impossible to the Slovenes, because of their vigorous demands for national self-determination. But disappointment and disillusionment came from all sides; in the autumn of 1920 the Slovenes lived to see the most terrible dismemberment in their history. In the West the boundary of the ninth century remained in its incomparably terrible form, while in the north the geographical unity of Carantania now turned to their disadvantage. The Treaty of Rapallo and the Carinthian Plebiscite tore away from their national body one-third of the Slovenes, so that only two-thirds of the provinces were liberated.

Before the end of the year the Slovenes were destined to be divided also in Yugoslavia. The last day before the acceptance of the Constitution of Vidovdan, on June 27, 1921, the Committee on the Constitution received a short royal motion: "No province must have more than 800,000 inhabitants." There were still too many Slovenes, so that in the spring of 1922 the Slovene territory in Yugoslavia was divided into the districts of Ljubljana and Maribor. The boundary between them was, in the main, the boundary between former Styria and Carniola, by which the national government had revived the old provincialism of the German feudal lords. But before that royal decree could divide the Slovenes into Styria and Carniola, the Vidovdan Constitution was abolished on the 6th of January, 1929 and the pre-war Drave Banovina established. The abolition of the Styrian-Carniolian boundary did not compensate in great measure for the loss of Bela Krajina, which was added to the Sava Banovina. When in the summer of 1931 it was returned to Slovenia, the Slovene territory in Yugoslavia was at least united into one administrative unit. United Slovenia, however, remained only an ideal.

When on the fatal day of October 9, 1935, King Alexander was assassinated in France, the crisis in Yugoslavia came to a head. In her sorrow Slovenia became more firmly resolved to work for the preservation of Yugoslavia. Because of their small number, the Slovenes could not make the same demands for autonomy that the Croats were making at this time and which they secured finally on August 26, 1939. In the early part of 1940, Dr. Anton Korošec, leader of the Slovene Peasant Party, was already laying the groundwork for Slovene autonomy. Dr. Korošec died late in 1940, and in June of the following year, Slovenia was invaded by Germany. The rest is history that remains to be written by future historians.

The factor of boundaries is a strange one in a nation's development, particularly if nature has cut them indelibly in the face of its geography. Nations come and go, but boundaries remain and write the fate of even the most humble nations. This may be seen also in the history of the Slovene Lands; in spite of their unfavorable position and frontiers which have divided them, these lands have remained Slovene and will continue to be Slovene as long as their people remain loyal.

* * *

For centuries German domination has been an obstacle to the economic development of the Slovenes; it was only with the establishment of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that they emerged in their present state as an important factor. A nation of small holders,

the Slovenes applied their energies to creating their own national and economic organizations. The Ljubljana Stock Exchange, for instance, was founded in 1924. It dealt principally in timber, wheat and state securities. Participating in all phases of Yugoslav economic life, Slovenia also established in Ljubljana a Chamber of Commerce, which dealt with commercial, industrial and craft questions.

Long famous for its cultivation of fruit trees, Slovenia is one of two principal apple-producing centers in Yugoslavia, principally in Maribor and Ptuj. The cultivation of fruit trees is very well developed and only the best kinds of apples are grown. The most important of these are *Mošančka*, *Bobovec*, *Canadian reneta*, *Grafenstein*, *Pisani Kardinal*, etc.

The valley of Savinja (Styria) possesses a well-developed hop-culture, which constitutes the principle source of revenue for its population. Žalec is the center of the hop trade in this valley of the Drave Banovina. Hops have been grown in this district on a large scale for more than sixty years. In the Middle Ages hops for the making of home-brewed beer were grown in lands belonging to the monasteries and in the outskirts of the towns. Many of the Slovene names of villages such as Hmeljič, Hmeljino, Hmeljnik, etc. show that Slovene agricultural workers in very early times were engaged in hop-growing. *Hmelj* in Slovene means hops. It is interesting to note that at the Universal Exhibition in Berlin in 1908 the hops of the Savinja districts were classed among those of the best quality, together with those of Württemberg and Žalec (Saatz).

Owing to its climatic conditions, Slovenia produces a variety of plants commercially important to Yugoslavia, so that the district of Slovenia is important for its alpine flora, some of which are used as medicinal plants. Located in the heart of the forest district, the Drave Banovina has become one of the principal exporting centers of dried mushrooms.

Vine-growing is another important feature of Slovene economic life. Slovenia has contributed greatly to making Yugoslavia the sixth among the European countries and the ninth among the wine-producing countries of the world. A world market has been found for such wines as *Čviček*, a slightly acid wine of pale red color and weak alcoholic content, and "Riseling" wine, similar to Rhone wines.

Stock breeding and poultry farming are two of the most important contributions to Slovenia's wealth and thus to Yugoslavia's. Montafon cattle, a true Alpine breed, are bred in great numbers in the Drave Banovina. Cows of this breed often produce as much as 6,000 liters of first quality milk a year. The Drave Banovina is also the principal breeder of pigs of

English origin known as "Yorkshires." Horses of the heavy Ardennes type, suitable for agricultural work and for use as cart-horses, and the heavy Pintzgauer type are bred in Slovenia. As for poultry, the best known breed of chickens in Yugoslavia is the Styrian, and they have become famous under the name of Styrian capons.

Rich in forests, Yugoslavia ranks fifth among the countries of Europe in the percentage of forest-covered area. In regard to forest area, the Drave Banovina is one of the most richly wooded districts in Yugoslavia, with 24 per cent of all the wooded area being in Slovenia. The Slovene pine and spruce are of excellent quality. One of the centers of the soft wood industries, Slovenia has 275 up-to-date sawmills and 1,677 of the primitive type. The latter are the property of small holders, since more than 80 per cent of the forests in Slovenia are in private hands.

As for coal production, 40 per cent of the total production in Yugoslavia is concentrated in the Drave Banovina. Soft coal is the most abundant, accounting for 70 per cent of the total production. As to other branches of mining, copper deposits have been worked in Slovenia. As regards zinc ore, the largest and richest deposits are in the Drave Banovina. This district is also rich in such war-materials as bauxite, antimony and pyrite. All this great and varied wealth suggests untold possibilities for the economic development and cultural progress of Slovenia and Yugoslavia. It is one of the reasons why Germany has cast longing eyes at Slovenia. Much of its mineral wealth is still to be exploited.

Yugoslavia's future as an industrial country is inextricably bound up with that of Slovenia. Of all the Yugoslav provinces, the Drave Banovina possesses the most favorable conditions for the development of industry. Raw materials, available power, skilled workers, etc., all of these can be improved even more in a freer and more united Yugoslavia.

Among other industries, Slovenia may claim superiority in the paper industry. The center of the Yugoslav paper industry is in the Drave Banovina. There are in all six factories for wood pulp paper, three for cellulose paper and five for cardboard and cartons.

Slovenia also has a large share in the tourist trade of Yugoslavia. Winter sports, especially skiing, date from early times. The principal starting point for all excursions in Slovenia and the largest center for all the district is Ljubljana, capital of Slovenia.

Few countries are so rich as Yugoslavia in health resorts and watering places. The thermal station of Rimske Toplice is located in Slovenia but the most famous of the Yugoslav thermal stations is the Slovene Rogaška Slatina.

The co-operative movement which began about fifty years ago in Slovenia has made this economic life possible. The first co-operatives to develop were the savings banks, organized according to the Raiffeisen system, which toward the end of the nineteenth century abolished usury in the Slovene villages and made possible the collection of the first Slovene capital. By the end of 1937 there were some 1677 co-operatives in Slovenia, the greatest part of which were the savings banks (539), the consumers' co-operatives (203), the stock farming (104), the pasture and forest (203), the milk (90), the building (103), the agricultural implements (61), and associated electric co-operatives (58). The majority of the Slovene co-operatives were organized into two of the leading associations, with the Co-operative Society of Ljubljana having 687 associate members and the Association of Slovene Co-operatives having 380. In these two associations alone there were by 1938, some 498 savings banks with 156,000 depositors and \$24,000,000 worth of small savings.

There were also the consumer co-operatives with over 42,000 members and 200 branches all over Slovenia. Breaking the monopoly of the German tradesman, these co-operatives brought all sorts of manufactured goods within the reach of the impoverished Slovene peasant. An endless variety of other co-operatives for the distribution of milk, fruit, cheese and agricultural machinery developed with the increasing prosperity of Yugoslavia. Co-operative sawmills, power stations and soap factories also sprang up. The iron works in Kropa, owned by its 280 factory hands, are among the many interesting industrial co-operatives. In fact the co-operative movement touches every phase of economic life in Slovenia. It has freed from the foreign industrialist both peasant and industrial worker.

* * *

One of the wonders of cultural history is the fact that a small nation like the Slovenes has been able for more than a thousand years to preserve its culture under both German and Italian domination. The Slovenes have, as we have seen above, no great political history. Their history is social history and is thus inextricably bound with the history of their culture.

Turning to the history of the fine arts as they came into being in the Slovene Lands, let us first consider Slovene music. As early as the eleventh century Slovene musicians and dancers were highly esteemed and in great demand in Germany. Later on, near the end of the fifteenth century appeared Slatkonja (1456-1522), considered in musical history as one of the most eminent representatives of Flemish polyphony and the organizer of the Court Choir of Vienna. Still later Arnold of Prukh

developed contrapuntal polyphony in Slovene music. In the sixteenth century the Slovene reformer, Primož Trubar, collected popular religious songs. The celebrated composer and musician, Jakob Petelin-Gallus (1550-1591) was the first to put into practice, in his *Musicum opus harmonicorum*, the idea of polyphony as a means of musical expression. A contemporary of Palestrina, Gallus has had a tremendous influence on the music of Central Europe. In Ljubljana in 1702 was founded the Academy of Philo-Harmonicorum, one of the oldest in Europe. Such great musicians as Dussek, Haydn, Kreutzer, and Beethoven were its honorary members. The first Slovene opera was written in 1780 by a schoolmaster named Jakob Zupan.

Composer then followed composer without interruption. The most important of these are Gašper Mašek (1794-1873) who wrote two operas, Gregor Rihar (1796-1863) who was a very prolific religious composer, and Jurij Mihevec (1805-1845), composer of several operas under the influence of Romanticism. Near the middle of the nineteenth century, under this same influence, choruses with expressive melodies and an intensely nationalistic spirit were composed by Miroslav Vilhar, Anton Medved, Benjamin and Gustav Ipavec and Davorin Jenko. Anton Foerster, especially prolific in the field of religious music and composer of the opera *Gorenski Slavček*, has exerted a tremendous influence on modern Slovene music.

In the second half of the nineteenth century and under the influence of realism colored by nationalism, we have Hribar and Sattner, who is a very modern composer of oratorios, cantatas and operas. Some beautiful operas have also been composed by Viktor Parma and Milan Sirc (Risto Savin).

A musical society, Glazbena Matica, was founded in 1872. Its purpose was to encourage musicians like Matej Hubad to harmonize popular ballads and write original compositions in the popular style.

The principal modern Slovene composers are Anton Lajovič (1878), Fran Lhotka (1883), Emil Adamič (1877-1939), Josip Hatze (1879), and Stanko Premrl (1880). Lajovič, at first under the influence of impressionism, has developed a clear, incisive style of his own. Although he has also written symphonies and solos, his principal work consists of choral compositions, especially his choruses for women which are admirable and captivating in technique and style. Lhotka has written dramatic music and a great number of choral pieces in the popular style. Adamič wrote in his lifetime more than 200 instrumental and choral compositions. He is a master of modern polyphony, a tonal and expressive artist of great talent. Premrl composed exclusively for the organ. Hatze has composed, in a very modern style, several solos and two operas. A great many other composers

have already given adequate proof of their talent: Lucijan M. Škerjanc, Slavko Osterc, Janko Ravnik, Marij Kogoj, Tomc, Arnič, Ukmar, Bravničar, Sivec, etc.

Slovene painting is probably the best illustration of the relationship between history and culture. The Serbs, in addition to their long political history, have a painting tradition that dates back to the eleventh century. While one finds some mural paintings in medieval Slovenia, modern painting dates only to the baroque period of the first half of the eighteenth century. In the birth of modern Slovene painting we may indicate only three painters famous in Carniola and Carinthia, and in Austria, namely Fran Jelovšek, Vallentin Mecinger and Leopold Lajer. In the beginning of the nineteenth century the greatest native artists were the painter Franc Kavčič, the painter and etcher, Lovrenc Janša, and Fran Lindar. Janša was also the greatest seal-etcher in the Europe of his day. Matija Langus introduced landscape and portrait painting into Slovene art, but the greatest Slovene painter of this period was Janez Wolf (1825-1884). Wolf dealt with church frescoes and oils; he is known for his monumental compositions.

But a real Slovene advance in painting begins with the impressionism which Ivan Grohar, Richard Jakopič and Matej Sternen imported into Yugoslavia by way of Ljubljana. Ivana Kobilica, the first Slovene woman painter of note, was one of the pioneers in the impressionist movement in Yugoslavia. Before her time, the Subič brothers, Janez and Jurij, helped to introduce realism into Slovene painting. Fran Tratnik and the younger A. G. Kos were the leaders of a school combining impressionism with post-war expressionism. Francè and Tone Kralj have become its chief modern representatives; the former turned to abstract symbols for his inspiration and the latter to church painting. Their contemporary, Božidar Jakac, has done much to raise the excellence of the Slovene graphic arts and has become an outstanding landscape painter. The newer generation of painters such as St. Cunderman, Miha Maleš, the Vidmar brothers, Mira Pregelj, Slavko Pengov, O. Globočnik, Fran Stiplovšek, Maksim Sedej and Stanè Kregar have already produced works of real merit. Simultaneously with contemporary European art, Slovene art has developed in all directions from expressionism to surrealism.

Sculpture is a comparatively recent form in Slovene art. Sculpture began to flourish in Slovenia with the establishment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Such sculptors as Fran Berneker, Lojze Dolinar, Francè Gorše, and the younger Francišek Smerdu are the best exponents of the revived art of sculpture in Slovenia. The generation following the first World War contributed much to developing a real tradition in sculpture. Such

names as Francè and Tone Kralj, Loboda, Napotnik, Tinè Kos, Nike Pirnat, and Bulovčeva are sufficient to prove this claim.

Turning to an earlier period, the best sculptors of the Baroque era include the famous names of Franc Mislej and Franc Robba. According to the Yugoslav art critic, Milan Kašanin, Franc Robba was "the only Baroque sculptor of Yugoslavia to show a profound feeling for serious sculpture." On the other hand Josip Plečnik ranks next to the Croatian, Viktor Kovačić, as an exponent of modern Yugoslav architecture. Plečnik, with the aid of his colleague, Ivan Vurnik, has trained an entirely new generation of architects, the most successful of whom are Fr. Tomažič, H. Hus, J. Omahen, D. Serajnik, and Černivec. Vurnik has also had a great influence on contemporary church art in Slovenia.

Although the oldest Yugoslav literary monument is the so-called *Freising Fragments*, dating from the tenth century, literary activity in the vernacular language of the Slovene branch of the Yugoslavs was practically non-existent until the time of Primož Trubar who flourished in the sixteenth century. Popular poetry, nevertheless, survived through oral tradition.

As the Slovene provinces were not so exposed to the Ottoman invasions, their literary impetus was primarily determined by the religious tendencies of the day. The Reformation, which had penetrated into Slovenia, had given birth to a great literary movement in the form of proselytism, illustrated particularly by Primož Trubar, translator of the New Testament into Slovene. The Catholic Counter-Reformation in its turn gave rise to some literary works considerable in number but lacking in any real merit.

The first modern Slovene poet was Valentin Vodnik who came under the influence of the Illyrian Provinces in the Napoleonic period, but Slovenia's first great poet was Francè Prešern (1800-1849). Simon Gregorčič (1844-1906), was the best exponent of lyric poetry. Prose literature, too, never losing contact with the masses, became rapidly attuned to the literary currents of the other European countries and produced such novelists and short-story writers as Fran Levstik, Josip Jurčič, Janez Kersnik. In the twentieth century, the great Slovene literary reviews, *Ljubljanski Zvon*, *Dom in Svet* and *Veda*, were founded in Ljubljana.

The last decade of the nineteenth century saw the rise of two of the greatest Slovene writers, Ivan Cankar and Oton Župančič. Cankar, the prose writer, was followed by F. S. Finžgar, F. X. Meško, Ivan Pregelj, Vladimir Levstik, and Milan Pugalj. The poet Župančič had worthy successors in Alois Gradnik, Rudolph Maister, Cvetko Golar, Pavel Golia, Anton Debeltjak, Stanko Majcen, Fran Albrecht and Tonè Seliškar.

The period following the World War produced a great variety of genres. Young Slovene writers of Yugoslavia frequently displayed a passionate desire for stating their attitude toward life and its universal problems. Successful writers of the short story and the novel were Ludvik Mrzel, Bogomir Magajna, Francè Bevk, Vladimir Bartol, Joža Lovrenčič, Juš Kozak, Josip Jalen, Miško Kranjec, Ivan Zorec. As lyric poetry broke away from old forms of expression, a small "revolution" was precipitated after the first World War through the expressionism of Anton Podbevšek and Miran Jarc. Srečko Kosovel continued the pre-war modernism. Tonè Seliškar and Milè Klopčič are the outstanding exponents of proletarian poetry. Based on metaphysical realism or mysticism the new Catholic lyric poetry found its most perfect expression in the work of Anton Vodnik and Edward Kocbek. There is also a quantitative growth of dramas written for the most part by Bratko Kreft, Tonè Cufar, Angelo Cerkenik, Francè Meško, Ivan Mrak and others. The essay is being developed into a fine art form and literary criticism is assuming contemporary standards of excellence through the work of Josip Vidmar, Anton Ocvirk, Francè Koblar and Francè Kidrič.

The first World War was a huge obstacle in the way of literary work, but the emancipation and unification of the Slovenes with the Serbs and Croats marked the beginning of a new era in Slovene literature.

Under the Yugoslav Constitution of 1921, Slovene became the official language of Slovenia and the University of Ljubljana was established on the old foundations of the Jesuit College in Ljubljana.

The college was founded about 1596 at Ljubljana and offered instruction on elementary and higher planes from grammar to theology, according to the Jesuit school code of 1599. Between 1810 and 1914, the college was reorganized and other studies added. King Alexander I University of Ljubljana has five faculties consisting of Catholic theology, philosophy, law, medicine and technology. Slovene is the medium of instruction. Secondary education in Slovenia also goes back to earlier centuries. The first secondary school in Yugoslav lands was founded in 1418 at Ljubljana, with Latin as the teaching medium. During the time of Primož Trubar, Slovenia had a few other schools using both Slovenian and Latin.

Before Slovenia became a part of Yugoslavia, education was denied to most Slovene peasant youth. Yet despite this, the Slovenes organized until the first World War more than 1200 grammar schools with 3300 branches and 223,000 students. In 1912 Slovenia had more than 32 secondary schools. After the establishment of Yugoslavia, Slovene education blossomed forth in all branches. A clear picture of what was accomplished

in education in Slovenia (during the school year 1936-1937, for example) may be seen from the following:

<i>Type of Schools</i>	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Branches</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Teachers</i>
Elementary schools	868	4141	185,000	4377
Junior high schools	46	85	10,651	416
Senior high schools	18	302	12,947	532
Teachers colleges	6	14	343	56

To these schools must be added a whole group of various trade and professional schools, such as theological seminaries, music and commercial academies, economic and agricultural schools, all kinds of schools for home economics, music, medical science, trade and commerce, forestry, textile industry, mining, etc. Over 200,000 students went to the various schools we have mentioned above, so that almost 20 per cent of all the Slovene people were receiving instruction in some school.

This great multitude of schools, of course, brought popular education in Slovenia to all classes of people. Whereas pre-war Austria had an illiteracy rate of 25 per cent, the Slovene's illiteracy rate was then only 14 per cent. In this respect, the Slovenes are far in advance of the rest of the nations of Southeastern Europe. In 1934 the illiteracy rate for Slovenia was 3.3 per cent, whereas the average rate for Yugoslavia was 44 per cent and Italy's 25 per cent.

Literature and the reading of literature are an important factor in the education of the masses in Slovenia. Although the first Slovene newspaper was established only in 1843, Slovene periodicals increased from 141 in 1922 to 245 in 1938. Almost every Slovene resident subscribes to at least one periodical. There are literally hundreds of reading clubs all over Slovenia. Pioneer work in this type of education has been done by the Brotherhood of St. Hermagoras, *Družba sv. Mohorja*, which, founded over ninety years ago, distributed until 1919 over 22,000,000 copies of all types of books. After the War other literary societies with 100,000 members were organized. In addition to the Catholic Press, the Slovenes also have the Slovene Literary Foundation, *Slovenska Matica*, which was founded in 1863. It is devoted primarily to the publication of scientific works on history, language, literature, art, etc.

Undaunted by the world depression the Slovenes founded two new literary reviews *Sodobnost* (1932) and *Modra Ptica* (1932). In 1937 the Academy of Arts and Sciences was founded in Ljubljana, and among its members were the poet, Župančič, the philologists, Franc Ramovš and Rajko Nahtigal, the historian, Metod Dolenc.

As in the case of the other art forms mentioned above, an original

drama and a national theater could not triumph in Ljubljana because of strong German and Italian literary influences. The Slovene metropolis, nevertheless, did in its turn found a national theater and various dramatic societies. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the repertories of the Slovene theaters were composed exclusively of German, Italian and Hungarian dramatic works. As political conditions did not permit authors to express themselves in their native language, it is only toward the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries that the Slovenes began to give plays in their own native language. Anton Aškerc created a purely realistic drama; Anton Funtek won great fame with his *Tekla*; the dramas of Anton Medved drew their subjects from Holy Scriptures. Ivan Cankar, who is also an object of great admiration in other countries, has engraved his name on the golden book of dramatic art as the greatest representative of the psychological drama. He is the author of dramas, comedies, and farces. His dramas have been presented with success in Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade. The real work of the theater in Ljubljana dates from the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1919, after which the dramatic art of the Slovenes was able to attain its full expression and the inspiration of the Slovene dramatists was able to develop freely within the confines of a unified Yugoslavia. Inspired with original ideas, Slovene authors are bending every effort to create a new drama, essentially Yugoslav, which will equal the dramatic masterpieces of Europe and be a credit to the genius of the Slavic race.

* * *

Surrounded on all sides by powerful forces which conquered and divided the Slovenes every time an opportunity was offered them, it is not surprising that Slovenia is one of the most partitioned nations in the Balkans. The Slovenes, of all the Balkan people, have had first-hand experience in the conquer-and-divide ideology of their next-door neighbors. Therefore, the problem of national minorities concerns them more than it does any other nation. Italy, Austria and Hungary have within their national borders parts of Slovenia that belong to the Slovene nation.

By far the greatest number of Slovenes lives within the borders of Italy. At the last Austrian Census, in 1910, the Slovene population of the districts now belonging to Italy was as follows:

Gorica (Goriza)	154,564
Istria	55,365
Venetian Slovenia (Italy)	52,003
Carniola	58,000

Carinthia	1,561
Fiume	3,937
Trieste	56,916

Soon after Mussolini's March into Rome, Slovene schools were closed and Slovene teachers driven out during the terror of 1921. Slovene clergy were replaced by Italian clergy; their property was confiscated and their religious communities were Italianized. Slovene musical, athletic, gymnastic, library, co-operative and agricultural societies were ruthlessly suppressed. By 1930 all Slovene publications in Italy were forbidden. Slovenes were forced to Italianize their names. Slovene writers, such as Francè Bevk, who was editor and publisher of the only Slovene cultural agency in Italy, the *Goriška Matica*, were persecuted. Thus the Slovenes were deprived of their culture, their liberty, their daily bread, and were in danger of losing the faith of their fathers. Their annexation to Italy has been one of the greatest injustices ever perpetrated upon a people.

Carinthian Slovenes, about 100,000 in number, have been equally subjugated under German-Austrian rule. The faked Plebiscite of October 10, 1920, which gave Carinthia to Austria was exposed by an English Minister in 1933. Immediately after the Plebiscite, began the savage persecution of the Carinthian Slovenes, the falsification of language and nationality statistics, the Germanization and denationalization of the Slovenes through school and church. Slovene cultural societies also were hampered in their activities.

In any revision of the map of Europe, European statesmen must decide the just claims on the Slovene part of Carinthia. In the Middle Ages the whole of the Duchy of Carinthia was recognized as a Slovene province. As late as 1842 the Hungarian statesman, Ferenc Deák, referred to the Duchy of Carinthia as a Slovene land and to the Carinthians as Slav people.

One of the mysteries of the Paris Peace Conference is why the Slovenes living along the Raab River on the northern tip of Yugoslavia were given to Hungary. These Hungarian Slovenes are a part of the Slovene nation and their territory is a part of the Slovene March. There are at the present time nine Slovene villages along the Raab River. These Pannonian Slovenes, about 6,100 in number, came under Magyar domination at the first settlement in their present home. In the course of several centuries the Magyars were able to Magyarize the Slovene territory north of the Mure to the Blatensee and the Danube, so that only 1,000 square miles have remained of the former Slovene territory which covered an area of more than 10,000 square miles. The Slovene character of this territory is indicated by the

external aspect of the Province of Raab, the system of colonization, and the geographical names.

* * *

The Slovene character has not changed much throughout the centuries. The Slovenes, with the rest of the Slavs, possess all the good and bad qualities of their race. Lubor Niederle, the eminent Czech historian, says in his *Manuel de l'antiquité slave* (vol. 2, Ch. XIII):

"However, there are certain traits among the Slavs which they hold in common: a disposition for liberty and democracy, assuming even anarchistic forms; a penchant for sensibility, skepticism, mysticism, and perpetual reverie; a great facility for becoming enthusiastic over an ideal, but with no aptitude for realizing it or for perseverance in the enthusiasm; a lack of energy in volition; an aspiration for justice and tolerance of all peoples. All these traits, although they may not be emphasized to the same degree in all Slav peoples, distinguish in general the Slav character from the German. Moreover, militarism has always been foreign to the Slavs; so, too, any designs of absolutism, or the ambition to concentrate in one man all the individual and scattered military power, and consequently the tendency toward imperialism. They are on the contrary always distinguished by what we have called the Slavophile and the fraternal doctrine which preaches justice and love for all, equality in the whole world. Slav nationalism has always been other than the domination and usuring nationalism of the Germans aspiring to form the world into a hegemony."

The Slovenes have not always been a race of peasants. In the early Middle Ages they were stout fighters for political independence, the first State-builders among the Slavs, a stubborn and indomitable race. They lived in house communities, called *zadruga*, elected their leaders from among themselves, and they have retained to this day their democratic character. The Slovenes vote everywhere the liberal or democratic ticket. The best example of this penchant for democracy is the large number of co-operatives in all the important Slovene towns and cities. A cultural or social club is found wherever there is a quorum of Slovenes.

The Slovene peasant's social position has improved very little through the centuries. If his hands are not employed by foreign capital they are exploited by native interests. Held in check by his church, he has few impulses that might lead to social or political revolutionary activities. His one ambition is to own land, property. Honest, industrious, thrifty and religious, he tills his land amid the beauties of the Julian Alps, faithfully pays his taxes, saves his pennies for a new kind of livestock, and conscientiously supports his Slovene Peasants' Party.

The spiritual side of the Slovenes is revealed to best advantage in their poetry. Their folk songs are in turn serious and tenderly elegiac, merry and whimsically humorous; they are hardly ever warlike. Their songs prove that they have always been essentially a peace-loving people. Lyric poetry is for the Slovenes the most popular form of literature. It is a source of inspiration for most of the music and art of Slovenia.

Men of universal genius have arisen from this people living at the crossroads of the Balkans in a space a little larger than Connecticut. With great linguistic talent, the Slovenes have given to the world such famous philologists as Jernej Kopitar (1780-1844), co-founder of the field of Slavonic philology; Franc Miklošič (1813-1891), the greatest philologist of the nineteenth century; Gregor Krek (1840-1905); Frederic Baraga (1797-1868), who compiled the first Chipawah grammar and dictionary; Matija Murko (1861), the greatest Slavist of the present century.

In the realm of science may be mentioned Baron Jurij Vega (1756-1802), who compiled the first practical logarithmic table and was an authority in military science; Josef Stefan (1835-1893), who was president of the Austrian Royal Academy of Sciences and the foremost physicist of the Europe of the nineteenth century; Ivan Regen (1869), zoologist and physiologist, and Milan Vidmar (1885), electro-physicist and chess-player.

In the field of bee culture the Slovenes contributed two of the greatest authorities: Anton Janša (1734-73), expert on bee culture in Vienna, and Francis Jager (1869-1939), who introduced Slovene bee culture to America.

Although a peace-loving people, the Slovenes have given Austria some great soldiers, such as Anton Haus (1851-1917), admiral and writer, and Rudolph Maister (1874-1934), who was an Austrian general, Yugoslav patriot and poet. During the reign of Maria Theresa many a Slovene private rose to the rank of general or marshal.

The Slovene pantheon is also rich in composers and musicians. The most famous composers are Fran Gerbič (1840-1917), opera singer and composer of piano and orchestral music; Thomas Koschat (1845-1914), famous for his *Songs of Carinthia*.

In American and English literature and art the names of Louis Adamič (1899), Janko Lavrin (1887), and H. G. Prusheck (1887-1940) are well known and honored.

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CENTRAL EUROPE AND EUROPEAN UNITY

by Reginald D. Lang

THE unity of Europe is a demonstrable truth; the division of Europe is a deplorable fact. Europe is divided because it lacks a center; central Europe must be either the point around which Europe can gain unity, and so recover its freedom, or a line of division between mutually suspicious powers. In a European union our civilization received its first impetus; only in a European union can it now be preserved. A divided Europe interjected between the Powers evokes possibilities that cannot even be contemplated without a shudder.

Even though divided, until recent times a form of European union was always sustained. Although the nations of Europe have been separated from each other for more than four centuries, only for the past century and a half have they been separated from Europe. While Europe was divided among monarchies, there still persisted among them a sufficient feeling of community to keep alive a sense of the European commonwealth. This recognition of the unity of Europe led to the acceptance of the balance of power principle, for it proclaimed the truth that no single European state could or should absorb the commonwealth of Europe. In an equipoise of the parts, it was believed, the integrity of the whole could be preserved.

So the eighteenth century was more European than the nineteenth or twentieth, because the civilization of Europe was still an integral and influential part of the culture of the several states. But the nationalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries turned aside from the common European heritage to cultivate excessive particularisms, so that today we think of Europe as the *sum* of its nations. But, in truth, it is the *prerequisite* for, and the *condition* of nationalism, for nationalism, though particular in form, is a European and not a provincial phenomenon. And, ironically, the nationalist triumph in Europe ultimately leads, not to the apotheosis of nationalism, as one might expect, but, rather, to its destruction.

World War II demonstrated the inherent contradiction of nationalism: that it unavoidably leads to imperialism. Political nationalism cannot find a principle of order by which to achieve a balance of forces; for the mosaic of nationalisms displays wide variations of power ratios, and, moreover, the territorial frontiers of nationalities cannot be drawn with a euclidean precision. Hence every political national State is incomplete. Moreover, when economic nationalism accompanies political nationalism (and this is inevitable, because national stateism implies military nationalism) the vital

interests of nation A may lie in the territories of nation B. So nation A, in order to support the integrity of its nationalism, must violate the nationalism of nation B. Consequently, political nationalism and imperialism are as inseparable in fact as they are antithetical in theory. Europe has tossed between the horns of this obdurate dilemma for four centuries.

Now, while Europe is disunited and dislocated, her destiny will be determined by the peripheral powers by arrangements made among themselves without reference to European interests. Thus not only has political nationalism devastated Europe and destroyed the autonomy of the European nations, but it has also delivered those broken nations over to the Big Three. And the Big Three, having divided Germany and Austria into three spheres of influence under a condominium, may, by their rivalries, divide Europe into two hostile parts. The continued occupation and division of central Europe is bound to bisect the continent. If Europe cannot recover her unity, she is doomed to be a frontier. And Europe cannot exercise the right of self-determination while her center is controlled by non-European powers. Thus the key to European unity and freedom lies in central Europe, and the hindrance to European independence lies outside Europe.

The United States, Great Britain, and Russia are non-European powers, because their political, economic, and cultural centers are not in Europe. They have "interests" in the region of Europe, and they are cultural derivatives of Europe, but their centripetence is not in Europe. The vital interests of the United States are contained primarily within her continental borders and the adjacent seas. The relations between Great Britain and Europe are those of trade and security. A prosperous and united Europe would stimulate British trade; an imperial hegemony in Europe threatens British security. But a Europe united upon democratic, federal principles would be an aid to British foreign trade and no menace to British security. Great Britain has interests beyond Europe that could not be abandoned as the price of incorporation into a European commonwealth, but they are too wide and influential to be inserted into a European polity. Great Britain, in Churchill's phrase, is "linked" to, but is not "comprised" within Europe. Russia has always been an uneasy and even alien power in the European state system. She is, herself, a continental area with rich and untapped resources. Although she has faced both toward Europe and Asia, her incursions into Europe have the character of frontier forays, while, on the contrary, her expansion in Asia has been a mass movement of colonization. The two all-European invasions of Russia ended in catastrophic failures; "of the many who went forth, few returned home." Europe cannot annex

Russia; Russia ought not to annex Europe. Russia cannot be separated from Europe, but, on the other hand, because she cannot be included in a European commonwealth, she ought not to divide it by controlling a part.

The borders of Europe cannot be fixed solely by an appeal to continental geography. Sometimes the frontiers of Europe are placed at the western borders of Russia, and the northern shore of the Mediterranean. Michelet declared that Africa began at the Pyrenees, but today it would be more accurate to say that Europe extends to the Sahara. The Mediterranean, the sea in the middle of the World, as the ancients called it, does not sever its circumambient shores but connects them to Europe. At its eastern end live the oldest and youngest of Europeans: Christianity came from ancient Syria, classicism from ancient Greece, while Turkey, throwing off the habiliments of an Arabian culture, is assuming the manners and the thought of Europe. Northern Africa is covered with multiple layers of civilization, but the surface is European.

The Mediterranean was the center of the Classical world, but central Europe is the center of the heir of that world. When central Europe is politically shattered, the organized states of Europe, and now of the world, swing in a precarious and uneasy balance upon that shifting pivot. And so a sense of common purpose among the European and non-European political units becomes secondary to a peremptory need for survival. At the opening of the modern age those kingdoms which had become consolidated in western Europe, engaged in a fierce rivalry with the medieval and unconsolidated empire in central Europe. When Charles VIII of France in 1494 invaded Italy, he struck the Empire at its weakest point, and proclaimed the supremacy of the organized and militant parts of Europe over the more tenuous and complex relationships composing the commonwealth of Europe. And after Italy, for all practical purposes, had become a Spanish province, the balance between the monarchies for more than three centuries swung upon the Germanies that were divided by religious conflict and weakened by political decentralization, but were still indomitably resistant to incorporation into a single kingdom. Moreover, it is significant that the wars of the eighteenth century, whether dynastic and European, or colonial, were finally determined by the physics of power between the monarchies among the several units that comprised the Germanies. When the elder Pitt declared that he would win America in Germany, he stated in an epigram the essence of eighteenth-century diplomacy.

Central Europe in the twenties, as in the eighteenth century, is the focus of world politics. Therefore, while it is dismembered, relations between

the Great Powers, non-European though they are, cannot be fixed, but must continue to falter in an insecure disequilibrium.

Before there can be world peace or a world organization, therefore, not only must central Europe be freed of foreign control, but it must thereafter be incorporated with western Europe into a European federation. Western Europe without central Europe is nothing more than a truncated fragment dependent upon Anglo-American support. Central Europe, while divided among the Big Three, is an exposed frontier feared by the western bloc as a Russian penetration into Europe, and feared by Russia as a western outpost beckoning expansion eastward. And what the two protagonists fear may come upon them. The undefined status of central Europe in such circumstances, neither a constituent part of Europe, nor a component part of Russia, distorts Russian policy by extending her frontier deep into Europe, and thwarts the European nations from carrying out a European policy.

For central Europe, despite some deeply-rooted differences in cultural aspects from western Europe, belongs to Europe. European developments did not strike central Europe with an equal impact, and consequently there are gradations of "Europeanization" within that region. Not until the nineteenth century did European ideas penetrate the southeastern lands; when they did, they were conditioned to the circumstances prevailing there. Nationalism, identified in western Europe with democracy and liberalism, was associated in the southeast with political independence. The democratic and liberal tradition has never been as vital there as in the west. Central and western Germany participated in the European tradition before Prussia; the Limes line was the first division of Europe, and it has not wholly vanished. It is significant, perhaps, that "Prussian Germany" has been a restless member of the European commonwealth. Nevertheless, despite these variations within central Europe, the differences between central and western Europe upon the development of the dominant themes of European culture are more environmental than indigenous.

The Germans may, when in despair, threaten, as an act of desperate frenzy, to turn away from Europe. But such a secession is presented as an act of immolation to accomplish a revenge against those who should not be enemies. For German culture is greatest precisely when it is most European, and it is most spurious when in denying the European tradition, it asserts its uniqueness. The insolubility of the Austrian question before 1919 lay in the cleavage between her cultural orientation to Europe and her vital interests in the southeastern semi-European hinterland. Since 1919

she has been cut off from both Europe and the hinterland, and Austria cannot exist in isolation. A union with Europe through Germany was forbidden when it could have been perfected, and was only achieved when Germany had already begun her attack upon Europe, so that Austria became merely an expendible colony, exploited by Germany, in an anti-European war. And today, as part of central Europe, Austria is partitioned.

The cardinal flaw in modern European diplomacy has been the perpetuation of the division between central and western Europe. It originated, after the unification of Germany, in the 'Three Emperors' League, and has continued to this dark hour. The bitterness aroused by the Franco-Prussian War prevented the incorporation of Bismarckian Germany into the European commonwealth. Hence, in order to be secure on her western frontiers, Germany, with Austria following hesitantly, used Russia to restore the balance of Europe. Thus the consolidation of central Europe, accomplished at last through the unification of Germany and the Austro-German alliance, instead of uniting Europe through co-operation with the west, cleft it through an eastern orientation. And after the "wire to St. Petersburg" was broken upon the dismissal of Bismarck, Germany tried to gain security either by taking advantage of divisions between France, England, and Russia, or by the clumsy attempts of William II to unite the continent, with Russia against England, instead of uniting the continent, without Russia, for itself. Although central Europe was no longer a pivot, but a weight, the opportunity to unite Europe was missed. Nevertheless, the union of Europe was never wholly renounced, because it was a profound yearning, but unhappily it was relinquished as a program too elusive to achieve.

After 1919 Germany was exiled from Europe; she could not join with Russia to destroy Europe, as some Germans desired; and she was not permitted to join western Europe to form a European commonwealth. Instead, in her exile, she unfolded an excessive Germanism, unrestrained by European traditions, and like an ominous cloud she first "lowr'd upon" Europe, and then stormed it. Before the attack the only safety for Europe lay in a fatal and titanic conflict between Hitlerite Germany, that had forsaken Europe, and Stalinite Russia, which had never been a part of Europe. Hitler, in success made deeper the Bismarckian cleavage, and by failure destroyed central Europe altogether. But a Europe that terminates at the Rhine, cannot recover in body or soul, for she would be only an appendage of a west European-Anglo-American bloc pointed toward Russia, or a Russian province protecting the western frontier of an Eurasian empire.

But Russia, even though she controlled all the territory up to the

Rhine, could find no security in a disunited Europe. For western Europe would not only remain out of her sphere, but would be hostile. And restless elements in central Europe (and there would be anti-Russian centers of influence although many would be reconciled to a Russian régime) could make the Russian hold uncertain; by compelling her to maintain an insecure position in Europe they could divert her from the great and vital task of reconstruction at home. Russia needs financial aid from America and the skills of an industrial Europe, but by entering Europe as an imperial power she would forfeit the one, and so be unable to use the other. Moreover, the Europe she controlled, cut off from its natural markets in the west, would not yield to Russia the treasures she could buy in a free and united Europe. The Russian sphere in Europe would be a desert in which there was no peace.

Russia should not fear a united and democratic Europe. A weakened European capitalism, naturally sensitive to the threat of the communist message to the masses, could not fail to be anti-Russian. But a socialist Europe could fraternize and act in concert with a Russia still officially Marxist, but socialist in practice, and no longer imperial. The Russian fear of a united Europe was pertinent to the circumstances of 1919; it is unrelated to the circumstances of today. In a divided Europe Russia might hold a part in uneasy subjection, but the part that she did not hold would be aggressively hostile. A united Europe would be independent of Anglo-American political control; a bisected Europe would be divided between Russia and the Anglo-Americans. Such a divided Europe would possess two sharp edges.

A truncated Europe, exposed as an open frontier to the rivalries of the peripheral aggregates of power, would be balkanized socially as well as politically. Not only would the several nations continue to be disunited, but internal conflicts, caused by economic pressures, and encouraged and intensified by the rival powers, would create continuous and explosive disquiet. Democracy and Communism, the slogans of power politics, like shuttles weaving among the broken threads of Europe, would fashion a terrible pattern.

The problems of central Europe can never be settled until Europe is united. The German problem defies solution until Germany re-enters Europe. Austria will be partitioned, or isolated in hopeless weakness until she is re-incorporated into Europe. Italo-Yugoslav differences may be subjected to temporary and futile expedients, but they cannot be reconciled except in a European design. The Congress of Free Italy in America at a convention in Montevideo in August, 1942 declared in the

8th point of their program that: "The Italians will cooperate with courage and serenity toward the solution of any international problem concerning them, on only one condition; that there will be no discussion of Italian problems as such, but of Italian sides of European problems."

Nor can the vexed issues of eastern Europe be adjusted except within the framework of a united Europe. This should have been perceived before the London Conference made it patent. As long as Great Power rivalries persist in Europe, the fate of the small nations can be determined only by reference to the exigencies of power politics without consideration for the welfare of the people or the peace of the world. The Polish question is insoluble while Poland is either a protégé of Russia expanding at the expense of Germany, or the spear-head of a western bloc pointed at Russia. Although situated in eastern Europe, Poland has religious, cultural, and economic ties with western Europe, and hence in a divided Europe she cannot escape being dimidiated. Czechoslovakia has signed a treaty of amity with Russia, but Czechoslovakia as a Russian sphere of influence in a divided Europe, isolated from the west, to which she is attached by cultural and economic ties, would be an impoverished state full of contention. Czechoslovakia can survive only in an integrated Europe; to be compelled to elect either western Europe or Russia means disaster for her. And the Dardanelles, which between Russia and a united Europe, would be straits of commerce, in a divided Europe may be a stronghold for Russia, or, conversely, a vulnerable point exposed to attack.

Nothing will be stable in a disjunctive Europe; every decision, when one can be reached, will be fugitive; and in an agonizing dissolution what were once the durable lineaments of European civilization will become evanescent and perish. But Europe will not be joined while central Europe is separated from western Europe, and kept asunder by the Powers. A restored Germany, unincorporated into a European commonwealth, will signify a splintered Europe, and the old tiresome and bloody tale, so often told, will be re-told.

If we do not accept the occupation of central Europe as a permanent measure, the policy governing its termination should be formulated. And if the occupation is to be lifted simultaneously, this policy must represent the common program of the Big Three. Anything less than a coincident withdrawal is a partial imperialism; no withdrawal at all is a joint imperialism. A restoration of Germany and the consequent return to the old power pattern ought to be unthinkable because it would be restoring the cause of two catastrophes. Today, however, we are happily in possession of the means of solving at once the problems of central Europe and of Europe,

by incorporating central and western Europe into a European commonwealth. The condominium over Germany and Austria can inaugurate a constructive plan for an all-European administration of basic economic and social functions. The reconstruction of Europe calls for production of engineering and chemical products, and the rehabilitation of transport systems, and because of German preponderance in these essential industries and services, Europe cannot recover without them.

A European Supreme Council, invested with a commission to administer relief, and associated with the Condominium, can accomplish the transition from a divided and a ruined to a free and united Europe. Besides undertaking the immediate problem of relief, the Council and the Condominium could establish the skeleton of a European economy by setting up functional organizations in the fields of transport, power, currency, industry, and agriculture and so initiate a European scheme of reconstruction. Such an organization, growing out of the continental desolation left in the wake of the war, attentive to the functional character of a re-founded economy, and unhampered by historic political boundaries, could lay the basis for a new and a European order. Not for centuries has Europe been so completely broken, and so the more easily reconstructed upon a new pattern. Nazi imperialism achieved a certain rough and ready European union; so its defeat in Germany entailed the collapse of Europe. But that very collapse, because it is so widespread, and so complete, is the opportunity for a European policy. The regulation of European disorders would be accomplished as a European experience. The pressure of the Big Three can thus be used for a constructive program of statesmanship, and need not lead to a barren imperialism. The magnitude of the disaster needs to be matched by capacious, bold and imaginative statecraft. The timidity of the powerful can be more devastating than the blindness of the weak.

The suzerainty of the Big Three should be temporary and limited to the emergency. Then as Europe revives, the extra-European controls could be relaxed. But those controls, cut to a European pattern, should not revert to a resurgent nationalism, but to a European organization.

European unity can only be achieved and maintained through a European federation. Europe must not only be reconstructed; it must also be rebuilt upon a new principle. And that is a federation of united Europe. This principle does not infringe upon the cultural autonomy of the European nationalities. It imposes no *single* cultural pattern. It declares for unity, but not for uniformity. The nationalities of Europe do not disprove the fundamental unity of Europe, for they are all unmistakably European. A European federation does not denote the imposition of Europe upon the

nations, but, on the contrary, it betokens the only method by which the nations can survive. Europe is a culture older than that of any nation, and to it every national culture is intimately related; through it every national culture has become self-esteeming. European federation is but the outward institutional symbol of a European culture that infuses every European nationality.

While central Europe is a province of non-European powers, and the Condominium is not pointed toward a European policy, Europe can never recapture its unity. When central Europe is unconsolidated it serves as a pivot for the power dynamics of adjacent States. When consolidated but unincorporated into a European body politic, central Europe subverts European unity either by intensifying the game of power politics, or by a militant imperialism directed against Europe. The division of Berlin, the dissection of Germany, the partition of Austria between the non-European powers, while it results from the malady of Europe, keeps the world in a fretful fever. As long as central Europe is disjoined, there can be neither unity in Europe nor peace in the world. When central Europe is united with western Europe in a European federation, there will be unity in Europe and peace in the world. Many European wars, as well as two world wars originated in central Europe; in central Europe too is the genesis of European union and world peace.

CARLETON COLLEGE

A SURVEY OF CZECHOSLOVAK-AUSTRIAN TARIFF AND COMMERCIAL TREATY RELATIONS, 1919-1937

by M. L. Flaningam

ONE of the best examples of nationalism as a motivating factor in economic policy is to be found in the tariff and commercial treaty relations of Czechoslovakia and Austria. Economic nationalism in the history of Central Europe since 1918 is a matter of common knowledge to the student of European history. The basic facts illustrative of economic nationalism in Czechoslovak-Austrian relations should at this time be restated and emphasized because a similar trend of events in economic relations among the Danube states, such as followed the European war of 1914-1918, must be avoided in the future. Errors in our thinking on problems which are now present and which will arise in the future, in the Danube area, must be avoided as much as humanly possible. By keeping constantly in mind the principal factors in the political and economic relations of the Danube states during their twenty years of independence, one can attain a clearer understanding of present trends in that region.

The influence of the U.S.S.R. is a new and decisive element in the present period. Though it will undoubtedly be a permanent factor, the true nature and the full extent of the Russian position is yet to be clearly ascertained, however. This fact is particularly true in relation to Czechoslovakia and Austria. The annexation of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia by the U.S.S.R. on June 25, 1945, can scarcely be, in itself, indicative of Russian policy.¹ That act was a foregone conclusion with the extension of the Russo-Polish border westward and was in keeping with Russian policy relative to the Ukrainian peoples. The clearest indication of Russian policy relative to Czechoslovakia is to be found in the recent agreements concluded between President Beneš with the U.S.S.R., but these are by no means complete or final. The Danube states and especially Austria were, in spite of their political independence, actually under strong foreign influence particularly of an economic character during the entire period of their existence. Foreign influence, including that of Germany, was nearly always a factor, even in Hapsburg days, in determining the economic life of the Danube area.²

We thus find that the tariff and commercial treaty relations, as well as economic relations in general, between Czechoslovakia and Austria were

¹ *Current History*, August, 1945, pl. 151-153 for the text of the treaty of annexation.

² A. T. Bonnelli, *Germany's Control over International Economic Relations 1930-1940* (Urbana, Illinois, 1940), for Germany's position in immediate pre-war years.

governed primarily by policies of nationalism and by foreign influences. Among the Danube states Czechoslovakia was the least directly influenced by foreign pressure prior to 1933. The great contrast between Czechoslovakia and Austria was to be found in their financial status. The former consistently maintained the most stable financial system in Central Europe in those years. In Austria, however, the financial situation was deplorable and foreign financial aid obtained either separately or through the League of Nations was always a major topic. This study, therefore, approaches the problem of tariff and commercial treaty relations between these states largely from the Czechoslovak position. Czechoslovakia was the real successor of the Hapsburg empire and its problems rather than republican Austria. Czechoslovakia was *the* new state; the Germans were now in the minority position.³

It was in this Czechoslovak region that much of the real wealth of the former Austro-Hungarian empire was to be found. Czechoslovakia upon its formation in 1918 contained three-fourths of the beet sugar industry, sixty per cent of the breweries, two-thirds of the iron and steel industry, and four-fifths of the textile industry of the former empire of the Hapsburgs.⁴ The most important natural resources were coal and lignite, iron, zinc, radium, and a limited amount of gold, silver, and petroleum. The provinces of the Czechoslovak republic were rich in forest and agricultural resources. The estimated 1,622,000 horse-power in hydroelectric resources was throughout the period largely potential rather than actual.⁵

Since 1918 Austria developed its own resources, though with great difficulty, to the point where the two nations were in direct competition with each other rather than supplementing each other as a part of a single unit. This was especially true in industrial products. After 1919 Bohemian, Moravian, and Silesian industries no longer sold their products unrestrained in the provinces of Austria proper. The post-war years witnessed the growth and improvement of the industries yet remaining in Austria, but the Austrian home market was a mere fraction of its pre-war capacity. Both Czechoslovakia and Austria were over-industrialized from the standpoint of home consumption as their industries had originally been built for the benefit

³ For illustrations of my contentions on Czechoslovak and Austrian economic foreign policy and for the opinions of President Beneš, see F. J. Vondracek, *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia* (New York, 1937), pp. 173-248, and 278-288.

⁴ United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Supplement of U. S. Commerce Reports, No. 461 (Washington, D. C., 1927), A. F. Rockwell, *Czechoslovakia, its Industries, Resources, Trade, and Finance*.

⁵ Leo Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism in the Danube States* (New York, 1928), p. 253.

of the former Empire. Extensive foreign trade and economic co-operation with each other were, therefore, imperative to the establishment of a normal industrial economy.

The economic relations of Czechoslovakia and Austria, to the date of the latter's annexation by Germany, were also governed by: (a) financial and economic reconstruction of Austria, (b) antagonism between Czechs and Germans (Austrians), (c) similar problems of post-war changes, (d) relations of Austria and Germany, and (e) by the economic political developments in the world at large, particularly since 1929. .

Austria had always depended upon its Czechoslovak provinces for fuel and a considerable proportion of its food supply. The city of Vienna, especially, depended upon favorable economic relations with the provinces to the north. Immediately following the collapse of the Hapsburg armies in 1918 the commercial connections were definitely disrupted or completely cut off between the provinces of the Empire. The situation in the provinces of the new Austria was extremely critical. The economic condition became progressively more difficult as their currency depreciated and financial chaos set in. The significance of foreign intervention in Austrian finances can scarcely be overestimated in the economic history of the Danube area.

It soon became evident that the establishment of favorable relations between Czechoslovakia and Austria was among the absolute essentials if Austria might ever hope to gain stability as a political unit. The contrast that Czechoslovak finances presented made it even more imperative that a commercial understanding between the two nations should be concluded. It should be pointed out here, however, that Czechoslovakia made a deliberate effort to divorce itself from Viennese influences. There was a clear indication that Czechoslovakia feared a natural gravitation of economic controls back to Vienna instead of their remaining in Prague. It adhered to the tariff of the former empire, however, with modifications until 1921 though that tariff was obviously designed to meet the needs of the former Dual Monarchy. This practice was also followed by the other succession states of the Empire. Consequently, one of the first European commercial treaties to be concluded after 1918 was that between Czechoslovakia and Austria, signed on May 4, 1921. The negotiations had been long and difficult and the treaty did not become effective until November 1, 1922.⁶ It was, however, preceded by a number of so-called "contingent" agreements. For example, two of these agreements were concluded on March 12, 1919 and February 19, 1920. The former agreement pre-dates the peace

⁶ League of Nations, *Treaty Series* (Geneva, 1923), vol. 15, No. 388, p. 14-157.

treaty of St. Germain by six months. The agreement of March 12, 1919 provided for freedom of transit for Czechoslovak products to Trieste, liquidation of war supplies in Vienna including metals, hides, and textiles, and for contingents of Czechoslovak coal and sugar to Austria. The latter agreement provided for the exchange of Czechoslovak coal totaling Kč. 12 million for Austrian iron ore and by-products to the amount of Kč. 9 million. Austria was to be supplied with Czechoslovak beet sugar, and provision was made for the settlement of financial and economic disputes.⁷

Thus, these contingent agreements were temporary, emergency, immediate regulations of post-war relations. Valuable and necessary as they may have been, they were by no means sufficient. A general commercial treaty was the essential need. Incidentally, the peace treaties of 1919 envisioned close economic ties between these two states as well as in the Danube area generally. There was actually a movement toward economic unity soon after their independence was established, but this was impossible because of the extreme nationalism of the victor states of the former empire. The failure of the Portorož Conference in November, 1921, was a fine example of the economic attitude of these victor states and a key to what the future held for economic co-operation in Central Europe.

The treaty of May 4, 1921, was the first general commercial treaty between Czechoslovakia and Austria and, though it failed ultimately, it did form the basis for subsequent negotiations. Therefore a condensation here of its principal provisions, is in order.⁸

1. A most-favored-nation policy was provided for and guaranteed by the first ten articles in a most comprehensive manner.
2. It was agreed that a list of articles was to be drawn up which were exempt from import and export duties, subject only to the usual customs regulations. This list did not constitute a complete "free list," however. The articles included were divided into the following categories:
 - a. Shipping articles, *i.e.*, packing boxes, barrels, crates, casks, etc. when "they are declared to be imported for the purpose of being filled and re-exported when full, and that there is no doubt as to the purpose for which they are exported."
 - b. Sample articles not for sale.
 - c. Articles intended for repair without change in nature or destination.
3. All previous agreements were incorporated as a part of this treaty.
4. Future reciprocal agreements in regard to rivers and vessels thereon were guaranteed.

⁷ Department of Overseas Trade, British Legation Reports (London, 1922), Report: *Economic Conditions in Czechoslovakia*; "Commercial Treaties."

⁸ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, 15, 388, p. 14-85 for original text.

5. Guaranteed equal treatment of nationals and their property in the use of transit facilities while in the territory of the other state.
6. Four articles conclusively enumerated and insured the performance of the foregoing principles.
7. Two articles provided for the regulation of telephone, telegraph, postal service, and air navigation between the two parties.
8. Rights of laborers from one country, while within the jurisdiction of the other, were guaranteed as to their social insurance, political, and economic provisions.
9. Exchange of and full recognition of consular services with all rights and privileges associated therewith were guaranteed.
10. All nationals of one of the contracting parties while within the jurisdiction of the other state were to be exempt from performance of military, police, and legal obligations to the latter state.
11. All disputes, changes, etc. to be by arbitration, and procedure in regard thereof was provided.
12. Article of ratification provided.

By 1923 neither the contingent agreements nor the treaty above had provided the desired results for either Czechoslovakia or Austria. The principal difficulty seems to have been in respect to the balance and nature of their trade which could be settled only by a more thorough commercial treaty definitely adjusting the tariffs on both sides and reducing government control over imports and exports.⁹ The possibilities of such a treaty were not favorable in the 1920's because Austria continually sought to raise her tariff on manufactured goods. The reason Austria followed such a policy may be assigned to a desire to stimulate home industries and protect them against the Czechoslovak industries and their low-priced products. The situation was further aggravated by the insistence of Czechoslovakia upon maintaining an autonomous tariff policy. The Czechoslovak government refused to compromise its tariff policy by commercial treaties though such treaties with foreign powers were desired.

Czechoslovakia and Austria were, however, able to conclude supplementary agreements to the treaty of 1921 in the years 1924, 1925, and 1926.¹⁰ The 1924 agreement was to all practical purposes a tariff treaty. Under its provisions duties were definitely fixed on virtually all goods exchanged between the two nations.¹¹ In less than two years these treaties

⁹ It should be remembered at this point that throughout the entire period both Czechoslovakia and Austria maintained various forms of government import and export control but usually through a licensing system.

¹⁰ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, 42, 1041, p. 201; 86, 1151 and 1152, p. 383 and 395; and 81, 1842, p. 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 42, 1041, p. 201.

became obsolete and by the fall of 1926 negotiations were instituted to remedy the situation. The negotiations were so difficult that by the end of November of that year nothing had been accomplished and Austria denounced all previous agreements.¹² Since the 1924 agreement automatically expired anyway, in 1926, the two governments were simply forced, therefore, to extend earlier provisions but only until April 15, 1927.

In the meantime all attempts to arrive at some understanding proved futile. Both the Portorose Conference earlier and the Central European Economic Conference in 1925 accomplished little of a real, practical, and lasting improvement insofar as Czechoslovak-Austrian economic relations were concerned. Finally, after much negotiation, postponements, and extensions of lesser agreements, they agreed to terminate *all* existing agreements *except* the most-favored-nation articles of the treaty of 1921. The immediate result amounted to a tariff war, for rates on both sides rose rapidly and extended to nearly every item in their foreign trade and aggravated their relations with third states.

Obviously the conditions of the trade created under this high tariff system could not long be endured by either party. Negotiations had been resumed in July, 1927, with the result that Austria was allowed a slight but general increase above its 1921 tariff against Czechoslovak textile products. Austria also agreed to reduce its tariff on metal goods and certain types of glass products. The reductions of Czechoslovak tariff, in respect to Austrian products, was negligible. A condition of strained relations and general dissatisfaction continued until 1931 and was progressively intensified after 1929 by the general economic depression of those years. In 1931 Austria once more threatened to abrogate all existing treaties and economic agreements with Czechoslovakia and institute a general revision of its tariff upward against the latter. Immediate negotiations prevented the application of such a policy. An additional protocol to the treaty of 1921 was agreed upon in July, 1931, but it did not provide for a clearing agreement so that the negotiations continued intermittently until the fall of that year.¹³

The failure of these two nations to reach a conclusive, satisfactory, and permanent agreement was due, in part, to the similarity of their industrial production, over-industrialization, and the consequent intense competition between them. The independent spirit of both nations to the point of *extreme* nationalism also minimized the possibilities of reaching a

¹² Pasvolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

¹³ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, 128, 2938, p. 59 for the text of the final treaty of 1931.

compromise. So nationalistic was Czechoslovakia that she has never regarded her inclusion in any larger economic unit or agreement as essential to her prosperity. The preservation of her economic separatism remained paramount with political independence in Czechoslovak policy regardless of the ultimate consequences both for herself and Central Europe in general. Furthermore, by 1924-25 Czechoslovakia was quite convinced that her future prosperity, insofar as foreign trade was concerned, depended primarily on western Europe and overseas trade rather than on the Danube area. Though these convictions were thoroughly justified, they also presumed harmonious economic relations with the states of Central Europe, a presumption which was unfounded in fact.

Another and equally important consideration, in the explanation for the failure of these two nations to settle their tariff and commercial relations satisfactorily, was the pressure of foreign interests in both Austria and Czechoslovakia. At this point the nature and character of foreign influence, whether political or economic, on the policies of Austria and Czechoslovakia, are most clear. It can scarcely be denied that the following forces directly militated against the establishment of desirable Czechoslovak-Austrian economic relations; namely, the pressure and propaganda of Germany for at least a customs union with Austria, the French political and financial influence in Czechoslovakia in connection with her alliances with the states of the Little Entente, Mussolini's saber rattling in every issue involving Austria and Hungary, the express purpose of the Little Entente to preserve the *status quo* of 1918 in the Danube area, and the financial interests of the Great Powers in Austria both as individual nations and through the League of Nations.

At last on April 2, 1936, a new commercial treaty was concluded and it became effective August 1, 1936. By its terms the treaty of May 4, 1921, was virtually re-enacted but with certain specific amendments.¹⁴ Of these the most outstanding feature was the provision relative to preferential duties which were not to be applied until further negotiation established a definite agreement thereon. In order for this article to be effective the other nations with whom Czechoslovakia and Austria had commercial treaties, would have to withdraw their most-favored-nation rights and this Germany and Switzerland refused to do. Once more failure to achieve a complete settlement was experienced.

These articles of the treaty of 1936, which actually went into effect, may be divided into two sections. The first group merely provided for a

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 170, 4173, p. 51 for the full text of this agreement.

most-favored-nation policy by both parties. The second group of articles provided for a reciprocal preference system in regard to their tariffs. The quotas were also attached.

Austria would seem to have profited by this treaty as it was allowed to export to Czechoslovakia machine tools, cutlery, wireless equipment, paper, furniture, steel and tinplates, leather products, and linoleum. Czechoslovakia was allowed a preference only on cheese, oats, and barley and the reduction of the Austrian tariff rates on some of the former's manufactured articles. Thus the trade relations of Czechoslovakia and Austria were governed until the *Anschluss* of March, 1938.

A survey of Czechoslovak-Austrian tariff and commercial treaty relations would scarcely be complete without these further observations. By the end of 1924 Czechoslovak banking institutions were quite thoroughly removed from Viennese influences and were distinctly Czechoslovak organizations. At the same time there continued the fear in Czechoslovakia that as Austrian currency became stabilized, or if the state should become absorbed into Germany, capital might gravitate to Vienna rather than to Prague because of higher interest rates prevalent in the former city. On the other hand, the rise of the Czechoslovak "crown" and its comparative stability made it extremely difficult for Austria to purchase Czechoslovak products. This was especially true in the years 1920 to 1924. Even in the depression years the payment for Austrian imports was a comparatively easy process. By contrast, Czechoslovak creditors of Austrian importers had a separate account, through the National Bank of Czechoslovakia, in the Austrian National Bank, to which all payments were made. Thus, although Czechoslovakia usually had a favorable *trade* balance against Austria the latter had a favorable balance of *payments* against Czechoslovakia. This meant that Czechoslovakia had "frozen" claims against Austria virtually throughout the entire post-war period. Austria, until its annexation with Germany, made efforts to pay for as much as it could, however, and the frozen claim situation was not necessarily a deliberate plan of the government.

It was essential to Czechoslovakia to have a balance of trade in its favor not only because of its extensive industrial system but because of the insufficiency of economic invisibles, i.e., extensive investments abroad, rediscounting of bills of exchange, and profits from the re-exporting of products of other nations. Therefore, Czechoslovakia must look upon republican Austria both past and future as the most important economically of its four neighbors.

The comparative importance of Austria in the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia on the basis of monetary value, during these unfortunate and

critical years in their tariff and commercial treaty history, may be observed from the following tables.¹⁵

TABLE I*
VALUE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S TRADE
with the principal powers
(000s omitted)

1921		1926	
TOTAL EXPORT: Kč.	27,311,586**	TOTAL IMPORT:	22,433,293
Austria-----	7,835,186		1,982,699
Germany-----	3,061,260		5,962,123
Hungary-----	3,066,439		935,578
United Kingdom_	2,104,017		1,341,598
Jugoslavia-----	2,008,219		367,447
Poland-----	1,424,061		383,782
Rumania-----	1,175,428		481,662
France-----	1,317,261		638,498
Italy-----	920,899		733,159
United States---	770,798		4,547,248
1926		1931	
	Kč. 17,847,607		15,261,610
Germany-----	3,552,400		3,237,510
Austria-----	2,902,608		1,125,156
United Kingdom_	1,550,000		602,000
Hungary-----	1,228,000		1,028,000
Jugoslavia-----	963,000		584,000
United States---	845,000		760,000
Rumania-----	834,000		482,900
Italy-----	441,000		337,000
Poland-----	363,000		1,096,000
France-----	254,000		667,000
1931		1938	
	Kč. 7,399,000		8,155,000
Germany-----	1,454,481		2,647,944

¹⁵ These tables are adapted from the League of Nations, *International Trade Statistics* for these years; Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, *Legation Reports* on "Economic Conditions in Czechoslovakia"; and various issues of the *Central European Observer* (Prague, 1926-1938).

* The writer has departed from the standard practice of listing imports first, exports second, and the countries by alphabetical order or by political rank as powers in order to emphasize the relative position of Austria in Czechoslovakia's foreign trade and in light of their difficult tariff and commercial treaty relationship.

** The Czechoslovak "Crown" (Kč) here is equal to 3 cents on the dollar on the old gold standard value, i.e., about 33 Kč to a dollar.

<i>Austria</i>	1,796,000	851,000
United States.....	506,597	344,019
United Kingdom.....	406,420	338,761
France.....	356,141	319,504
Rumania.....	301,807	334,940
Hungary.....	201,349	120,748
Italy.....	193,848	252,774
Poland.....	181,512	373,932
Jugoslavia.....	(Figures unreliable, trade negligible)	

1936

	Kč. 8,086,000	7,909,000
Germany.....	1,231,768	1,581,381
United States.....	729,816	482,617
United Kingdom.....	721,054	474,784
<i>Austria</i>	716,528	353,304
Jugoslavia.....	429,762	346,912
Rumania.....	379,971	361,431
France.....	343,000	479,189
Poland.....	164,603	220,271
Hungary.....	151,250	143,313
Italy.....	(Figures unreliable, trade negligible)	

1937

	Kč. 11,971,000	10,986,000
Germany.....	1,645,000	1,701,000
United States.....	1,112,000	961,000
United Kingdom.....	1,034,000	701,000
<i>Austria</i>	878,000	456,000
Italy.....	353,000	249,000
Hungary.....	227,000	161,000

(Figures for others noted above unreliable and comparatively negligible)

TABLE II***
 VALUE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S TRADE
 WITH AUSTRIA 1920-37
 (000s. omitted)

IMPORTS from:		EXPORTS to:
1920 — KC.	3,043,554	9,678,018
1921 —	1,982,698	7,835,186
1922 —	986,698	3,969,000
1923 —	665,250	2,639,000

*** In order to arrive at a true and complete account of this trade an analysis of the products of trade itself would be necessary but since that is a vast topic in itself, I have dispensed with its statistics in this survey.

1924 —	1,245,437	3,523,121
1925 —	1,293,704	3,251,331
1926 —	1,125,156	2,902,608
1927 —	1,276,334	3,064,914
1928 —	1,442,405	3,123,591
1929 —	1,548,252	3,064,723
1930 —	1,210,876	2,242,963
1931 —	851,000	1,796,000
1932 —	450,301	1,038,705
1933 —	299,000	722,000
1934 —	324,839	769,411
1935 —	310,000	754,000
1936 —	353,304	716,528
1937 —	456,000	878,000

Beyond all reasonable doubt the pressure of economic problems, both at home and abroad, during the depression years, intensified the political friction among Czechs, Austrians, and Germans. Czechoslovakia's relations with both Germany and Austria were strained almost to the breaking point even before the *Anschluss* movement in 1938. The reasons for this were, in part the desire of Germany after 1933 to conquer economically the Danube area and southeastern Europe (a revival of the "Drang nach Osten" idea), which meant that Czechoslovakia must be the first of the non-German states to be brought into Germany's new order, and the corresponding determination of the government at Prague to preserve its economic position as well as its political independence.¹⁶

Unfortunately, Czech industry was for the most part Austrian and German in origin of control and was located in areas occupied by German majorities. Thus, the failure of Czechoslovakia and Austria to reach the obvious and desirable economic relations through the conclusion of mutually satisfactory tariff and commercial treaties served only to intensify the economic hardships and political hatreds during the depression years. Such conditions must be prevented in the future. Accordingly, the maximum of economic co-operation not only between Czechoslovakia and that area to be designated as Austria in the present post-war period but among *all* the Danube states and south Germany should in the future provide one of the principal steps toward the breakdown of political and national hatreds and guarantee peace in that area.

If the peoples of Central Europe could be guaranteed economic peace and security and reasonable opportunity for the promotion of their standard

¹⁶ A. Basch, *Germany's Economic Conquest of Czechoslovakia* (Chicago, 1943), p. 4-10, for an analysis of German economic policy in Czechoslovakia.

of living with justice for all and privileges for no particular national group, the dangers of economic nationalism as a cause for war will have been avoided. This can be done only through a high degree of co-operation among those states in the future and with *real* encouragement from the great powers rather than intervention. Though such co-operation may have been impossible in the past, it is imperative in the future. The events and trends of the depression and war years have proved that no political frontier is defensible against either economic forces or armed forces and nowhere is this more true than in Central Europe. There is no economic excuse for the independent existence of Czechoslovakia, Austria, or any other nation in this post-war era if by "independence" is also meant economic autarchy, extreme economic nationalism, and/or economic isolationism. The exalting of economic separatism by any nation to the point where open friction both at home and abroad is generated between different nationalities, as in the case of Czechoslovakia and Austria, is not only suicidal to the states concerned but a cause for war, war which can no longer be localized but must necessarily jeopardize the peace of the entire world.

Germany lost one of the greatest opportunities afforded a modern nation for real leadership when, from 1933 to 1939, she sought to dominate and exploit Central Europe for her own purposes and then attempted to saddle her political and military creed upon her subject peoples since 1939. Germany's colossal blunders and outrages have, of course, brought the whole of Europe down into the depths of economic chaos the magnitude of which is yet to be fully appreciated. If the peoples of Central Europe, of their own accord, do not break down their economic barriers and strive toward mutual benefit, some third state may do it for them and without the blunders of the Nazis. Unfortunately, the Western Powers have not in the past seen fit to sponsor sound economic co-operation in Central Europe or to assume the leadership themselves. In the future they may not have the opportunity to do so. Since the Munich Conference it has become increasingly evident that strong elements among the peoples and governments in Central Europe have a tendency to look eastward, i.e., to Moscow, rather than westward for leadership. Whether this is desirable or not is irrelevant here; the fact remains. The point is, if Czechoslovakia and Austria had been able successfully to eliminate their economic differences prior to 1933, if the great powers had given real encouragement to economic co-operation in the Danube basin, the Nazi movement would have been denied one of its principal sources of strength and could, perhaps, have been stopped rather than encouraged at the Munich Conference or even prior to it.

Admittedly it is dangerous to deal in these generalities and conjectures. The facts will, however, support the conclusion that the recurrence in the future of the tariff and commercial treaty relations of Czechoslovakia and Austria, which existed prior to 1938, must be avoided if peace and prosperity are to return to the Danube basin and if those states are to retain any semblance of their political independence.

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JEWS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

by Bernard D. Weinryb

PERHAPS a more fitting title for this study would be "Central Europe without Jews," paraphrasing Hugo Bettauer's *Die Stadt ohne Juden*, which pictures an imaginary expulsion of Jews from Austria. It would seem permissible to regard Central Europe, at least for the next generation, as devoid of Jews because of the negligible number remaining after the flood of World War II and because of the desire of the remnants to emigrate from this region.

We are dealing here not with the hearty greeting with which the first Jew to Vienna was received (Bettauer's idea) but with both the changed situation of Central Europe caused by the decreasing number of Jews, and with the Jewish group still in this region. Settled in various parts of this area for more than a thousand years, moving east and west—from Germany to Poland, Bohemia and Russia, from the Kingdom of the Khazars to Poland—and later in their westward and southward migrations from Germany-Austria and Rumania to France and England, the Jewish group fulfilled certain economic, social, and other functions. As a minority group with a different occupational structure from the majority of the peoples among whom they lived, the Jews occupied important positions and played significant rôles in trade and industry. Comprising a considerable percentage of the population—about ten per cent in Poland and about five per cent in Hungary—in some countries they formed the main bulk of the urban population and to a certain extent monopolized the urban occupations. At the same time, there was rivalry between the Jewish and the non-Jewish groups both for economic positions and in political matters. The last half century or so of the internal history of Central Europe is marked by this struggle of the peoples of some countries against the Jewish group. And to a great extent the internal political and social life is stamped by this struggle. The Jewish issue was also utilized for other political ends such as to divert attention of certain groups from their own demands, or in the struggle of one party or group against another. With the war and the Nazi policy of extermination the Jewish rôle in Central Europe ended. Shrinking in number so that they now comprise only fractions of a per cent, their influence in the economic and political life of the countries will probably sink to insignificance. The Jewish issue will also cease to play an important part in the internal political problems of the various countries.

The extermination of the Jews seems to have destroyed in a considerable measure the basis for future anti-Semitic propaganda.

Still greater are the consequences for the Jewish people themselves. For centuries the Jewish settlements in Central and Eastern Europe formed the main bulk of the Jewish people, and they were the source of Jewish culture, especially since the disintegration of the Jewish centers in Spain and Portugal with the forced exile at the end of the fifteenth century.

During the nineteenth century four-fifths of the world's Jews lived in Poland, Russia, Rumania, Hungary, Germany, Austria and other countries of Central Europe. But in the second half of that century there began a strong westward migration which ultimately brought larger Jewish groups from Central Europe to France and Great Britain. With the beginning of the mass emigration to America and later to South Africa and Palestine at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of this century, the proportional distribution of the Jews began to be altered to the disadvantage of Central Europe, a tendency which was augmented in the later decades. But even so, before World War II, more than fifty per cent of the Jews lived in Central Europe, with a mass concentration of over three millions each in Russia and Poland, and eight hundred thousand in Rumania. The misfortunes of war reduced all these concentrations of Jews and transformed Central Europe into an area in which there is today only an insignificant fifteen to twenty per cent of world Jewry. The destruction of Central European Jewry, however, means more than a mere loss in numbers. It means the breaking up of traditional and cultural centers; it means also the uprooting not only of those who remain in the area of Central Europe but a transformation of the bulk of the Jewish people to groups of comparatively "new settlers" (in the Americas, Palestine, South Africa, etc.), while those with older roots and century-long traditions and cultural foundations have been destroyed or uprooted.

These pages, which will summarize the changes of the last decade and analyze the new situation, will deal with both these aspects: Central Europe ("without Jews") and the Jewish group.

I

Jews came to different parts of Central Europe at different times. There is evidence that there were Jews in western Germany, in the vicinity of Cologne and Trier, when the Roman legions came to that region. In the fourth century Jews were to be found not only in Gaul and along the Rhine but also in Hungary.

Ibrahim Ibn Yakob, who came to Bohemia from Spain in the tenth

century, found Jews from the Near East in Prague, where they brought their wares, as well as Byzantine coins for which they bought slaves, tin and hides. During the tenth century when the land route from West to East, through Germany, Bohemia and Poland to Kiev and Itil was developing, there sprang up along it a number of Jewish communities, especially in Mainz and Augsburg at the beginning of the century, and in Regensburg and Prague in the middle of the century. In the next century, after the Hungarians had embraced Christianity and their attacks upon travelers ceased, the route went through Hungary, from Regensburg on the Danube to Budapest, and thence to Russia. In the same century we find Jews settled in Kiev, while in the more westerly parts of Central Europe fragmentary information tells of Jews from Mainz who participated in the fairs of Cologne at the end of the tenth century, and of Jews from Worms, who in the eleventh century came to the fairs of Frankfurt, Hammerstein, Dortmund, Gosslar and elsewhere.

From the point of view of regional settlement in the first millenium the Jews remained a group which, for the most part, was settled in the Near East. After the eleventh century they gained numerically in Europe, especially in Spain and other western European countries. It is estimated that at the end of the fifteenth century, at the time of the expulsion from Spain, the Jewish group was equally divided between Europe and the Near East. But at that time the eastward movement of the Jews, which brought considerable numbers of them to Bohemia and Poland, was already some centuries old. This movement was hastened in the time of the Black Death *ca.* 1349, with the ensuing expulsions of Jews from Western Europe and most of the cities of Germany. The sixteenth century witnessed many such expulsions,¹ and the Jews of these places either settled in the villages, enjoying the protection of the landed nobility, or moved eastward toward Poland, where again the eastern parts, the Ukraine particularly, offered better possibilities for settlement and earning a livelihood than the western parts.

These expulsions from Germany and adjacent parts of Bohemia, from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century came at the time of the great development of town life in western Europe and Germany, in the flourishing period of the guilds, when the city-dwellers were anxious to rid themselves of their competitors, the Jewish merchants, or their creditors, the Jewish money lenders. At least they endeavored to exclude the Jews from city trade and other urban occupations, limiting their economic activity

¹ Ansbach, 1560-61; Bohemia, 1517; Beyreuth, 1528, 1569; Braunschweig, 1557, 1590; Brandenburg and Berlin, 1510, 1573; Erlangen, 1515; Frankfort am Oder, 1510, 1573; Regensburg, 1519; Sachsonia, 1514; Silesia, 1527; etc.

mainly to money lending and pawnbrokerage. In western Poland, in Cracow, Poznan, and even in Warsaw and Lublin, where a considerable German town population was organized in accordance with German town procedure—the so-called Magdeburg Law—the strength of the guilds and the townspeople was far greater than in the eastern parts, where most towns belonged not to the Crown but to the landed nobility. Since, for instance, Poznan continued to absorb German immigrants as late as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the guilds were more firmly established, and, as a result, there was stronger opposition to Jews. The guilds had, however, only slight influence in the eastern towns of Poland. There, both crafts and trade were more or less open to Jews. Here it was also possible for them to earn a livelihood by taking over from the landlords the concessions to sell beverages, by leasing from them grain mills, toll bridges, villages, etc. This eastward movement shifted a great part of the European Jews to Poland, which included at that time Lithuania, White Russia and the Ukraine. Even the refugee stream going west in the middle of the seventeenth century because of the Cossack uprisings and massacres, did not change much, at least not more than temporarily, the equilibrium between the East and West.

The number of Jews in Poland in 1500 is estimated at 20,000, but a century later there were already 100,000 Jews in that country, constituting about 3.5 per cent of the total population. In the following centuries, the balance was turned further in favor of Eastern and Central Europe. Of the two-and-a-half million Jews in the world around 1800, the majority—54.8 per cent—inhabited the countries of Central Europe, while only 5.2 per cent lived in Western Europe, and about 40 per cent in the Near East.² The Jews in America, Italy and elsewhere were insignificant in number. Half a century later, over three-fourths of the nearly five million Jewish population inhabited Central Europe and the Balkans. The "westward movement," which started in the second half of the nineteenth century, began in the last two decades to affect the supremacy of Central Europe. About five million Jews left Central Europe in the sixty years between 1880 and the second World War. At the beginning of the war, only about a half of world Jewry, comprising some sixteen and a half millions, lived in Central Europe. Of these, over one-third were to be found inside the boundaries of Soviet Russia, where the general trend toward isolation also affected the Jews, and led to almost complete severing of their ties with the rest of world Jewry. The center of gravity of the Jewish group, as a result of emigration, moved to America and Palestine.

² Arthur Ruppin, *Jewish Fate and Future* (London, 1940), p. 27.

II

Those Jews who came to Europe and Central Europe from the Near East had to adjust themselves to the conditions they encountered wherever they settled. As newcomers they were confronted with an existing social and economic order which it was hard for them to penetrate. They had to utilize formerly acquired experiences and connections, to undertake to seek sources as yet untapped, and to fill in "gaps" in the economy of the new country. Thus such a group of newcomers, when they first settled in a new country, engaged in only a limited number of pursuits and did not participate in all activities of the country. The available material does not give us an exact picture of the occupational status of the Jews in every country or at all times, since they first began to settle in Europe. But it is almost certain that the occupational structure of a Jewish group in any country seldom wholly resembled that of the majority in that country. There were always certain occupations, varying from trade to weaving, dyeing, vine-growing, etc., which were regarded as "Jewish occupations," while some other means of making a livelihood were either only partially or seldom adopted by the Jews. So long as the number of Jews in a country remained small, they contented themselves with the limited scope of their economic activities. But with increasing numbers, they were compelled to seek other sources of income and to try to make their way into other occupations. From this necessity sprang the variations in the occupational structure of the Jewish groups in different countries. The more dense the Jewish population, the more variations we find in their occupational structure. This was the reason for the differences between the occupational structure of pre-war Poland and that of pre-war Germany for instance. In Poland, where the Jews constituted about ten per cent of the population, of every 100 Jews gainfully employed, there were, in 1931, 38.3 per cent in business, and 45.3 per cent in industry and handicrafts; in Prussia, in 1925, with a Jewish population of less than one per cent, 58.79 per cent of the Jews were in trade, leaving only about 29 per cent for industry and handicrafts.

But the development of the Jewish economic situation in the Central Europe of the pre-war years goes back to the seventeenth century. At that time the medieval regimentation and forcible limitation of the Jews in one or a few occupational functions began to change. The Thirty Years' War and, even more, the Cossack uprisings in Poland beginning with 1648, brought devastation, death and poverty to many communities in Germany and Poland. But the changes brought about by these events had, to a certain extent, beneficial influences on the economic lot of the Jews. Both in Germany and Poland the havoc wrought in the cities and the annihilation of much

of the population through war and plague contributed toward loosening the hold and impairing the efficacy of old anti-Jewish legislation. In places laid waste by wars and fires, and in towns abandoned by their inhabitants, where the roads were deserted or unusable, there was no place for the regular type of city merchant, who waits for customers to come to his store to buy his wares at fixed prices, or for farmers to come there and sell their produce to him also at fixed prices. The Jews, either living in the village or traveling from village to village, were in a better position to buy products from the peasants and sell them in turn the goods which they needed. In this trade the Jews were aided by the fact that the inhabitants of the villages, nobles as well as peasants, were dissatisfied with the monopolistic hold which the town merchants exercised, and they were anxious to break this political and economic power. The same motives, plus the desire to increase their incomes, induced the German princes and dukes to admit Jews and draw them into their courts. The "court Jew" is typical of the princes' courts in Germany in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There was none among the hundreds of German princes, great or small of that period,³ who did not have a "court Jew" to deliver to him necessary wares, lend him money, manage his financial matters or help him to erect factories and organize enterprises.

The Jewish peddler on the one hand and the court Jew on the other were representative of the two Jewish groups who penetrated the commercial world of this period. From these two groups sprang the Jewish city merchant who in a constant struggle with the townspeople for the right to trade and settle in the towns, penetrated the towns from which Jews had been expelled in previous centuries or settled in newly founded ones.

In Poland the results of the shift of the chief highways of world trade from East to West, beginning with the sixteenth century, began to be more noticeable with the dislocation brought about by the wars and uprising (Cossack) of the seventeenth century and the growing antagonism between the feudal nobility and the townsmen. The position of the burghers became so bad that they began to leave the towns and their places were taken over by Jews. In Poland the rôle of the nobility was much the same as that of the princes in Germany. They had "their own Jews" (court Jews) or were ready on payment of large sums to allow Jews to settle on their estates adjacent to the towns from which Jews had been expelled. In this manner the Jews were able to occupy positions in trade in Poland

³ S. Stern, *Jud Süß* (Berlin, 1929); Felix Priebatsch, "Die Judenpolitik des fürstlichen Absolutismus in 17. und 18. Jht.," in *Festschrift für Schäfer* (1915).

and in the crafts as well, and gradually they were able to pursue these activities openly, with only minor restrictions.

When the French Revolution ushered in an era in which the regulations and limitations on trade came to be discarded, and industrialization and opportunities for economic development in the cities increased, it found the Jewish group in Central Europe concentrated in trade and other urban pursuits, with some mobile capital and trade experience and connections. The Jews could, therefore, take an important part in the ensuing development of trade, banking and industry. As merchants and bankers they made an essential contribution to the development of trade, railway building, steamship companies and other corporations. As an urban group they succeeded also in acquiring education and technical skills and filled positions in the professions and the cultural world. And some individuals even reached heights of national and international renown. We may take, as examples, such men as Felix Deutsch and Rathenau who built the A.E.G. (General Electricity Co.), Berliner who gave the modern stamp to the firm of Siemens, and Ballin who built the Hamburg American Line. The influential dailies, *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *Berliner Tageblatt* were directed by Jews.

In Poland the Kronenbergs built railways, while in Russia, to which the Jews came with the partition of Poland, the Polyakoffs, Ginzburgs and others built or financed the building of railways. Both in Russia and Poland we find Jews among the bankers and industrialists, although they were mostly concentrated in the medium and smaller⁴ manufacturing enterprises rather than in the larger ones.

The economic opportunity afforded the Jews by the development of Central Europe was reflected both in the rate of urbanization and the rate of natural increase. The nineteenth century marks an enormous growth in the Jewish population. From some two-and-a-half million at the beginning of the century their number reached over ten million by 1900, the principal numerical growth occurring in Central and still more in East Central Europe. The number of Jews in Germany grew from 223,000 in 1825 to 520,000 in 1900 and in so-called Congress Poland from 400,000 in 1825 to 1,325,000 in 1900. Still higher was the rate of growth in cities and towns to which they flocked from the villages and hamlets. The Jewish population in Berlin, for instance, grew from 9,595 in 1850 to 172,672 in 1925; in Warsaw from 41,062 in 1856 to 322,185 in 1921; and in Budapest from 44,890 in 1869 to 215,512 in 1920.

This period of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was for the

⁴ Particulars are to be found in B. Weinryb, *Neueste Wirtschaftsgeschichte d. Juden, in Russland und Polen* (Breslau, 1934).

Jews in Central Europe a time of cultural and political expansion and inner consolidation. Attaining general education, they tried to secularize their mode of living and to organize in parties and groups as their neighbors did. Their struggle for civil rights re-aligned them also around certain principles and organizations. Later, again, disappointment in the possibilities of emancipation combined with other factors helped to create new trends toward Jewish national revival. The ideologies of Jewish movements and the organizational forms of the parties were born in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; at the same time there developed a system of education, scholarship, a modern literature in Hebrew and Yiddish, a theater, and a press. All of these activities developed for the most part in the region of Central Europe, or were transmitted from this area by immigrants (in London and America). In addition to these activities of the Jewish group among themselves, individual Jews took part in the general political, social and cultural life of the countries in which they lived.

In the first post-war years the regeneration of the Jews in Central Europe reached its zenith. The first Russian Revolution gave equality of rights to most Central European Jews, while in the other countries, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere, the remaining limitations were removed. Minority rights were granted to the Jews along with other minorities and in some countries (the Ukraine and Lithuania) a special Ministry for Jewish Affairs was set up. The Jewish group, while fostering its own culture and organizing for political purposes, also tried to participate in the movement to assure the minority rights which then developed. In Poland the Jewish representatives to the Parliament (*Sejm*) even endeavored, for a time, to organize all the minorities of the country, comprising about one-third of the population.

But at the very time of so much hope for further free development, the Jewish group in this region was already in the midst of a serious crisis, the gravity of which only became clear about a decade later.

Internally the vital statistics of Germany and Austria already began to show a deficit, while in other countries the natural growth either reached or was about to reach a point of stagnation, as in Hungary. But in the main, Jewish national revival, like the political emancipation and economic development, was part and parcel of general trends which were themselves either in a critical stage or threatening in their development to reverse their initial freedom for the Jews.

The nationalistic trends in Europe, which influenced the Jewish national revival, grew in intensity, becoming chauvinistic, anti-foreign and, by the same token, anti-Jewish. Moreover, the intensified nationalistic tension and

the struggle between the different nationalities brought in its wake an increase of anti-Jewish tendencies. In Eastern Galicia both the Ukrainians and the Poles accused the Jews of helping the other group, as did the Germans and Czechs in Bohemia. In Poland the Jews were branded as adherents of a free Poland by the Russians and as "Litwacks" (coming from Lithuania), and thus favoring "Russification" by the Poles.

From the time of the French Revolution, which brought the beginnings of Jewish freedom, all other revolutions for democracy and freedom in Europe down to the Russian Revolution of 1917 were followed by reactions, intensification of extremist nationalism, which again was turned against minority groups generally and the Jews in particular. The same was true of economic development which opened new possibilities for the Jewish group. The ensuing crises resulted in autarchic tendencies against foreign goods and against "foreigners" residing in the country. All these tendencies were augmented by the competition resulting from urbanization. The Jews were not the only ones turning to the cities. They may perhaps be viewed as the pioneers of this trend, but at the same time large groups of non-Jews also streamed into the cities. In Germany, for instance, in 1871 about one-third of the population lived in the cities; by 1933 the proportion had increased to two-thirds. In the rest of Central Europe the tempo of urbanization was slower, but there was also a steady stream moving from the country to the city. These newcomers at first became the industrial proletariat or were employed as domestics. Gradually, however, they or their children attempted to enter more important positions. These non-Jewish elements came into conflict with the Jews who were already occupying the urban positions. This non-Jewish middle class came to view the Jews as their chief enemies who "grabbed" the positions which they themselves coveted. The growing urbanization, therefore, brought in its wake an increase of anti-Semitism and the desire to eliminate the Jews from their position.⁵

If the Romanticism in Germany of the period that followed the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars developed the concept of the Christian State, which tended to bar the way to all non-Christians, especially Jews, the post-Franco-German War period witnessed the beginning of the racial theories, with the tendency to bar even descendants of Jews from economic, cultural and political life. And these trends increased in the post-World War years.

⁵ Particulars are to be found in B. Weinryb, "The Economic and Social Background of Modern Anti-Semitism," in *Essays on Antisemitism*, ed. Koppel J. Pinson (New York, 1942), pp. 145-166.

At that time the urbanization of the non-Jews had already made deep inroads upon the Jewish position in the cities and in the urban occupations. Emigration and lower natural increase gradually decreased or brought to a standstill the percentage of Jews in the cities and their part in urban occupations, while the influx of the non-Jewish population raised their percentages in the urban settlements and urban occupations. The rate of urbanization was much more rapid among the non-Jews than among the Jews. In 1900 the large cities of Germany contained 48.4 per cent of the German Jews and 16.2 per cent of the non-Jewish population. In 1933 the percentages were 70.9 for Jews and 30.2 for non-Jews. In Warsaw the percentage of Jews decreased from 33.9 in 1897 to 30.1 per cent in 1931, and from 34.5 per cent in Lodz in 1921 to 33.5 per cent in 1931. Still larger was the relative decline of the Jewish population in smaller cities and towns. In Vilna the Jews constituted 45.5 per cent of the population in 1897 and 28.2 per cent in 1931; In Brest Litovsk, 75.4 per cent in 1897 and 44.3 per cent in 1931. The decline of Jewish participation in urban economic activity was even somewhat greater. In pre-Hitler Germany the majority of small businesses, such as storekeeping, the sale of milk, vegetables, and peddling, was in the hands of non-Jews. The Jews were also practically eliminated from some other branches of urban activities.⁶ In Congress Poland the percentage of Jews in business and banking fell from 75.4 per cent in 1897 to 58 per cent in 1935; in Galicia from 83.4 per cent in 1910 to 74.1 per cent in 1921; in Lithuania and Latvia from 85.7 per cent and 45.4 per cent respectively in 1897 to 55 per cent and 32 per cent respectively in 1935; and in Hungary from 46.6 per cent in 1910 to 30 per cent in 1935.

This growing non-Jewish middle class, in competition with the Jewish group, resulted in added tension and trends toward elimination of the Jews, a tendency which found a favorable background in the developing economic trend. If the economic and social rise of the Jewish group was made possible by the economic growth of the continent with the attendant liberal tendencies and free enterprise, the rising counter-tendencies of regimentation and state control tended to eliminate the Jewish group. The fact is that in every country, with the exception of Soviet Russia, the partial or general introduction of state economics and state control meant curtailment of opportunity and discrimination against Jews. In Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, the more enterprises were monopolized by the government, the more Jews were eliminated from the corresponding branches.

⁶ Particulars in Alfred Marcus, *Die Wirtschaftliche Krise der deutschen Juden* (Berlin, 1931).

The practices of the governments in the succession states to raise and educate from the majority groups an urban class which would control the urban occupations also led to this trend of elimination. The minorities, especially the Jews, had to bear the brunt of this practice.

III

In the post-war years, when the Nazi party was founded and growing up, there appeared in Europe two opposing trends. On one hand, the social reform efforts and hopes for justice and freedom and for improvement of the economic and social order were strengthened by President Wilson's Fourteen Points and by the tendencies stemming from the Russian Revolution. On the other hand, the reactionary tendencies were strengthened by counter-revolutions, the intensification of extremist nationalism and militarism, particularly in the new and in the defeated countries. These conflicting tendencies were accentuated by the increasingly strained relations between the groups. Those whose influence and possessions had been reduced by the war or by the post-war changes refused to reconcile themselves to their losses, whereas the others, who had acquired positions and power, naturally defended them. In addition, many of the generation which had come of age during the war, particularly former soldiers, were unable to adjust themselves after demobilization, and they became the main opponents of the existing order.

The founders of the National Socialist Workers' Party in 1919 belonged mainly to the latter group. Among the later followers were great numbers of academic youth and middle class persons or, in other words, members of the group whose economic life and advancement brought them in touch with the Jews, with whom they had some strained relations.

The Nazi ideas and attitudes toward the Jews are a conglomeration of doctrines, but the main sources are the racial theories which developed in Austria and Germany in the last decades of the nineteenth century.⁷ According to these theories, Jews differ from Aryans, and they are aliens among the European peoples. In keeping with this idea, the program of the Nazis demanded the exclusion of the Jews from citizenship and the professions, and their elimination from German cultural life.

When the Nazis assumed power in 1933, they began to "solve the Jewish problem" by the same method of gradualism which they applied in other matters. During 1933 and 1934, Jews were eliminated from civil service, the professions, and the cultural life of Germany; a *numerus*

⁷ Cf. this writer's "Nazification of Jewish Learning," *The Jewish Review* III (1945), pp. 27-36.

clausus was introduced in the schools. But, theoretically, the Jews still remained full-fledged citizens until the introduction of the Nuremburg Laws of September, 1935. From that time up to the *Anschluss* with Austria in March, 1938, there was a comparative lull in anti-Jewish legislation and practices. The rapid degradation of Jews in Austria within a brief period convinced the Nazis that accelerating the process of eliminating the Jews from the economic and social life of Germany would not affect too adversely the country's situation either internally or externally. A number of legislative measures were passed, ranging from the registration of Jewish property in April, 1938—probably in preparation for confiscation—to the limitation of Jewish economic activities, the final elimination from the professions (July) and the attempts at complete segregation (decree of August 17, 1938 that Jews must acquire Jewish names). The staged pogrom of November 8-9, 1938 served to launch the final phase of elimination of the Jews from the economic life, by confiscation of their property, and the like.⁸

When war broke out in September, 1939, the Jews in Germany had already been deprived of all rights, robbed of their property, barred from the professions and business, restricted and segregated. It seems, however, that the Nazis expected the war to provide an opportunity to "solve" the Jewish question radically in all of Europe.⁹ It has now been disclosed, at the Nuremburg trials, that even before the end of the Polish campaign Hitler was demanding that the Jews in Poland be exterminated.

The official anti-Jewish acts in Poland began with the introduction of compulsory labor in October, 1939.¹⁰ There followed in November a number of decrees, obliging Jews to wear a yellow armband with the Star of David and blocking Jewish bank accounts. Later, at the beginning of 1940, Jews were forbidden to use railways or trolley cars. Jewish-property in the area which was incorporated into the Reich was sequestered. In October, 1940 the Jews in Poland were compelled to live in ghettos; leaving the ghetto without permission was punishable by death.¹¹ The amount of personal belongings and furniture that the Jews were permitted to take with them to the ghetto was limited to a fifty-pound maximum. In this way they lost most of their belongings.

⁸ Particulars and the decrees, as well as the corresponding acts in other countries, in B. Weinryb, *Jewish Emancipation Under Attack* (New York, 1942).

⁹ According to documents presented at the Nuremburg Trials, in October, 1938, Ribbentrop demanded from Poland that the Jewish problem be "solved" by forced emigration.

¹⁰ *Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs für die Besetzten Polnischen Gebieten* No. 1, October 26, 1939.

¹¹ Particulars and documents, for the subsequent parts also, in Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, 1944).

At the same time unofficial and semi-official anti-Jewish acts were mounting. During the war against Poland and immediately thereafter, mass murder, confiscation of Jewish property, torture and expulsions were already spreading. It was at this time, too, that the uprooting and evacuation from "annexed" territories began. Later these practices spread over the whole country. Jews were uprooted and moved from place to place, herded into small areas of towns and cities, while the food rations were systematically cut down to the starvation level. Disease and epidemics spread, and there was no possibility of combatting them with medical means. The death rate in Warsaw, for instance, rose from 11.4 per thousand in June, 1939 to 108.2 per thousand in June, 1941.¹² It has been estimated that by the middle of 1942 about 400,000 Jews in Poland had died of "natural causes" and some 300,000 had been murdered. By that time the Nazis had already begun to materialize their plan for full liquidation of the Polish Jews. Under the pretext of deportation they began the wholesale annihilation of Polish Jews and of Jews deported to Poland in the gas chambers of Maidanek, Treblinka, Oswiecim and others, and the slower death in the labor camps. Poland became a slaughter-house for hundreds of thousands of native and foreign Jews. When the destination of the "deportations" became known to the Jews, some groups, particularly in Warsaw, Białystock, and Będzin defied the Germans and were killed in battles with them. In the parts of Soviet Russia which were overrun by the Nazis the treatment of the Jews was still more severe. Here, no excuses were sought and no pretense at deportation was made. Jews were mostly shot down on sight. The Indictment before the International Military Tribunal lists the following "by way of example":

"At Kislovodsk all Jews were made to give up their property; 2,000 were shot in an anti-tank ditch at Mineralniye Vody; 4,300 other Jews were shot in the same ditch; 60,000 Jews were shot on an island in the Dvina near Riga; 20,000 Jews were shot at Lutsk; 32,000 Jews were shot at Sarny; 60,000 Jews were shot at Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk; thousands of Jews were gassed weekly by means of gas-wagons which broke down from overwork."

The harsh treatment of Jews in the newly occupied countries in the East had repercussions on the practices in Germany itself and in Austria and Bohemia-Moravia. In this protectorate, where anti-Jewish legislation was not begun until June, 1939, the Jews lost all their rights during the first years of war and were eliminated from the economic life. By October, 1941, they were limited to two shopping hours daily. In the Old Reich

¹² Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Hitler's Ten Year War on the Jews* (New York, 1943), p. 145.

slave labor was widely used from the beginning of the war. All Jews and Jewesses in Germany up to fifty years of age were recruited. In June, 1941 the Jewish schools were closed to Jewish boys over 12 years old, who were compelled to work in munition factories. In September of the same year—two years after the introduction of the same law in Poland—all Jews were obliged to wear the "yellow Jewish star." In the following years the deportation from these countries and from Western Europe brought Jews for slaughter to Poland. In the other occupied countries like Greece and Yugoslavia there was similar destruction of Jews under Nazi rule.

In Greece the first restrictive measures were taken in the summer of 1942. A little later some Jews were concentrated in ghettos, while others were forced into labor gangs. There followed the requisition of property and the obligation to wear the "Star of David." By spring, 1943 the deportations to Poland began. Jews, including old men and children, were herded into closed cars in groups of 100 and 150 without food or clothing and sent off. In the area occupied by the Italians the lot of the Jews was much better. After the Italian collapse, when the Germans took over the occupation, they started to deport the Jews from this region.¹³ In the satellite states (Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania) the Jews fared somewhat better. All the governments of these states introduced anti-Jewish legislation on the German pattern involving deprivation of citizenship, confiscation of property, prohibition of the exercise of professions, forced labor and deportations. But here, except for the last year, 1944, the deportations were less brutal. In Bulgaria deportation meant leaving Sofia for the province. In Rumania there were pogroms and (jointly with the Germans) deportations to Transnistria where tens of thousands perished. But Rumanian Jews were not killed *en masse* in the gas chambers.

In Hungary there were organized labor battalions of Jews, some of whom were killed. But the main persecutions did not begin until 1944, shortly before the liberation of the country. By mid-1944 the ghettos were established and the Jews segregated in them. The situation in Hungary at that time may be roughly compared with the one in Poland in the years 1939-1940, when the mass killings had not yet started. In the short time before the liberation in which the Nazis took over Hungary they killed a number of Jews, but they were not successful in liquidating them all.

In all these countries Jews were deprived of their wealth and commercial establishments, driven from their homes and ousted from their positions. In the occupied and associated countries the Nazis attempted

¹³ Greek American Council, *The Jews and the Liberation Struggle. Report of the EAM.*

to win the sympathy of the nation, or of certain groups and individuals, by humiliating the Jews and inculcating anti-Semitism upon the people of the country. They hoped to win the people over through collaboration in the anti-Jewish measures. The times seemed to them to be ripe.

In Poland the spirit of the Endeks, the Polish Nationalist Party, was dominant in the last pre-war years, while the OZON government party (Camp of National Unification) demanded the polonization of commerce and mass emigration of the Jews. Pogroms were staged in 1937, and local unofficial restrictions of the Jews were all indications of the acceptance of anti-Semitic ideas. In Hungary anti-Jewish legislation was first introduced in April, 1938 with a second anti-Jewish law, more severe than the first, which was passed in May, 1939.¹⁴ In Rumania the short-lived Goga cabinet (December 28, 1937-February 10, 1938) introduced racial legislation on the model of the Nuremburg Laws. In Greece fascist elements existed for many years, carrying on an anti-Semitic campaign. It was the leaders of this movement who, during the occupation, became the instigators of persecuting the Jews.

It is as yet impossible to obtain a full account of the measure of collaboration with the Nazis on the part of the conquered and "allied" peoples in the oppression of the Jews. But, in contrast with the West (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and even Italy) where anti-Nazism was bound up with sympathy for the Jews, in the East there seems to have been a more widespread anti-Jewish feeling. Naturally, in the satellite states, under German pressure, the local authorities were carrying out the anti-Jewish measures. In the occupied countries the extent of collaboration by the local population varied from country to country, and even from group to group.

The Lithuanians and Ukrainians seem to have been the most co-operative. The Nazis used them in exterminating the Jews not only in their own countries but also in Poland and elsewhere in the camps. In Poland the urban non-Jewish population helped the Nazis a great deal in their anti-Jewish actions. They hoped in this way to become the heirs to Jewish homes and businesses. Later they also participated in exterminating the Jews. Among these collaborators were Polish academic youth, officials, and policemen. The latter, on the other hand, also supplied Jews with false documents on payment of large sums.¹⁵ Survivors from the camps tell of representatives of all these nationalities helping to oppress the Jews and

¹⁴ Reprinted: B. Weinryb, *Jewish Emancipation Under Attack*, pp. 70-80.

¹⁵ *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), August 28, 1945.

JEWISH POPULATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE BALKANS (Fall, 1945)

	BEFORE AXIS DOMINATION				Estimated % of Total Population ¹⁹	Survivors outside the Country ²⁰
	Latest Year	Census Number	Percentage of Total Population	Total of Survivors ¹⁷		
Poland	1931	3,113,000	9.7	100,000 ¹⁸	0.4	350,000
Rumania	1930	758,000	4.2	335,000	2.3	60,000
Hungary	1930	444,567	5.1	170,000	2.2	80,000
Germany	1933	503,720	0.8	100,000	0.2	—
Austria	1934	191,781	2.8	10,000	0.17	—
Czechoslovakia	1930	356,830	2.4	51,000	0.3	5,000
Lithuania ¹⁶	1923	155,126	7.6	2,000	0.1	5,000
Latvia	1935	93,406	4.8	500	0.03	5,000
Estonia	1934	4,566	0.4	200	0.02	2,000
Yugoslavia	1931	68,405	0.5	10,000	0.07	3,000
Greece	1928	72,791	1.2	10,000	0.15	3,000
Bulgaria	1934	46,431	0.3	40,000	0.7	—
Memel District	1936	3,000	2.0	Unknown	—	—
Danzig	1929	9,239	2.4	Unknown	—	—
Total		5,820,862	3.3	828,700	0.5	513,000
Soviet Russia (in Europe) 1926		2,570,330	2.2	2,328,700	—	—
Grand Total		3,391,192	2.9	1,500,000	—	—

¹⁶ Without the Memel District.

¹⁷ The figures of the survivors are derived from various sources and are therefore different in their value. While the data of *Statistics on Jewish Casualties during Axis Domination, August, 1945*, issued by the Institute of Jewish Affairs (New York), were accepted, some corrections were necessary. For Poland, for instance, the figures of the Polish Foreign Minister, Wincenty Rzymowski, were 100,000 as against a figure of 73,995 given in August by the Polish Central Jewish Committee. For Russia the figure of a million and a half was recently quoted as against a higher figure some time ago.

¹⁸ Besides there are about 25,000 Jews in the former Polish parts which were incorporated into the U.S.S.R.

¹⁹ The percentage of the survivors in the total population is a gross estimate, probably far from accurate. In general a 10%

exterminate them. Although such statements are but generalizations, they do contain a great deal of truth, which fact still influences the attitudes of the survivors toward their home countries.

IV

It is almost impossible as yet to have *exact* data about the number of Jewish survivors in Europe. Liberated Europe is divided into different occupational zones; the availability and reliability of the figures coming from each zone are at variance. There are, moreover, discrepancies in the information and figures coming in from one and the same zone. Some are exaggerated or represent groups which have been counted twice. While details may change, the permanent flow of information will not substantially affect the general picture. The given figures of survivors may, therefore, be regarded as a close or possible approximation.

At first glance the table shows that in Central Europe, with the exclusion of Soviet Russia, less than one million Jews survived out of a population of about six million. This gives a casualty figure of roughly five millions in Central Europe and one million in Soviet Russia. Naturally in order to get a more exact figure of the casualties we have to add to the survivors the number of over half a million refugees to be found in Soviet Russia, England, Sweden, and elsewhere and to deduct from the casualties the emigrants from Central European countries during the years 1931-39, which will amount roughly to 400,000. On the other hand, the natural increase of the years after the last reported census and up to the beginning of the war should again be added. This number will amount roughly to about half a million or more. In other words, the number of Jewish casualties in Central Europe during the war (with the exclusion of soldiers killed in action) will amount to five and a half to six millions. This depletion of the Jewish population in Central Europe entirely changed the whole picture. The percentage of the Jews in the whole population fell (with the exclusion of the Soviet Union) from 3.3 per cent in the pre-war years to about one-half of one per cent after the war. If we consider the separate countries, the transformation appears still more drastic. If in Poland before

loss was deducted for war casualties. In the case of those parts of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia which came under Russia, the population was deducted.

²⁰ Of the survivors outside the country most of them are in Soviet Russia. There were to be found about 200,000 Polish Jews, 50,000 Rumanian Jews, 3,000 Lithuanian Jews, etc. there. In addition there are about 50,000 refugees in Great Britain, 13,000 in Sweden, 30,000 in Switzerland, 8,000 in Spain and Portugal and a few thousand were settled in other countries.

1939 every tenth person was a Jew, we find now only one Jew among 200 or 240 persons. In Czechoslovakia the ratio fell from 1:40 to 1:300 and in Lithuania from 1:13 to 1:1000. With the exclusion of Rumania and Hungary, where there is still a Jewish density of 2.8 per cent and 2.2 per cent, respectively,²¹ in all other countries of Central Europe there survived such a small number of Jews that they may almost be written off as a group. This comes to the fore still more prominently if we consider some of the central cities in which the greatest part of the Jews were concentrated. In Berlin, where there were, in 1933, 160,000 Jews (in round numbers), there are now a few thousand; in Warsaw instead of 352,000, there are about 6,000. Only in Lodz, which now has the largest concentration of Jews of any Polish city, there live some twenty thousand Jews where there were formerly 150,000. In smaller cities the depletion is much greater. There are other cities and towns in Poland in which Jews constituted a majority of the population before 1939, or at least 40-50 per cent of the population, in which there can now be found only two, six, ten or twenty Jews. In Salonika, Greece, there are around 1,000 Jews instead of 45,000.

The population potential of the surviving Jews does not appear to be high either. First of all the number of children who survived is very small. They were killed off by the Nazis. The total estimated number of surviving Jewish children in Europe is 150,000. Miss K. F. Lenroot, Head of the Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor, who recently returned from Europe, states: "Among the displaced in Germany there are practically no Jewish children between the ages of 6 and 12."²² In the German and Austrian camps which fell in the American and British zones, were found about 2,000 Jewish children. In Berlin, there were (October, 1945) 6,000 Jews and only 100 children 14 years old or younger. More recent information puts the number of Jews in Berlin at 10,000 with 279 children up to the age of 15.²³ Little better is the situation in Poland where, in addition, a great many of the children are suffering from tuberculosis. In Lodz, in August, 1945, there were 1,139 Jewish children up to the age of 14 in a Jewish population of 20,438 (5.5 per cent). The main age of the survivors seems to be 30-50 years and up, except in Poland, where a

²¹ In Rumania there was but little planned extermination of the Jews, and in Hungary it began as late as 1944, that is, only a short time before the country was liberated from the Nazis.

²² *New York Times*, December 2, 1945.

²³ *Der Aufbau*, December 7, 1945.

considerable number are younger. In some places most of the survivors are either old people or they appear so as a result of their sufferings.

A correspondent found (November 9, 1945) at a gathering in the Synagogue of Frankfort on the Main approximately 100 Jews "among them one child, a boy aged 12, a few young men of what is considered generally military age, but the majority of those present, like the majority the writer has seen anywhere in Germany, were old people with women representing the majority."²⁴

An estimate of the Jewish child population in the fall of 1945 gives the following figures:^{24a}

Bulgaria	12,000
Czechoslovakia	2,500-4,500
Greece	2,400
Hungary	12,000
Poland	7,000
Rumania	60,000
Yugoslavia	1,000-2,000

Only in Bulgaria and Greece did the Jewish child population constitute about 25 per cent of the Jewish population, while in Poland it amounted to only 7 per cent (pre-war 29.6 per cent), in Hungary 7 per cent (pre-war 17.6 per cent), in Czechoslovakia 10-20 per cent (pre-war 24.1 per cent), and in Rumania 14 per cent. Another source gives the percentage of the child population (up to the age of 15) among the registered Jewish population as 8.6 per cent in Bohemia and Moravia and 11.3 per cent in Slovakia. In addition the percentage of persons who intermarried among the survivors seems to be very high, at least in the case of Germany and Czechoslovakia.

In Berlin reside 6,000 Jews: 1,155 were released from concentration camps, 1,050 who lived in Berlin illegally during the Nazi regime; 2,000 who were married to non-Jews; and 1,600 married to non-Jews whose children were raised as Aryans. The total includes also about 100 children 14 years of age or younger and about 800 non-German Jews, mostly of Polish origin.²⁵ From Czechoslovakia we hear that:

"Unless there is Jewish immigration into Bohemia from Slovakia, the Carpatho-Ukraine and Poland, Jewish life in Bohemia will be extinct in one generation," it was stated here today by a high Jewish official of the govern-

²⁴ Congregation Hahonim *Bulletin*, VI, No. 2, Dec., 1945 (New York) p. 4.

^{24a} L. Shapiro, *Jewish Children in Liberated Europe* (Joint Distribution Committee Research Department Report 1, New York, 1946); L. Shapiro and J. Starr, "Recent Population Data Regarding the Jews in Europe" in *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. VIII, 1946, Pp. 81-85.

²⁵ *JTA* (Jewish Telegraphic Agency despatch), October 23, 1945.

ment. "Half of the Jews in Bohemia are intermarried and their children are mostly non-Jewish."²⁶

Nor are the vital statistics very encouraging. In Vienna in 1945 the mortality rate among Jews was 36 per thousand (against 12 per thousand in 1938). In Budapest 518 Jewish children were born in 1945, while 7,906 Jews died in the same year.

It should be added that a greater part of those Jews who are to be found in the cities and towns of Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland do not belong to the pre-war population of these cities and towns. They originate from other parts of the same country, or even from other countries. They were either found, at the time of liberation, in a concentration camp nearby, or were hiding with the underground and later moved to the nearest place. Early reports estimated that in Poland there were almost 10,000 Jews, from other countries, in Rumania 27,000, in Czechoslovakia 12,000, etc. According to a report from Vienna, only 2,000 of the 17,000 Jews found in Austria originated from there. In other words, a great part of the survivors who now live in Central Europe are uprooted people who have little connection with the particular places or countries in which they happen to be.

Their countries of origin differ: in Rumania are mostly Hungarian Jews, in Germany, Polish Jews, in Poland, French, Belgian, Dutch, Greek, Czech and Hungarian Jews. Among the group of 347 children from Buchenwald who came to Switzerland with the help of the Swiss Red Cross, the majority were from Poland and Hungary.

A cross section of refugees has been found in Theresienstadt. Of the 23,000 Jews who remained there as of June 1, 1945: 8,000 were from Hungary, 4,000 from Poland, 1,300 from the Netherlands, 1,300 from Austria, 6,000 from Germany, 2,500 from Bohemia and a few hundred from France.²⁷ A similar situation prevails in the camps in Austria, with Polish and German Jews apparently predominating. German Jews also seem to predominate in Switzerland and Great Britain.

Earl G. Harrison in his report on Germany (as of July-August, 1945) gives the information that "the principal nationality groups (among the Jews in Germany) are Poles, Hungarians, Rumanians, Germans and Austrians."²⁸ A published list, picked at random,²⁹ of Jews in Frankfurt on the Main in search of their relatives shows that among 51 listings, 32 were from Poland, 11 from Germany, 2 from Rumania, 1 from U.S.S.R. and 1 from

²⁶ *JTA*, October 22, 1945.

²⁷ *JTA News*, June 1, 1945.

²⁸ *New York Times*, September 30, 1945.

²⁹ Published in *Forward*, Nov. 29, 1945.

Hungary. In other words most of the survivors have not only been uprooted from their homes, but they are in foreign countries where they have few ties. As the situation now stands there is little hope that the refugees from Central Europe now in neutral countries will return,³⁰ and further "voluntary" uprooting, mainly of Polish Jews, still goes on.

In Italy there were about 15,000 Jews who fled there from Poland because of renewed anti-Semitism since the end of the war. In Berlin were 2,500 such "pseudo-displaced" persons from Poland, and 3,500 passed through Berlin moving westward to the American zone. They all arrived since October "and they are still arriving at the rate of 250 daily."³¹ According to General Walter B. Smith, U. S. Chief of Staff in the European theatre, Jews are "slipping unauthorized into the U.S. zone from the British and Russian areas at the rate of nearly 3,000 weekly. Nearly 80 per cent . . . are coming from Poland . . . 90 per cent of the Jews repatriated to Poland were returning, with many bringing their relatives."³² Also in Czechoslovakia, according to the words of the Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, there were at the end of 1945 thousands of such Jews from Poland and they were continuing to enter the country. Also from Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania, Jews have been, and are, moving westward toward the American zone of occupation.

In the year since the end of the war certain changes have taken place in the Jewish population of Central Europe, but without affecting the general picture.

In the first place a number of children were removed from concentration camps to Switzerland and Sweden, and elsewhere. About 2,500 Jews were admitted to the United States, and about 10,000 immigrated to Palestine. A few hundred, or more, moved to France, Belgium, etc. This decrease in the Jewish population of West-Central Europe was more than offset by the continuous stream from Poland and in part from Rumania. The rate of Polish-Jewish refugees moving westward was estimated at times to be as high as a few thousand weekly. This flow of refugees was accelerated both by the continued pogroms in Poland and by the repatriation of Polish Jews from Russia. During 1946 about 85,000 or, according to other information, over 100,000, returned from Soviet Russia to Poland. A number of these Jews, upon returning from Russia, try to make their way to Anglo-American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and

³⁰ According to private information, many of the Polish Jews who returned from the Russian Asiatic provinces, are now in Italy where they fled from Poland.

³¹ *New York Times*, December 9, 1945.

³² *New York Times*, December 7, 1945.

to Italy. They hope that from there a way will be found for emigration abroad.

At the beginning of 1946, when the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was touring the region, they found 80,000 Jews in Poland, 60,000 in Czechoslovakia, and 74,000 in the camps in Germany in addition to 20,000 German Jews, 200,000 in Hungary, 46,000 in Italy, of whom over one-third were Polish, Rumanian, etc., 11,000 in Yugoslavia and 335,000 in Rumania.^{32a} Since then, the Jewish population in Poland has grown to some 130-160,000 by virtue of the arrival of repatriates from Russia, while additional thousands or tens of thousands have moved westward. According to recent information^{32b} there are 92,000 Jews in the American zone of occupation in Germany and 20,000 in the British and French zones (against 54,000 and 18,200 respectively, at the beginning of 1946). The number of Jews who left Poland during the month of July, following the pogroms in Kielce, is estimated officially at 20,000. In Austria there were in July, 1946 34,000 Jewish refugees as against "15,000 Jews in Austria a month ago."^{32c}

V

The further V-E day recedes into the past the clearer it becomes that no quick return to normalcy will be possible in Europe. The entire economy, currency, industry and agriculture have been disrupted, the towns have been destroyed and social and human relations upset. Hunger, cold, lack of shelter and of transportation, and unemployment are the lot of the European peoples at present and probably will be for some years to come.

The political situation is unsettled, while the occupying Allies are as yet unable to agree among themselves on the future of Germany. In the meantime, a whole *Voelkerwanderung* is going on. Millions of Germans are being evicted from the territories which came to Poland, and from Czechoslovakia, and they are moving westward with little hope of finding adequate shelter and food. Under conditions such as these, robbery and murder have become all too common in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere. The new political alignments and the communist, or pro-communist orientation of most of the governments in Central-Eastern Europe are resented

^{32a} Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry Regarding the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine. (London, 1946) pp. 47-59.

^{32b} Statement of Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, adviser on Jewish Affairs to General Joseph T. McNarney, *New York Times*, August 6, 1946.

^{32c} *N. Y. Times*, July 30, 1946.

by the nationalists and reactionaries who openly oppose or even fight the governments.

Speaking of Poland, Wincenty Ryzymowski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, recently said at a press conference in New York that the traditional antagonism of the Poles to Russia is now being transferred to the Polish Government which has been sponsored by the Soviet Government. To this should be added the hatred on the part of the Catholic church: the separation of the church from the state accomplished by the new Government made an adversary of the church, as the division of land among the peasants has turned the landlords against the Government.

All these groups are also antagonistic to the Jews, the more so since intolerance and anti-Semitism of the Nazis have survived Hitler in most of the countries. In Poland the *Armja Krajowa* (Home Army), the underground formerly sponsored by the London Government,³³ together with other groups have begun pogroms on Jews. Since the disturbance in Cracow in August, 1945 the anti-Jewish terror has been repeated over and over again in several places. According to information from Poland the terrorists are well armed and they arrange pogroms in smaller places, killing all the Jews who returned from camps or sometimes serving advance orders to them to leave immediately under the threat of death. According to the statement of refugees who fled to Austria, "it is dangerous [in Poland] for a Jew to show his face in the streets particularly in the small towns." By April, 1946 it was estimated that about 800 Jews had been slain in Poland since that country's liberation. In the pogrom which occurred in Kielce in July, 41 Jews lost their lives. Such terrorist acts against Jews are now mounting in Poland and beginning to appear in Slovakia.

In Hungary, members of the anti-Semitic "Arrow Cross" are secretly conducting anti-Jewish agitation. This is being done more openly by the Peasant Party. Also in liberated Czechoslovakia resentment of the Czechs against returning Jews is to be felt. In Bucharest fascist excesses occurred at the University as early as March, 1945 when a Jewish student was seriously wounded, and more recently, during the demonstrations before the King's palace one Jew was killed and ten injured. From Germany it is reported that the youth, even though disillusioned about Nazism, were reverting to anti-Semitism. This situation is also slowing down the process of the return

³³ General T. Komorowski (General Bor) former Commander of the Polish Home Army, however, issued a statement denying that the members of the Home Army mistreat Jews: "the statement said that the Home army has been dissolved after the liberation of Poland." (*New York Times*, December 14, 1945).

of Jewish property for anti-Semitism is liable to be aggravated by any forced restoration of such property.

Suppressed, uprooted, robbed of their property, the Jews emerged in the liberated countries with undermined health, no means of earning a living and with only a slim hope of being able to return to "normalcy," to an economic existence which the war and anti-Jewish legislation interrupted. The property of the Jews which had been confiscated by the Nazis and the countries under Nazi domination seldom remained in the hands of the authorities up to the time the country was liberated. For the most part it was sold by the authorities to third persons, who in the meantime may have sold it again, and at the time of liberation it may be found in the hands of a fourth or fifth owner.

The situation is still worse when it concerns business enterprises and jobs, rather than immovable property. It is difficult to decide how far property rights can be used here. The authority which has to handle these matters must take into account the interests and situations of the people who are found in the former Jewish enterprises, and is bound to delay the solution in order to avoid antagonizing the population against the Jews. The same is true of reinstating Jews in their former jobs.

In every country of Central Europe laws and decrees have been enacted concerning the restoration of Jewish property or the reinstatement of Jews to former positions. This provides a legal basis for the restoration of property or jobs, but the realization of these decrees encounters difficulties which have not as yet been overcome. In Slovakia Jewish property was confiscated by Slovaks (not by the Nazis) who are now reluctant to part with it. The large factories are to be nationalized by the Slovak State. In other countries the remaining anti-Semitic officials are delaying action, while in many cases the still weak governments are afraid to multiply their adversaries by using force.

In Czechoslovakia the government has taken over all factories, property and goods formerly owned or controlled by the Germans and Hungarians, including those which were taken from the Jews during the Nazi domination. This will probably hinder a number of Jews in recovering their property.

We may take the situation in Bulgaria as an example of what happens to the restoration laws. Bulgaria is among the few countries of Central Europe in which no great measure of anti-Semitic annihilation was accomplished. But in the summer of 1943, 25,000 Jews were forcibly exiled from Sofia, the capital, and the remainder were eliminated from all branches of economic life, and all their property, including furniture,

was handed over to non-Jews. When the régime of the National Front took over, the Jews expected a complete restoration of their rights and property, and compensation for the damage caused by the anti-Jewish measures. The Government published a number of ordinances and laws regarding the abolition of anti-Jewish legislation, but these ordinances are incomplete and in actual practice the restoration of property with the exception of the dwellings which survived is being carried out in such a manner that the Jews have no real opportunity of retrieving their possessions. If, for instance, a Government order called for distribution to landless peasants of lands belonging to those landowners who do not cultivate their entire property, the Government is enforcing this law primarily with respect to land taken from Jews under the anti-Jewish Laws. The restoration of businesses, shares, etc., is made dependent on payment to the present owners by the former Jewish owner, the amount which the first purchaser paid to the (fascist) government. As a result, Jews cannot regain their property, for they do not possess the necessary means to do so. Also the amendments to the Rehabilitation Law of March, 1946, passed recently do not give complete satisfaction to the dispossessed Jews.

In Austria, according to a report of November, 1945, Jewish survivors of concentration camps were still unable to establish any industry or engage in trade because they were being denied licenses by the various associations. Seventy per cent of the food stores in Austria and at least 30 per cent of the clothing industry is still in the hands of former Nazis.³⁴

By mid-1946 the restitution laws had not yet been passed and the Jewish community organization was complaining that the government refused to recognize the special situation of the Jews in this matter. On the other hand, the Russians claim the property found in Nazi hands, including that which the Nazis took away from Jews.

According to the words of the T. D. C. representative "millions of dollars worth of property belonging to these [Viennese] Jews has not been returned. They have therefore no economic basis for rebuilding their lives. Out of 7,000 Jews only 300 have regular employment and this is provided mostly by Jewish organizations supported from abroad."^{34a}

The slow rate of restoration of Jewish property is also being denounced from Hungary, Rumania, etc. In Berlin the community accounts were still "frozen" in October and the leaders were unable to use the funds to assist the Jews there who had been deprived of their former homes and possessions and were in dire need of clothing, shoes, etc.³⁵

³⁴ *JTA*, November 1, 1945.

^{34a} *New York Times*, August 1, 1946.

³⁵ *JTA*, October 23, 1945.

Deprived of capital, Jews can scarcely make a fresh start in commercial occupations. From Hungary alone comes information that some Jews are again trying to earn a living in commerce.³⁶ In Poland groups of Jews moved to lower Silesia where they organized, on land the government took away from the Germans, a number of agricultural settlements. Elsewhere co-operatives for handicrafts were organized.

Jewish settlement in Silesia began spontaneously shortly after the liberation of surviving Jews from extermination camps located in Silesia. In this region there are available housing facilities; the authorities are removing the Germans and giving the houses to the Jews. But generally the picture is a gloomy one. It depicts impoverishment, need and hunger.

In Greece, of the some 10,000 Jews who survived, "7,500 are living on dole given them by the J.D.C."³⁷ In Rumania, after liberation more than half of the Jews were destitute; this includes 94,000 who were released from the labor camps, 18,000 who returned from Transylvania and 58,000 who were disabled in the war, or are homeless and sick. In Germany there are about 100,000 Jews in the camps, whose situation Earl G. Harrison so gloomily pictured in his Report.

Since publication of this report (September, 1945), statements have been made that improvements were introduced, the food rations raised and some individuals transferred to homes from which the Germans were ejected. Latest reports, however, picture the camps as overcrowded, and the inmates underfed. There was improvement in some camps after the publication of the Harrison report, but they deteriorated again, according to the words of a chaplain who returned recently, because "the personnel in charge . . . is incompetent and disinterested."³⁸ Dr. Lee Srole of UNRRA resigned from his post "as the only means of protest" against the treatment of Jews in the camps.³⁹

There is, however a brighter side. Probably at no time have there been governments in most of the Central European countries so friendly toward the Jews as in our day or so much participation by Jews in high posts. Although some profess themselves in favor of assimilation (Rumania) and

³⁶ Anne O'Hare McCormick tells that an American observer remarked about Central Europe after he saw in Hungary that Jews started again to occupy themselves in trade: "I see here that what this part of the world needs to get going is to resurrect the Jews. It has destroyed the leaven in the lump." (*New York Times*, November 26, 1945.)

³⁷ *Palcor*, December 4, 1945,

³⁸ *New York Times*, November 22, 1945; December 7, 1945.

³⁹ General Smith, however, after inspection of the camp in Landsberg, denied that the situation is as bad as Dr. Srole pictured it. Dr. Srole himself later reconsidered his resignation when Lt. Gen. Smith visited the camp and promised to remedy the situation.

most of them are opposed to the preservation of Jewish minority rights, or are retaining some of the anti-Semitic officials, the official trend is pro-Jewish. In Yugoslavia and Poland anti-Semitism has been officially outlawed. The newly-established Polish government includes a Jew as Minister of Industry; there are a few Jews with the rank of vice-minister, while some others occupy high posts. The appointed Mayor of Breslau is Jewish and likewise the new Polish Consul to New York. The Central Committee of Polish Jews, the highest Jewish authority in the country, receives much of the necessary funds from the government. In Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, Jews are to be found in high government posts. In Hungary they have two seats in the cabinet.

Groups of Jews are themselves trying to rebuild the communities. Some have settled on the land, while others have opened industrial co-operatives and workshops. Jewish writers and artists have organized themselves into an Association and have begun to publish a weekly; they have also organized an historical commission to collect material on the Jewish situation during the Nazi occupation. In Lodz a Jewish school for children was reopened, which will be maintained by the government. Other schools are being opened in Warsaw, Lublin, Cracow, and other places. Similar activities are being reported from other countries. It seems, however, that all these activities are regarded by the Jews of these countries as temporary measures, while there is much doubt concerning the possibility of a normal re-establishment.

This general situation in the Central European countries, particularly the remnants of anti-Semitism, the position of minority groups in general, and the Jewish minority in particular, strongly influences the attitudes of the Jews toward those countries in which they were found at the time of liberation, or the question of return to these countries.

There is first of all the feeling of insecurity, the fear that there is no real way to find a future in these places. This feeling is augmented by the fact that anti-Semitism still survives and that part of the local population formerly collaborated with the Nazis.

"I am living as a Polish woman," writes a Jewess from Cracow in a private letter after the liberation (March 9, 1945) "under the assumed name of . . . I am reluctant to [reveal my real name] because the Germans have imbued the minds of the people with deep hatred against us and have inculcated the opinion that we have no right at all to exist."⁴⁰

⁴⁰ The Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine *Bulletin*, May, 1945. At the end of November, 1945 it was reported "that 20,000 Jews still retain forged identification papers bearing non-Jewish names." (*JTA*, November 29, 1945).

The same reluctance to remain results from the fact that Jewish property is not being restored to its owners, or is being returned on a very small scale. Such people are inclined to see in the present governments, or their officials, a continuation of the Nazi practices. Of further psychological importance is the fact that these people are unwilling to live in places in which they suffered racial or religious persecution, or where their loved ones or relatives were killed. And this feeling is augmented both by the still existing anti-Jewish attitudes and by the fact that the Jewish group declined so rapidly that they do not have much hope of rebuilding a new Jewish life. Thus for instance the *Dagens Nyleher* reports from Stockholm:

"Polish Jewish refugees from Nazi camps who are being sheltered here in camps for Polish citizens have encountered anti-Semitism among their non-Jewish countrymen . . . the Jews do not wish to return to Poland, where they fear they will meet the same prejudice."⁴¹

And a member of the Polish Army writes a letter:

"Instead of longing for home I am in dread of the moment when I shall have to return. Reason says that there is no hope, and only the heart is still longing. Indeed, what is there to hope for after I have seen no more than a mere handful of Jews in towns where thousands of Jews used to live. What can I hope for after having seen Maidanek and similar places? And who are the survivors? Mostly the rabble people of the "underworld" or young folk who have joined the partisans."⁴²

There are others who are no longer at home in these countries for political reasons, either because they do not agree with the pro-communistic trends in the governments of Central Europe, or because of the changed attitudes toward minorities. In Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and other countries assimilation of the Jews is being advocated by the governments, while in Poland the small number of the survivors makes a cultural survival very doubtful if not impossible. These fears were recently expressed by a young Jewish writer from Poland who was found in a concentration camp in Germany:

"There emerges the thought that I am young . . . And I want to live, I shall have to become a different person . . . My soul may cry in me — but I will be forced to turn to the language of the country and its culture, because with thirty thousand Jews scattered over all parts of the land, with their souls torn by inner conflict and de-Judaized to a large extent, you cannot build a new Jewish cultural tradition in Poland."⁴³

There also exists a kind of social inhibition. Individuals who have

⁴¹ According to the *JTA*, June 29, 1945.

⁴² The Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Bulletin*, May, 1945.

⁴³ The *Zukunft* (New York, August, 1945).

lost social contact with their countries or places of former settlement are unlikely to desire repatriation. To this group belong refugees from Axis countries who fled to neutral countries before the beginning of the war. In other words, there are to be found displaced persons who have been away from their countries for ten years or so and in this way have lost all contact and connection with the places of their former domicile, the more so since most of their relatives and friends have in the meantime been removed from their homes or deported. There are also people who were deported over and over again, being driven from one place to another. They usually lost track of their bonds with their former homes. To this group belong children found in concentration camps whose parents were killed or have died. Such youngsters, who have grown up or were born outside their countries, have no contacts or connections with the former homes of their parents.

Failure to believe in the possibility of attaining security and building up a new Jewish life in Central Europe has developed among the refugees a disbelief in the possibilities of rehabilitation in the countries of former residence. They long to leave these countries and to settle somewhere far from the scenes of horror. These attitudes were summarized by Earl G. Harrison in his report dealing mainly with the camps in Germany and Austria:

"Most Jews want to leave Germany and Austria as soon as possible . . . they want to be evacuated to Palestine now, just as other national groups are being repatriated to their homes . . . Very few Polish and Baltic Jews wish to return to their countries; higher percentages of the Hungarian and Rumanian groups want to return, although some hasten to add that it may be only temporarily in order to look for relatives."⁴⁴

More specific information shows that we do not deal here with generalizations and that similar attitudes manifest themselves in places other than Germany.

"The majority of the repatriated Polish Jews . . . have no relatives left alive in Poland. They believe that the Polish Government in Warsaw will provide them with passports to enable their emigration to the United States, Palestine and other countries where they have friends willing to aid them."⁴⁵ According to the words of the Secretary of the Jewish Community in Theresienstadt:

" . . . the surviving Germans are mainly elderly and almost all of them have children outside of Europe . . . they should be allowed to emigrate as

⁴⁴ *New York Times*, September 30, 1945.

⁴⁵ *Palcor*, May 23, 1945.

'they will die from heartbreak' if they are sent back to Germany. The Poles also could not endure being returned to the land where their families were exterminated."⁴⁶

In Innsbruck, Austria, about 2,000 Jews have been released from concentration camps in Tyrol and other localities, about one-half of whom want to go to Palestine and the others to emigrate to the United States and South America, "very few expect to remain in Central Europe."⁴⁷

The children in Buchenwald, according to U.S. Army Chaplain Capt. H. Schachter, who stayed some time with them, "have definite ideas on where they want to go eventually . . . and few of them want to return to their homelands."⁴⁸

Polish Jews in former Nazi concentration camps in the Allied-controlled section of Germany are refusing to be considered part of the Polish national groups within the camps . . . "a Polish-Jewish group refused to leave Dachau for a camp where all Poles were being concentrated. . . . The chief aim of these survivors is to emigrate to Palestine, England and the United States."⁴⁹

Those rescued from Theresienstadt and Bergen-Belsen and admitted to Switzerland "have threatened to resist, physically, their removal to UNRRA camps which, they feel, will mean a prolongation of their status-quo of statelessness and homelessness. Some of them, Hungarian Jews, demand repatriation to Hungary if they are not permitted to go to Palestine."⁵⁰

"German-Jewish refugees in Swiss labor camps do not desire to return to their homes in Germany, it was established here today by a poll taken among the refugees by the Swiss authorities. A similar response was elicited from non-interned refugees."⁵¹

"Jewish survivors of the German death camp of Bergen-Belsen, now inmates at Philipperville, Algeria, have demanded to be allowed to emigrate to Palestine, although conditions in their present camp are satisfactory."⁵²

The British Parliamentary Delegation, which visited Buchenwald received from the Jewish Relief Committee formed in the camp, a letter urging them "to open the gates of Palestine and make it possible for these people, after the inexpressible horrors of the last few years, to make life worth living, in a Jewish community."⁵³

"Most of the 30,419 Jewish inmates found alive at Theresienstadt Ghetto, in Czechoslovakia, desire to emigrate as soon as possible to Palestine, according

⁴⁶ *JTA*, June 1, 1945.

⁴⁷ *JTA*, June 25, 1945.

⁴⁸ *JTA*, June 29, 1945.

⁴⁹ *JTA*, June 25, 1945.

⁵⁰ *Palcor*, June 6, 1945.

⁵¹ *JTA*, June 19, 1945.

⁵² *Palcor*, May 1, 1945.

⁵³ *JTA*, May 3, 1945.

to a detailed report from the liberated camp received here (Geneva) through the International Red Cross."⁵⁴

The inmates of the Hilsleben camp near Magdeburg (Germany) and of Leonding near Linz (Austria) want, according to dispatches, to emigrate to Palestine.⁵⁵

This is also the attitude of the Jewish refugees in Switzerland.

"In the elections of the Advisory Committee on Refugees, which was formed on the advice of the Swiss Government, the United Jewish Party which opposes repatriation and insists upon the right to settle in Palestine, won all the 9 seats."⁵⁶

A similar attitude seems also to be prevalent among a great part of the Jewish displaced persons who have returned to their former countries. According to their spokesman in Moscow, Dr. S. Sfarad, representative of the Association of Polish Jews in the USSR:

"... the majority of the repatriated Polish Jews ... wish to emigrate to the United States and Palestine."

In Greece the Jews presented the British labor leader, Sir Walter Citrine, on his visit to that country, with a memorandum signed by 2,000 Jews requesting that they be rescued by admission to Palestine.⁵⁷

From Poland, where actual anti-Jewish pogroms occurred in the last months, repatriated Jews "slip across national boundaries into the American and British Zones in Austria" and Germany. It is estimated that about 15,000 Jews came recently in this way to Austria and Italy. According to a recent report "there is not in Poland a single man [Jew] woman or child who would like to stay in the country."⁵⁸

Somewhat different seems to be the attitude of the Jews in Hungary and Bulgaria where they did not suffer as much, but apparently there also exists some tendency toward emigration.

VI

This fragmentary information is mostly concerned with the period right after liberation. Neither the situation nor the attitudes have changed much in the subsequent months. During the time the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry Regarding the Problem of European Jewry and

⁵⁴ *Palcor*, May 29, 1945.

⁵⁵ *JTA*, June 25, 1945; *Der Tag*, June 28, 1945.

⁵⁶ *JTA*, June 19, 1945.

⁵⁷ *Morning Journal*, January 29, 1945.

⁵⁸ *JTA*, November 26, 1945. Similarly, the first issue of the weekly *Der Weg*, published by the Jews in the camps of Bavaria (October 12, 1945) puts as the main demand, possibility of immigration into Palestine.

Palestine visited Central Europe (January-February, 1946) most of the representatives of the Jews in Central Europe pictured their situation in the darkest colors and demanded possibilities for emigration. A poll made by the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry with the help of UNRRA, among about 2,000 Jews located in two places in Bavaria revealed that none of them want either to remain in Germany or to be transferred to another European country. In Vienna the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry observed "two streams of migrants, one from Poland and another from Hungary and Rumania."

The Commission itself stated that in Germany the "lack of means add greatly to their — the Jews — unwillingness to attempt to stay in Germany," and in Poland "the vast majority . . . now want to leave Poland." In Slovakia "there are many . . . who wish to emigrate," and in Rumania "there are indications that many wish to do so," while in Hungary "the chief desire seems to be to get out."

More recent information from Poland shows that out of the 160,000 Jews (including the repatriates from Soviet Russia) only about 60,000 may be willing to stay.

At the same time the situation in the camps and centers in Germany and Austria and Italy is steadily deteriorating. As early as the beginning of the year the J.D.C. representative stated upon his return that the 20,000 Jews who are being sheltered in centers for DP's in Austria and Italy are "physically under par, emotionally broken and economically in an utter state of deprivation."^{58a} Judge Simon H. Rifkind, adviser on Jewish affairs to the Commander of the U. S. in the European Theater, declared, about two months later, that "300,000 uprooted Jews in centers in the occupied countries are reaching the end of their emotional tether and must be given a permanent haven soon if an explosive situation is to be averted."^{58b} In fact, there have been some explosions in certain camps (Landsberg, Foehrenwald and others) as a result of the demoralization and psychological strain upon people who are forced to stay in "the country which caused all our troubles."

Naturally, no one can predict the future with any measure of accuracy. It is impossible to know what will be the lot and rôle of the Jews in Central Europe during the next generation or century. As things stand now, it seems that their function in that region is more or less over. The Jews of Central Europe are rendered helpless and weak as a result of the toll of lives. Instead of millions they now number thousands. The decisive factor in

^{58a} *New York Herald Tribune*, January 4, 1946.

^{58b} *New York Herald Tribune*, March 16, 1946.

this direction is, however, not so much the immense drop in numbers and the loss of wealth and position, although these are important, as the fact that the catastrophic development of the Jewish group in this region went in the direction in which the first slow inroads were made in the decades preceding Nazi rule in Europe. The elimination of Jews from the towns and cities, their exclusion from urban occupations, from positions of influence and authority and their decimation in numbers were essentially the catastrophic materialization on a grand scale of a "natural" trend which was already to be observed in the inter-war years, but which might not have materialized without the Nazi "flood." Because it was to a certain degree a "finishing job," its results may be more nearly final than those of a catastrophe of another character.

The decimation in numbers, uprooting and loss of property and capital will preclude the Jewish group in Central Europe from again attaining a leading position in the economic, political and cultural life of Central European countries. Jews in this region, so far as we know, now generally seek employment in manual work, in agriculture, etc. There is little prospect for the future of being able to transfer to other occupations, as they did on other occasions after a calamity, since the tendencies of regimentation and autarchy, which in the pre-war years favored the exclusion of the Jews, are now on the increase. It seems that only in Hungary and Rumania, where the number of Jews is still quite considerable and their percentage in the population amounts to 2.2% and 2.8% respectively, they try again to take up positions in commerce and similar urban functions.⁵⁹

Moreover, the non-Jewish population, which in many cases collaborated with the Nazis insofar as the elimination of Jews was concerned and which, during these years, became the heirs, physical or economic, of the Jewish functions in trade and other occupations, now views the returning Jews as "intruders" desirous of "eliminating" them from their positions. The anti-Jewish sentiment has, therefore, "survived" the Jews and may not lessen in intensity in the years to come. Before the war it was the non-Jewish newcomers (from the villages or from "lower" occupations) who attempted to force their way into trade, handicrafts and professions by eliminating the Jews, and this resulted in a growing tension. Now it will be the "established" non-Jewish group who will be unwilling to let the Jews in. While this pressure from without will probably make the Jews

⁵⁹ This is also true of the Western European countries—France, Netherlands, Belgium—where during all the years of occupation a wide-spread sentiment for the oppressed Jews could be felt.

more "clannish," causing them to cling together, they have little prospect of developing culturally and socially as a group. The "numbers" are against any such development. Neither can they develop in an atmosphere of pogroms. Returning from Poland, a social worker recently pictured all the Jews in the country with their luggage packed ready to move away if given the opportunity of migrating and building a new life in the free atmosphere of a new country. The majority of the Jews of Central Europe given the above conditions would probably emigrate and endeavor to build for themselves a new future. If such opportunities are not given them, some individuals brought into movement by their wanderings and sufferings, mostly the young and energetic ones, whose number may amount to tens of thousands, will probably try to penetrate into Palestine and other countries illegally; or they will drift from the border of one country to another, while others remain in the countries of their recent domicile, wandering from one place to another.

The historian will be tempted to find similarity between the recent situation of the Jews of Central Europe and that of about three centuries ago. Then, too, they were decimated—in Germany during the Thirty Years' War, in Poland and the Ukraine during the Cossack massacres, and the Polish-Swedish wars—hundreds of Jewish communities were destroyed and refugees reached as far as the Netherlands and Italy. The tendency to seek security in a new country, especially in Palestine, grew at that time, too, and served as the basis for a Messianic movement,⁶⁰ toward "return" to Palestine. When these enthusiasms died down, Jews began again to develop their opportunities and, as we have seen, made the new situation a beginning for the later development in the nineteenth century.

It is, of course, hard to predict what will happen in two or three centuries. But in this comparison, we should not forget that the events of the seventeenth century brought financial ruin to the Jewish community organization in Poland, from which they never again recovered. In the end the impoverishment became a cause of inner social strain and finally led to dissolution. Most important, however, in such historical comparisons, one should not forget that it was the later industrialization, free trade and enlightenment which opened the doors for the Jews and afforded them opportunities of which nobody could have dreamt in the seventeenth century. If atomic energy, or some new unforeseen invention, should cause such a revolution in the economic situation of Europe as did industrialization and the introduction of steam power and electricity, the lot of the Jews may

⁶⁰ Sabbatai Zevi, 1666, developed in the Near East and Greece, but involved a great part of European Jewry.

be somehow entirely different from what it seems now, and they may attain again, in the framework of a revived Europe, unforeseen heights. In Europe, however, as it now exists, the events of the last years seem to have reduced the Jewish group to an unimportant rôle, and their future in that region appears to be even less rosy than that of the general population.

NEW YORK CITY

NOTES

The following note, taken from the "Chłopski Sztandar," Warsaw, February 3, 1946, shows the agricultural situation in Poland as to seedings and probable harvests, and the conditions regarding livestock. The figures speak eloquently for themselves.

Seedings and harvests of principal crops cultivated in Poland.

The total cultivated area within the present Polish borders amounts to: 16.668.000 ha.

*Seedings of principal crops as to area calculated in thousands of ha.**

	<i>Within the present borders but without reclaimed territories.</i>		<i>Over reclaimed territories.</i>	
	in 1938	in 1945	in 1938	in 1945
Wheat	981.2	723.0	365.0	315.0
Rye	3,965.3	3,212.0	1,448.2	1,368.0
Barley	679.8	470.0	362.4	35.0
Oats	1,316.4	1,068.0	627.4	60.0
Seed mixture	111.0	111.0	190.3	31.3
Buckwheat & millet	114.5	114.5	3.1	2.0
Potatoes	1,925.0	1,396.7	812.4	179.7
Sugar beets	114.2	98.0	106.1	4.0
	9,207.4	7,193.2	3,914.9	1,995.0
	100%	78%	100%	51%

Estimated harvest of principal crops in thousands of tons.

	<i>Within the present borders but without reclaimed territories.</i>		<i>Over reclaimed territories.</i>	
	in 1938	in 1945	in 1938	in 1945
Wheat	1,218.0	687.0	740.0	30.0
Rye	4,642.0	3,115.0	2,106.0	1,215.0
Barley	881.0	437.0	746.0	3.0
Oats	1,636.0	1,175.0	1,194.0	6.0
Seed mixture	144.0	109.0	339.0	3.0
Buckwheat & millet	105.0	77.0	3.0	0.2
Potatoes	24,181.0	12,430.0	13,099.0	25.6
Sugar beets	2,525.0	1,145.0	3,263.0	61.0
	34,732.0	19,175.0	21,487.0	1,574.2
	100%	55%	100%	7.1%

* 1 hectare = 2.47 acres

*Condition regarding live stock.**Within the present borders
but without reclaimed terri-
tories**Rem-
nants**Over reclaimed terri-
tories.**Rem-
nants**in 1938**in 1945**%**in 1938**in 1945**%*

Horses	2,240,920.0	880,000.0	39	922,913.0	90,000.0	10
Cattle	6,348,908.0	2,800,000.0	44	3,665,669.0	300,000.0	8
Pigs	4,781,447.0	1,200,000.0	25	5,013,702.0	200,000.0	4
Sheep	1,018,037.0	204,000.0	20	922,963.0	30,000.0	3
Goats	356,576.0	350,000.0	98	437,797.0	100,000.0	23

A PLEA FOR LUSATIAN INDEPENDENCE

The desire of the Lusatian Sorbs for national existence has been an object of some concern to their neighbor Slavs for many years. It will be remembered that their cause was presented to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, but no action was taken. Their fate under the Hitler régime was considerably worse even than under the Weimar Republic, so that by 1945 Germanization had lessened the numbers of those who were in any real sense conscious of their Slav origin. But since the collapse of Germany, Lusatian political and intellectual leaders have been conducting a campaign both in Czechoslovakia and in Poland for recognition of their Slavic character and their desires for liberation from German pressure.

Visits of committees of Lusatian Sorbs to Prague and Warsaw have been frequently reported in the world press during the months since May, 1945. It has not always been clear whether the Lusatians were united in their aims. Some of them appeared to wish to be united to Czechoslovakia, as the dialect of Upper Lusatia more closely approached Czech than Polish, and the dialect of Lower Lusatia clearly had a more Polish tinge. For a time it looked as if the best solution would be a division between Upper and Lower Lusatia, the former to be incorporated in Czechoslovakia, the latter to be joined contiguously to the newly acquired western territory of Poland.

The most recent *démarche*, however, seems to point in another direction. On Feb. 15, 1946 a Lusatian-Sorb Committee from Budyšin, headed by Wojtěch Delanow-Koczka, presented a memorandum to Stanislaw Szwalbe, Vice-Premier of Poland, in which the following five points, which were supposed to present the aims of the people of the two Lusatias, were made:

1. The acceptance of the Lusatian nation into the UNO.
2. The recognition of the National Lusatian Council as the government of an independent Lusatia.
3. The presentation of the demands of the Lusatian representatives at the coming peace conference.
4. Guarantees by the Allied powers of the independence of Lusatia.
5. The exception of Lusatians from the conditions imposed by the Allied

Control Council in Berlin upon Germans and the issuance of provisional conditions appropriate to a free and independent people

It was reported in the Polish Press on February 18 that Mr. Delanow-Koczka, in his conference with Mr. Szwalbe, estimated the territory inhabited by Lusatian Sorbs between Budyšin and Kottbus (Chociborz) covered approximately 8000 sq. km. and that 800,000 persons lived in the area, of which 500,000 were of Slavic origin. Previous figures as to the number of those who could properly be called Slavic seldom ran higher than 150,000, but it is true that for the most part these latter figures originated in German census calculations. In general German census figures have proven in the past to be more interesting by reason of their artistry than because of their resemblance to the truth. It will be interesting to see how the relative figures for Germans and Slavs in this area change in the coming years.

BOOK REVIEWS

PRINCE HUBERTUS ZU LOEWENSTEIN, *The Germans in History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. Pp. xii, 584. \$5.00

The Germans in History is the history of the Ghibelline tradition, that is the story of the imperial (e.g., universal idea *versus* the nationalist-particularistic idea. The triumph of the latter, in Prince Hubertus' view, ruined the German cause and the German people, to say nothing of the Occidental world. For Germany the equality and co-ordination of the Two Swords was the keystone of the Ghibelline tradition. Under this diversion of rule and up until the time of Gregory VII, the Church forbore to assert temporal power, but: "As soon as the Church reached for the temporal sword, that sword could be turned against her. And the undermining of the prestige of the empire ended by shaking the foundations of all temporal order and, finally, even the unity of the faith" (p. 138). Hence "the world of Occidental man, religiously and politically, would probably have fared better with the Ghibelline teaching" (*ibid*), of which the Germans were the repository, once in deeds, long after of the idea itself. Frederick II was the greatest of the Ghibelline men of action; the men of thought, in whose line of descent Prince Hubertus places himself, rather more naively than pompously, are St. Augustine, Dante, Hegel, and many others of as great or lesser stature.

Many distortions are necessary to fit imperial figures from Otto I and Frederick II to Bismarck, even loosely, into the universal-minded tradition, and the argument is confusing and unconvincing. The treatment of Bismarck and the *Kulturkampf* is surely one of the most extraordinary to be found. Prince Hubertus says that he has, wherever it was physically possible, gone to the documents. To write a telling study, such as he has undertaken, and it is conceivable that something valuable could be done with the subject from an administrative and institutional point of view, he needs to use old documents in a new way and to turn over quite new materials. Political and intellectual history of the old order will not do the trick: a new emphasis, particularly a new emphasis on the "idea," the German "soul," does not prove that the Ghibelline tradition made Germany great in its great period or that it will restore her now. Nor does it have any demonstrable connection with the rather liberal program for a new Germany which the author offers in conclusion.

It is difficult to see how American scholarship can take a book like this seriously. It is probable that it is sincerely done; but it adds nothing to an understanding of Germany or the German people which a social scientist can work with. That Prince Hubertus is a German, a Wittelsbach, a theist, a Roman Catholic, and a conscientious student of Western Europe has not made him *ipso facto* a useful interpreter of any tradition.

Washington, D. C.

PAULINE R. ANDERSON

LONČAR, DRAGOTIN, *The Slovenes: A Social History*, translated by Anthony J. Klančar. Cleveland: American Jugoslav Printing & Publishing Co., 1939. Pp. 77.

Slovenes never in their history succeeded in organizing an independent state of their own, and though they preserved their ethnic identity, they were for centuries split administratively into various units. Moreover, since they came under German political domination early in the Middle Ages, German feudal lords took possession of their country and German craftsmen and merchants laid the foundations of the urban centers in Slovene regions. In this way from early Middle Ages up to the present time, there was a sharp split in the Slovene social structure between the town and the country. At first the urban centers and the nobility were German; the rural areas were Slav. Then the Reformation entered the cities, but the Counter Reformation found support among the peasantry. Following this trend of development, liberal and anti-clerical movements were supported by the urban strata and conservative-Catholic movements by the peasants. Finally the socialist, communist and partisan movements found their leaders and followers mostly in industrial and urban centers and were strongly opposed by the Catholic Church backed by the peasantry. This cultural, social and political background as manifested in the sharp split between the two layers of Slovene population and between two conflicting ideologies and philosophies strongly affected Slovene historical writing according to the camp in which a writer happened to find himself. Thus in Lončar's study on Slovenes' social history, the writer obviously belongs to the anti-clerical camp and finds much to say in favor of Reformation but very little in favor of Catholicism. And though the writer undertook to give an outline of the social history of the Slovenes, he failed to give a picture of the cultural, economic and political development of the Slovene peasantry since the nineteenth century when the Slovene peasantry led by the Catholic clergy and the ideas of "Christian socialism" developed a strong co-operative movement which greatly helped Slovene peasants to emancipate themselves from complete dominance by German and Italian bankers and merchants. Lončar does discuss the peasant rebellions in the Slovene and Croatian lands in the sixteenth century since he believes that these uprisings were stimulated by the ideas of the Reformation.

Like many other "liberals" of his camp Lončar finds the solution of the Slovene social problems in Pan-Slavism (union with other Slavs) and in a planned Yugoslav economy that would exclude Western capital from the country. These and similar ideas among the "liberal" and "leftist" groups in Yugoslavia formed the ideological background of the Partisan movement which took power in Yugoslavia at the end of the second World War. The Partisans government-alized the whole economic life and they also completely regimented the cultural and the political life of the country, a trend of events that was not foreseen by many of those who, like Lončar, expected a millenium in a planned society.

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D. TOMASIC

KACZMARCZYK, ZDZISLAW, *Kolonizacja Niemiecka na Wschodod Odry* (German Colonisation East of the Oder). Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1945. Pp. 267 with maps.

This interesting survey is the work of the former Secretary of the Union of Poles in Germany, a long-time student of the subject. The author rejects from the start the German thesis designed to justify the *Drang nach Osten* of modern times: that in the years before history was written the areas held by the Polish Kingdom since the tenth century were inhabited by Germanic peoples; and he has no lack of evidence to show that reversely the whole of Europe east of the Elbe was for ages in the hands of non-Germans. But he does not waste many pages on this—a fact well-known to all students of prehistoric Europe (witness the place-names)—and plunges at once into his main theme, the infiltration of German elements eastward into Slavonic lands during the latter Middle Ages, which takes up one-third of the book. This movement of population, so highly praised as a national achievement by German historians, had mostly peaceful ends in view, and resulted almost everywhere in the absorption of these desirable elements into the Slav population, whose town life they helped notably to enrich. The single and fateful exception, into which this book does not enter, was the Teutonic Order of Knights of the Cross, who settled on the lower Vistula in 1229 and founded in due course the notorious *Ordensstaat*, which caused endless trouble and did little to spread the Christianity they professed.

Two important points are brought out by the author with regard to German migration eastward: (1) though not opposing it the Polish ruling classes under the Piast dynasty recognized the dangers of, and successfully resisted, the German influence in governmental affairs; and, (2) while the gains accruing in social and economic life from the influx of settlers from the west were undoubted, it is nonsense to argue that civilization was brought to Polish lands only by these Germans. (For many arguments supporting this latter thesis see *Germany and Poland* published in German and English under the editorship of Professor Brackman, München, 1933.) In other words, national sentiments were already strong in the leaders of state and church who guided the Polish Kingdom throughout the Piast dynasty; and, though from time to time overrun by the Tartars, a settled civilization did exist, with both rural and urban institutions, all the way from the Oder to the Dnieper, before the appearance of the *jus teutonicus*. On the other hand, it is true that intermarriage with German princely families was already bringing about the denationalization of some branches of the Piast line. Finally, no one should think of this German movement eastward as something planned or organized as was the latter settlement of the 18th and 19th centuries. Reversely, it was but another expression of the restlessness of western Europe during the centuries of the Crusades, and could be paralleled by what followed three hundred years later—only this time overseas. Its earlier phases carried the Germans to the Oder; its later ones saw them (but in small groups) scattered over the plains of northern Europe even beyond the Vistula. Particulars are

given of all this according to provinces, starting with the whole Oder basin, and its consequences are discussed in Chapter V. The immigration was almost wholly urban in character, and touched the countryside very little; apart from lower Silesia, its numbers were a tiny fraction by comparison with the native Polish population: and during the 16th century even the town-dwelling Germans were almost wholly Polonised.

The second "wave" of migration eastward from the Reich began after Reformation days, and was confined chiefly to the northwestern provinces. It was relatively more numerous than in the Middle Ages, and it was quite as much rural as urban in character. Largely on this account the process of assimilation was less effective than before. In general Poland's powers of resistance in the west were rather weakened by the "orientation toward the east" than they had progressed since the union with Lithuania and Ruthenia: the barriers were down, where they should have been kept in place at all costs. This fact made Frederick II's task much easier from 1740 onwards and his planned colonization of Polish lands was to be only an earnest of more ambitious efforts under Bismarck a century later. Everything was changed by now. Prussia was "starving its way to greatness" (the historic boast!), and the Joint Kingdom was in a state of virtual helplessness. The Partitions were effected while Western Europe was engaged with Napoleon!

The main features of the modern German "thrust toward the East" are set out clearly, but what interested the reviewer more was the author's shrewd account in Chapter X of what Germans have had to say about it all. The "German myth,"—a dream of power and of "manifest destiny" is not new, and there have been Germans who have seen that it could not be squared with any recognition of the right of their Slav neighbors to "a place in the sun": but these have been overridden in modern times by a variety of forces—now spiritual now material, which revealed a complete absence of moral sense. In this unbridled campaign university professors from Mommsen onward have played a part not one whit less inglorious than politicians or journalists. German *kultur* more precisely described as "the German plow," or "German industry" in the theoretical sense, or "German law and order" was idolized and its mission identified with the Divine Economy for Europe. Of this an extreme example appeared in the work of Kurt Lücke, a Poznanian (Polish) citizen, whose *Deutsche Aufbaukräfte in der Entwicklung Polens* (1934) surpassed in its conceit anything done before. For him even Jan Długosz was a German, as well as Rej and many another Pole of distinction (he wouldn't consider even discussing the case of Copernicus!) Whatever in Modern Poland is worthwhile should be ascribed to German initiative! Incidentally, we had heard this same tale in 1933 at the Congress of Historians in Warsaw from the late Professor Hotsch!

"The glory is departed from Israel!" is the reflection forced on one after reading these pages. Whether one agrees with what has now been done or not

to "restore the balance" between German and Slav, one must regret that a great people was thus led astray for centuries, and that it has all ended with Rosenberg sitting in the dock at Nürnberg! What will the next phase be?

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EBENSTEIN, WILLIAM, *The German Record. A Political Portrait*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc. Pp. 395. \$3.00.

This book is, from several points of view, a valuable diagnosis of the basic German political problem, which is, as many have pointed out, the time-lag in the achievement of status as a nation. It also has some valuable things to say about the social conflicts of the nineteenth century, even if the author is so firmly committed to the "Jeffersonian view" that it is sometimes difficult to see whether he is on the plain and homely ground of history or whether he is soaring into speculative mid-air. Again and again one is struck by the breadth of his reading. But in a moment he will have carried himself, at least, away on the wings of a whopping generalization. Thus the decimation of the German populace during the Thirty Years' War is attributed to a native gift for internecine slaughter. One fancies that the careful historian will attribute some of this murderous success to the French and the Swedes, even while bearing in mind that neither the campaigns against the Huguenots nor the wars against the Irish were bloodless picnics. Or again, on a less sanguinary level, one reads: "While Emile Zola fought against inequality and injustice in his great novels . . . Friedrich Nietzsche taught the Germans to admire strength and despise 'all philosophies of the weak.'" But one cannot wholly forget that at about the same time Hauptmann was writing the *Weavers*, with considerably greater social effect than attended the publication of Zola's "great novels." Even more notable is the war-time coloring which tinges Mr. Ebenstein's reflections. The Nazis were a gang of desperados, to be sure, and their crimes are legion. Yet it is seldom safe to write contemporary history while the cannon are booming, and Mr. Ebenstein's book is hardly an exception. He is certain, for example, that Germany shared in hatching the Pearl Harbor plot. We now know, curiously enough, that it did not. In short, this book is war-time literature which came too late, and history which appeared too soon.

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GEORGE N. SHUSTER

EYCK, ERICH, *Bismarck: Leben und Werk*. Erlenbach-Zürich, 1941-44. 3 vols. Vol. I, pp. 679; Vol. II, pp. 630; Vol. III, pp. 687.

The publication of these three large volumes on Bismarck justifies an assay of the main lines of our knowledge about this personality and his achievements. This biography, the most critical which has been written, is based on a study of all the essential source material and the best monographs, and reveals the author's close acquaintance with the dozens of references which he gives at

the back of each volume. While the parts vary in quality, the entire work arouses the reader's admiration.

The present biography reflects sharply the amount of Bismarckian history which recent history has taught us. But it approaches the relationship of the two periods with such reticence and caution that the reader is aware of it almost entirely through the distribution of emphasis upon the phases of Bismarck's life. The volumes contain remarkably few generalizations about the effect of the Bismarckian period upon the subsequent course of Germany and world history, and those few are not elaborated upon. In the main they amount to a historical indictment of the achievements of Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm I in the name of the enduring qualities of liberty.

After World War I the research and writing on Bismarck concentrated mainly on diplomatic relations. Students of the question of war guilt neglected problems of internal German history. Emphasis has been shifted by the violent career of Nazism to the study of the social, economic, cultural and political structure and character of German life and to the similarities and the differences between it and the life of other countries. For practical reasons of policy toward Germany, as well as for the satisfaction of historical curiosity, we need to explain as far as we can how a phenomenon like Nazism came to be. One is forced back to the Bismarckian period for an understanding of the basic structure and character of Germany's present-day internal life. In spite of the transformations since 1918, the present elements of German society, except for the proletariat, obtained their relative weight and influence at the hands of Bismarck. While he did not create these elements, he fixed the general limits of their power within the state. The internal history of Germany since his day is largely that of the struggle between some elements to preserve and others radically to change the Bismarckian distribution of social forces.

The analysis of Bismarck's diplomacy provides one of the strongest features of the present biography. A rich literature on the subject helped to make this excellence possible. The author handles with particular effectiveness the diplomatic events of the Empire by showing more successfully than anyone else has done the intimate relationship between internal political affairs and foreign policy. For this period he attributes to internal policy the dominant influence over foreign affairs, and he discloses the remarkable extent to which Bismarck exploited foreign policy for winning election campaigns and maintaining his own power within the Reich. While he admires Bismarck's brilliant handling of foreign relations, he also argues persuasively that on certain occasions Bismarck made serious mistakes. The latter's success at utilizing even his mistakes for subsequent victories, Eyck states, does not detract from the initial fact of their having been mistakes. "*Wer die Geschichte nur unter ästhetischen Gesichtspunkten betrachtet, muss Bismarck die höchste, uneingeschränkte Bewunderung zollen*" (II, 487), he writes. (*Italics the author's*).

Eyck treats in full detail Bismarck's training in foreign relations prior to 1862 and the diplomacy of his most creative period from then until the founding of

the Empire; but the chapters on the first two wars lack the originality of those on the later period. The treatment of Bismarck's development from Junker to statesman does not compare favorably in quality with Srbik's exhaustive study of Metternich. The drama of the diplomacy of the wars of 1864 and 1866 fails to appear; the reader frequently loses his way in details, where he cannot feel the moments of tension or follow Bismarck's grandiose plans.

In fact, the first two volumes suffer from one fundamental defect, a defect the more extraordinary because the last volume reveals almost no trace of it. The first two volumes overemphasize diplomatic history. In spite of their length they lack the balance of Ziekursch's first volume. Eyck treats the profound social and political and above all the moral significance of the constitutional conflict in Prussia with too great brevity, slighting the fact that this period witnessed the most courageous and powerful attempt in German history to align Prussia and the rest of Germany with the liberalism of the West. The intelligent and vigorous line-up of bourgeoisie and aristocrats in the *Deutsche Fortschritts-partei*, the *National Verein*, the Chambers of Commerce, the *Kongress Deutscher Volkswirte*, and in similar other organizations formed the backbone of this attempt. Eyck might well have enlarged upon the efforts of these groups and reduced the space given to diplomatic history, for from their midst came what Eyck later calls some of the potentially most able talent to be found in any country, talent which Bismarck blighted in the bud. The constitutional conflict in Prussia rather than the political crisis of 1878-9 proved to be decisive for the character of Germany. Any treatment of this crucial period should analyze the strength, plans, and effectiveness of the liberals, and should offer a full analysis of their struggle with Bismarck and the forces of reaction. Only in this way will Bismarck's diplomatic victories and the accompanying military conquests gain their full dramatic quality as victories over both internal and foreign enemies, over both the will and political morality of the German people and the armies of the opposing powers.

The failure to give due attention to the internal conflict in Prussia points the way to the areas of research which must be explored. Since Bismarck conditioned so profoundly the character and institutions of Germany, an adequate biography should be based on an analysis of the social elements, the institutional structure, the military and economic forces, the popular habits and attitudes with which he had to deal. No comprehensive study of any social group in his period, with the possible exception of the proletariat, exists at present to make possible an evaluation of the relative strength of these forces. Eyck frequently cites Bismarck's estimate of these social groups; but one does not know whether Bismarck spoke judiciously or with his usual sarcasm. One does not know what rôle these groups occupied in German life. Another area to be explored and one closely related to the first is that of the position and rôle of the various institutions—the monarchy, the army, the bureaucracy, the representative assembly, the government—in German life. And a third area, not to mention more, includes the rise and change in function of relatively new types in German life,

such as the politician, the newspaper editor and his assistants. It would be essential to know how much Bismarck understood of the forces with which he was dealing, especially from the standpoint of the long-run effects of his action upon them. Eyck is probably correct in his view that Bismarck's reactions to these social and institutional forces typified essentially those of a Junker who concerned himself with them only to the extent necessary for exercising power over them for his own purposes. Bismarck seems to have been particularly ignorant of and unconcerned about economic developments, and Eyck gives us almost nothing about the expanding economic factors with which Bismarck had to deal. The astonishing story of Bismarck's relations to the Reichstag discloses a lack on his part of understanding and consideration of the fundamental political and governmental forces in German life. One needs to know whether Bismarck stood alone in this deficiency.

All in all Eyck offers just enough detail and analysis, especially of the institutional structure, to deepen the impression that we are still judging this Germany too much according to the constitutional, institutional, and social standards of the West. A detailed analysis of each of the ingredients—its forms of behavior, its structure, the solidity and security of its place in German life—must be made before we can judge the mixture of Junkerism, liberalism, socialism that constituted the Germany created under Bismarck's direction. To offer one example: the Prussian ministry and the Reich Chancellery cannot be understood by analogies with contemporary English or American institutions. The open criticism and verbal knifing of colleagues on the part of Prussian ministers may be best explained on grounds of the youth and social setting of the ministry and its kinship with the former royal cabinet of private advisers. Eyck does not go very far into these problems of constitutional and administrative organization.

The author's superb portrayal of Bismarck's relations with the Emperor, the main figures at court, a few of his most important colleagues and a few of the influential leaders in the Reichstag needs to be supplemented by studies of his relations to the larger forces in German society. The tendency of a biography of Bismarck to become a general history of Germany for his period can be kept in check by a functional treatment of the interrelationship of Bismarck and the social forces and institutions with which he had to deal and which were influenced by him. Only in this way can one evaluate his rôle in history.

The author constantly examines the problem of Bismarck's political and social morality. He does so in brilliant pages which are among the most interesting ever written about this personality. He supplies the detailed evidence time after time of the meaning of *Realpolitik*, as applied by Bismarck in his relations with foreign countries, with the Emperor, with leaders of the Reichstag, with his own family, indeed, with anyone and with any institution. Time after time he proves that Bismarck lied, that he pursued with all the power at his disposal (and who had more?) his opponents both alive and dead. He prevented his son from marrying a young woman who belonged to a family of political opponents. Not even the Tsar Alexander III trusted him. Eyck goes so far as to assert that:

"Das Element der Herrschaft spielt in seinem Kopf eine grossere Rolle als das der nationalen Einheit" (III, 381). The cumulative effect of Eyck's detailed treatment is convincing and devastating to the personal reputation of Bismarck. I believe that the rise of Nazism did not influence the author in blackening this picture: it merely emphasized the need to explore these aspects and to utilize the voluminous evidence in print supplied by Bismarck's colleagues. Some of the most surprising passages in the third volume are statements by colleagues and admirers of Bismarck about the necessity of ousting him from power. These statements were made by good conservatives, men like Theodore Fontane, as well as by political leaders, men who were alarmed over the influence of Bismarck upon German political and social life. In August 1893 Fontane wrote as follows:

Du fragst wegen Bismarck . . . Das ewige sich auf den Biedermeier und Waisenknaben hin Ausspielen ist grässlich, und man muss sich immer wieder das Riesengrosse zurückrufen, was er genialisch zusammengemogelt hat, um durch diese von den krassesten Widersprüchen getragenen Mogeleien nicht abgestossen zu werden. Er ist die denkbar interessanteste Figur. Ich kenne keine interessantere; aber dieser beständige Hang die Menschen zu betrügen, dies vollendete Schlaubergertum ist mir eigentlich widerwärtig, und wenn ich mich aufrichten, erheben will, so muss ich doch auf andere Helden blicken. Dem Zweckdienlichen alles unterordnen, ist überhaupt ein furchtbarer Standpunkt, und bei ihm ist nun alles noch mit so viel Persönlichem und geradezu Hässlichem untermischt, mit Beifallsbedürftigkeit, unbedingtem Glauben an das Recht jeder Laune, jedes Einfalls und kolossaler Happigkeit. Seine aus jedem Satz sprechende Genialität enzücht mich immer wieder, schmeisst immer wieder meine Bedenken über den Haufen; aber bei ruhigem Blut sind die Bedenken doch immer wieder da. Nirgends ist ihm ganz zu trauen (III, 626).

The effect of Bismarck's actions upon the political standards and habits of the German people needs to be explored further in an independent volume. One could study the question objectively with the aid of methods supplied by the social sciences. Although the methodological problems cannot be discussed here, I suggest that a study of this topic would go beyond Eyck's analysis of Bismarck's political morality to that of his allies and opponents, the approximation of the latter's methods to Bismarck's or the reverse, and the subsequent history on a comparative basis of these practices and attitudes, including those of the Nazi period. As a side light the validity of the remark that Bismarck's diplomatic methods did not differ from those of his contemporaries in other countries needs to be explored. It is unfortunate that Eyck did not draw more conclusions than he does from his previous study of Gladstone.

Eyck deals with another subject at many points and in a most revealing way, namely, with Bismarck's relation with people, his treatment of colleagues, of foreign personages, of subordinates. A systematic analysis of this subject would be richly rewarding. A statesman must be able to handle people, and the quality and endurance of his achievements depend to a large extent upon his ability to do so. One need not be frightened by the prospect of a vague and unhistorical psychoanalytic product: Heinrich Friedjung made a highly interesting

and useful study of the Emperor Francis Joseph along these lines without the aid of psychoanalysis. Some knowledge of modern psychology, however, would have greatly improved his essay and would be essential for one on Bismarck. This kind of study would clear up many problems, including the accuracy of the assertion that Bismarck dealt most effectively with monarchs and aristocrats.

It is impossible to comment on many problems taken up in this large work. The reader's attention should be called to a few other superb analyses: those of the Kulturkampf, the history of the laws against the Socialists, the success of Bismarck in breaking up not merely the Liberal political power but also that of the old Conservatism and substituting *Interessenpolitik* for idealism. Bismarck's fear of the old Emperor's death and the possible effect of this upon his position, Bismarck's open use of his governmental authority to further his own economic interests and to attack his personal opponents. I commend the biography to the reader as a stimulating and rewarding venture, and I hope that Volume III will find a translator and publisher.

My review copy of the third volume was marred by the omission of certain pages at some of the most interesting points.

Throughout the three volumes Eyck keeps in the center of attention the personality of Bismarck. He reveals more of its facets with more convincing detail than any other work does. Eyck has achieved an evaluation of this complicated individual which persuades the reader of its fairness. One sees him struggling with the problem in the account of each episode. When the end of the third volume is reached, one is willing to accept his conclusion:

Aber niemand, wo immer er steht, kann verkennen, dass er [Bismarck] die zentrale und beherrschende Figur seiner Zeit ist und mit ungeheurer Kraft und tyrannischer Energie ihr die Wege gewiesen hat. Und niemand kann sich der faszinierenden Anziehungskraft dieses Menschen entziehen, der im guten wie im bösen immer eigenartig und immer bedeutend ist. Er konnte geschmeidig sein wie ein Höfling, fein und geistreich wie ein Marquis der alten Schule, spöttisch und satirisch wie Heinrich Heine, zartfühlend und weich wie ein Poet—aber auch hart und brutal wie ein Despot der Renaissance, verschlagen wie ein Fuchs, und mutig wie ein Löwe. Grösseren Reichtum hat die Natur nur selten in einer Person vereinigt. Aber den Sinn für Recht und Gerechtigkeit hat sie ihm versagt (III, 638).

Washington, D. C.

EUGENE N. ANDERSON

JANOWSKI, OSCAR, *Nationalities and National Minorities*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945. Pp. 323. \$2.75.

After the last war it was widely held that the application of the principle of self-determination coupled with an international system of minority protection would bring peace to the world and, particularly to the troubled area of east-central Europe. These optimistic expectations have not been realized. In the present volume the author examines in detail the reasons why the post-war minority regulation failed and he proposes instead an alternative solution.

Westerners, because of the fortunate circumstances in their own countries, are prone to judge minority problems of east-central Europe from the point of view of the success of the national state which they know. Yet for good or for ill, the assimilating processes which have made for homogeneity in the west and, particularly, in America were lacking and are lacking for the mosaic of peoples in the region between the Baltic and the Black Sea. Memories of the forced and futile attempts at Prussianization, Russification, and Magyarization linger on—not to speak of the more recent gruesome experiences. None of the smaller nations in turn is capable of forming a national state and assimilating to it the remaining minorities living in its territory. The whole post-war system of minority protection aimed at toleration rather than at equality. Being drafted by westerners it assumed that minorities would disappear in the long run. Even before the Hitlerian conflagration they showed few signs of voluntary surrender. Their very existence burdened the national states and the international guarantee for minorities was considered a discriminatory inroad into national sovereignty.

Economic necessities call for the creation of larger and, therefore, inevitably multi-national regions. The author, because of humanitarian considerations, rejects the idea of large-scale compulsory transfers and exchanges of populations such as were effected between Turkey and Greece in the 1920's. The solution which he suggests is more historically organic and less violently radical and should give—if it works—more satisfaction to the groups and to the individuals concerned. The new approach is called "national federalism," a term for which the author acknowledges his indebtedness to Dr. James Shotwell, who has written the preface to the book. National federalism would try to reinforce cultural rights of the national group as a whole and would not limit itself to the protection of the traditional freedoms of the individual. Cultural autonomy on the part of any sizable minority in the troubled area would, in the opinion of the author, lead to a reconciliation of the national minority to the state in which he lives.

In support of his thesis Dr. Janowski gives an interesting survey of the multi-national developments of Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, and the Soviet Union. Their respective historic evolutions and solutions are, of course, quite different. All of them, however, have reached a harmonious pattern of multi-national co-operation and all of them have gone through long periods of internal strife and national frustration. Their successful endeavor should give cause for thought and, perhaps, also for hope.

The author proposes that international guarantees for minorities should be extended to all states which have in recent years pursued oppressive policies toward national, racial, or religious minorities. It is further suggested that the United Nations Organization should be represented by expert agents on the spot who should collaborate with the various groups so that the international instances would not have to wait until an actual conflict had arisen. In this scheme of things even the German and Hungarian minorities of east-central

Europe would, after a considerable period of probation, be given their place in the enlarged regions of economic unity and national federalism.

The time has come when east-central Europe has to be reorganized. The time has also come when the Great Powers should start to think less in terms of zones of interest and more in terms of organic growth. In this respect the present volume offers a completely novel but nonetheless thoughtful proposition which is based upon a thorough familiarity with the local problems and upon a judicious appreciation of its international implications. "Peace," in the words of the author, "is not menaced by the outcry of the minority, but by the persecution of which it is the victim."

Sumner Welles and James Shotwell are much impressed by the present thesis. So will others be. It may indeed be hoped that this small volume, written with a facile pen and supported by powerful arguments, may find a large circle of readers and may leave an impact upon public opinion.

Michigan State College

HANS L. LEONHARDT

SPROUT, HAROLD and MARGARET, *Foundations of National Power: Readings on World Politics and American Security*. Princeton University Press, 1946. Pp. 774. \$4.25

During the war years the United States Navy organized a course in world affairs as part of the V-12 program at six universities: California, North Carolina, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Princeton and Yale. In order to supply students with authoritative background material and reasonably up-to-date commentaries and analyses a comprehensive body of readings was compiled and progressively revised in the light of teaching experience. With the aid and advice of all the academicians participating in the enterprise, Professor Harold Sprout (who taught the course at Princeton) and his wife have edited and assembled these readings in a stout volume which is admirably adapted for use as a reference work or textbook for college and university courses in international politics.

All symposia have the defects of their virtues and *vice versa*. Problems of selection, organization and integration are invariably difficult. The Sprouts have faced their difficulties boldly and have come closer to overcoming them than do most editors of works of this type. The material is grouped in five major parts: "Bases of International Politics," "The European Realm of the Great Powers," "The Afro-Asian Realm of Rival Imperialisms," "The American Realm Between Europe and Asia" and "Foundations of Peace and a New World Order." In a new age in which the truly "Great" Powers are reduced to three, a good case could be made for organizing such of the data as deserves a geographical frame of reference around the security zones and spheres of influence of the United States, the British Empire and Commonwealth and the Soviet Union. But the Sprouts have done well with the scheme they have adopted.

The volume suffers, to be sure, from the lack of any bibliography and from an index which is too sketchy to be useful. Since the book apparently

went to press before VJ-Day, the challenge of the atomic age is not dealt with. Readers of this Journal, moreover, will doubtless feel that Central Europe, outside of Germany, is woefully neglected in the apportionment of space. Most of the excerpts, however, are wisely chosen and are reproduced on double-column pages which make for easier reading. They are preceded, followed and held together by editorial commentaries of exceptional relevance and clarity. There are maps and charts from a variety of sources. The hundred writers represented in the volume include Sumner Welles, Wendell Willkie, Nicholas Spykman, André Siegfried, Sir Halford J. Mackinder, Walter Lippmann and sundry geographers, journalists, historians and political scientists. Pending the appearance of a comprehensive text on world politics in the epoch of UNO and U-235, *Foundations of National Power* fills a long neglected gap in the current literature of international relations.

Williams College

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

COBBAN, ALFRED, *National Self-Determination*. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp. 182. \$4.50

In this penetrating exposition of the subject, Dr. Cobban tries to rescue the principle of national self-determination from the disrepute into which it had fallen between the two world wars by devising what the reviewer might call a formula for salvage. Recognizing that this principle as presented to the world during the Paris Peace Conference could not find fulfillment, and yet that it is a spiritual force which cannot be wished away, the author searches the records to find the lowest common denominator for the reconstruction of an adequate theory of national self-determination.

The method used by Dr. Cobban dictates the arrangement of material. He explores first the manner in which national self-determination has worked out in a practical world. This requires synthesis of the meaning of the term against a background of compromise at the peace conference and the subsequent oppression of national minorities by the new nation-states. The theory, he thinks, has proved to be unworkable. The conference left with the world the impression that national self-determination was the basic ideal upon which it made the settlement. The Germans, Russians, Poles and Ruthenians, who, through the settlement, now became disembodied minorities under the rule of those who previously had been minorities, knew better. The difference between the principle and the practice brought about a disillusionment which Dr. Cobban thinks is primarily responsible for the ultimate failure of the League. Further he thinks they are "profoundly mistaken" who argue that the Versailles settlement sacrificed economic and political considerations to the exclusive demands of the principle of self-determination. Actually no one principle guided their determinations, and "the more we study the work of the Peace Conference, the less it seems to have been under the control of the principle of self-determination" (p. 34). The real danger lay in advertising this idealistic and impractical principle as the basis

of the settlement and then departing from it to the extent that minorities could successfully call it a fraud.

This lays the foundation for the most important part of the book—a reconsideration of the theory. He disposes of the notion that national self-determination is an absolute right. Then follows an excellent analysis of the several versions of the interrelation between nation and state. In central Europe it had been too generally accepted that every nation had the democratic right to become a state in spite of the difficulty in defining a nation. Cobban demonstrated previously that this was unworkable in practice; now he demonstrates with equal vigor and clarity that the nation does not necessarily precede the state, rather that nations are more frequently welded together by the machinery of the state. Under the old theory, self-determination, a democratic ideal, has in practice become national determinism, which is a perversion of the former leading directly to the denial of democratic rights to other minorities.

The upshot of all this is a pragmatic theory, characteristically English, lacking the pompous metaphysics and logical schema of the European theorists. He finds three major elements in the theory of self-determination—nationality, democracy, and sovereignty. In his restatement he would keep the first two and drop or modify the third. "The conclusion which seems to be forced on us is the abandonment of the idea of national sovereignty" (p. 73). If every cultural group insists upon becoming a state, this will lead only to national and international disaster.

Therefore, since economic and political stability seem to thrive better in states of reasonably large size, cultural or racial groups should seek autonomy within these larger units. Should "the national demands of Wales, White Russia, Alsace, or Flanders . . . be met by the granting of political independence?" The answer to this should be yes only where the conflict between the minority and the state is so deep seated that no other recourse is possible. Otherwise, the demands of national minorities should be met by something short of absolute national sovereignty.

The remainder of the book is so organized as to elaborate this thesis wherever such problems still remain. He turns to the problems and experience of the British Commonwealth, the United States, and Soviet Russia. After these come the special cases of China, India, and the Arab World. One chapter is devoted to self-determination as a regional problem; another to national independence and economic interdependence.

Dr. Cobban has made a useful contribution in his clarification of the implications of national determinism. He has done here what pragmatists generally have been doing to the impractical and pompous claims of the system builders. He tears down but does not fail to reconstruct. It is no reflection upon the value of his theory to doubt whether those nurtured in the cult of national determinism will be responsive to such a compromise. Just when we are striving for one world, the balkanization of politics goes on apace everywhere. The tendency for political parties to become more doctrinaire, for the people within

a nation-state to break down into Left and Right, no less than self-determination, is part of the same process of disintegration. Only the future can tell whether we are living in a world where constructive suggestions such as these can ever secure a foothold.

University of Colorado

CLAY P. MALICK

HEBERLE, RUDOLF, *From Democracy to Nazism: a Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945. Pp. ix, 130. \$2.50.

This study attempts to explain why "freedom-loving North Germans, who were not at all accustomed to a tradition of authoritarian government, should have trusted a man like Hitler and his party." It also seeks to determine whether the Nazi regime was "an outgrowth of permanent dispositions and characteristics of the German people" or an "anomalous phenomenon."

To accomplish these objectives Professor Heberle has concentrated his attention upon "Political Movements among the Rural People in Schleswig-Holstein, 1918 to 1932" (chapter III) and "The Ecology of Political Parties in Schleswig-Holstein" (chapter IV). These two chapters form the heart of the book and present interesting data which have been thoughtfully interpreted. By focusing attention upon Schleswig-Holstein the author has examined in detail social, economic, and political life in that area. In the analysis of the *Schleswig-Holsteinische Landespartei* it is seen how a group which espoused *laissez faire* economics and helped to neutralize the Communists simultaneously prepared ideological ground for the Nazis by its political concept of the state and its anti-Semitism. A more striking correlation in ideology and tactics is apparent between the Nazi and *Landvolk* movements, the latter originating in the summer of 1928 when some farmers refused to pay taxes. The *Landvolk* embraced terrorism, and both professional revolutionists and farmers practiced it. It was, therefore, not unexpected that many *Landvolk* members joined the National Socialists. With much evidence of this kind, the conclusion that such elements of National Socialist doctrine as the "neo-romantic conception of the social order . . . postulating an ideal state based on the 'community of the people,'" and "counter-revolutionary syndicalism" had wide acceptance before the National Socialists consolidated their strength, seems unassailable.

The chapter dealing with the ecology of political parties in Schleswig-Holstein throws additional light upon the problem. First, however, a point dedicated to clarification. The author defines "ecology" as "denoting the study of distribution and constellations of social phenomena in space; that is, it refers to the observation and analysis of social facts in a given area or territory and in their co-existence and inter-relatedness" (p. 90f). This is somewhat at variance with the usual (biological) connotation of the term "ecology" or "bionomics." What Professor Heberle has actually done is to analyze statistically the voting in Schleswig-Holstein between 1919 and 1932. Various categories have been created and the votes within them tabulated. The results are interesting. ". . . The

agricultural workers and other wage earners, held firmly to one of two Socialist parties while the middle and upper strata, especially the supposedly ideal backbone of democracy—the family farmer—swayed from left to right like reeds in the wind and finally supported a political movement which was diametrically opposed to their own political tradition" (p. 119). This result is attributed to the possession of a political philosophy by the workers. The action of the middle classes is explained by inadequate faith in the Weimar Republic and by the materialistic interests of the class.

In the concluding pages Professor Heberle emphasizes the converse of his problem: the driving force of the Nazis with their methods of intimidation. He expects the "new democratic Germany" to be forged by the industrial and labor classes who actively opposed the Nazis. Though the author has not definitely stated his belief in one or another of his opposing hypotheses, the balance of evidence would indicate that the Nazi régime was *not* an "anomalous phenomenon" but an outgrowth of permanent characteristics. Much thoughtful evidence is brought to bear on this point. The scope of the study, however, limits its conclusiveness. The testing of one of the premises—that North Germans were freedom-loving and unaccustomed to a tradition of authoritarian government—might yield results which could modify the conclusions.

Though much research technique and thought have been exhibited, the work would be more useful to scholars if provided with an index. Likewise, the reader would be less burdened if chapter III were reorganized and rewritten. The style could be improved throughout.

The book is well worth the attention the serious student of Germany will give it.

University of Colorado

RICHARD M. BRACE

GONELLA, GUIDO, *A World to Reconstruct: Pius XII on Peace and Reconstruction*. Tr. by T. Lincoln Bouscaren. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1944. Pp. xxx, 335. \$3.50

The past five years have seen the publication of three extremely useful manuals elucidating the papal position toward world problems. In 1941 A. C. F. Beals offered the British public his scholarly and penetrating analysis, *The Catholic Church and International Order*. 1944 brought Philip Hughes' guide to the social encyclicals of recent pontiffs, *The Popes' New Order*, and Fr. Bouscaren's translation of Dr. Gonella's *A World to Reconstruct*. The last named, in the words of Cardinal Stritch, "explains and interprets the statements of the Pope in the relation to many problems which face the peacemakers. . ."

This book, one of a projected two volume study, by a capable international lawyer and editor of the Vatican house organ, *Osservatore Romano*, is an evaluation of the first five points of each of the Christmas homilies of Pius XII for the years 1939, 1940 and 1941. In two appendices at the end are excerpts from these messages and the complete texts of the 1942 and 1943 discourses. Originally these materials were printed in the *Osservatore* between January and May, 1942,

as separate articles. Each was approved and some were actually annotated by His Holiness before being published.

Dr. Gonella begins by calling for the reform of international moral practice in the light of papal pronouncements. His thesis is that "the system of relations between peoples cannot be reformed without reforming the spirit of men; laws cannot be reformed without a reform of morals." To secure this end there must be victories over hate and distrust, the narrow utilitarian spirit, and reliance on force as an instrument of national polity. After demonstrating the necessity for the reform of international moral usages on the basis of Church teaching, Gonella proceeds to outline at length the papal platform for the rebuilding of world order. This includes protection of minorities, economic co-operation among peoples, abolition of total war, encouragement of disarmament, respect for treaty obligations, and elimination of religious persecutions. The Pope accepts the need for some society of nations, for juridical institutions and for suitable methods for equitable revision for international obligations. He is deeply concerned over past failures in world federation and the crisis of the treaty system.

This handbook is not so much an exact blueprint for world reconstruction as it is a set of guiding principles that are pre-conditions to the creation of a workable world organization. As such the volume will be of immense value to those who are or will be called on to assist in making the United Nations Organization work and to draft the treaties of peace.

A World to Reconstruct, although handicapped by lack of any index, is presented in carefully arranged form. It is a "must" book for any library's purchase list.

University of Miami

DUANE KOENIG

The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943. Edited by Hugh Gibson. Introduction by Sumner Welles. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1946. Pp. xxxi, 584. \$4.00.

Perhaps the best description of this book is contained in the final entry: "They [these notes] do not, therefore, form part of a book, but rather the raw material from which a book could have been prepared later" (Dec. 23, 1943, pp. 580-81). Obviously, the Foreign Minister of Italy from 1936 to 1943, the period during which Count Ciano filled that office, could tell us much of both interest and importance. But the quotation above is a measure of the limitations of the book. We look in vain for new revelations, for, on most important occasions, Count Ciano's usual remark is that his report has been filed elsewhere, while he confines himself to comments on circumstances, personalities, and various trivia.

The greatest value of the book lies in the internal view which it gives of the Axis and of the Italian régime. Here again, no startling revelations are to be found, but we have the testimony of a witness of the first importance. The cavalier manner in which Germany treated her weaker partner is abundantly

documented. Time and again Germany initiated action and her decision was conveyed to Ciano—usually in the middle of the night—by the German envoy in Rome. One of the neatest gems is the statement that Mussolini, despite his violent pro-Germanism, "fears that the Germans are getting ready to ask for the Alto Adige" (June 30, 1941, p. 372). It was fitting that the relations between Nazism and Fascism should be characterized by such trust and delicacy.

But the German attitude toward Italy, if crude, was founded on an essentially sound estimate of the accomplishments of Fascism. The book conveys throughout a picture of the weakness of Italy and of the inefficiency of the régime which can only be described as appalling. Never has better evidence been given of the absurdity of the Italian attempts at economic autarchy or at playing with visions of being a first-class imperial power. One of the major deterrents from action on the part of the Italian navy was the prosaic shortage of fuel. The state of Italian production and, as a consequence, of the military forces and their equipment, was truly pitiful; the ridiculous performance of the Greek war was an adequate reflection of this state of affairs.

Native material resources were scant enough. The quality of the human material that was supposed to organize them was on an even lower level. Of the people in positions of importance in the régime, hardly any appear in a guise other than that of fools, or knaves, or both. So incompetent and sordid a character as General Cavallero would be hard to match; the appointment of the ignorant buffoon, Vidussoni, at the ripe age of 26, to the position of general secretary of the party, was a good indication of the quality of its management. There is no little humor in contrasting this state of affairs with the fulsome bombastic talk of Fascism and its untiring harping on youthful energy compared with the agedness of decadent democracy.

Ciano confirms the picture of Mussolini's supremacy in the Fascist system. Considering that the Duce was Ciano's father-in-law, the picture that is given of Mussolini strikes one as surprising. Professions of loyalty abound on Ciano's part, who, as late as February, 1943, upon his leaving the Foreign Office, writes: "I like Mussolini, like him very much, and what I shall miss most will be my contact with him" (p. 580). Yet, throughout, Mussolini emerges as a fickle incompetent, full of hesitancy, moved to major decisions by petty happenings, blindly and unreasonably pro-German, given to foolish outbursts against the bourgeoisie, the Vatican, the Italian people (he rejoices at the bombing of Italian cities), the Italian army which he himself saddled with incompetents, childishly rejoicing at the prospect of fighting for the sake of fighting.

The portrait is so extreme indeed that it raises the question of the reliability of the witness, a question of the highest importance in a document of this sort. Ciano himself, in the last entry, written in the Verona jail shortly before his execution, declares that "not a single word of what I have written in my diaries is false or exaggerated or dictated by selfish resentment," and Mr. Welles asserts that "there is no question of its [the diary's] authenticity, nor have I any reason to believe that . . . he [Ciano] had the opportunity or the desire to

make any changes in what he had previously written" (p. xxvii). Even without raising the issue of authenticity, there remain issues of the standards and of the quality of judgment of the writer. On the first, we may, perhaps, put side by side the comment "it is such a nuisance to lie" with the one "I denied rumors of an Italian expedition in Albania," both under the same date of March 17, 1939. This has no doubt the authentic ring of human inconsistency; it is also a measure of the ethical standards of the man. Actually, Ciano was a good fascist and had not the slightest objection to the designs of the Axis; he was opposed to war in 1939 and in 1940 merely on grounds of expediency. His indignation at German treachery is little more than humorous in the light of Italy's behavior in Albania, Greece, Yugoslavia and other places. Presenting his case, he—like Messrs. Churchill and Welles—accepted the oversimplified one-man explanation of Italy's misfortunes. But if he and the Italian people were so anti-German as he claims repeatedly, how account for this entry on May 6, 1939: "Milan's welcome to von Ribbentrop dispels the legend . . . that northern Italy was deeply anti-German. The Milanese population is very much flattered that the Lombard city has been chosen as the meeting place for an important event . . . I, myself, was surprised not at the thing itself but at the proportions of the demonstrations" (p. 78)?

We cannot agree with Ciano's estimate that "the Italian tragedy . . . had its beginnings in August, 1939, when . . . I suddenly found myself face to face with the cynical German determination to provoke the conflict" (Dec. 23, 1943, p. 581). Such an estimate is a reflection on the soundness of the author's judgment, for the Italian tragedy had begun long before this. Even without going back to the beginning of Fascism itself, the events in which Italy, including Count Ciano, played a leading part after 1935, especially the Abyssinian and Spanish adventures, must rank high among the causes of Italy's own and the world's tragedy. There was poetic justice in the fate that befell Count Ciano in January, 1944. As one of the leading actors in the world drama, his testimony cannot but be important. It is but one, however, of the pieces of evidence, many more of which will have to be forthcoming before we can get a satisfactory picture of the drama and its participants.

Barnard College
Columbia University

RENE ALBRECHT-CARRIE

REVES, EMERY, *The Anatomy of Peace*. New York: Harper, 1945, Pp. 275.
\$2.00.

This is unquestionably one of the more significant books of our time. A year after publication it is going stronger than ever. Hundreds of thousands perhaps millions, have read it in one form or another, and many of them in widely varied walks of life (including Nobel Prize winners and Supreme Court justices) have commended it to the careful attention of their countrymen. Written after Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco but before Hiroshima, it has

acquired even greater pertinence in the atomic age. In a nutshell, Mr. Reves' thesis is that nationalism and all its concomitants—including "internationalism"—are leading the world to certain destruction through bigger if not better world wars. He finds that the current formulas for preserving peace, such as the United Nations Charter, merely make matters worse by accepting and fortifying the very system of sovereign national states which breeds these conflicts. Socialism, democracy and religion have all failed to tackle the fundamental problem of how to break away from nationalism. Fascism, he tells us, will be the end-product of both the democratic and the Soviet nation-state systems. He brands as "fallacies" the current concepts of internationalism, self-determination and collective security—"collective security without collective sovereignty is meaningless." His conclusion, inherent in his entire argument and constantly reiterated, is that "what is needed is universalism"—one law and one government for all mankind. The method by which Reves makes his points, and builds up what must appear to most readers as an overwhelming case for his main thesis, is a combination of the historical and the logical. Parts of his argument constitute a veritable *tour de force* of logic. Indeed, one is struck by the rigidity, the uncompromising finality of his logic, for there is often too much emphasis on words as such and too sovereign a contempt for stubborn and uncomfortable facts. One sees a notable example of this word-juggling in his discussion of communism and nationalization in Chapter XI. He deals too much in absolutes that permit of no shadings—a tendency which no doubt commends itself to mathematical minds in search of certainty. Even his logic—*qua* logic—at times steps from the rational plane to the hortatory as (in the last paragraph on p. 241). One also senses that the author has no real understanding of those historical and psychological forces which unhappily deprive mankind of that freedom of choice he appears to think we enjoy. Yet, despite these perhaps somewhat subjective criticisms, the reviewer finds it impossible to quarrel with Mr. Reves' main thesis. Whether or not the national sovereign state has, as he says, been dead for several decades, we can agree that the world is now confronted with this choice: unite or perish! Mr. Reves is so appalled by the imminence of the latter eventuality that he is even prepared, in case we do not have enough sense to unite by consent, to see us united by conquest. One wonders what candidates for this task he has in mind!

University of Denver

ROBERT GALE WOOLBERT

RONIMOIS, H. E., *Russia's Foreign Trade and the Baltic Sea*. London: Boreas, 1946. Pp. 52. 2s. 9d.

This concise and severely factual study is the work of a young Estonian economist who draws freely on very full Russian sources. If his array of facts and figures appears almost formidable, his study can claim to adhere to the best standard of Western scientific training; it is written without any bias and the author appears to shy away from any deductions of his own. This reluctance

to sum up the results of his wide reading would be irritating were it not for the promise of a more extensive study which is to follow and will deal with the economic relations of Eastern Europe as a whole. It is welcome news that this work is to be completed at Oxford.

After a very brief reminder of the big rôle the Baltic route played in Russia's foreign trade before the opening of the Black Sea (and after the decline of the White Sea route, one is inclined to add) the author contrasts Russia's Baltic trade down to 1914 with the trade over the same route since the foundation of the Soviet Union. He gives chapter and verse for the decline of the share of the Baltic trade in the total foreign trade of Russia (from more than 70% to less than 34% during the nineteenth century) and he shows that Tsarist Russia kept this percentage of one-third of the total only by a special policy of preference. The railway Riga-Stalingrad, i.e. Tsaritsin of those days, was built in order to send the grain of the lower Volga regions through the Baltic. The same was true of the parallel lines Liepāja (Libau)-Romno and Königsberg or Danzig to Kiev. The export trade was thus diverted from the short southern route to a twice or six times longer route "to achieve primarily greater profits for the railways. It was hoped that the increased cost of overland transportation would be offset by the higher price obtained in the Baltic ports, as well as by the lower cost of sea-transport there prevailing."

With the emergence of the Soviet Union such export practically disappeared—the Europe of 1946 will not see the grain that came from the Russian plains before the first World War. In 1913 no less than 13.3 million tons of goods were traded across the Russian Baltic border—in 1935 it amounted to a mere 4.6 (taking Leningrad together with the practically negligible transit trade through the Baltic States.) Leningrad alone, says the *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia*, could handle 12 million tons per year. The conclusion is obvious—the author does not pause to draw it, but the reader may be allowed to add that these figures make nonsense of the "economic argument" sometimes advanced for the Soviet annexation of the three Baltic nations. It may be added that, before the war, the Soviet Union used a mere third of Leningrad's capacity.

Neither did the Soviet Union make use of the facilities offered by the three Baltic States for transit trade: the special Russian clause, securing preference to all Russian trade in the trade agreements signed by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with other states, thus remained a dead letter. The cranes, the special moles, the storehouses, all erected with a view to facilitating Russian transit trade, remained unused: the Soviet Union had decided on an exchange of a mere 14.3 million tons of goods (in 1937) as against 39.5 million tons before the Four Years' War (in 1913). She did not need the Baltic ports.

Mr. Ronimois leaves it to the reader to draw these and other conclusions. He is satisfied with marshaling the figures which show that the Baltic trade of Russia has declined, relatively and absolutely, and that all signs—e.g. of Russian planning further East and the ban on additional industries in the Leningrad region—point to the fact that such decline will continue. It seems ironical

indeed that the very men who nurse their people on the notion of the over-riding importance of economic forces should have embarked on a policy of annexation in a region which, on the showing of the figures, declines in trade importance. If it appear ironical to the onlooker, it yet means subjugation to the Estonians, Letts and Lithuanians.

Godalming, England

F. W. PICK

STRONG, C. F., *Dynamic Europe. A Background of Ferment and Change*. London: University of London Press, 1946. Pp. x, 472. 16s.

It is well-known that second and third rate books very often express the trend of the times more clearly than does the work of genius, always beyond and in advance of his time. It is with no sense of censure, then, that Dr. Strong's book on European history is welcomed as a very typical product of the present pre-occupation with Europe which characterizes the best Englishmen of to-day. Dr. Strong's *Story of the American People* has proved quite a useful text book in British Secondary Schools, and he has now aimed higher, perhaps at the ordinary man and woman who attend evening classes under any of the schemes for adult education. They must feel the need for a single volume which gives them, without any frills, the straight story of Europe, from the Greeks to the Nazis. The present book meets that need.

There are no high-lights in this rather pedantic summary of European past. But there are no mistakes either (but for the ridiculous slip which attributes to Dr. Beneš what was done by Hacha!) There are, of course, plenty of half-truths in the form of well-worn clichés and labels stuck on everybody and everything as is, indeed, unavoidable in a single-volume History of Europe from Hellas to Hitler's hell. The book, then, ought to be welcomed as a healthy sign:—the sign that ordinary Englishmen are anxiously trying to find out how Europe reached the present impasse. Would it be unkind to add that it might serve a similar purpose for Americans?

GODALMING, ENGLAND

F. W. PICK

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NATIONALITY PROBLEMS AND PARTISAN YUGOSLAVIA

by Dinko Tomašić

I

IN THE elections for the Constitutional Assembly of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1920 the Communist Party polled about 200,000 votes and won fifty-six seats, comprising about thirteen per cent of all national representatives elected to the Assembly. This was out of all proportion to the numerical strength of industrial workers and landless peasants in Yugoslavia, who at that time composed less than ten per cent of the population, even in the more industrialized parts of the country. The strength of the Yugoslav Communist Party was not based on the class struggle, but was rooted primarily in the national conflicts that marked the birth of the new state as manifested in the clash between the Serbian centralistic idea and the demand of non-Serbian national and regional groups for a federal state organization. The popularity of the Communist Party among the dissatisfied national and regional groups was enhanced by the attitude of the Communist International, which at that time favored the principle of self-determination for the peoples of Yugoslavia even to the point of their separation from the Kingdom.¹ The inability of the Serbian rulers of Yugoslavia to federalize the state, and especially their failure to come to an agreement with the Croats, the second largest and politically very conscious national group in Yugoslavia, alienated the moderate elements who represented the overwhelming majority in the dissatisfied groups and who could have been easily won for co-operation in those days even if limited concessions were made to their demands. By the lack of such statesmanship, a fertile ground was prepared for all extremist elements, Fascists

¹ See speech of Joseph Stalin delivered on March 30, 1925, at a meeting of the Yugoslav Commission of the Communist International when the Communist policy toward Yugoslavia was discussed and determined.

and Communists alike, and in these circumstances the political conditions in the state instead of improving were constantly deteriorating. From a sham parliamentarism Yugoslavia moved to an open dictatorship.² King Alexander was assassinated, and both Fascists and Communists saw their best chances in the coming war and in Yugoslavia's downfall.

When finally Yugoslavia was overrun by the German and Italian armies and split into a number of separate Axis-controlled states and provinces, the Chetnik guerrillas, who were formed to fight against the Axis but also to restore the old and discredited centralistic and dictatorial régime, were at a disadvantage when compared with the Pan-Slav intelligentsia and the Communists, who professed to be fighting for the settlement of a new and democratic Yugoslavia, organized on a federal and multi-national basis and on the principle of complete equality of all its national and regional units. It was out of the activities of these two groups, the Communists and the Pan-Slavs, and of their pledges of a better future for all peoples of Yugoslavia, that a new guerrilla faction known as the Partisans emerged after Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941.

Since it was the underground cells of the Communist Party which served as the nuclei for the Partisan movement, the Communists were enabled to retain in their hands the control of this movement and to direct it in accord with their own intentions and aspirations. The Partisan movement was first organized in Serbia by the Serbian Communist leaders and Serbian Communist youth; but because of their open clash with the Serbian peasants, the Partisans were forced to retreat into the Dinaric mountains of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a province which was incorporated in the newly established Independent State of Croatia.³ The peasants in the plains resented guerrilla activities against the Germans because the latter revenged themselves by destroying peasant property and killing the peasants held as hostages. The herdsmen in the mountains were largely free of such persecutions because they did not own much property, were mobile with their herds, and because the Germans avoided the mountains where they could easily be ambushed by the guerrillas. In Bosnia-Herzegovina there is a large Serb Orthodox group, mostly herdsmen. These militant elements strongly resented the rule of their new Croatian rulers, most of whom were Moslems

² Dinko Tomašić, "The Struggle for Power in Yugoslavia," *Journal of Central European Affairs* (July, 1941), pp. 148-165.

³ See about the formation and internal organization of this state in Dinko Tomašić, "Croatia in European Politics," *Journal of Central European Affairs* (April, 1942), pp. 74-81.

and Catholics from Bosnia-Herzegovina with whom Serb Orthodox had traditionally clashed in the past. The Orthodox of Bosnia-Herzegovina first joined the Chetnik groups, but when the Partisans moved from Serbia into western Bosnia, most able-bodied Serbs in the regions under Partisan control either voluntarily moved into the Partisan camp or were forced to.

About the same time another significant group, consisting of Croatian guerrillas from Dalmatia, joined the Partisans. The occupation of Dalmatia, of the coastland of Upper Croatia and of parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Italian army and the annexation of some of this territory by Italy stirred up a strong reaction against the Italians in these regions, where from the days of Venetian control of these lands, the Croats had always feared Italian territorial aspirations on the eastern Adriatic coast and its hinterland. As soon as Dalmatia was occupied by the Italian army, the Croats of Dalmatia formed an underground movement to oppose and undermine Italian rule by means of a well-organized mass resistance. However, after the German attack on the Soviet Union this Croat-Dalmatian underground became increasingly infiltrated by the Communists and therefore increasingly active in acts of open and individual violence against the Italians, regardless of the cost of lives. It was the contention of the Communists that any sacrifice of life and property, no matter how great, was justified as long as the guerrilla activities contributed to the weakening of the Axis strength. The Italians reacted to these tactics by mass execution of hostages, and by razing entire villages in their bombing expeditions. As a result of these wholesale massacres, many Croats had to flee to the mountains of Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to save their lives. Soon after these Croat-Dalmatian fugitives reached their hideouts, they were greeted and organized by the Communists, who had in the meantime already developed a well-disciplined and Communist-controlled guerrilla movement. This trend was favored also because of the co-operation of some Chetnik units with the Italians in these regions. Armed, trained and financed by the Italian Army, these Chetnik groups professed to serve the cause of Serb nationalism by indiscriminate killing of the Croatian population in Dalmatia and Herzegovina as a retaliation for the persecution of the Serb population by the pro-Axis Ustaša terrorists⁴ in Upper Croatia and Bosnia. In such circumstances many Croats of Dalmatia joined the Partisans in order to revenge themselves against the Chetniks.

Similarly the internal and international conditions favored to a certain degree the spread of the Partisan movement in Montenegro and in Serbia.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Ever since the loss of their independence at the end of the first World War, the Montenegrins remained divided into two factions: the autonomists, and the pro-Serbians. The Partisans promptly promised the Montenegrins a state of their own in a future Yugoslav federation and won over all those Montenegrins who resented the centralistic policies of former Belgrade régimes. Moreover, the Partisans represented themselves as the representatives of Russia. Montenegrins, like all other Serbs, were traditionally friendly to Russia because of the common Orthodox religion and because Montenegro, as well as Serbia, gained independence from the Turks with Russia's help. Also before the first World War many Montenegrin and Serbian officers, priests and lay intellectuals were educated at Russian military colleges, theological seminaries, and universities. All these circumstances created a pro-Russian feeling among the Montenegrins and other Serbs. And since Russia and later (after the Teheran conference) all of the Allies openly favored the Partisans against the Chetniks, many former Chetniks both in Montenegro and Serbia when they became aware of the inevitable ascendancy of the Partisans, moved into the Partisan ranks. Paradoxically enough the same motives prompted some Ustaša units, especially those of Moslem faith, to join the Partisans.⁵

In a like manner the Partisans easily succeeded in winning over the Macedonians. Because of Macedonian resentment of Serbian hegemony, already in 1919 the Communist movement was exceptionally strong in Macedonia. After the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was suppressed, Macedonians were divided into two main factions: a Fascist-dominated, pro-Bulgarian faction and a Communist-autonomist one. When the Bulgarian army occupied Macedonia in 1941, the pro-Bulgarian faction was in the ascendancy, but when Bulgaria surrendered to the Russians in 1944, most Macedonians, regardless of factions, gladly accepted the rule of the Partisans who promised them a state of their own in a future Yugoslav democratic federation.

In Upper Croatia the intelligentsia of Pan-Slav orientation and the Serb minority who resented the establishment of a separate Axis-oriented Croatian state joined at first the Chetnik movement as the best means of undermining the new state and preparing the ground for the restoration

⁵ Most of the rank and file and leaders of Chetniks, Ustašas and Partisans were recruited from among the Dinaric mountaineers, traditionally warlike but emotionally unstable elements. In the course of the war individuals and groups frequently moved from one camp or one faction into that of their adversaries according to the fortunes of war. The same will happen when the internal and international situation becomes less favorable for the Partisan rulers. See Dinko Tomašić, "Personality Development of the Dinaric Warriors," *Psychiatry* (November, 1945), pp. 449-493.

of Yugoslavia after the war. But when the Partisan movement was organized, the Pan-Slav intelligentsia and the Serb guerrillas from Upper Croatia readily joined the Partisans since the Partisan movement, backed by the Soviet Union and offering a democratic and federal organization of the future state closely allied with Russia and other Slav countries, appeared to have better chances of succeeding. A part of the Serb minority in Croatia even before the war was infiltrated with Communist propaganda, while some political and cultural organizations of this Serb minority, especially those led by the Independent Democratic Party,⁶ were used as front organizations for Communist activities. Likewise, in Slovenia the Communists before the war penetrated among the working class of this industrialized province of Yugoslavia. As a result of Axis invasion, Slovene regions were split and annexed by Germany and Italy. Here, too, the Slovene Pan-Slavs and many Irredentists joined the Communists in the Partisan movement, which professed to be fighting for an independent Slovenia within an All-Slav union from Vladivostok to Trieste,⁷ which was to recover all Slovene lands and unite all Slovenes in a state of their own.

When Italy surrendered to the Allies in October, 1943, and declared war against Germany, the Partisans, who were in the ascendancy in the parts of the Balkans occupied by the Italian army, appropriated most Italian war materials in those regions. At the same time a number of Italian and Albanian soldiers joined their ranks. Thus against a numerically stronger and well-equipped Partisan army with a platform which promised a national and personal Utopia, Mikhailovitch's Chetniks, who were looked upon as Great Serbian imperialists, had no chance. Abandoned by the Western Allies soon after the Teheran conference (December, 1943), they were not able to oppose the growing strength of the Partisans but had to retreat to their mountain hideouts and wait for a chance. Thus with the material and moral help of all the Allies and with the direct assistance of the Red Army and of the Bulgarian army (after its surrender to the Russians), the Partisans finally took over the control of Yugoslavia, but only after the main body of the German army had surrendered to the Allies in May, 1945.

⁶ See about this party in Dinko Tomašić, "The Struggle for Power in Jugoslavia," *loc. cit.*

⁷ For the development of Pan-Slavism among Southern Slavs, especially Croatians, see Cyril Bryner, "The Political Philosophy of Jure Krizhanich," *New Scholasticism* (April, 1939); also Philip E. Mosely, "A Pan-Slavist Memorandum of Liudevit Gaj in 1838," *The American Historical Review* (July, 1935), pp. 704-716.

II

Along with their gradual territorial expansion the Partisans undertook to lay the foundations for an administrative, governmental and national structure of future Yugoslavia according to a preconceived plan. Claiming to be building a "Federal Democratic Yugoslavia,"⁸ they divided the country into states and autonomous provinces following the example of the Soviet Union, which is composed of Union Republics, Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Regions. Accordingly the Partisans established six Autonomous Republics in Yugoslavia: Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia, an autonomous province, Vojvodina, and an autonomous territory, Kosovo-Metohija. The republics and provinces have their own local governments but as in the Soviet Union, these local governments are responsible to the central government and have to follow its decisions and orders, so that the territorial units function *de facto* not as self-governing bodies but rather as organs of the central authority. Their functions may be enlarged, restricted, or even abolished by the central legislative body.⁹ Moreover, since the Partisans in the meantime have eliminated all opposition to their rule and established a one-party system in the country, both the central government and the local governments base their rule on a political police, known as the OZNA, on People's courts, People's army, and local political committees, all of which instruments of power are exclusively in the hands of the Partisans.

The Partisans claim that such a national, administrative and political structure of Yugoslavia, closely resembling that of the Soviet Union, best answers the demands of various national, regional and ethnic groups for their self-expression and autonomy along democratic lines. It appears, however, that the real motive behind the Partisan plan was not to free formerly oppressed minorities and give more freedom to national majorities,

⁸ The formal foundations of Partisan Yugoslavia were laid at the two sessions of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia held in Jajce, a town in northwestern Bosnia, November 29 and 30, 1943, a few days before the end of the Teheran Conference. The documents of the Jajce meetings are published by The United Committee of South-Slavic Americans in the pamphlet, *The Re-Creation of Yugoslavia* (New York, 1944).

⁹ According to the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, adopted in February, 1946, the functions of the central government in Belgrade include the army, foreign affairs, economic matters (waters, forests, mines, commerce), communications (railroads, roads, postal service, telegraph and telephone), internal security (police), and social security. It appears that Partisan Yugoslavia in its internal organization corresponds to a Union Republic in the Soviet Union, such as Ukraine, not to the U.S.S.R. as a whole. This may indicate the preparation of the Partisan rulers of Yugoslavia for an eventual union with the U.S.S.R. as a Union Republic.

but primarily to cope with Croatian and Serb nationalisms, which were considered to be the main obstacle to the consolidation and perpetuation of Partisan power.

The Partisans, for instance, raised Bosnia-Herzegovina to the rank of a state, in spite of the fact that this territory is not settled by a separate nationality but exclusively by Croats and Serbs. It is true that there is a large Slav-speaking Moslem population in Bosnia-Herzegovina (thirty per cent of the population), but the Moslems there do not regard themselves as a separate nationality, rather identifying themselves with either Croats or Serbs. Instead of dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia, as was done in the Croat-Serb agreement of 1939, the Partisans preferred to organize a separate state out of this province and in that way weaken territorially both Croats and Serbs.

The same motive seems to have been behind the recent decisions of the Partisans to organize Istria as an autonomous unit though this territory, which has an Italian minority, is settled overwhelmingly by Croats and Slovenes. At the same time the organization of Vojvodina (Baranja-Bačka-Banat) as an autonomous province and of Metohija-Kosovo as an autonomous territory, and the raising of Montenegro and Macedonia to the ranks of states equal to that of Serbia were aimed primarily at weakening the Serb national strength. By encouraging Macedonian and Montenegrin nationalisms, and Albanian (Kosovo-Metohija) and Hungarian (Vojvodina) autonomies within Serbia the Partisans hope to check Serb nationalism.

This divide-and-rule policy of the Partisans became especially noticeable when the Assembly of Nationalities was organized following the example of the Soviet of Nationalities in the Soviet Union. In the Assembly of Nationalities, which formed a part of the Constituent Assembly of Yugoslavia, every state was represented by twenty-five delegates; the autonomous province, Vojvodina, by fifteen delegates, and the autonomous territory, Metohija-Kosovo, by ten delegates. Therefore, in this Assembly, Croatia and Serbia, with twenty-five votes each, if they had shown any tendency to assert themselves, could have been overwhelmingly outvoted by the delegates from Macedonia, Vojvodina, Kosovo-Metohija, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Slovenia, who together had over a hundred votes. Or, all Croatian-Catholic delegates from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Istria and Vojvodina together might have been outvoted by the Serb-Orthodox delegates from Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina and Montenegro. But equally, all Serbs votes together could be outnumbered by Croatian, Macedonian, Slovene, Hungarian and Albanian votes. This situation will not be basically

changed by the draft of the new Constitution which provides for thirty delegates for each of the six Autonomous Republics, twenty delegates for Vojvodina and fifteen delegates for Kosovo-Metohija. It is by playing one national group against the other, one religion against the other, and by encouraging regional nationalisms against the historical nationalisms, that the Partisans expect to perpetuate themselves in power. This policy is manifested also within each autonomous republic. In Croatia, for instance, the Serb minority is played off against the Croatian majority¹⁰ and in Serbia the Hungarian, Albanian and Rumanian minorities may serve a similar purpose. Likewise in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Moslems, Orthodox and Catholics may be played off one against the others.

There is much doubt that the Croats and Serbs will acquiesce in this situation. The Croats and the Serbs together represent two-thirds of Yugoslavia's population,¹¹ are nationally and politically very conscious, and each of these two peoples strongly objects to being dominated. The Partisan plan goes counter to the national traditions and the political aspirations which have been built up in the course of a thousand-years struggle of these two peoples for national and political independence. It is difficult to imagine that these two politically and culturally advanced peoples will willingly accept a plan whose purpose is to split and weaken both of them. In their whole past both Croats and Serbs demanded and fought to be nationally integrated within separate territorial units in which either all or the overwhelming majority of their respective nationals would be united under separate and independent governments. Both the Croats and the Serbs have always claimed a separate nationhood and statehood; it does not seem likely that they would suddenly give up this tradition and resign themselves to an inferior position. Austria-Hungary and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia tried such a divide-and-rule policy before the Partisans did, and it was exactly this policy that was most instrumental in bringing about the final downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and of the Yugoslav Kingdom. Unless the Partisans find a way of solving the nationality

¹⁰ In the Constituent Assembly elected in November, 1945, there were about 30% Serbs among the deputies from Croatia, which is greatly out of proportion to the numerical relation of the Croats and Serbs within the present boundaries of Croatia.

¹¹ According to the official figures of the 1931 census there were about fifteen million people in Yugoslavia. Of these six million were Serbs (including about 300,000 Montenegrins), and about four million were Croats (not including 700,000 Moslems of Bosnia-Herzegovina). The rest consisted of Slovenes (approx. 1,100,000), Slav-speaking Macedonians (approx. 800,000), Albanians (approx. 700,000), Hungarians (approx. 400,000), Rumanians (approx. 250,000), and others (approx. 200,000). There were about 500,000 Germans, but these were forcefully expelled by the Partisans.

problem that will be satisfactory not only to national and ethnic minorities but to national majorities as well, their whole work will be jeopardized; Yugoslavia will again become a major factor of instability in the Balkans, perhaps eventually following the ill fate of its predecessors.

It seems, therefore, that the only way to solve the nationality problem of Yugoslavia and bring about a lasting stabilization of that country is by a direct understanding between the freely-chosen representatives of the national majorities and national and ethnic minorities. There are a few fundamental problems that will have to be solved in this connection, such as the boundary line between Croatia and Serbia, the relation of Serbia to Macedonia, the status of Slovenia and the problem of national minorities that may remain within a state or an autonomous unit.

III.

The most difficult part of the territorial issue between the Croatians and the Serbs is the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the official statistics of 1931, Bosnia-Herzegovina is forty-three per cent Eastern Orthodox (Serb), twenty-seven per cent Catholic (Croat), and thirty per cent Slav-Moslem. The majority of Moslem religious, intellectual, and political leaders has been in the past oriented toward Croatia rather than toward Serbia. In pre-war days the Moslem clergy of Bosnia-Herzegovina was overwhelmingly pro-Croatian as were most of the outstanding Moslem writers. In the elections of 1927, out of seventeen Moslem deputies elected in Bosnia-Herzegovina, eleven declared themselves to be Croatian, one considered himself a Serb, and five declared themselves neutral, or "Yugoslav." In practical politics, however, the Moslem political leaders supported Belgrade régimes in pre-war Yugoslavia against Croatian demands, but again after the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia in the course of the second World War the Moslem leaders and many of the rank and file were among the best supporters of the Croatian state.¹² Most of the Moslem common folk in Bosnia-Herzegovina are still religiously rather than nationally conscious; they follow in the path of their local clergy and lay intelligentsia and may swing in one direction or the other. Therefore, since the question with whom the Moslems are identified is not definitely settled and since Bosnia-Herzegovina is geopolitically, strategically and economically for both Croatians and Serbs very important, this territory

¹² Dinko Tomašić, "Croatia in European Politics," *Journal of Central European Affairs* (April, 1942), p. 80.

presents a most controversial issue involving national pride as well as vested political and religious interests.

In 1939 the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina was settled in an amicable way in an agreement between the representatives of the Yugoslav government (Prince Paul-Tsvietkovich) and the Croatian Peasant Party. According to this agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided in such a way that most of the predominantly Moslem and Orthodox counties, and even some with a slight Catholic majority, remained within the direct sphere of the Belgrade administration while those with a large Catholic majority became a part of autonomous Croatia.¹³ Many Croats objected to this agreement on administrative and ethnic grounds. They claimed that regions of north-western Bosnia, heavily settled by Moslems and geopolitically a part of Croatia, were separated from Zagreb, their closest economic and cultural center. This objection was met by the statement that future plebiscites would be held to rectify the borders, if necessary. At the same time Serb nationalist opposition strongly objected to the agreement claiming that it was invalid because concluded by a dictatorial and not by a democratic government. The Serb opposition saw in the agreement the territorial aggrandizement of Croatia at the expense of what they considered to be exclusively Serb lands.

In the absence of a direct understanding between the representatives of the Croatian and Serb peoples over the boundaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only other democratic way to solve this issue would be by a plebiscite held separately for each religious group. Or, since the Catholic and the Orthodox populations are already so clearly oriented, a plebiscite among the Moslems would be sufficient. In case the majority of Moslems voted for Serbia, the boundary between Croatia and Serbia could be established along the lines agreed upon in 1939, with certain necessary modifications to include within Croatia all predominantly Catholic counties. But should the Moslems vote for Croatia, or should the Moslem vote be indecisive, the national demarcation line between the Croats and the Serbs in Bosnia could be established along the Bosna river, and the boundary in Herzegovina could remain the same as that agreed upon in 1939, which would divide the Moslem population about equally between the Croats and the Serbs. According to similar ethnic principles, the boundary line of Dalmatia could remain the same as that in 1939, which left the county of Kotor together with the Bay of Kotor within direct

¹³ "Uredba o Banovini Hrvatskoj," *Narodne Novine* (August 30, 1939), Art. 1. See also Dinko Tomašić "Constitutional Changes in Yugoslavia", *Polit. Sc. Quarterly* (December, 1940), pp. 591-593.

Belgrade administration. In the eastern part of Upper Croatia, the 1939 boundary could be rectified in favor of Serbia, but the predominantly Catholic western part of Vojvodina should be included within Croatia. (see map).

The major objection to such a solution of the Croat-Serb territorial problem is that it would leave a large minority of Orthodox Serbs within Croatia. This is a serious objection in view of the fact that the Serbs, who had immigrated into Croatia under the pressure of Ottoman invasion and had lived there for several centuries, were unable to assimilate themselves and constantly presented a difficult internal and international problem.¹⁴ Being of Eastern Orthodox faith, they followed the Byzantine tradition according to which the church identified itself with the state. But the Serb Orthodox church in Croatia identified itself with the state of Serbia and Serb national and political aspirations, not with those of Croatia. This lack of loyalty to the country of adoption explains why the Serb minority in Croatia was often used as a means in the hands of administrations, which fought Croatian nationalism, such as Hungarian rulers of Croatia before the first World War, the Belgrade governments after the first World War, and the Partisan rulers of Yugoslavia after the second World War. A strong Serb minority within Croatia may, therefore, become a fertile ground for Irredentist movements which may provoke political restlessness within the two neighboring units and tense relations between them, thus endangering not only the stability of the Yugoslav commonwealth but of the whole Balkan-Danubian area as well.

Theoretically, there are only two ways to cope with such a possibility. One is the acculturation of the minorities with the majority population; the other is the transfer or exchange of the minority populations.

Undoubtedly a gradual and painless assimilation through social amalgamation is the most desirable solution of a minority problem. Such a painless process of national integration has been taking place, for instance, among American national and racial minorities. The same process will undoubtedly take place among Hungarian, Albanian, and Rumanian minorities in Serbia, but this same process cannot be expected to take place among the Serb-Orthodox minority in Croatia, judging from the experiences of the past. A process of gradual assimilation of Serbs in Croatia would take place only if an Eastern Orthodox Church, independent of the Orthodox Church of Serbia, and identified with the state of Croatia could be organized. But as long as the Eastern Orthodox clergy in Croatia is devoted exclusively

¹⁴ Dinko Tomašić, "Croatia in European Politics," *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

to the state of Serbia, it could not be expected that the Serb minority in Croatia would be unconditionally loyal to their adopted country.

It would, therefore, be more helpful to Croatia and Serbia and it would be to the interests of the lasting political stability in central and south-eastern Europe as well, to have the smallest possible Serb minority in Croatia. An exchange of population might solve this problem. But any transfer of the Serb minority from Croatia into Serbia or vice versa should be first, on a *voluntary* basis, and second, should have financial help and supervision of the United Nations Organization. All Serbs and Croats desirous of emigrating could then be transferred at the expense of the state and be given financial assistance in buying land and equipment to establish themselves in their new home. Loans to states should be made available for such a purpose by the United Nations Organization. A similar agreement for the transfer of populations was reached between Soviet Lithuania and the former Polish Committee in Lublin, and also between this Committee and the Soviet Ukraine. After the first World War the transfer of populations between Greece and Turkey was considered generally to have brought good results from the point of view of the relations between the two countries. Since most of the Serbs in mountainous regions of Bosnia and Upper Croatia (Lika) are herdsmen who eke out a meager existence in the mountains and are accustomed to migrating, they would undoubtedly emigrate gladly if offered better economic opportunities and fertile land in the plains. In fact this process of emigration from the western mountainous area of Yugoslavia to the eastern Danubian plains of Serbia, Vojvodina and Sirmia has been taking place for a long time¹⁵ and is now encouraged by the Partisan rulers themselves. The Serb immigrants are taking the lands of the Germans whom the Partisan government has forcibly expatriated.

Once a boundary line between Croatia and Serbia was established and a transfer of populations effected, one of the main sources of mutual Croat-Serb fears and suspicions would be eliminated, and the two nations might then proceed to solve the other two fundamental problems, Serbian-Macedonian relations and the status of Slovenia.

IV

Slav-speaking Macedonians are an ethnic group whose main territory was included within Serbia after the Balkan wars of 1912-13, while the rest of it remained within Greece and Bulgaria. It is estimated that there

¹⁵ Concerning the trends of migration of Balkan herdsmen see Jovan Cvijić, *La Péninsule Balkanique: Géographie Humaine* (Paris 1918).

are about eight hundred thousand Slav-speaking Macedonians in Yugoslav Macedonia. There are also large non-Slav minorities in Yugoslav Macedonia, such as Albanians and Turks.

The policies of police rule, economic pressure and violence practiced in Macedonia by Belgrade régimes before the second World War failed to bring the desired results. Macedonians refused to be cowed and Serbicized and will be less willing to do so in the future after they have experienced even the limited amount of autonomy secured under the Partisan régime.¹⁶ It seems, therefore, that the best possible way to settle relations between the Serbians and the Macedonians of Slav and non-Slav origin would be to grant Macedonia a local autonomy within a Serb federation. If such an autonomy were organized on the basis of a representative democracy, it would be more appealing to the Macedonians than the present one-party system and police-supported régime disguised as an autonomy. Since the Macedonians have not developed claims to independent nationhood,¹⁷ but are only insisting upon the recognition of their cultural individuality, a local autonomy should be sufficient to satisfy their demands and to win them over to co-operate constructively with the Serbs in a common state union. Likewise, the Montenegrins who consider themselves Serbs and whose cultural, religious and historical ties with Serbia have always been very close, will not oppose joining the Serbs of Serbia in a common state, providing Montenegro is assured a certain degree of administrative decentralization in place of its present pseudo-statehood. Such a solution of the Serbian-Montenegrin-Macedonian problem would satisfy both the Serb national aspirations and the desire of ethnic and regional minorities within Serbia for an opportunity for self-expression along their own cultural traditions.

Likewise Croatian-Slovene relations could be settled in an amicable and democratic way. According to the official statistics of 1931, there were a little over one million Slovenes in the Slovene regions of pre-war Yugoslavia, occupying less than ten per cent of Yugoslavia's territory. Throughout their history the Slovenes have been exposed to gradual denationalization and infiltration by their overwhelmingly stronger neighbors,

¹⁶ Though the police régime established by the Partisans is even harder than the police governments of pre-war Yugoslavia, the Macedonians are now allowed and even encouraged to use their own language and their own ethnic name. In pre-war Yugoslavia they were officially called "South Serbians," and only the Serb language was taught in the schools and used in offices and newspapers.

¹⁷ There were some claims for "Great Macedonia" put forward by a faction of IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), but the overwhelming majority of Macedonians want either a union with Bulgaria or an autonomy within Yugoslavia.

the Germans and the Italians. Under these conditions, the Slovene middle classes, led by the Catholic clergy and lay intelligentsia, developed claims to cultural individuality and administrative autonomy, but did not feel sufficiently independent ever to put forward demands for separate statehood. Unlike the Croats and the Serbs, the Slovenes had never in their history established a state of their own;¹⁸ so they lack the tradition of sovereignty and political independence which developed so markedly among the Croats and the Serbs.

At the end of the last World War, when Austria-Hungary was crumbling, the Slovenes accepted the idea of a common state of southern Slavs as a protection against Austrian and Italian designs on Slovene lands. Their small territory, their feeling of national insecurity, the absence of a large and economically independent middle class and the absence of a historical tradition of independent nationhood, all explain their lack of national consciousness and political initiative. These conditions explain also the political opportunism of the Slovenes manifested in an inclination of their leaders to attach themselves to whichever seems at the moment the rising but least menacing power.

Both the Italian and the German threats to the Slovenes seem to be eliminated as a result of the defeat of these nations in the second World War, and Slovene demands for more independence will undoubtedly increase as threats to their border decrease, if at the same time their middle classes become economically stronger and politically more independent. The Slovenes, therefore, should be allowed to decide freely through their representatives their future status and their relations with the Croats and the Serbs on the basis of an agreement freely accepted by all parties. Should they decide upon a union with Croatia, a Croatian-Slovene federation could be organized between these two peoples of strong Western traditions. Such a solution would certainly be preferable to the present position of Slovenia which is, like the other "Autonomous Republics" of Yugoslavia, only a cog in the Partisan political machine.

In this way, two main units might be formed within the territory of Yugoslavia, a predominantly Eastern-Orthodox unit, Serbia-Macedonia-Montenegro, and a predominantly Catholic unit, Croatia-Slovenia. Each one of these units could organize itself along its own cultural traditions and along its own concepts of state organization, thus avoiding the fatal mistake of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In such a case it would be possible to form

¹⁸ Since their immigration to their present territory in the second part of the sixth century A.D., the Slovenes have been successively ruled by the Avars, the Bavarians, the Franks and the Austrian Germans.

a confederation between the Croatian-Slovene and the Serb-Macedonian federations that might be organized along the pattern of the British Commonwealth of Nations.¹⁹ Since such a union of peoples, if ruled by governments of the people's free choice, would satisfy both the aspirations of national majorities for separate nationhood and representative government and the desires of smaller ethnic groups for local autonomy, one of the main causes of instability in Yugoslavia and in the Balkans would be removed. Such a Commonwealth of Nations, especially if extended to other countries of central and northeastern Europe, would become one of the most stabilizing factors in European politics and an effective link between the Eastern and the Western worlds.²⁰

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

¹⁹ Each of the two units would have an independent government and a separate foreign representation, but they would be united in a common economic union. Common affairs would be managed by a council composed of delegations from state legislatures.

²⁰ For such a Commonwealth of Nations see Dinko Tomašić, "Reconstruction in Central Europe," *The Am. Polit. Sc. Review* (October, 1943), pp. 888-903. See also D. Tomašić, "The Structure of Balkan Society", *The Am. Journal of Sociology* (September, 1946), pp. 132-140.

THE LEGEND OF THE BALTIC BARRIER STATES

by Alfred Bilmanis

THE Central Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, are often referred to as "barrier states," allegedly "carved" out of Russia's territory by the Versailles Treaty, with the aim of separating Bolshevik Russia from Western Europe. This is a serious accusation indeed.

A "barrier," according to Webster, is a hindrance or a fence. Thus a "barrier state" would be a state refusing to allow any traffic of its neighbor state to pass over its territory, refusing commerce, postal, telephonic, telegraphic, air and railway communications, shipping, floating of rafts, etc.

Such was not the situation in the Baltic. Soviet Russia was not fenced in by the Baltic States. The truth is that the Versailles Treaty did not have as its purpose the creation of such a "barrier" between Russia and Germany, at least not a barrier consisting of the Baltic States. As a matter of fact they did not even sign the Versailles Treaty.

Actually the Baltic States were recognized *de jure* by Russia and Germany (in 1920), before they were recognized by the other great powers. And when the Allied powers finally (on January 26, 1921) did recognize the Baltic States *de jure*, they recognized them as states in their own right, not as "artificial creations."

Neither Latvia nor the other Baltic States were ever integral parts of Tsarist Russia, which ruled them under the dubious right of an imperialistic conqueror. Soviet Russia herself, by virtue of the right of self-determination, solemnly denounced the Russian constitutional law and international treaties by which the Baltic States were placed under Russian subjection.¹

There is also a basic difference between the two regions—one the Baltic Occidental European, and the other, the Russian Eurasian. This difference, going far back into history, has deepened and broadened through generations and has never been so distinct as it is now. Russia had no Middle Ages, no Renaissance, no Reformation. This fundamentally divided her civilization from that of the West, which did not and could not produce Bolshevism. The Baltic states shared Occidental culture at an early date when Russia did not yet exist. The Baltic States firmly wish to remain within the European community to which they have always belonged in every way.

After the Baltic States became members of the European family of

¹ See: Latvian-Soviet Russian, Treaty of Peace, August 11, 1920, Art. 2. *League of Nations Treaty Series* 1920-21, No. 67.

nations, they tried to be and were good neighbors. During the twenty-two years of their independence no complaints were ever heard about the Baltic States being "barrier states" or bad neighbors. Their international reputation was impeccable, but not that of their two big neighbors, Germany and Russia, who always coveted the Baltic States.

After their defeat in 1918 the Germans would have preferred to border directly on Russia, a Russia that was preferably a pro-German monarchy, in order better to prepare their *revanche* against the Allied Democracies, which had allegedly put Germany in the "chains of Versailles." But the Germans were willing to settle for a Bolshevik Russia, if only it were friendly to Germany. Since the Rapallo Treaty (1922) Bolsheviks were also eager to come closer to Germany, but they were reluctant to act directly and to conquer the Baltic States by force. They preferred instead subtleties of a dialectic foreign policy in order to weaken the Baltic States internally first and simultaneously to isolate them from Western Europe, and then to make them their satellites.

The Czechoslovak diplomat, J. Hanč,² who has been a member of several American university faculties, states that the alleged innate incapacity of the small states to govern themselves has been largely a libel of German invention to justify attempt at domination. The same statement could be made of Soviet Russia's intentions.

Despite the Rapallo treaty, neither Germany nor Russia really trusted each other, although they both considered it useful for forming a common front against their alleged oppressors, "the Versailles states," which stopped German aggression, but at the same time refused to recognize the Maximalist Government in Russia as being a usurper. The fact remains that the Bolsheviks in January, 1918 disbanded the Russian Constituent Assembly and in March, 1918 signed the surrender treaty with Germany.

Germany and Soviet Russia would probably have been glad if the Baltic States had manifested any intention of becoming "barrier states," but the Baltic States scrupulously fulfilled their obligations, which they had assumed by signing the Barcelona International Transit Convention, the Paris Air Convention, and by signing the peace and other treaties with Germany and Russia as well as by joining the League of Nations.

Conscious of their peculiar geopolitical situation, the Baltic States were the first in Europe to grant cultural autonomy rights to their national minorities (Jews, Russians, Germans, Poles) which, according to the basic laws of the Baltic Republics, also enjoyed equal political rights. The

² *Eastern Europe and the U.S.A.* (Boston, 1942), p. 64.

Baltic States regulated their frontiers among themselves by means of arbitration and they had no border incidents nor border problems with either Germany or Russia. They also granted free transit to all neighboring states. Soviet Russia enjoyed particular favors with regard to transit. Baltic railway tariffs were reduced (in Latvia from 10-70%), and tax-free transit was granted to Soviet Russian import and export goods through Baltic ports. Airlines functioned between Berlin and Moscow, Stockholm and Moscow and Berlin and Helsinki over Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn. Direct railway passenger traffic was provided by international railway agreements. German and Russian ships called often at the harbors of the Baltic States. Russian rafts enjoyed the freedom of floating on the Daugava River and Baltic frontier rivers. Special frontier communication agreements regulated frontier traffic.

It was really not the fault of the Baltic States that economic relations with Soviet Russia did not develop. Soviet Russia simply had not enough transit goods for Baltic ports. This fact was not resented by the Baltic governments, because it was Russia's free will to use the offered facilities or not to use them at all. However, the Baltic Governments held in full preparedness all their railway and port facilities in order not to be accused of "obstructing," in spite of its cost to the Baltic taxpayer. In addition to diplomatic representatives in Baltic capitals Soviet Russia also had trade representatives, who enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In 1935 besides the Soviet diplomats, 1,156 persons lived in Latvia with Soviet passports; they were engaged mostly in Soviet state economic activities abroad such as Book-knyga, Sov-torg-flot, etc.

After becoming a member of the League of Nations (September 18, 1934), Soviet Russia did not even then raise any accusations against the Baltic States, because there were no grounds and because all Baltic treaties were registered at the League of Nations' registry. Soviet Russia's delegate even voted for a Baltic representative to be elected to the Council of the League of Nations (in 1936).

Evidently there is some ominous design behind the present unfounded accusation that Baltic States are "barrier states." The aim is only too transparent: it is to discredit them in one way or another in order to gain recognition of the *fait accompli* in the Baltic. Such maneuvers of imperialistic states against their small neighbor states have been made before, and there are some analogies.

* * *

The geographical position of the Central Baltic States is similar to the position of Belgium, which is situated between France and Germany.

Belgium could also be wilfully accused of being a buffer or "barrier" state, and was actually so accused by Germany, when the latter on August 3, 1914 demanded free passage for German troops and violated Belgium's neutrality, guaranteed by Prussia herself on April 19, 1839, and reaffirmed many times later. History knows many cases of large states violating the rights of the small states living between them. But history has never justified such breaches of international law, treaties and morals, and eventually Germany, which violated Belgium's rights, was punished for this breach of trust.

History also knows that small states, lying between large states and being coveted by their big neighbors, often become "buffer states." As long as the large states are of equal force, they are mutually balanced, and the buffer states are safe. The rival big states might, as they did in the case of Switzerland, even guarantee the permanent neutrality of a buffer state. But by mutual agreement they might also partition the small buffer states among themselves.

This happened to the predecessor of Latvia and Estonia, the Terra Mariana or Livonia (an Archbishopric and a principality of the Holy Roman Empire since 1207) when in 1561 it was partitioned between Poland and Sweden, purportedly to save Livonia from Muscovy's imperialism. Muscovy, who also coveted Livonia, was eliminated from the deal, being at that time militarily the weaker. Livonia was partitioned as follows: Sweden annexed Estonia, the northernmost province of Livonia, while Poland (united with Lithuania) subjected Livonia proper, the former Latvian tribal kingdoms of Lettia and Tholova, north of the Daugava River. The southern provinces of Livonia, the former Latvian tribal kingdoms of Kurland and Semigallia, became a hereditary Duchy of the Master of the Livonian Order, Gothard Kettler, under the suzerainty of the Polish King. In the beginning of the seventeenth century the Polish-Swedish partition of Livonia was reaffirmed, but Sweden got a larger slice; in addition to Estonia she took also the Latvian province of Vidzeme with Riga (35% of Latvia). Poland kept only 23% of Latvia (Latgale), while the Duchy of Kurland (42%) became gradually emancipated from Polish suzerainty.

At the end of the seventeenth century the ascending Muscovy formed a coalition against Sweden, consisting of Muscovy, Denmark and Poland. The issue of the war being uncertain, Tsar Peter proposed to King Charles XII of Sweden a partitioning of Swedish Livonia, but eventually victorious Muscovy annexed southern Finland with Viborg, Ingria (the site of St. Petersburg), Estonia and Livonia with Riga. Thus Tsar Peter retained all Swedish Baltic possessions. Sweden agreed to that in the Treaty of

Nystad of 1721. Now the tsar of Muscovy changed his title to the Tsar of All the Russias.

Poland, the partner of Russia, badly weakened after the war with Sweden, was happy to keep what it had possessed before the war with Sweden. It was now the turn of Poland to become a buffer state. Russia at the end of the eighteenth century, being too weak to annex all of Poland with its dependencies, had to agree to the partitioning of Poland between Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

That is how Russia in 1773 got the Latvian province of Latgale, then a Polish dependency, and in 1795, the Duchy of Kurland and Semigallia, the core of present-day Latvia. She also annexed Lithuania, White Russia, Ukraine, and Poland as far as the Vistula River. Parts of Poland (Poznań, Pomorze) and of Lithuania (Suwałki) were taken by Prussia, and another part (Galitzia) was taken by Austria. This wholesale grabbing was possible because of the unsettled conditions in Western Europe as a result of the French Revolution, which had upset Europe's stability.

In 1809, with the consent of Napoleon, who cajoled Tsar Alexander I, Russia annexed the rest of Finland. After Napoleon's downfall the Holy Alliance was signed between Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France, with the blessing of England. The aim of the Alliance was to support a legitimistic *status quo*: any partner kept what he had taken. Several conferences took place, but no real understanding was achieved or existed. England soon dropped the Holy Alliance and supported the independence movements in Greece and Belgium. Thus the Holy Alliance eventually boiled down to a tripartite Prussian-Austrian-Russian affair, particularly after the Crimean War, in which England sided with the Ottoman Empire against Russia. In the eighteen-sixties and 'seventies a mighty industrial Germany arose after having defeated France and Austria, and annexed land from Denmark (to have territory for the Kiel Canal). Bismarck's Germany avoided clashes with Russia, and also kept Austria on friendly terms with Russia, because for Germany a coalition between Russia, France and England would have been most dangerous. The Baltic problem was ignored by Germany for the time.

Meanwhile the situation in the Baltic underwent great historical changes. In view of the rising grain prices in Europe the oligarchic German landed nobles in 1817-1819, with the acquiescence of Tsar Alexander I, expropriated all the Baltic peasant lands. After the grain prices fell, they changed to sheep breeding and neglected grain cultivation. The situation of the Latvian and Estonian peasants became deplorable. Hunger revolts often took place. After agriculture in the 'fifties had become less profitable,

the squires began to sell lots to peasants, preferably through their own bank, charging 6% for mortgages. Eventually, in the eighteen-sixties, some slight peasant reforms were introduced in the Baltic by Tsar Alexander II in line with the general reform in Russia. The transparent aim was, however, gradually to introduce in the Baltic the Russian administration in place of the local autonomy. In 1878 the guilds in the Baltic cities were abolished instead of being made accessible to Latvians. The development of industry and commerce, however, opened possibilities for landless Baltic peoples. As education was considered necessary for skilled workers, it necessarily became democratized, i.e., made accessible to Latvians. With the help of credit co-operatives Latvian tenants redeemed more land from their German landlords, who had expropriated it with the tsarist blessing. Simultaneously a city middle class of intellectuals arose. The result was that a national awakening developed in the Baltic States. At the end of the nineteenth century the Baltic peoples were ready for autonomous self-government and even for statehood. The Russian reactionary Tsar Alexander III, together with the German squires, tried to hamper this development, but without success. The Baltic peoples continued their intellectual and political ascendancy.

This Baltic autonomous movement, directed against both tsarist oppression and the German-Balt *ancien régime* with its medieval privileges still tolerated by the Russian tsars, culminated in the revolution of 1904-1905, when the Baltic peoples through their national assemblies demanded social reforms, self-government and the election of Constituent Assemblies to organize a new basis of life. In a bloody manner the Russian Government of Nicholas II, the reactionary son of Alexander III, suppressed the revolution. The German squires, disguised as honorary police officers ("Selbstschutz"), led the Russian punitive squads. Thousands of farms were burnt and thousands of Baltic peasants shot or deported. A large emigration movement began in which thousands emigrated to the United States. The political movement, which went underground, became stronger. It was a paradox that at the time of the Hague Peace Conference in 1907, initiated by Russia, the blackest reaction took place in Russia herself, morally strengthened by Russia's military alliance with France and England. Only the United States openly protested against the bloody Jewish pogroms permitted by the hypocritical Russian tsarist régime.

Germany, still trying to gain time, in 1908 signed the agreement of St. Petersburg concerning the *status quo* in the Baltic. In the same year the Russian Premier, Stolypin, issued a secret order demanding an acceleration of russification in the Baltic. The German-dominated Baltic Diets,

however, were spared. Instead of trying to bring the Baltic peoples, who hated the Germans as their oppressors, to its side, the Russian government continued to cajole the reactionary German-Baltic court nobility, which, however, was unable to prevent the war between Germany and Russia.

Soon after the beginning of the first World War, in May, 1915, Liepaja, the most formidable Russian naval base in the Baltic was easily taken by the Germans; Lithuania and Kurland were occupied and Riga was menaced. Now the Russian tsar (in August, 1915) permitted the formation in Latvian voluntary rifle regiments of 180,000 officers and men. They held the Daugava (Dvina) front for two years, thus alleviating the German pressure on France and on the English sector in Belgium. But the impact of war was too hard for the Russian people. Tsar Nicholas II, under the influence of his courtiers, was ready to sign a separate peace with Germany, but in March, 1917 he was forced by the war party to abdicate. His brother, the Grand Duke Michael, refused to accept the throne, demanding an election by the Russian Constituent Assembly. Thus, constitutionally, the cementing force of the Russian Empire ceased to exist, and the nations subdued by tsarist Russia felt quite free to decide about their future. However, there was not yet a separatist movement by the Baltic peoples; they hoped for territorial autonomy within the frame of a federative republican Russia. They were also in favor of continuing the war against Germany until victory was achieved.

A Russian Provisional Government of the Duma was established, which promised to carry on the war to a victorious end. But this proved to be an illusion. Also the "reforms" promised Baltic peoples were not very encouraging. In order to counteract the German attempts to establish pro-German puppet governments in occupied Lithuania and Kurland, the Russian Provisional Government of Prince Lvov in April and June, 1917 granted Estonia and Latvia the "Zemstvo" self-government, which had already existed in Russia under the tsars since 1864. It was not the territorial autonomy that the Baltic peoples had expected. However, the German-Baltic landed nobles, feeling menaced, turned to the German Kaiser for support, and began to conspire against Russia, an old scheme of theirs. For the preservation of their privileges they had betrayed the Pope to Martin Luther, Livonia to Poland, the latter to Sweden and both the Swedes and Poles to Russia, under whom they had fared best.

The All-Latvian political conference, which assembled in Riga on July 30, 1917, demanded that all districts inhabited by a majority of Latvians be united in one autonomous Latvian state, whose form of govern-

ment should be decided by a freely-elected Constituent Assembly. The same demands for Constituent Assemblies were voiced in Estonia as well as in German-occupied Lithuania. But the Russian Provisional Government stubbornly refused to meet the just demands of the Baltic majority population, which expected no greater rights than the German nobles had enjoyed.

Meanwhile the Bolsheviks, who were determined to return to Russia from exile (from Switzerland, Sweden, and even the U. S. A.), and were liberated from Siberian prisons and forced labor camps were busy corrupting the Russian army. Their slogan was peace to the Russian peasant huts and war to the Russian capitalists and large land-holders.

The situation in Russia grew so desperate that the Kerenski government, like that of Tsar Nicholas II, saw the only salvation in a quick peace, at least with Austria. On November 7, 1917, a day before the opening of preliminary separate peace negotiations with Austrian delegates in Stockholm, the Bolsheviks, having got wind of this peace move and being eager themselves to give peace to the Russians in order to strengthen their weak position, overthrew the Kerenski government and at once offered peace to Germany and its allies. In order to gain the sympathy of the national minorities, the Bolshevik government on November 15, 1917, in a decree signed by Lenin and Stalin, promised all nations formerly annexed by the Russian tsar full self-determination and the right of secession. But the opposite of the expected happened; instead of supporting the Bolsheviks, almost all the national minorities decided to secede from Russia: the Georgians, Armenians, Tartars, Sarts, Kirghiz, Turkmens, Bucharians, Siberians, the Kuban and Don Cossacks, the Crimean Tartars, Ukrainians, White Russians, and naturally, also the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Poles. It was a general exodus from Russia. The Great-Russian Bolsheviks, supported by a small group of assimilated bolshevistic aliens, despaired of losing their preponderance. It is interesting to note that, according to the census of 1897, there were in tsarist Russia (by percentage): Great Russians, 43.30%; Ukrainians, 17.41%; Poles, 6.17%; White Russians, 4.54%; Jews, 3.94%; Kirghiz, 3.18%; Tartars, 2.91%; Latvians and Lithuanians, 2.41%; the others were less than two per cent. One can imagine the desperate situation of the Bolsheviks, who now tried to divide their opponents by granting one or other of the national groups recognition.

The non-Russian peoples of the western Russian region, particularly the Baltic peoples, had the best chances of building up their own statehood. They were more advanced culturally, believed in private property as a stimulus of progress, in free religion as a basis of ethics, in a strong

family as a basis of social life, in free idealistic education as a means of bettering life; they hated Bolshevism and its doctrine which denied all these natural rights.

The Baltic peoples professed democratic self-government, free elections, free press, free associations, and demanded the partitioning of the large estates, but not the establishment of socialistic rural estates instead of privately-owned farms. Instead of the struggle between classes the Baltic peoples believed in co-operative organization. These ideas were all contrary to the Bolshevik doctrine. There was no alternative: the choice for the Baltic peoples was to become either free and democratic, or to be subjected to a wild experiment of fanatics. By November, 1917 the Baltic States had legally seceded from Russia and formed their own provisional governments.

The Bolsheviks, eager to preserve their government, at least in central Russia, on March 3, 1918, signed the Brest-Litovsk peace with Germany, paying the Germans for their recognition with the Baltic States, which Russia renounced. Quite cynically the Bolsheviks on August 27, 1918, in Berlin signed a frontier agreement with Germany under which all the Baltic States, White Russia, Poland and Ukraine were ceded to the German sphere. Now the Germans became busy building up, according to Prof. Rohrbach's scheme, a chain of satellite buffer states between Germany and Russia. Except for the Allied victory with American help, they would have eventually abolished also the Bolshevik government and re-established some pro-German Russian paternalistic monarchy. Finland was to have a German prince as Grand Duke; Estonia and Livonia proper, both north of the Daugava River, were to become a Livonian-German satellite duchy with the Kaiser as Duke, but Kurland was to be incorporated into Prussia; Lithuania was to be ruled by a German Catholic Prince. All were to become parts of the German Empire. This plan fell apart with Germany's collapse.

The Baltic peoples, even before Germany's downfall, strongly protested against this plan and decided to struggle against both violators of their natural rights, the Germans and the Bolsheviks. This strong pro-Allied stand had its compensation in the form of *de facto* recognition of the Baltic Governments on November 11, 1918, by Great Britain and the other Allies. Simultaneously the Brest-Litovsk treaty with its supplementary agreements was declared null and void.

The Baltic provisional governments now assumed administration in their liberated countries, successfully organized tribunals, defense, education

and reconstruction, and simultaneously began to co-operate among themselves on a regional basis.

The politically isolated Bolsheviks in November, 1918 had already begun to organize on Russian soil Baltic-Soviet puppet governments, which were to reconquer the Baltic in order to bring the Soviet Revolution into Western Europe. This aim was proclaimed quite cynically in the *Izvestiya* of December 25, 1918:

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are directly on the road from Russia to Western Europe and are a hindrance to our revolution, because they separate Soviet Russia from revolutionary Germany . . . This separating wall has to be destroyed . . . The conquest of the Baltic Sea would make it possible for Soviet Russia to agitate in favor of the Soviet Revolution in the Scandinavian countries so that the Baltic Sea would be transformed into the Sea of the Soviet Revolution.

From this officially revealed plan it is quite evident what the Bolsheviks mean when they and their fellow-traveling supporters talk and write about the "Baltic Barrier States"!

At the same time, communist revolutions were being fostered in Bavaria, Hungary and Saxony. However, by 1919 the Bolshevistic enterprise in Germany had failed. The Hungarian communistic state was liquidated by Rumanian and Czechoslovak armies. (That was why Hungary lost considerable territory to the one and the other "liberator"). Neither did the Bolsheviks succeed in the Baltic. They were repulsed by the Finns with the help of the Germans, by the Estonians with the help of anti-Bolshevik Russians and Finns, and by the Latvians with the help of the German-Balt territorials.

Once again the German Balts proved their treacherous nature. After the liberation of Riga on May 22, 1919, the German territorials, reinforced by the Finnish von der Goltz detachments brought to Kurland purportedly for transportation to Prussia, suddenly attacked the Latvians and Estonians, but were decisively defeated at Cesis (Wenden) on June 22, 1919. The indignation of the Latvians and Estonians against this treacherous act of the Germans while Estonia and Latvia were in a life and death struggle with the Bolsheviks, is understandable. The Germans would have been annihilated but for the intervention of the British, who influenced the Baltic leaders to be "humane" with their most deadly enemies.

It is said that foreign diplomats appearing in Baltic capitals mingled preferably with the remnants of the Baltic German nobles. Latvian intellectuals and leaders were often snubbed, although the Latvians had fought for the Allied cause and had lost 32,000 officers and men during 1915-

1917. In the eyes of the German nobles the Latvians were "only peasants." As late as 1944 an English author used the expression "Baltic peasant armies" and "peasant republics"; thus have the German Balts imbued some Western European minds with the idea that the Baltic peoples are only a class of peasants. But these "peasants" were good enough to prevent the re-establishment of a German-controlled monarchy in Russia, which would have endangered the peace of Europe after the first World War, so dearly paid for by Allied sacrifices. During the Paris Peace Conference German-Balt aristocrats also enjoyed special attention. They urged the recognition of Admiral Koltschak and brought forward plans for intervention against Soviet Russia. It so happened that the Baltic "peasant" statesmen in Paris categorically refused to participate in these Baltic baronial plans.

The outrageous acts of the German generals (von der Goltz and others) in the Baltic were instrumental in creating Article 433 of the Versailles Treaty, which forbade the German military formations still lingering in the Baltic to hamper the defense organized by the Baltic governments. This is the sole article wherein the Baltic governments are mentioned. However, the Germans disregarded this article and continued their intrigues under Russian disguise.

Nothing is said in the entire Versailles Treaty about the Baltic States governments having been recognized or established for purposes of intervention or as "barrier states." The pro-Bolshevik publicists spreading such cold-blooded lies have not even seen the text of the Versailles Treaty; they believe what their bosses tell them. The truth is that the Baltic States are not creations of Versailles. In a telegram sent by the Department of State on August 23, 1919, to the American Commissioner in Helsinki it is particularly emphasized that the Versailles Treaty did not recognize the Baltic States.³ After the signing of the Versailles Treaty on June 28, 1919, the Baltic States still had to fight for their independence and recognition.

The German troops still lingering in Kurland and disguised as Russians, led by a Russian monarchist named Bermondts against Riga in November, were completely routed and thrown out of the Baltic. Thus the last attempt of German militarists to re-establish a pro-German Russian monarchy in the Baltic States was also frustrated. Soviet Russian historians know all the facts; they also know that the strong anti-interventionist Baltic attitude indirectly saved their régime.

Finally, on January 30, 1920, the last Bolshevik was driven out of Latvia, with the help of Polish divisions. Already at the end of 1919 the

³ *Digest of International Law I* (Washington, D. C., 1940), 199, "Recognition of New States."

Estonians had reached their ethnographic border. There were still some Bolshevik formations in Lithuanian border districts, but eventually these were also liquidated.

Now Soviet Russia, which had lost in Hungary, Poland and everywhere in Western Europe, was ready to sign peace treaties with the so-called Baltic "barrier states," who accepted the peace offer, despite the misgivings of certain Allied statesmen, who, still having hopes for the resurrection of a democratic Russia, cautioned the Baltic States against signing a treaty with Soviet Russia. The peace treaties were nevertheless signed in 1920. Thus Soviet Russia was recognized by the Baltic States *de jure* even before France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, etc., did so.

Some American protagonists of Soviet expansion in the Baltic now endeavor to minimize the Baltic-Soviet Russian peace treaties, which actually were not extorted from Soviet Russia but signed quite voluntarily, and are based on the principle of self-determination of nations. The Bolsheviks themselves in these treaties denounce the tsarist imperialistic treaties, by which the Baltic States at the end of the eighteenth century were annexed by the tsars. The Soviet Government declares that it recognizes the independence of the Baltic States for eternity. The principle of non-interference in domestic affairs is being accepted. Economic, cultural and other normal state relations are desired. The Baltic-Soviet frontier is traced along the historic ethnographic border which has existed for more than a thousand years, separating the Baltic States from Russia by a wide belt of swampy rivers, lakes and peat-moss forests. Besides the peace treaties, repatriation, optation, sanitary, and direct railway traffic conventions were also signed. Agreements for raft floating and a convention for a peaceful liquidation of frontier incidents normalized frontier traffic. Commercial treaties, with commercial arbitration conventions, were also signed. Mutual non-aggression treaties, accompanied by conciliation conventions topped the structure. Eventually the convention defining the aggressor and aggression, proposed by Soviet Russia, was signed. Already before that in 1929 Soviet Russia together with the Baltic States had signed the Kellogg Pact outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. All the above conventions, pacts, agreements and treaties were registered at the League of Nations Treaty Registry.

Gradually a *modus vivendi* was worked out between the Baltic States and the U.S.S.R. This served as an encouraging example for other Western European States to normalize relations with Soviet Russia. It might be also stated that Soviet Russia by the Baltic peace treaties obtained the possibility of establishing relations with other Western European states, from which opportunity Soviet Russia profited considerably. Thus all the sudden idle

talk about extorted Baltic peace treaties, after an analysis of the truly historical events, proves to be "staggering balderdash," to use an expression of Lord Vansittart.

A similar threadbare falsehood is the insinuation that the alleged "unfriendly" attitude of the Baltic States deprived them of Soviet Russian transit. Russia preferred to use its own ports and railways for its very limited exports. There are statistics to prove it, but what can statistics prove to merchants of power politics? In defiance of all calumniations, the Baltic States managed to achieve economic welfare and even to become economically self-supporting without the economic assistance of Soviet Russia.

The often alleged loss of the Russian market for Baltic "heavy" industries as a result of secession from Russia is also based on disregard of facts. The Baltic prewar (1914) industries were built up as a result of investment of foreign (not Russian) capital, and they were dependent on large Russian exports and the high Russian import tariff. Foreign ships which came for Russian export cargoes (from 1907-1912 there were millions of tons of Russian hides, flax, butter, eggs, oil-cake, timber, etc. available for export) brought as ballast coal, steel, ore and other raw materials from England, Sweden, Belgium, and Denmark. Only a part of the iron ingots were imported from Russia. It would have been uneconomical to import to the Baltic coal from the Russian Ukraine by railway. Thus the Baltic pre-first World War industries were a pure financial conjecture. The more Russia became industrialized near its sources of raw materials, the less profitable the Baltic industries became. By the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century an industrial crisis was in the making in the Baltic. At the outbreak of the war, in August, 1914, Baltic industrial machinery was hastily evacuated to Russia, mostly scattered along the railway lines and only partly reinstalled in factories somewhere in Russia. Almost nothing came back to the Baltic States after the Baltic peace treaties were signed.

However, the new Baltic States succeeded in developing their own local industries: pulp, paper, leather, cement, glass, foodstuffs, textile, metal, etc. which produced also for export. The maximum Soviet Russia could absorb was about 3 per cent of the total Baltic export. The fact is that Soviet Russia imported more foodstuffs from the Baltic than industrial products. The Baltic States imported from Russia: salt, soda, naphtha, artificial fertilizers, some machinery, and textiles. However, the low quality of Russian industrial products (textiles, etc.) did not encourage Baltic purchasers, who preferred the high quality products of the United States, Great Britain, Belgium, France, and Germany.

Baltic economic vitality may be embarrassing for Soviet apologists, but the evidence speaks against their assertions.

Often Baltic-Soviet Russian political relations have also been distorted. Actually these were normal, as good as they could be. There were no incidents and no border problems. The Soviet Government usually refused to be responsible for communistic incidents, spying, etc. Thus formally and legally good neighbor relations existed. However, there was always the Russian-German political *rapprochement* as a potential menace. The Russian-German *entente* began in 1922 in Rapallo, but did not develop into a close alliance. Even the so-called Eastern Locarno treaty of 1934 did not bring both partners closer, because there was always mutual mistrust. Thus the Baltic States, although considered buffer states by both Germany and Soviet Russia and coveted equally by them both, actually balanced the relations between them, and consequently stabilized politically all the Baltic region.

Soviet Russia became more nervous after Hitler's appearance. She tried to build up collective security in the form of an East European Pact, which should have been guaranteed by France. The Baltic States were ready to adhere to this pact, but Germany refused to have any part in it. In 1933 a *rapprochement* with the United States was achieved. In 1934 Soviet Russia extended the non-aggression treaties with the Baltic States for ten years. In the same year Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed the Baltic Entente for closer collaboration. In 1935 Soviet Russia entered the League of Nations, after Germany had left it. But Soviet Russia did not raise any protests against the Baltic Entente, which, incidentally, was open to other states. Soon Soviet Russia learned about the tragic impotence of the League, to which the unstopped Japanese aggression in Manchukuo, Italy's in Ethiopia, and the absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia by Germany testified.

Now Soviet Russia began a *rapprochement* with Germany, which had showed signs of great military might. There is information that before the re-annexation of Memel, (Klaipeda) by Germany on March 22, 1939, Soviet Russia had already re-established more intimate relations with Germany. On March 28, 1939, Soviet Russia's Foreign Commissar, M. Litvinoff, offered Latvia and Estonia a special guarantee and cautioned them against granting any other country any exceptional rights and privileges, which Soviet Russia would consider as a menace and indirect aggression. The Baltic States, whose international conduct was impeccable and who had adopted strong neutrality laws, rejected this unwelcome suggestion, and on June 7, 1939, signed a non-aggression treaty with Germany.

The Balts were firm in their decision to avoid entanglements in international affairs of no direct concern to them. In their neutrality policy they followed the Swedish pattern, but the trouble was that the Baltic States were geographically on the wrong Baltic shore. During the summer of 1939, as revealed by the Earl of Halifax on December 5, 1939, Soviet Russia tried to obtain the assent of France and Great Britain to formulae covering cases of Soviet Russia's indirect aggression, i.e., the right to occupy the Baltic States when Soviet Russia would choose to do so, allegedly in order to prevent direct or indirect aggression, which existed only in the dialectical minds of Soviet Russia's brain trusts. That is the reason why Soviet Russia systematically refused to accept arbitration, consultation, or mediation in political matters.

The Soviet action "to stop aggression" would have been unilateral and automatic, without previous consultations with anyone. The automatic principle was systematically upheld in all Soviet Russian projects of mutual guarantees with France, Czechoslovakia, etc. Soviet Russia proved her rather unpredictable international behavior when on August 23, 1939 she signed the well-known treaty with Germany. There was no reason to accuse the Baltic States of unfriendly action or conspiracy against Soviet Russia, and to break off all conversations with Great Britain and France. The Bolsheviks knew that the Baltic States were not going to side with Germany or any other aggressor of Soviet Russia. However, it became clear that Germany had obtained from Russia a free hand in the West. The price Germany paid Soviet Russia for that is as yet unknown in details. But there are some facts. Soon after Poland's invasion by Germany, the former, on September 29, 1939 was partitioned by the treaty of demarcation between Germany and Soviet Russia, signed at Brest-Litovsk.

But the deal between Soviet Russia and Germany during their new honeymoon was not limited to Poland alone. On September 28, 1939, the same day when in Moscow Herr von Ribbentrop and Mr. V. Molotov outlined the new German-Russian demarcation line in Poland, Estonia (accused unjustly of breach of neutrality with reference to the escape of an interned Polish submarine) was forced to sign a mutual assistance pact with Soviet Russia, providing for a ten-year lease of Estonian naval, air and military bases to Soviet Russia, and to accept a Red Army garrison of 25,000 for the duration of the war. The counter promise was that Russia would help Estonia against aggression and supply the Estonian army with munitions, arms, etc., which it never received. It was especially emphasized, however, that the Estonian-Soviet Russian peace treaty and other treaties were to be respected. Similar pacts with slight modifications were signed with

Latvia on October 5, and Lithuania on October 10, 1939. Latvia had to accept a garrison of 30,000, Lithuania had to lease bases for fifteen years. The same deal was offered to Finland, but the latter rejected the leasing or selling of Hangoe, although accepting almost all other proposals.

Soviet Russia's next step was the invasion of Finland, which was a very unflattering show of the alleged mighty Red Army. At the same time also the League of Nations continued to show weakness. Outside the stigmatization of Soviet Russia as the unprovoked aggressor, pronounced on December 14, 1939, nothing was done to help Finland. The refusal of Norway and Sweden to let a League of Nations expeditionary corps pass through their territory to assist Finland, was evidently welcome to the League of Nations. Eventually Finland came through badly bruised instead of being completely annexed by Soviet Russia. It is rumored that Germany insisted on a Soviet Russian-Finnish peace, because Germany was preparing its "blitz" against Belgium, the Netherlands and France, which was to begin on May 10, 1940, and included also Denmark and Norway as objectives.

During the Russo-Finnish war in which the Baltic States observed strict neutrality, the Soviet Russian attitude toward the Baltic States was also tolerable.

At the Conference of the Baltic foreign ministers in March, 1940 in Riga, after the end of the Russian-Finnish war, the decision of the Baltic States to remain strictly neutral was reiterated. On March 29, 1940, Foreign Commissar V. Molotov also reiterated Russia's assurance that she would continue to respect Baltic independence. The fiasco of the League of Nations intervention in Finland and the practical isolation of the Baltic States from Western Europe made everything now dependent upon Soviet Russia's *bona fides*.

As soon as the German "blitz" proved successful, Soviet Russia's attitude changed fundamentally. Unfounded accusations were hurled against Lithuania, and frontier incidents were created with Estonia; for a while Latvia was spared—evidently to avoid a common Baltic counteraction. There were still great powers in the world who sympathized with the Baltic States. However, after the fall of Paris and the débâcle of the Allied Western front, Soviet Russia dared to invade the Baltic States. The strongly neutral Baltic States were, for no known reason accused of military conspiracy against Soviet Russia.

It is quaint to accuse six million Balts of conspiring against gigantic Soviet Russia. The real historical events of that period are now completely falsified by some writers partial to the Bolsheviks, who spread the

insinuation that the Baltic States had conspired against Soviet Russia with Germany, the former's closest political friend. There is absolutely no proof of such conspiracy. The Bolsheviks, having in 1940 seized the Baltic diplomatic archives, would have published long ago the respective documents if they had really existed. The fact is that the Baltic States governments accepted the Soviet Russian armed ultimatum to let Russian troops pass freely and to form governments "friendly" to Soviet Russia. The president of Latvia, K. Ulmanis, then appealed over the radio to the Latvian nation to meet the entering Red Army as the army of a friendly neighbor nation. "I stay at my post," said Ulmanis, "you continue to do your work!"

This hardly agrees with the specious stories of some commentators and publicists who now try to convince the listening and reading public as in the *Intelligent American's Guide to Peace*, or J. Steel's *The Future Europe*, that the Baltic governments, together with German noblemen who allegedly controlled the Baltic governments, fled to Germany. Incidentally, the Germans had been repatriated in 1939 from the Baltic States. But the Baltic governments in 1940 were almost *in toto* deported by the Bolsheviks to Siberia and Central Asia.

A great surprise awaited the Bolsheviks when the Baltic peoples did not rise up against their legitimate governments but continued to be loyal to them. The open prison doors let out only a few hundred prisoners, criminal and political (the latter mostly tried for totalitarian, i.e., either fascistic or communist activities). There were in all Latvia about 150 registered communists. The fact is that no Soviet revolution took place in the Baltic despite the presence of the Red Army. Now the Bolsheviks dispatched by airplane special envoys to form so-called "friendly" governments: to Lithuania, Dekanozoff; to Estonia, Zhdanoff (at present chief of the Russian Control Commission in Finland); and to Latvia, Vishinsky, the same person who not so long ago arranged things in Rumania, and who in London represented Russia in the UNO. In addition to the official Soviet Russian proconsuls, Baltic members of the Comintern were sent to establish the Soviet system and a proletarian dictatorship in the Baltic under the guiding hand of the Communist party.

In brief, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia acquired governments "friendly" to Soviet Russia. After mock elections (July 14-15, 1940), under pressure of Red Army divisions, the "peoples' parliaments" proclaimed Soviet systems in the Baltic (July 20, 1940) and unanimously on the next day, (July 21, 1940) decided by acclamation to beg for the incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R. This mock procedure was performed for the benefit of the Western democracies in order to save appearances.

However, it did not deceive the realistic Americans, who on July 23, 1940 denominated the Soviet Russian enterprise in the Baltic as "devious processes" and "predatory activities" with the aim of annihilating the independence of the Baltic States.

Disregarding the outspoken American attitude, Soviet Russia's Foreign Commissar, V. Molotov, on August 1, 1940 stated in the Central Soviet in Moscow that:

"If the Russian Tsars, beginning with Ivan the Terrible, were trying to reach the Baltic Sea, they were doing this not only for their own personal ambitions, but because this was required for the development of the Russian state. It would be unpardonable if the Soviet Union did not seize this opportunity, which may never occur again.

"The leaders of the Soviet Union have decided to incorporate the Baltic States into the family of the Soviet republics."

He ended his speech with the declaration that:

"we dispatched the Red Army to the Baltic countries to 'produce the required results . . .'"

It is evident that the Soviet Union now intends to realize the aim set by *Izvestiya* on December 25, 1918. The latest deeds of Soviet Russia fully justify the *Izvestiya* program. Immediately after the annexation of the Baltic republics their standard of living was levelled to that of the Soviet Union. A constitution providing for a "proletarian dictatorship" was imposed. Purges, deportations and mock trials ending in death sentences took place. Teaching of the "politgramota" was made compulsory. A Latvian scientist and an eyewitness, A. Ceichners, has published in a volume of seven hundred and fifty pages a description of the Bolshevik "paradise" in Latvia, not at all complimentary to the "paradise." The International Red Cross is fully informed about the Bolshevik atrocities in the Baltic during 1940-1941. In June, 1941, before the German attack, according to *New Europe* of June, 1945⁴ the Baltic peoples spontaneously revolted against this so-called Bolshevik "sunshine, happiness and peace . . ." brought to them from Moscow.

The Germans, who on January 10, 1941, had signed in Moscow the new Russian-German frontier treaty with Soviet Russia, on June 22, 1941, attacked Soviet Russia. They still coveted the Baltic, all Poland, White Russia, Ukraine. The Germans, like the Bolsheviks, went back to their 1918 program.

Now Soviet Russia, who suddenly became an ally of Great Britain, had to change her tactics and language. She became "democratic," and

⁴ Pp. 6-7.

"slavophile"; she even liquidated the Comintern (but farsightedly kept the members for later special tasks in Western European "liberated" countries). The Bolsheviks re-established the Moscow Patriarch to cajole the Balkan "bratushki," and to make the world believe that they had indeed evolved. The U.S.S.R. also subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration by the United Nations, re-established relations with Poland, gave promises to Iran, expelled the Slovak minister, called back to Moscow the removed Greek, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak diplomats, and eagerly participated in all conferences of the big democracies, using the most liberal and promising language. But this was only "old wine in new bellows"—to paraphrase the proverb.

Meanwhile the Germans in some eight days had occupied the Baltic, but did not get any farther than the swampy borderlines separating the Baltic from Russia. Leningrad was never taken by the Nazi war machine. But the Baltic, as in the first World War, again became a battleground for almost four years (1941-1945). The Germans this time did not even consider it necessary to create a satellite state from the Baltic. They established the "Ostland" satrapy as a sort of Gestapo colony of the Nazi party. A full description of this period is presented in the book *Latvia Under German Occupation*,⁵ based on reliable information.

The Baltic peoples, relying on the promises of the Atlantic Charter, elected their Underground Central Councils, which led the fight against the Germans and organized passive resistance. A few Baltic Nazi collaborationists, similar to the few Baltic Bolsheviks, could not influence the determination of the Baltic peoples to regain their democratic freedom. Eventually in the fall of 1944, thanks to the victorious campaigns of the Allied forces in Africa, Italy, and France, the decisive defeat of the Germans on the Western front, and the supplies sent to Soviet Russia by the United States, the Red Army eventually succeeded in re-occupying the Baltic States (Kurland not until May 8, 1945, after the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces on the Western front). But instead of the promised liberation from Nazi tyranny, slavery, and oppression, the Bolsheviks re-established in the Baltic the proletarian dictatorship of 1940, with all its bloody accessories. Thus the Baltic peoples were right when they denounced Bolshevik tyranny.

The pro-Bolshevik fellow-traveling publicists are now doing their best to cover up the Bolshevik crime against the Baltic States in 1940. They aim to belittle the Baltic States, by presenting them as "barrier states" and

⁵ *Latvia Under German Occupation*, Publ. by the Latvian Legation, Washington, 1943. 114 pages.

German satellites, which they never were. They question the recognition granted to the Baltic States by the United States Government in 1922 and try to present it as "conditional" although there is no ground for saying so. By trying to tie the Baltic States to the Treaty of Versailles, they hope that after the official nullification of the Versailles Treaty the independence of the Baltic States will also be nullified. They also attempt to present the Baltic States as "integral parts" of Russia, by comparing them with Texas or California. They obviously have no basis for this assertion.

A British labor politician, Sir Stafford Cripps, is most anxious in wooing leftist voters, to let Soviet Russia keep the Baltic States for "strategic reasons," so that from there Russia can better protect the Leningrad heavy industries, which, as a matter of fact, were evacuated beyond the Urals. If some of these industries appeared again in Leningrad, it would be to organize the most powerful navy yard in the Baltic and to build up a Red Navy second to none with the aim of dominating the Baltic and probably the Seven Seas.

There are other people who become ecstatic about Soviet Russia, even millionaires, such as Lord Beaverbrook, who once declared that "communism under Stalin is the best." But Lord Beaverbrook himself naturally prefers to live in plutocratic England. Certainly the Bolsheviks at home use all these "testimonies" to enhance their prestige and to strengthen their hold on the Russian "masses," which are far from being communistic. The oppressed Russian people would gladly acclaim the four freedoms and enjoy real democracy if they were only permitted to do so.

Since Germany's defeat by the Democracies, Soviet Russia is now copying the victorious Germany of 1918, when before the crash in November of that year, she tried to establish a chain of pro-German and satellite states on her eastern borders. Soviet Russia now dominates all Eastern, Southern, Central and Northern Europe. Her sphere of influence is marked in the West by a line drawn from Lübeck to Trieste. But for the British and American occupation forces in Western Europe, all Europe would certainly have been in a Bolshevik grip.

In order to stabilize this Bolshevik domination in Northern Europe, of course, the Baltic States had to be described as "barrier states" or "dictatorships" unfriendly to and intriguing against Soviet Russia. Thus the legend of the Baltic "barrier states" is actually used as a lever to achieve Bolshevik domination in the Baltic and Central and Northern Europe.

The absolute *veto* right gained in the United Nations Organization provides the necessary formula to stabilize the new *status quo*. But the democratic world still believes that the rule of reason, of justice, and of

law, the basis of modern civilization itself, as expressed by the Department of State Declaration of July 23, 1940, when condemning the annihilation of the independence of the Baltic States by Soviet Russia, will eventually prevail.

The Baltic States have developed by a natural process, much as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and other European national states. The Baltic nationalities are externally founded on geographical conditions, their dwelling places being separated geographically from the Slavs. Internally the Balts possess the powerful instinct of cohesiveness.

The creation of the Baltic nations was fostered by the instinct of self-preservation and protection. Only when the independent Baltic nations achieved their highest welfare, did their birth rate grow also. There is no doubt that the Baltic national states incarnate the soul of the Baltic people, which is sentimental, idealistic, and truly democratic.

The Baltic peoples enriched humanity by their arts, literature, music, inventions, science, and agricultural methods; they stabilized the situation in the Nordic Baltic world, thus helping indirectly to preserve Nordic civilization. They exported considerable surpluses of raw materials and foodstuffs to Western European industrial states. Their part in world trade was 0.5% (almost half that of Soviet Russia's). One cannot deny that the Baltic nations were useful members of the world community.

From all the evidence that has thus far come to light, this would seem to be exactly what has taken place in the Baltic States.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

COUNT STADION AND ARCHDUKE CHARLES

by Walter Consuelo Langsam

AUSTRIA'S Foreign Minister in 1809, at the time of the premature uprising against Napoleon, was Count Philip Stadion, German-minded scion of an old Rhenish family whose ancestral lands had been sequestered by the advancing French. Filled with a bitter hatred of Napoleon and the French Government, though apparently not of the French people,¹ Count Stadion concentrated the powers of a remarkable and practical intellect, the strength of an untiring energy, and a determined will, in an effort to free the German territories from French control. From a personal viewpoint he was well-fitted to instil into the subjects of Emperor Francis an enthusiastic confidence in their ability to liberate Central Europe. Stadion was intensely patriotic, aristocratic in thought and action, and withal straightforward, frank, and courageous. He despised the censorship and police spy systems as being beneath the dignity of a great state, and placed the opening of letters on a level with eavesdropping.²

The foreign minister was responsible, at least in part, for the governmental promise (1806) of a freer intellectual life,³ and he constantly emphasized to the emperor the need for working on the "spirit of the nation" and for creating an "electrified army."⁴ He encouraged patriotic acts of every description⁵ and as foreign minister maintained unbroken contact with the remaining Germans,⁶ ably assisted in this endeavor by his brother, Frederick Lothar, Austrian Minister to Bavaria.⁷ Philip Stadion's greatest weakness as a statesman seems to have been a tendency to regard even the most serious matters too lightly and too optimistically.

¹ France, *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Autriche, Correspondance Politique, Vienne*, 1807, vol. 380, folio 413, Andréossy (French Ambassador to Vienna) to Champagny (French Foreign Minister), December 24, 1807: "Il [Stadion] ne peut dans les circonstances les plus ordinaires déguiser sa haine pour tout ce qui tient au gouvernement Français." Austria, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, *Kaiser Franz Akten*, Fasz. 78e, *Vortrag Stadions, Wien*, 22. Jänner 1809, Beilage: "Mein Erster Satz wird also dieser seyn: dass wir Krieg gegen Napoleon, nicht aber gegen Frankreich führen." Langsam, W. C., *The Napoleonic Wars and German Nationalism in Austria*, 1930, pp. 35-41.

² Austria, *Staatsarchiv, Vortrag Stadions*, June 8, 1808.

³ Wurzbach, C. von, ed., *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich*, vol. xxxvii, p. 39.

⁴ Austria, *Staatsarchiv, Vortrag Stadions*, October 22, 1808.

⁵ Austria, *Staatsarchiv, Polizey-Corresp. 1807-1810. Noten an die Polizey Hofstelle*, Fasz. 2, Stadion to Baron von Hager, vice-president of police, March 10, 1809.

⁶ *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. xxxv, p. 372.

⁷ Cf. Perthes, C.T., *Politische Zustände und Personen in Deutschland zur Zeit der französischen Herrschaft*, 2 vols., 1869, vol. ii, pp. 311 and 320.

Closely associated with Stadion in the task of awakening the masses was Archduke Charles, brother of the emperor and, since 1805, generalissimo of the Austrian armies. Charles seems, in fact, to have been largely responsible for the appointment of Stadion to the foreign ministry.⁸ In view of the generally friendly relations obtaining between the two men, and of their able co-operation, the following Stadion letters, whose originals are preserved in the *Staatsarchiv* in Vienna,⁹ would appear to be of some interest. The first was written a little more than two weeks after Napoleon's successful campaign at Ratisbon and a little less than two weeks before the defeat of the French at Aspern. The second was written two days before Napoleon, recovered from the defeat of Aspern, crossed the Danube with a large army and won the bloody contest of Deutsch-Wagram.

Schrems, May 9, 1809

Your Majesty:

Since it is not to be my fortune to accompany Your Majesty on the trip to Zwettel [for a military conference], where the welfare and the woe of the twenty million persons whose fate was placed in Your Majesty's hands by Providence is to be decided, I must take the liberty thus to lay some words at your feet.

It was not bad luck, but the daily piling up of errors that led us into the cruel situation in which we now find ourselves. Even so, our condition is far from desperate. The number of troops still at our command; the spirit of the soldiers, still excellent considering the gruesome disasters that have befallen them; the strategic disposition of the troops commanded by Archduke John; the friendly spirit evinced throughout Germany despite our misfortunes; and, finally, the remarkable spirit of Your Majesty's own subjects, would yet win for us a happy outcome of this pressing crisis, if only there could be found in the supreme military command a spark of the strength, will-power, and ability necessary to derive the obvious advantages from these factors. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Except for the further piling up of regiment upon regiment, the wearing-down of our troops through ill-advised marching orders, and the consequent creation of a useless mass which must invariably arrive at any scene too late even momentarily to check the progress of the foe, nothing is being done. The strength of the enemy is not known; the commands of the several enemy army corps are unknown; except for some useless marching in circles, everything is being neglected. Instead of being led, the army blindly feels its way, so that every eyewitness must lose all confidence in future events.

Certainly no other sovereign has ever entertained more benevolent wishes

⁸ Austria, *Staatsarchiv, Kaiser Franz Akten*, Fasz. 78a, note of Archduke Charles to Francis, January 3, 1806, on the condition of the monarchy.

⁹ Austria, *Staatsarchiv, Kaiser Franz Akten*, Fasz. 78e, folios 38-39 and 70-74.

for his subjects. But, gracious lord, permit me to say it: Nothing can now be accomplished with sterile wishes which tear at Your Majesty's heart without staving off the ruin of the state for even a day. At the moment there is need for a firm and decisive will, before which must recede every consideration of relationship, of brotherly affection, and every factor which does not bear directly on the welfare of the state. Even though I ought not to bring up the matter of Your Majesty's personal existence, I must insist all the more strongly that now millions of people have the right to *demand* their salvation through Your Majesty, that duty and conscience require their salvation and the subordination of each and every other consideration.

It is my opinion:

1. That Your Majesty should *unequivocally* demand of the generals called to the conference at Zwettel their suggestions, plans, and thoughts; should require them to be definite in their speech; and, without any regard for the opinion of the generalissimo, should make peremptory decisions whenever the language of the officers betrays doubt or hesitation or, of all things, the idea that there is nothing more to be done. If the Archduke should refuse to co-operate *fully, frankly, and freely*, then I conjure Your Majesty to remember that now the state alone must count as *all* for you.
2. I believe that everything humanly possible must be done to save Vienna. If Vienna be lost, the heart of the monarchy will be laid bare and all our might will be paralyzed. The river crossing at Comorn is at least as dangerous as that at or near Vienna. Whoever seeks to demonstrate the impossibility of crossing the Danube at or near Vienna will find it just as impassable at Comorn. Such an one would end by manoeuvring Your Majesty right out of your dominions in order to avoid another clash with the enemy with what would then certainly be a useless army.
3. I am of the opinion that in the decision which is to be reached, the *preservation of the monarchy* and not of the *army of Archduke Charles* must be regarded as the essential element; that, therefore, consideration must be given to the whole state of affairs, especially the movements of Marquis Chasteler and Archduke John; and that, finally, the uprising which has actually broken out in northern Germany be not neglected lest, if it be left to accomplish nothing and to be destroyed, such aid be denied us for all future time. In this connection I must humbly request Your Majesty to devote some attention to the accompanying memoir [missing] and see that it *definitely enter the discussions* at Zwettel.

Stadion.

Wolkersdorf, July 3, 1809

Your Majesty:

His Imperial Highness, the Archduke Generalissimo, has several times approached Your Majesty, orally and in writing, on the need for immediate peace negotiations as the sole means to save the monarchy from its present

predicament. The same opinion is expressed in the memoranda of General Wimpffen. At the recent conferences I have confined myself to acknowledging my convictions that any feeler which we might extend in the direction of such negotiations in existing circumstances would, far from accomplishing its object, have the harmful effects of paralyzing our strength and robbing us of all outside help. Moreover, I have not yet been able to discover in our present position any sufficient reason for seeking the salvation of the monarchy solely in such a doubtful and dangerous proceeding. The subject matter in question is, however, so very important and urgent, that I would be open to reproach as having failed in my duty, did I not take it upon myself to inform Your Majesty more definitely and in greater detail than was possible at the conferences of my views thereon.

To begin, I believe I may assume that we definitely do not have to prefer *any* peace, no matter how severe it may be on the monarchy and the ruling house, to a continuation of the war. In the relative number of our fighting forces as compared with those of the enemy (even were we to count the Russian troops in with Napoleon's allies) there certainly lies no basis for any such assertion; nor is there any justification for it in our military situation. The unfortunate circumstance that our military might happens to be gathered at the heart of the monarchy should really be a stimulus to us to extract whatever advantages there may be in such a condition—rather than to convert into certainty through ruinous peace terms a collapse which, in the event of continued war, would at least remain a matter of some doubt.

On the other hand, I am ready to admit that we do not find ourselves in a position to contemplate far-reaching plans, and that *any* peace which ensures the *honorable, independent* existence of the monarchy should necessarily be regarded as an acceptable peace.

If, therefore, the talk is of the necessity to conclude peace or of the probability of securing a peace, then it is needful above all to determine of what nature the peace shall be—whether it shall be a peace which ensures the existence of the monarchy or such an one as, like unto a capitulation, embodies the early and complete dissolution of the state.

Prince Liechtenstein, distinguished by the excellency of his views on all matters, flatters himself, by giving ear only to his proved patriotism, even now to be able to retain, in a peace with Napoleon, Tirol and a contiguous Italian boundary which would be a bulwark for our southern provinces. I declare my willingness to support such a peace with word and deed, and to go to meet it whenever occasion may offer. But can we at all expect that Napoleon, in existing circumstances, would agree to such a peace?

His Imperial Highness [Charles] has never specifically defined his understanding of the word "peace." It seems to me that he would be inclined to regard as very advantageous a peace which permits us to keep the boundaries of the Peace of Pressburg and as acceptable even a peace which would involve territorial cessions.

Under this assumption, my views differ entirely from those of His Imperial Highness. For I am firmly convinced that, following these three months of confusion and chaos in all branches of the administration, a return of the monarchy to the boundaries of the Pressburg Treaty would bring on the early downfall, and further territorial cessions the immediate downfall, of the monarchy and the end of the Austrian dynasty.

Circumstances may develop or come to my knowledge any day which may, in my judgment, either offer *a* possibility or prove *the* possibility of negotiating with the French Emperor in an honorable fashion or at least in a manner to remove any fear of the break-up of the state. As soon as such an opportunity appears, I shall, as I have already begged leave to remark, seize it and steadfastly attempt to make use of it.

But in order to arrive at our goal through such negotiations, in whatever circumstances they may be held, it is absolutely necessary that the war be continued until the very moment of signature with such a display of determination, will-power, and might as if we believed it utterly impossible to achieve a peace save through the ordeal of battle.

Only in this event may Your Majesty hope to open and complete advantageous negotiations which will, in their final result, save the monarchy. And only then shall I be able to undertake and carry on such negotiations with sincere convictions. Should, however, the thought of peace have the effect of immediately paralyzing all operations which might well be undertaken with Your Majesty's numerous soldiers, should the peace proposal serve as a motive systematically to prolong the inactivity which has hitherto characterized the current campaign, then I can only request release and retirement. And then I also foresee, either through the war or the peace, no alternative but the decay and dissolution of the state..

THE ELIMINATION OF GERMAN MINORITIES IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

by Joseph B. Schechtman

I

THE German settlements in southeastern Europe can be traced back as far as the eleventh century. German colonists arrived in successive waves composed in turn of warriors, landowners, officials, peasants, artisans and professional classes. The main objectives of German colonization were the then Hungarian provinces of Transylvania, Banat, Vojvodina and the Zips which later became parts of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Slovakia.

In 1940 German sources estimated the number of *Volksdeutsche* in Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary at 2,151,546. This estimate was based on registrations carried out by German organizations and was at considerable variance with the national census in the respective countries. The following table shows the discrepancies between figures given by German and official sources:¹

<i>Number of Germans</i>	<i>According to national census (Year)</i>	<i>According to German sources</i>	<i>Discrepancy</i>
In Rumania.....	745,173 (1930)	818,000	72,827
In Yugoslavia	499,326 (1931)	685,000	185,674
In Hungary.....	478,630 (1930)	648,546	169,916
Total	1,723,129	2,151,546	428,417

Taking into account, on the one hand, the tendency of the official Rumanian, Hungarian, and Yugoslav census authorities to minimize the number of persons belonging to national minorities, and, on the other hand, the tendency of German organizations to inflate these figures and, furthermore, the application of different criteria to determine ethnic nationality, we may assume that the actual number of *Volksdeutsche* in southeastern Europe amounted to some two million.

The occupational structure of this large *Volksdeutsche* population was characterized by the prevalence of land-bound elements. Some 74 per cent of the German folk group in Rumania lived on the land, while only 26 per cent were concentrated in the towns. The German minority in Yugoslavia was similarly distributed. In Hungary, only 17 per cent lived in

¹ Heinz Brunner, "Biologische und Soziologische Streiflichter auf das Südosostdeutschum," *Nation und Staat* (July, 1940), pp. 362-364. Helmut Wolter, "Zur Volksbiologie der deutschen Volksgruppen," *Nation und Staat* (December, 1939), pp. 90-91.

urban areas, while 83 per cent belonged to the farm population.² There were, of course, regional discrepancies in the rural-urban distribution of the German groups. In Rumania, for instance, 96.3 per cent of the Germans of Bessarabia lived in villages while in Bukovina 83 per cent lived in towns and only 17 per cent, in rural areas. With the exception of Bukovina, where 15 per cent of the German population were employed in industry, there were almost no industrial workers among southeastern Germans. Artisans were more numerous. The percentage of artisans among the German folk groups was as follows: in Hungary 10.5 per cent; in Bessarabia and Dobrudja 13 per cent; in Banat 18 per cent; in Transylvania 19 per cent; and in Bukovina 41 per cent. Most of them lived in rural areas. The percentage of *Volksdeutsche* in the liberal professions varied considerably between countries and provinces. It was very small in Bessarabia (1.8), Dobrudja (1.2) and Banat (1.72); in southern Bukovina it amounted to 3.5 per cent, while in northern Bukovina it reached 3.5 per cent and in Transylvania 6.5 per cent.³

Despite the small size of an important fraction of all German agricultural holdings, the diligence and skill of German peasants brought them considerable wealth and a corresponding standard of living. This, in turn, led to an exceedingly low birth-rate; although there was a simultaneous decline in the death-rate, natural increase among the southeastern *Volksdeutsche* was unusually small, as can be seen from the following figures:⁴

Country	Year	Births per thousand	Deaths per thousand	Natural increase per thousand
Rumania -----	1936	21.2	15.7	5.5
Yugoslavia -----	1935	17.0	14.0	3.0
Hungary -----	1936	15.9	14.0	1.9

These figures are particularly striking when compared with the overall natural increase in these countries: 11.7 per thousand in Rumania (as compared with 5.5 among the Germans), 6.3 in Hungary (as against 1.3), 13.0 in Yugoslavia (as against 3.0).⁵

The German Reich, not only Nazi Germany, but the Weimar Republic as well, considered southeastern Europe and, in particular, the German colonies there, to be of paramount importance for the interests of the Reich. Several research agencies and publications, especially after 1933, dealt

² Heinz Brunner, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-364.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 368-369; *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, Nos. 1 and 7.

⁴ Wolter, *op. cit.*, pp. 83, 96.

exclusively with southeastern Europe. Among them the most renowned were: the *Südostausschuss der Deutschen Akademie*; *Südostdeutsche Forschungen* in Munich; *Südosteuropa Gesellschaft* in Vienna; *Leipziger Vierteljahresschrift für Südosteuropa*. Extensive materials on southeastern Europe in general,⁶ on the relationship between southeastern countries and Germany,⁷ and especially on the German minorities in these countries⁸ were being published in the Reich. With Hitler's coming into power, the German minorities in southeastern Europe became an important pawn in the Reich's political game. In all southeastern countries the German folk groups enjoyed a high privileged status which was still further enhanced during the war years. Simultaneously, however, various factors such as transfer to the Greater Reich, mobilization for the German army, evacuation and flight contributed to their numerical decline. With the final Allied victory in Europe, a drastic reversal of their position set in, culminating in most of the countries in the almost complete elimination of the German folk groups.

This process of elimination took different forms in Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary.

II

Pre-war Rumania, with its 745,421 *Volksdeutsche* (1930 census), forming 4.1 per cent of the total population, contained the fourth largest German minority group in Europe, exceeded only by that of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Poland. This population was distributed geographically as follows: 320,955 in Transylvania, 225,107 in the Banat, 81,089 in Bessarabia, 75,533 in Bukovina, 12,581 in the Dobrudja, and the remainder scattered throughout Old Rumania.⁹

⁶ *Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations*, 1937-1938.

⁶ H. Gross, *Südosteuropa* (Leipzig, 1937); H. Ullmann, *Die Völker im Südosten* (Jena, 1933); H. O. Wesemann, *Das Verkehrsweisen Südosteuropas* (Wien, 1940); J. Hobus, *Wirtschaft und Staat im Südosteuropäischen Raum* (Leipzig, 1939); H. Hummel, *Südosteuropa und das Erbe der Donaumonarchie* (Leipzig, 1937).

⁷ *Deutschland und Südosteuropa*, herausgegeben vom Arbeitswissenschaftlichen Institut der Deutschen Arbeitsfront (1940); H. Gross, *Die Wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Südosteuropas für das Deutsche Reich* (Stuttgart und Berlin, 1941); R. W. Krugmann, *Südosteuropa und Grossdeutschland* (Breslau, 1939); H. Schröder-Steinberger, *Südosteuropa in der deutschen Donauraumwirtschaft*, (Berlin, 1939); H. Zeck, "Die deutsche Wirtschaft und Südosteuropa," *Macht und Erde* (Leipzig, 1939), Heft 14.

⁸ Heinz Brunner, *Das Deutschtum in Südosteuropa* (Leipzig, 1940); L. Gruenberg, *Die deutsche Südgrenze* (Leipzig, 1941); E. Klebel, *Siedlungsgeschichte des deutschen Südostens* (München, 1940); K. Müller, *Die Bedeutung des deutschen Blutes in Südosteuropa* (München, 1940); W. Schneefuss, *Deutschtum in Südosteuropa* (Dresden, 1939); J. Schultze, *Die deutschen Volksgruppen in Südosteuropa* (Leipzig, 1940); F. Valjovec, *Der deutsche Kultureinfluss im nahen Südosten* (München, 1940); H. Ullman, *Das Südostdeutschtum* (Berlin, 1935).

⁹ *Annuarul Statistic Al Romaniei*, 1937-1938 Institutul Central de Statistica (Bucharest, 1939), p. 60.

In June, 1940 Rumania ceded Bessarabia and North Bukovina to the Soviet Union. Some 135,000 Germans in the Soviet-incorporated territories were transferred to the German-incorporated Polish provinces in September-October, 1940 on the basis of a Soviet-German agreement of September 5, 1940.¹⁰ The so-called Vienna Award of August 30, 1940 gave the northern part of Transylvania (with 60,046 Germans)¹¹ to Hungary.

The Germans who remained in rump Rumania at that time not only enjoyed equality with Rumanians but actually held a privileged position and had no reason to apprehend the future. Nevertheless, like their compatriots in the Soviet-annexed areas, the Germans in Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja were summoned to leave for the Reich. On October 22, 1940 an agreement was reached between Berlin and Bucharest, whereby, despite the privileged status they had begun to enjoy in Rumania, 66,100 Germans from these two provinces answered "the Führer's call for repatriation."¹² After the repatriation, only 3,734 Germans remained in the Bukovina and 1,639 in the Dobrudja. The Rumanian census of April, 1941 enumerated 542,325 Germans distributed as follows: 221,762 in the Banat, 268,878 in southern Transylvania and the Crisana district, and the remaining 51,685 in the other provinces.¹³

The number of *Volksdeutsche* repatriated in the fall of 1940 formed about 10 per cent of the German population in the reduced Rumanian kingdom. The bulk of the German folk group in Rumania, who lived in the Banat and in Transylvania, were asked to stay. Bernard Newman¹⁴ expressed the well-founded belief that it was "Hitler's deliberate policy . . . to leave a large German population in the rump Rumania to justify a subsequent claim as German territory." He also recalled the fact that at one time it had been suggested that a portion of Transylvania be carved out to form a new German state, for which the name *Donaustaat* had already been selected. The *Volksdeutsche* remaining within the boundaries of the Rumanian state firmly believed that they owed allegiance not to the government under which they were living but to the Führer of the German Reich. Instead of serving with the Rumanian army, some 73,000 *Volksdeutsche*, therefore, volunteered for the German *Waffen-SS* and left for

¹⁰ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, N. 7.

¹¹ According to the data of the Rumanian census of 1930. *Nation und Staat* (March, 1941), p. 206. The Hungarian census of 1941 enumerated 44,686 Germans in the incorporated Transylvanian territory. *Magyar Statistikai Szemle* (Budapest, 1941), XXII, pp. 1, 4, 13.

¹² *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, N. 7.

¹³ Institutur Central de Statistica, *Communicari Statistice*, January 15, 1945, p. 3.

¹⁴ *The New Europe* (New York, 1943), pp. 282, 462-3.

the front in July, 1943.¹⁵ Contrary to the general rule that nationals of a state who join a foreign army lose their citizenship, a Rumanian-German agreement based on a Rumanian law of January 16, 1939 safeguarded for these volunteers their claim to Rumanian citizenship.¹⁶

Those who joined the German army left never to return home. Thus the German group lost some 73,000 men in the prime of life, reducing its number in 1943 to about 475,000.

Political and military events in the late summer of 1944 brought about a sudden collapse of Germany's ambitious plans. Rumania went over to the Allied camp and declared war on the Reich. The new Rumanian government decided to revoke the citizenship of all *Volksdeutsche* who had belonged to any civilian, military, or para-military German organization or who had held any privileged position during the period of German ascendancy.¹⁷ It also decided to dissolve the organized German folk group in Rumania.¹⁸

The situation of the Germans became especially precarious in Transylvania, where the local Rumanian population was openly hostile. Soviet armies crossed into this province with the co-operation of Rumanian troops, and the Germans found themselves face to face with the "Bolshevist menace."

Under these circumstances the Reich tried to save the endangered folk group through evacuation. On September 29, 1944 *Transocean* reported that the whole German minority group in Transylvania, numbering about 250,000 persons living in an area roughly outlined by the cities of Sibiu, Brasov, and Cluj, had been evacuated, rural and urban population alike, and that they had been directed to Hungary from where they were to be sent to the Reich. The *Slovak Home Service* reported on October 14, 1944 that the German folk group in the Rumanian Banat, numbering some 221,000, was also involved in this evacuation.

This information proved to be erroneous. The retreating German army was unable to evacuate both its military contingents and the local civilian German population. The majority of the latter were trapped by the swift advance of the Soviet and Rumanian troops and remained in their homes.

No overall figures on the Germans in Rumania who were evacuated

¹⁵ *German Home Service*, November 18, 1943.

¹⁶ *Bukarester Tageblatt*, July 28, 1943.

¹⁷ *Rumanian European Service*, October 5, 1944.

¹⁸ *Turkish Home Service*, September 29, 1944.

or fled with the German army are available. Some figures on specific districts in the Banat and Transylvania have been reported by a reliable source. Thus it was said that 21,000 *Volksdeutsche* had fled from the districts of Satu Mare and Arad and from the town of Carei, and some 6,000 to 7,000 from the town of Oradea.

Apparently the *Volksdeutsche* had at first been terrified by the prospect that the Rumanians and the Soviet troops would take revenge for their arrogant and treacherous behavior during the Antonescu régime. But when nothing happened to them during the first few months after the withdrawal of the German armies, they gradually recovered confidence and went about their business in precisely the same way as before.

An entirely new situation was created early in January, 1945 when the Soviet head of the Allied Control Commission (ACC), General Sergei Vinogradov, ordered the mobilization of all able-bodied members of the German folk group in Rumania and their deportation for reconstruction work in the devastated USSR areas. This order covered men from 17 to 45 years of age, and women from 18 to 30, except those nursing children under one year. The mobilization was to be carried out from January 10 to 20.

The Rumanian government, headed by General Radescu, and the Rumanian political parties which supported it strongly opposed this Soviet deportation move. Their basic objection was that the affected Germans were Rumanian citizens and that the Rumanian government only was entitled to decide their fate. The Soviet-Rumanian Armistice gave the Soviet representatives in Rumania no right to mobilize any population group for forced labor in the USSR. But the Rumanian political leaders did not demand the complete abolition of the Soviet deportation order as such, endeavoring to obtain only some partial concessions. The Rumanian government submitted to General Vinogradov a formal note protesting against the Soviet action, requesting that the procedure be modified. The Rumanian note acknowledged that a part of the German minority had aided the German war effort and that the internment of actively hostile elements was justified, but it raised a number of legal and humanitarian objections to the Soviet procedure. The note stressed particularly that the "violent uprooting" of the able-bodied *Volksdeutsche*, who had formed an integral part of Rumanian society for centuries, was bound to dislocate the national economy, thereby hindering the fulfillment of the armistice: the removal of the *Volksdeutsche* would make the general manpower shortage more serious than ever. The note requested the Soviet authorities to consider whether the mobilized *Volksdeutsche* might not be assigned to labor projects on Rumanian territory.

There is no indication that the Rumanian objections had much effect on the Soviets. When requested to exempt from deportation left-wing elements, they refused to do so, saying that such persons could simply resume their activity in the Donets region.

The deportation of the *Volksdeutsche* was officially completed on February 3, 1945, although small groups may have been mobilized since that date. According to the Soviet authorities, the following totals were arrived at:

<i>Volksdeutsche</i> eligible for mobilization	93,538
Persons mobilized	80,083
Men	41,230
Women	38,853
Persons shipped to Russia	69,332
Men	36,590
Women	32,742
Persons released after mobilization	10,771
Men	4,653
Women	6,118

It was reported that German families slated for deportation were either offering their business enterprises for sale at bargain rates or else kept their establishments closed in protest. Some of the *Volksdeutsche* had gone into hiding, in order to escape deportation. According to reliable information, the deportees were allowed as much as 500 pounds of luggage and were generally well treated.

The Soviet deportation delivered the last blow to the German ethnic group in Rumania. The liquidation of this group had been effected in four consecutive moves:

1. In 1940, 66,100 ethnic Germans were "repatriated" from Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja.
2. By 1943, over 73,000 ethnic Germans had left Rumania in the ranks of the *Waffen-SS*.
3. An unspecified but considerable number of Germans left with the retreating German troops in September, 1944. It can be assumed that among the refugees, adult members of families of *Volksdeutsche* SS volunteers predominated, the latter being particularly fearful of retaliatory measures. When the Soviets ordered the registration of all German men between 17 and 45 and of all women between 18 and 30, only 93,538 Germans belonging to these age groups were enumerated. According to the

order of the Soviet authorities, some 93,000 persons were to be mobilized, namely men between the ages of 17 and 45 and women between 18 and 30. This can serve as the basis for a rough estimate of the total German population which remained in Rumania when the country was occupied by the Red Army; for it can be assumed that the sum of the various extrusions prior to the Soviet occupation added up to a normally distributed population as to age and sex. Although no data on the age of the Rumanian Germans are available, by analogy with the age distribution in Central Europe where population development was similar to that of the Rumanian *Volksdeutsche*, it can be assumed that these age groups comprised about 35 per cent of the total population. Accordingly, the number of Germans who remained after the evacuation with the retreating German Army would amount to some 265,000. As the total of Germans before the recent evacuation (i.e. after the departure of 66,000 repatriates and 73,000 who joined the German armed forces) was some 470,000 it can be estimated that about 205,000 were evacuated or fled with the retreating German Army.

4. The Soviet mobilization practically exhausted all the remaining reserves of the adult German population. Of the remaining 265,000, about 70,000 were deported to the Soviet Union and some 195,000 are still in Rumania. Of the 93,538 *Volksdeutsche* subject to mobilization 74.1 per cent have been deported to Russia, leaving less than 25,000 Germans in the productive ages in Rumania. The overwhelming majority of *Volksdeutsche* who were not affected by deportation orders consists of children and youths under 17 years of age for men, and 18, for women, and persons above 45 (men) or 30 (women).

Rumanian legislation rapidly reflected the new policy towards the German minority. The land reform decreed by the Rumanian government in March, 1945 ordered the expropriation of all land belonging to Rumanian citizens who

- a. enlisted in the German army or the SS or were parents or descendants of such volunteers;
- b. left the country with the German (or Hungarian) army;
- c. belonged to the German folk-group;
- d. spread Hitlerite propaganda by working against democratic principles or by contributing in any way to the assistance of Hitlerite Germany in the field of politics, economy, culture or sports.

The agricultural property of all these persons with all farm installations, livestock and equipment, both in villages and in towns, became the property of the state and was to be distributed among peasants entitled to

land-grants.¹⁹ Since among the 542,325 Germans registered by the Rumanian census of 1941, 370,460, or almost 70 per cent, belonged to the rural population and were almost all prosperous farmers, the very foundations of the German economy in Rumania were thus shattered.

III.

Germans formed the largest minority group in pre-war Yugoslavia. In 1930 official Yugoslav data put the number of Germans in that country at 499,326 (3.9 per cent of the total population),²⁰ while German sources claimed the number to be 685,000.

In May, 1941, Yugoslavia was invaded by German and Bulgarian troops. Most of the provinces with a large German population were annexed by Hungary (Bachka, Baranya, part of the Banat), Italy (the Dalmatian coast, the town of Ljubljana and the surrounding territory of the Yugoslav province of Drava), and Germany (Lower Styria), as well as in the puppet state of Croatia; in the rump state of Serbia proper only about 200,000 Germans remained, concentrated mainly in the Serbian section of the Banat, where they numbered about 130,000.

Since the full liberation of Yugoslavia by the Partisans and the Red armies early in 1945, the unity of the Yugoslav state territory has been re-established, although on a federative basis. In the course of about four years of foreign occupation, the German folk group was numerically reduced by the following moves:

1. On October 6, 1942 a German-Croatian agreement provided for the transfer of the (around) 26,000 Germans in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Croatia proper.²¹ On the basis of this agreement, about 20,000 Germans registered for the transfer.²² They were resettled in the Lublin district of the German-occupied Polish Government General.²³

2. In the Hungarian-annexed Yugoslav Vojvodina (Bachka, Baranya, Banat), the 200,000 *Volksdeutsche* were the first to respond to the appeal of the Reich to enlist voluntarily in the German army, mainly in the *Waffen SS*, instead of fulfilling their military service in the ranks of the Hungarian army. According to *Berliner Lokal Anzeiger* of July 30, 1943, "these people ardently love their new country, but a homesickness for the

¹⁹ *Monitorul Oficial*, March 23, 1945.

²⁰ *La Yugoslavie d'Aujourd'hui*, p. 8.

²¹ *Relazioni Internazionali*, October 31, 1942, p. 8.

²² *Hrvatski Narod*, October 15, 1942.

²³ *Więści Polskie*, Budapest, April 9, 1943.

uniform of Adolf Hitler took possession of their hearts." Of the 25,000 men of six age groups to whom the appeal was directed (those who had just reached 18 and those between the ages of 30 and 35), 22,500 had volunteered for the *Waffen SS* and 20,000 actually joined; only 2,500 men, i.e. 10 per cent, "evaded their national duty."²⁴ By September, 1943 over one thousand of the 1942 volunteers had already been killed in action.²⁵ In May, 1944 the number of Bachka Germans who voluntarily joined the SS reached 26,000; all of them left for the Eastern front.²⁶ They never returned to liberated Yugoslavia.

3. In December, 1941, a few months after Yugoslavia's dismemberment, 1,925 Germans were transferred from Serbia²⁷ proper for resettlement in the Polish Government General.²⁸

These three German-initiated moves have reduced the German folk group in Yugoslavia by some 50,000 persons.

When in September, 1944, the news began to spread that Soviet troops were nearing the Serbian Banat, 80 to 90 per cent of the German folk group tried to leave in the wake of the retreating German army. According to reliable information, however, only about 20 per cent succeeded in getting away. The rest were rounded up by the Partisans and put into special labor and detention camps. Their entire property was confiscated. Subsequently, Soviet military authorities began to ship all Banat *Volksdeutsche* between 16 and 60 years of age to the Soviet Union for compulsory labor. In the town of Bela Crkva alone some 700 houses formerly inhabited by Germans were empty by the end of 1944. The Serbian population is reported to have welcomed the forced removal of the German folk group with enthusiasm, looking forward to its total disappearance from the Banat.

A similar policy was carried out with regard to the *Volksdeutsche* in the Yugoslav province of Vojvodina (Bachka, Baranya, and Banat), where after the German withdrawal, all able-bodied male ethnic Germans were shipped in special convoys to Soviet Russia for forced labor.

In a reply to the question as to what was happening to the *Volksdeutsche* who remained in Vojvodina after the German withdrawal the Vice President of AVNOJ, Kardelj, stated at the end of January, 1945 that they were being held in concentration camps and had been put to work. Asked if they were staying in Yugoslavia, Kardelj answered evasively that "some

²⁴ *Deutsches Volksblatt*, Novi Sad, November 7, 1943.

²⁵ *Deutsche Zeitung*, Budapest, September 29, 1943.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, May 25, 1944.

²⁷ *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, 1943, No. 10.

²⁸ *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 4, 1944.

are going to work in various areas, including Hungary and Rumania." A local Partisan town commandant in the Vojvodina told an American officer that all able-bodied male *Volksdeutsche* were being sent to Soviet Russia for forced labor; columns of such deportees were pointed out to the officer.

It is believed that Marshal Tito has come to an agreement with the highest Soviet authorities whereby not only German war prisoners but also Yugoslav *Volksdeutsche* should be sent to the Soviet Union for work. Diplomatic information which reached Washington by the middle of April, 1945 placed the number of Germans removed to Russia from Yugoslavia at 100,000.²⁹

IV.

About two million Germans lived within the pre-1914 boundaries of Hungary: in Banat, Burgenland, Transylvania, the mountains and valleys of Buda and Pilis, the vicinity of Budapest, the country of Tolna and Baranya, which was called the Swabian Turkey, on the Upper Danube and in the Szepes. In the highlands they were called Zipsers, on the right bank of the Danube, the Swabians (or Svabs), and in Transylvania, the Saxons. After the collapse and dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, most of the areas containing a large German element were incorporated into Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Austria. Only 500,000 Germans were left in post-war Hungary.

In November, 1938, March, 1939, and April, 1939 Hungary annexed considerable areas of Czechoslovakia, containing a German population of 13,168.³⁰ On August 30, 1940, by virtue of the second Vienna Award, Hungary incorporated the regions of Marmorosch and Kreisch, as well as all of Rumanian northern Transylvania with 44,686 Germans. In April, 1941 Hungarian troops occupied the Yugoslav provinces of Bachka, Banat and Baranya with a German population of over 200,000. Through these successive territorial gains, Hungary won the dubious privilege of harboring "the largest German minority in Europe."³¹ Her 1941 census registered 719,762 Germans (4.9 per cent of the entire population); of this number 540,000 lived in Hungary's pre-1938 boundaries. German sources estimated the number of *Volksdeutsche* in Greater Hungary at 1,250,000.³²

²⁹ John M. Hightower, "Germans Taken to Russia to Repair War Damage" in *The Evening Star*, (Washington, April 16, 1945).

³⁰ *Central European Observer*, December 16, 1939, p. 392; *Annuaire Statistique Hongrois*, (Budapest, 1940) v. 47.

³¹ *Tagespost* (Graz) December 14, 1942.

³² *Uj Nemzedek*, August 12, 1943.

³³ *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest) April 4, 1943; *Krakauer Zeitung*, October 23, 1941.

Early in 1945, the Hungarian Provisional National Government of General Miklos with the seat in Debrecen surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. The Red Army occupied the country. The surrender terms deprived Hungary of all annexed Czechoslovak, Rumanian, and Yugoslav areas and reduced her territory to the boundaries established by the Trianon Treaty. These territorial changes returned over 250,000 Germans to the sovereignty of the above-mentioned countries, leaving in Hungary proper some 540,000 persons of "German mother-tongue" according to the 1941 census. Some 360,000 of them had declared their "nationality" as German; 340,000 were members of the notorious *Volksbund*. Even within her narrowed frontiers Hungary remained saddled with a numerous, nationalistic and well-organized German minority.

However, not all of the 540,000 Germans registered in 1941 had remained in Hungary by the time the Germans left the country.

Responding to the appeal of the Reich, some 40,000 *Volksdeutsche* in "Greater Hungary" joined the *Waffen SS* instead of fulfilling their military service in the Hungarian army³⁴ and left for the Eastern front. Among them about 10,000 originated from Hungary proper, the rest being volunteers from newly annexed Yugoslav and Rumanian provinces. According to Hungarian legislation, persons enlisting in a foreign army forfeited their Hungarian citizenship. The Hungarian Official Gazette, *Budapest Közlöny* regularly published long lists of *Volksdeutsche* who had for that reason been deprived of Hungarian citizenship. When on March 19, 1944 German troops occupied Hungary and installed the Nazi Sztojaj government, the original citizenship status of Hungarian *Volksdeutsche* in the German army was restored. A decree published in June, 1944 in the Hungarian Official Gazette stipulated that those Hungarian citizens who, during the present war, had lost their citizenship through serving with the German Armed Forces, were again considered Hungarian citizens, and were to be treated in every respect as if they had never been deprived of their citizenship.³⁵ According to *Deutsche Zeitung*, this decree "gave back their country to all those of our racial comrades who are fighting in Adolf Hitler's army." Then events took a different turn. After Hungary's surrender, the new Provisional National Government of Miklos invalidated all decrees promulgated by the Sztojaj régime, while Hungarian *Volksdeutsche* in the German army, who have survived the débâcle, are now considered foreigners and barred from returning to Hungary.

³⁴ *Paris Home Service*, October 23, 1943.

³⁵ *Transcontinent Press*, June 15, 1944.

Many *Volksdeutsche* had left Hungary with the retreating Germans. Some were evacuated in orderly fashion into Germany or Austria; others simply fled or joined the German troops and retreated with them. As early as October, 1944 the *German Forces' Service* reported that Germans from eastern and southern Hungary, "menaced by the proximity of the front, have moved in solid blocks and are now being brought to safety in Germany."³⁶ How large a proportion of the 540,000 fled and how many remained cannot be accurately stated. According to descriptions of conditions in various settlements, it seems that in most of the communities in the vicinity of Buda over half the German population remained (e.g., 13,000 out of 22,000 in Soroksar, 4,200 out of 7,100 in Budaörs). Farther north, the proportion of those who remained was apparently higher; but in the south, where the German population was more compact and also more nationalistic, it was probably substantially lower. From some villages the entire population fled. It has been estimated that not more than 300,000 out of 540,000, and perhaps fewer, left when the Red armies arrived.

However, too many remained in the opinion of the Hungarian population, deeply incensed against the *Volksdeutsche* (usually called Swabians) because of the treacherous and often cruel part the latter had played before and during the war. A strong agitation for expelling all Swabians from Hungary was initiated by the National Peasant Party. Originally this demand was raised in connection with the Land Reform, when it became clear that the supply of land did not equal the demand; another reason was the mass influx of Hungarian refugees from Rumania and Czechoslovakia for whom settlement possibilities had to be found. Subsequently, however, these motives of a practical nature were superseded by a broader concept upholding the historically proven impossibility of the co-existence of Magyars and Germans on Hungarian territory. *Szabad Szó*, the organ of the National Peasant Party, stated on April 22, 1945: "All our history is interwoven with the constant struggle against the Germans . . . We Hungarians and the Germans have lived side by side for a thousand years, and a thousand years have not sufficed to build up a friendship deeply rooted in minds of the two people. . . today . . . there can be no hope that the two peoples will be on peaceful terms with each other. One of them must go, and it cannot be in doubt/which is the one to go." The newspaper recalled that all the talk about German assimilation with the Hungarian spirit proved to be vain talk: "In vain was there great joy over the success of assimilation, in vain did every good son of the Swabians write and speak eloquent

³⁶ FCC, October 27, 1944.

Magyar; in the hour of decision the ancient Germanic feeling got hold of the spirit; the usually lukewarm blood was beating fast in their temples when the Horst Wessel song was sung." The Berlin-directed *Volksbund* "divorced the *Volksdeutsche* from the Hungarian community—the Swabians do not deserve any mercy . . . They must get out as they came: with a bundle on their backs. Their houses, their estates must be left to the most exploited fighter of Hungarian history: the agrarian proletariat . . . they should leave with 5 pengő [10 dollars at the official rate of March, 1945] and a parcel weighing not more than 30 kilogrammes [66 pounds] . . . there will be room for them in Germany."

The campaign for expulsion of all Germans from Hungary was energetically backed by the Communists, while the Independent Smallholders gave more hesitant approval, arguing that Hungary should not imitate the racial theories of Hitler, nor adopt the doctrines of collective responsibility. They stressed that not every person of German mother-tongue had been disloyal to the Hungarian state and could be or ought to be, expelled. Only those should be made to go who had proved their disloyalty by declaring themselves of "German nationality" in the census, or by joining the *Volksbund*. The matter came before the Cabinet on May 4 and 16, 1945. According to the semi-official *Magyar Nemzet* of May 1, 1945 Premier Miklos decided to call a special Cabinet meeting on this problem because "the Cabinet considered as one of its most important tasks the just but thorough solution of the Swabian question. The events of the past years have proved that without the proper settlement of this question there can be no peaceful life in the Hungarian orbit." The official communiqué published after the Cabinet meetings refuted the doctrine of collective responsibility and stated that every *Volksdeutsche* would be judged on his merits. It would be carefully investigated whether he had joined the *Volksbund* or German Army, whether he had been hostile to the Hungarian State or to democracy. The fate of those whose disloyalty or Nazi sympathies were proven (membership in the *Volksbund* alone was apparently not considered a conclusive criterion) would be loss of citizenship, confiscation of property, and expulsion. But even Germans found loyal and allowed to live in Hungary would not be allowed to remain where they had lived for centuries in compact groups in their traditional residence; they would be scattered over Hungary, to bar the danger of ideological mass infection. This relocation would be carried out by the Office for Refugees and Repatriation.

This cautious and hesitant approach to the popular demand for a wholesale compulsory elimination of the German minority was, however,

radically changed as a result of events which did not depend on the Hungarian government. According to a decree signed by President Beneš, the execution of which began on June 22, 1945, all Czechoslovak citizens who declared themselves to be Hungarians in the 1930 census would have to leave the country.³⁷ Since at that time 691,923 inhabitants of Czechoslovakia declared themselves to be Hungarians, it seems that virtually the entire Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia is to be affected. The actual deportation of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia started even before the promulgation of the decree.

For Hungary to resettle these some 700,000 prospective deportees from Czechoslovakia would be a complicated problem. Although an industrialized country, the average density of population in Trianon Hungary is as high as 93.4 per square kilometer (in Slovakia it is only 68.0). The Hungarian government claims that the treaty on "exchange" of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia for the Slovak minority in Hungary³⁸ would by no means solve the problem, since, according to the census of 1930, there were only 104,819 Slovaks in Trianon Hungary.³⁹ A solution has been sought in the wholesale expulsion of Germans from Hungary. As early as the middle of May, 1945 *Szabad Nép*, the leading organ of the Communist party, suggested that Hungary must correlate the deportation of Hungarians from other countries and the deportation of the German minority from Hungary, in order to keep the national economy in balance.

And the Potsdam Conference of the "Big Three" unanimously decided to agree to compulsory, though orderly, transfer to the Reich not only of the German minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but also of the almost half million strong German community in Hungary.⁴⁰

NEW YORK CITY

³⁷ *New York Times*, June 23, 1945.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, June 23, 1945.

³⁹ Czechoslovak observers estimate the number of Slovaks living in Hungary at 350,000. *The Central European Observer*, March 1, 1946.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, August 3, 1945.

AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT VIEWS THE DAWN OF LIBERALISM IN PIEDMONT (1843-1848)

by Howard R. Marraro

THE year 1848 is generally regarded as the turning point in Italian political history chiefly because it was hopefully assumed that at long last Italian patriots were to witness the fruition of their efforts to establish democratic institutions everywhere in the peninsula and to achieve national independence. And, indeed, everything seemed to point in this direction, for that year found the Italians in a state of feverish excitement, with preparations for war evident on every side. Besides, for the first time in many centuries the people of the peninsula united their sympathies and their efforts on one common point—the achievement of the liberation of Italy from foreign oppression and the political unification of the country.

During the five years prior to 1848, the United States had been represented at the Court of Turin by Robert Wickliffe Jr.¹ a native of Kentucky, who was commissioned chargé d'affaires to the Kingdom of Piedmont on September 22, 1843, and who remained at his post until about May, 1848. During his sojourn at Turin, Mr. Wickliffe, because of his

¹ Robert Wickliffe Jr. was a graduate of Transylvania University at Lexington, Ky. After becoming a lawyer, he was a representative from Fayette County in the Legislature in 1835, 1837, and 1841. From 1843 to 1848 he was chargé d'affaires to Turin. He was an able lawyer and an effective speaker, but he excelled in the field of scholarship, being especially accomplished in the ancient and modern languages. The Columbia University Library has copies of the following works by Mr. Wickliffe: *Speech delivered in the National Convention of the Whig Young men of the United States at Baltimore, May 4 and 5, 1480*. Lexington, Ky., 1841, 23pp.; *Plea for the education of the people of Kentucky: an address delivered before the Mayor and Common Council of Lexington, Ky., July, 1837*, 17pp.; *Second speech on the veto power: delivered in committee of the whole of the House of Representatives, Jan. 1842*. Lexington, Ky., 1842, 20pp.; *Machiavel's Political Discourses upon the First Decade of Livy. Interspersed with various reflections*. Louisville, Ky. Prentice and Weissinger, 1840, 29pp. In this last work the author confined himself to Machiavelli's discourses, and, following its pages, endeavored to trace to its true sources and deep laid principles, that enormous power which the Roman Republic for so many ages maintained over the nations of the earth. After a careful examination and study, Mr. Wickliffe concluded that many of the sources of the grandeur of the Roman Republic "lie in an unknown and undiscovered region. We have pointed out the mighty influence which descent, education, morals, love of liberty, devoted patriotism, encouragement of virtue, and the civil, military and religious institutions of the state had upon its march to that height of power and fame which it afterward reached. Much has been laid at the door of fortune, but we are too apt to give to fortune the credit of events, because we do not know, or if we know, because we do not trace the sources from which they spring. He who will pursue the discourses of Machiavel upon the Decades of Livy, will be surprised to find design and art in every part of a machinery so vast and complicated. Scanned by the searching eye of the Florentine secretary and Italian statesman, the grandeur of the Roman Republic is no

official position, had an unusual opportunity to study the causes and witness the events that led to the political revolutions and to the wars of independence of 1848 and 1849, and the forces that enabled Sardinia, under the enlightened leadership of Charles Albert and Victor Emmanuel II, to assume the leadership in the struggle that ultimately led to the political unification of all of the peninsula under the House of Savoy.

But in order that the reader may appreciate more fully the significance of the observations that Mr. Wickliffe makes in his despatches to the secretaries of state, it will be necessary to review briefly the career of Charles Albert, the King of Sardinia, at whose court Mr. Wickliffe was accredited. After years of wavering between absolutism and liberalism, the King about 1835 adopted a wise and more energetic domestic policy. This he did by giving every possible assistance to the development of the intellectual and economic forces of the country; by encouraging the establishment of museums, art galleries, schools, historical associations, libraries, and new university professorships; and by giving his generous support to many hospitals and institutions of public welfare. Through his economic reforms he hoped not only to give to his kingdom a position of leadership in Italian life, but also to make of Genoa the principal commercial port for the products of Switzerland and Central Europe. Had he succeeded in his efforts, Genoa would have become the principal emporium in the Mediterranean, thus strengthening the commercial relations of his kingdom with the East and South America. It was with this aim in view that he increased the number of Sardinian consulates in South American countries.²

However, in his foreign relations Charles Albert left very much to be desired. The vague and uncertain policy he adopted in his dealings with Austria was largely responsible for the failure of the military campaigns of 1848 and 1849, which forced him to abdicate his throne in favor of his son, Victor Emmanuel II. It must be remembered that after 1840 the material and cultural development of Lombardy, then under Austrian domination, made it increasingly necessary to improve her relations with the rest of Italy, especially with the neighboring Kingdom of Sardinia. At the same time, however, Austria was aiming to isolate all her Italian provinces,

longer a mystery yet to be unveiled—but its origin and progress may be as distinctly traced as though it were marked on a map." Mr. Wickliffe Jr. delivered the oration at the laying of the cornerstone of Medical Hall, Transylvania University on July 14, 1839. He was married in Europe, perhaps while at the Court of Sardinia in Turin. He died in 1850, at the age of 35. The writer is indebted to Mr. H.V. McChesney, of the Kentucky Historical Society, for most of the biographical data on Mr. Wickliffe here presented.

² G. Casalis, *Dizionario geografico-storico-statistico degli Stati di S.M. il re di Sardegna*. Turin, 1833-1856. 28 vols.

including Lombardy, from the rest of Italy so as to enclose them more firmly within the sphere of her own interests. A serious custom house dispute which arose at that time strained the relations between Sardinia and Austria and finally resulted in a war between the two countries. Using old treaties as a pretext, Austria wanted to stop the transit through Piedmont of the salt commerce with the Canton Ticino; and since she did not succeed in this attempt, she retaliated by doubling the custom tariff on Piedmontese wines imported into Lombardy. This act, of course, struck a serious blow to the wine industry of Piedmont. Fully aware of the seriousness of the situation that developed, Charles Albert told his intimate advisers: "Well, if we lose Austria, we will find Italy; and then Italy will do for herself." (*L' Italia farà da sè*). This was in 1843, the year which marks the turning point in his career, for thereafter Charles Albert was determined to follow a Catholic national Italian policy.³ In fact, in that same year Vincenzo Gioberti,⁴ a Catholic priest who had been exiled for his liberal ideas, published his *Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani* in which he advocated the unification of the peninsula under Charles Albert and the Pope. In that year, too, Charles Albert invited Giovanni Prati,⁵ the exiled poet from Trento, to write the military hymn for the Piedmontese army. In 1845 Charles Albert asked Massimo d'Azeglio,⁶ who had just returned from a political tour of the Romagna region, then under papal rule, to urge the Italian patriots to remain quiet, since there was nothing that could be done at the moment, but that as soon as the occasion presented itself, his [the King's] life, the lives of his children, his army, and his wealth—all would be spent

³ F. Lemmi, *La politica estera di Carlo Alberto nei suoi primi anni di regno*. (Florence 1928).

⁴Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852). Born in Turin and principally known as a philosopher and political writer. Up to 1833 he was Chaplain of Charles Albert. Secretly accused of being a member of the Giovine Italia, he was arrested and then exiled to Paris and later to Brussels where in 1843 he published his *Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani* in which he, the author, insisted that Italy was destined to become the universal center in moral and spiritual things, but that to attain this leadership, Italy had first to achieve national independence and freedom. He thought that this could be accomplished through the medium of Charles Albert and the Pope. From Dec. 16, 1848 to March 29, 1849 he was President of the constitutional ministry of Piedmont. See D. Berti, *Di Vincenzo Gioberti riformatore politico e ministro*. Florence, 1881.

⁵ Giovanni Prati (1815-184). Famous lyrical and romantic poet. After 1843 he became the champion of the House of Savoy, praising its effort to liberate Italy from all foreigners.

⁶ Massimo Taparelli, Marquis d'Azeglio (1798-1866), was born at Turin, and during his lifetime was active as political writer, novelist and statesman. From 1849 to 1852 he was Prime Minister and in 1853 was made a senator. In 1859 he was appointed Governor of the region of Romagna and later of Milan. His memoirs entitled *I Miei Ricordi* contain important information on the political and social conditions of his day.

for the cause of Italy.⁷ In his desire to give positive proof of his liberalism, in December 1846, Charles Albert permitted the Genoese to celebrate with great pomp the centenary of the expulsion of the Austrians from the city and the unveiling of a monument in honor of Balilla.⁸ A few months later, in July, 1847, he offered his army to Pope Pius IX who wanted to drive the Austrians out of Ferrara which they had occupied despite the Pope's protests. In November, 1847, Nino Bixio, a young Genoese patriot, urged the King to declare war against Austria, assuring him that they would all follow him to the battlefield.

Finally, on March 4, 1848, Charles Albert granted a liberal and democratic Constitution to the Kingdom of Sardinia,⁹ thus voluntarily divesting himself of the powers of an absolute monarch which his ancestors had exercised for eleven centuries. This document provided for a senate to be nominated by the King, an elective chamber of deputies, freedom of assembly, speech, and of the press, and granted the franchise to all subjects who could read and write. At the same time Charles Albert established a customs' union with the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Papal States, and organized an effective army of more than 60,000 men.

Less than three weeks after the signing of the Constitution, on March 23, 1848, Charles Albert declared war against Austria. Within a month, on April 30, he led his army, which had been strengthened by reinforcements from Tuscany, Rome, and Naples, across the Ticino River into Lombardy where he fought against the Austrians. Although he was undoubtedly a courageous and a valiant soldier, Charles Albert was not a military strategist and therefore unable to exploit the victories he had won early in the war. Unfortunately, the war ended disastrously for the Italians, and Austria was in a position to tighten her grasp on the peninsula.

In the following hitherto unpublished despatches to the secretaries of state, Mr. Wickliffe discusses with unusual clarity of vision and sound judgment, the economic, social and political problems that confronted Charles during the latter part of his reign. Anxious as he was to give his government accurate and reliable information, Mr. Wickliffe went out of his way to keep himself correctly informed on the events that transpired in that part

⁷ See E. Masi, *Il segreto di Carlo Alberto—Cospiratori in Romagna dal 1815 al 1859*. Bologna, 191.

⁸ Giambattista Perasso (1735-1781), popularly called Balilla. In 1746 he cast his first stone which resulted in the liberation of Genoa from the Austrians.

⁹ This same Constitution, or *Statuto*, was gradually applied to the other regions of Italy as they became incorporated with the Kingdom of Italy. It is still the Constitution that governs the Italian people. See A. Colombo, *Dalle riforme allo statuto di Carlo Alberto* (Casale, 1926).

of the Italian peninsula during a very critical period of the Risorgimento. The twenty-three despatches here presented are important not only because they are the eye-witness account of one who took a keen interest in his diplomatic mission, but also because they add an interesting chapter on Italo-American diplomatic relations during a critical period of Italian political history.

No. 16

Legation of the United States,¹⁰
Turin, [1845]

The Hon. John C. Calhoun¹¹

Secretary of State.

Sir:

. . . After ten years of deliberation, discussion and no inconsiderable opposition, it is understood that the Sardinian Government has finally yielded its consent to the construction of railroad from Milan and Turin to Genoa. The two forks will meet at some convenient point of junction on the Sardinian territory. In consequence of the dilatory mode of proceeding in such matters that prevails on this side of the Alps, it will doubtless be a very considerable time before the contemplated work is completed. It ought to be a lucrative investment and a profitable road; for Milan, Turin, and Genoa, each contains perhaps more than one hundred thousand inhabitants. Besides, Piedmont and Lombardy are very fertile, and their productions, especially of silk, very rich. When it is completed and especially if the two forks should be continued into Switzerland and Germany, the importation of American cotton, tobacco, etc. into the southern part of Europe will be facilitated;¹² and perhaps the increased commerce of the United States with Genoa, will justify the American Government in selecting that city, as one of the ports to which the new steamers, recently recommended by the President, will ply.

Under the patronage of the King, the citizens of Genoa propose to erect a monumental statue to Christopher Columbus, a native of that city. The subscriptions, I am informed, already amount to nearly thirty thousand dollars, his Majesty having opened it with a liberal donation of ten thousand dollars. Although there are a great many American artists and citizens who reside permanently and a still larger number that reside temporarily in Florence and Rome, yet unfortunately we have no diplomatic representative either in Tuscany or in

¹⁰ MS archives American Embassy, Rome.

¹¹ John C. Calhoun (1782-1850), of South Carolina. He was Secretary of State in 1844 and 1845 during President Tyler's administration.

¹² A treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of Sardinia was concluded on November 26, 1838. For the text of the treaty see William W. Malloy, *Treaties, conventions, international acts, protocols and agreements between the United States of America and other powers 1776-1909*. Wash., D. C., 1910, p. 1603 ff. This treaty was superseded by the treaty of 1871 with Italy, Sardinia having become merged with that Kingdom.

the Pontifical States.¹³ Consuls in Italy are persons that however worthy of able in themselves, have no weight or influence with governments, where so much importance is attached to etiquette and to rank. I understand that the commission named for the construction of the statue to Columbus intended to employ only Italian or even only Genoese artists. I took occasion to write them a letter upon the subject and from their response, I flatter myself with the belief that the concurrence of American artists (of whom there are several very clever ones both at Florence and Rome) will be permitted.¹⁴

It is understood that this government takes a very lively interest in behalf of the Jesuits, the question of whose expulsion from the Canton of Lucerne, has given rise to the troubles veering towards Civil war, with which Switzerland is at present so deeply agitated . . .¹⁵

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

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No. 19

Legation of the United States,¹⁶
Turin, May 5, 1845.

The Hon. John C. Calhoun
Secretary of State.
Sir:

Following the example of the ministers of the great powers, the Minister of Foreign Affairs¹⁷ for this Kingdom has addressed a note to the Sardinian Chargé d' Affaires at Zurich, on the troubles of Switzerland. That note is couched in very general terms and merely expresses an interest for the welfare of the Helvetic Republic and a desire that peace and order should be restored. It is however understood that this Government not only like the others disapproves the liberal movement in Switzerland, but takes a deep interest in the cause of the Jesuits, whose call to the Canton of Lucerne, has been the immediate occasion of the difficulties which threaten apparently a civil war. Owing to the repulse of the free corps from Lucerne and the losses in killed and wounded which they

¹³ With the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the United States never established diplomatic relations; with the Papal States, the United States maintained diplomatic relations from 1848 to 1868.

¹⁴ For an interesting account on American artists in Italy during this period, see: Giuseppe Prezzolini, *Come gli Americani scoprono l'Italia (1750-1850)*. Milan, 1933, pp. 155-169; H. R. Marraro, "American travellers in Rome, 1848-50." *The Catholic Historical Review*, Washington, D. C., Jan. 1944, XXIX, pp. 470-509.

¹⁵ In 1847, the liberals in the Protestant cantons of Switzerland resorted to force to break up a federation of seven Catholic cantons—the so-called "Sonderbund" which had been formed for defensive purposes in 1845—and to compel them to adopt liberal constitutions, expel religious orders, and consent to a closer and more democratic union of all the Swiss cantons.

¹⁶ MS archives American Embassy, Rome.

¹⁷ This was Clemente Solaro della Margherita (1792-1869). He was minister of foreign affairs from Feb. 7, 1835 to Oct. 9, 1847, when he was finally dismissed. For an authoritative biography, see: C. Lovera and I. Rinieri, *Clemente Solaro della Margherita*. (Turin, 1931).

have sustained (although the number of slain is not so great as was at first represented) a temporary quiet prevails in Switzerland. I cannot but think however that the question is not yet resolved. I am inclined to regard it as a democratic movement of a majority of the people of Switzerland which will not terminate until it overthrows the Federal Pact or is put down by foreign intervention. The dangers attending such an intervention are very clear to those powers who feel an interest or have the desire to make it; and it would probably extend the troubles of Switzerland to many of the surrounding kingdoms. On the eve of such a probable crisis, it is to be regretted that the United States has not a representative in Switzerland to communicate to you the earliest and most authentic intelligence. If our difficulties with England are not speedily adjusted, such intelligence will be more especially interesting and important to the government of the United States. . . .¹⁸

The Sardinian Government is still in negotiation with a company of Englishmen for the construction of a railroad from Turin to Geneva. Nothing definitive as to the terms upon which the charter will be granted has as yet transpired. For the construction of the railroad from Genoa to Turin, which the Government has refused to a Genoese company and has resolved to itself, it is understood, that a French, a Belgian, and an English engineer will be employed. Such works are not completed so rapidly in Europe as in the United States, but when these two roads and the branch to Milan are finished, I have no doubt that the commerce of the United States with the port of Genoa will be increased, in consequence of the increased facility of transporting our produce to Lombardy, Switzerland, and parts of Germany. A good deal of our produce consumed in this country, instead of being brought to Genoa in American ships, is imported in English. This is owing to the fact that there is very little produce of Sardinia that can be exported to the United States with profit. The direct trade, of consequence and mutually beneficial to the two countries, is therefore limited. To England they can send silk, fruits, flowers and some hand manufactures. I have endeavored to induce merchants and speculators to send wine and silk to the United States, so that by this means, this country may produce articles to exchange for our own, and thus a more direct trade be established. This government does not seem to bestow much attention to the extension of their commerce of Genoa, apparently contenting itself with the idea, that this should be mainly an agricultural country. In consequence of the defective skill, industry, and improvement to bring silks and wines into successful competition with those of other kingdoms especially of France. As to silk a merchant whom I induced to make the experiment by sending a quantity to Boston, assures me that he sustained a loss on the exportation. I am now engaged in trying to persuade others to try wine, but I fear it cannot compete with the light wines of France in the markets of the United States. When neither the governments nor the people have the spirit of commercial enterprise, it is difficult for a foreign representative

¹⁸ The United States and England were then disputing the settlement of the Oregon boundary dispute on the line of 54° 40'.

to do much in that line. The monopoly of tobacco, however injurious to the people, is yet so profitable to the government, that the discussion of its abolition is infinitely disagreeable to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and may, in fact, be considered as formally prohibited. This monopoly though injurious to us is still more oppressive to the subjects of Sardinia. It is also a great obstacle to the extension of the direct trade, for the government buys its tobacco second-hand with European speculators. Last year Mr. Harris and Mr. Lester made a contract to supply the Sardinian Government with a portion of the tobacco, they require. The experiment, if successful, might have been attended with happy consequences but unfortunately those gentlemen did not comply with their contract. In consequence of this failure, it may be difficult for other Americans hereafter to offer proposals for this same purpose.¹⁹

The publication of the translation of Mr. Bancroft's history of the United States,²⁰ in the forwarding of which I have taken an interest, has been refused both by the civil and ecclesiastical censures of Turin. Its views of religion are considered heretical and its political opinions utterly radical and subversive of all order and government.

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

* * * *

No. 26

Legation of the United States,²¹
Turin, September 8, 1845.

The Honorable James Buchanan²²
Secretary of State.
Sir:

The King having passed more than a month at his chateau of Racconigi returned to Turin on the 5th inst. The health of His Majesty is as good as usual.

This government has employed the celebrated English engineer Mr.

¹⁹ In his despatch no. 16, dated Sept. 29, 1946, Mr. Buchanan, the Secretary of State, instructed Mr. Wickliffe to investigate the alleged breach of contract with Sardinia by Mr. J. G. Harris, late Tobacco Agent, and Mr. C. Edwards Lester, United States Consul for Genoa. [For text of Buchanan's despatch see James Buchanan *The Works*, Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1909, p. 89-90.]

²⁰ George Bancroft (1800-1891). Historian and diplomat. Visited Italy from 1821 to 1822. The Italian translation of Mr. Bancroft's history appeared in 1847. See: Giorgio Bancroft, *Storia degli Stati Uniti dalla scoperta del continente americano*. Turin, G. Pomba & Co., 1847, 536 pp. 2 vols. Translation from the tenth American edition. Seen by the author, with notes in original writing of Carlo Carenzi. The translation was reviewed in *Risorgimento: giornale quotidiano*. Turin, supplement to No. 179, July 26, 1848.

²¹ MS archives American Embassy, Rome.

²² James Buchanan (1791-1868). Was Secretary of State from 1845 to 1849 under President Tyler.

Brunel²³ to superintend the construction of the railroad from Turin to Genoa. He obliges himself to be in the country two months in the year and receives for his services for that term sixty thousand francs or one thousand francs per diem.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs having twice declined my proposition of reciprocity with regard to the entering of protests before the consuls of the respective countries, I will not, in pursuance of the instruction of Mr. Calhoun, trouble him farther on the subject. . . .

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

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No. 27

Legation of the United States,²⁴
Turin, October 3, 1845.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.

Sir:

. . . On the 1st the news arrived at Turin that on the 24th ult. an emeute had broken out at Rimini;²⁵ that the garrison had taken part in the revolt; that the public property had been attacked and in fine the city taken by surprise. The state Gazette of Turin makes light of the movement, speaks of the actors as marauders and without pretending to have information to that effect, thinks that order and tranquility were speedily restored. Such uprisings of the people in the legations are neither surprising nor uncommon. There is perhaps no part of Europe where the administration is so wretched or the people so crushed by taxes. The legations are governed by priests very often foreigners and nearly always poor and hungry. They profit of their brief power to draw as much money as possible from the people, to enrich themselves and their needy families and make no effort either to conciliate the affection or to develop the resources of the country. Under such a blithing system the Pontifical States become every day, more and more a wilderness, and the population driven to despair break out in partial revolts and are then judicially murdered by military commissions. It is not for liberty but for bread they rise, and much as Austria is detested by all Italy, the Legations are reduced to such dreadful extremities, that they would

²³ Isambard Kingdom Brunel (1806-59). Famous civil and naval engineer. He was asked to advise upon railway lines in Sardinia and the Papal States. See: Celia Brunel Noble, *The Brunels: father and son*. London, London, Cobden-Sanderson, 1938, 279 pp.

²⁴ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

²⁵ The Rimini uprising did not aim at overthrowing the papal government, although certain reforms were demanded in a *Manifesto* prepared by Luigi Carlo Farini. The *Manifesto* revealed the deplorable conditions existing in the papal government and invoked the same reforms which the Great Powers in 1831 had advised the Pontiff to adopt following the suppression of the 1831 revolt. Massimo d'Azeglio, who was then passing through Romagna, wrote *Gli ultim. casi di Romagna* in which he exposed the evils in the administration of the Holy See. See, O. Montenovesi, "I casi di Romagna: settembre 1945." In: *Rassegna Storica Risorgimento*, vol. 8, 1921. L. C. Farini, *Lo stato romano dall'anno 1815-1850*. Florence, 1866, 4 vols. English translation by Gladstone. London, 1851-54

gladly seek refuge from priestly extortion in the more orderly and better regulated despotism of an Austrian prince. In travelling through that country, the stranger is obliged to keep one hand on his purse and the other on his throat. . . .

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

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No. 29

Legation of the United States,²⁶
Turin, November 9, 1845.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.

Sir:

It is now considered as settled that the hereditary Duke of Lucca²⁷ will be married in a few days to the sister of the Duke of Bordeaux, Mademoiselle of France. This young prince has been for several years in the military service of the King of Sardinia and during that period has resided in Turin. His father, the reigning duke, governs a very small country and one as poor as it is small. After the death of Maria Louisa, the Dutchy of Parma will be united with that of Lucca and the principality will then be more respectable than it is now, both in point of territory and population. The bride is certainly a very charming woman of excellent character and amiable disposition. Her dower has however been greatly exaggerated, for instead of bringing fourteen millions of francs, I should be surprised if she brings more than five. The legitimist journals, like all parties in minority or in exile, make a great noise about this match and pretend that it is significative of the ultimate triumph of their principles and the restoration of the Bourbons. No man of common sense however entertains such chimerical ideas or believes that this match will have any influence upon the political affairs of France. The bridegroom is a youth of three and twenty, of some capacity for the acquisition of modern languages, but of a very light turn of mind. As far as I could observe him, he seemed wholly devoted to his dress, his horses and the ladies of his acquaintance. Amongst the young men, women and trades people of Turin, he was quite popular, as any one would be who would allow himself to be spunged upon and cheated without a murmur. No great things need be expected from him as ruler. . . .

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

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No. 32

Legation of the United States,²⁸
Turin, January 25, 1846

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.

Sir:

²⁶ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

²⁷ This was Charles III of the Bourbons of Parma. (1823-1854). Became Duke of Parma on March 3, 1849. His wife was Luisa de Bourbon, daughter of the Duke of Berry (1819-64). He was assassinated.

²⁸ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

Intelligence has been received at Turin that His Royal Highness, the Archduke of Austria d'Este Francis IV of Modena,²⁹ died at Modena on the 21st ult. This court has gone into mourning on account of his death for twenty days. Of all the sovereigns of Italy, the deceased Duke was the most odious. This state Gazette openly maintained that it was right and politic to keep the people in ignorance and that nothing was more injurious to themselves than education. In the attempted revolution of 1830, he was guilty of the basest treachery and the most unheard of outrages. He played a double part, secretly pretending to side with the liberals and at the same time keeping up his relations with Austria. If the revolution had succeeded, he hoped to be king of Italy; if it failed, he hoped still to stand well with Austria and not to lose his duchy. It is said that he and the leader of the liberals in Modena, entered into a reciprocal engagement, to grant each other passports in case the one or the other triumphed. When the attempt failed, the leader of the liberals called on the Duke for the promised passport. The Duke refused to give it, coldly witnessed the execution of the unfortunate patriot³⁰ whom he had deceived. He even battered with cannon the houses of those citizens of Modena who had been compromitted in the attempted revolution and desisted only from the remonstrances of the Austrians themselves. Few I presume will shed tears over the death of such a man. . . .

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

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No. 33

Legation of the United States,³¹
Turin, February 12, 1846.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

[Refers to the Oregon question between United States and England] . . . In the official gazette of Turin published under the direct supervision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I have discovered the clearest evidence of the bias and prejudice of this government in the matter. You are aware that a certain jealousy and dislike of the United States has always existed in certain

²⁹ Francis IV of Austria-Este (1779-1846). Son of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria and Marie Beatrice, heirs to the duchies of Modena, Reggio, and Massa-Carrara. After 1814 Francis IV was Duke of Modena and in 1829, after the death of his mother, he was also Prince of Massa Carrara. His wife was Maria Beatrice Vittoria of Savoy (1792-1840), daughter of Victor Emmanuel I. In 1846 his son Francis V (1819-75) became Duke of Modena and Prince of Massa-Carrara.

³⁰ Francis IV betrayed Ciro Menotti (1798-1831), a patriot and a leader of the revolutionary uprising at Modena in 1831. Menotti was arrested on February 3, 1831 with many other patriots who used to meet at his home. When he was forced to flee to Mantua, the Duke took Menotti with him in order to prevent the patriot from revealing secrets which would have made the Duke as intolerable to Austria as he was now odious to the Italians. Menotti died on the scaffold at Modena on May 26, 1831.

³¹ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

circles of Europe. When I first came to Europe, this jealousy and dislike was rather an abstract or theoretical sentiment. Since the annexation of Texas it has become a general alarm. The moral power of the country displayed to the whole world by that annexation, has struck the people on this side of the water with wonder and the governments with the liveliest apprehensions. The fact is, few believed that that measure could be carried against the joint influence of France and England, and when it was carried by an unanimous vote, men of all classes were thrown back with wonder and astonishment. It is amusing how much the affairs of the United States attract attention and discussion in Europe. This has never been the case so much as within the last two years. Every body watches with eagle eyes the progress of the Oregon question. The aristocrats say that the United States will give way; the liberals exclaim "Look England bullies all Europe, but she cannot bully the United States. That is incontestable proof of their power." So great and even so ridiculous is the alarm felt by many persons at the rapid progress and increasing greatness of the United States that more than one diplomat here said to me, that the further aggrandizement of that country must be restrained, for not only may it expose Europe to revolutions but to invasions! All professions of friendship from the sovereigns and ministers of Europe such as those made by M. Guizot,³² are disproved by facts and I set down as shew hypocrisy. When was a man or a government friendly to what they feared? . . .

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

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No. 37

Legation of the United States,³³
Turin, May 15, 1846.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

Quite a custom house war has commenced between Sardinia and Austria. It is probable that there is bad feeling between the two governments and that if there had been a cordial understanding between them, there would have been no difficulties whatever about the interpretation of treaties. It appears (at least according to the account of the affair that we have almost officially here) that in the year 1751, a treaty was concluded between Austria and Sardinia, by which the former ceded to the latter, the right of transit across Lombardy of salt purchased from the Venetian Republic; and in consideration thereof, Sardinia bound herself, not to sell salt to the Swiss cantons or to any of their possessions in Italy. The Sardinian Government, not having for a long time obtained salt

³² François Pierre Guillaume (1787-1874). Historian and diplomat. In 1840 he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was Prime Minister from Sept. 19, 1847 to Feb. 23, 1848. He sought to assure the peace of Europe by forming an alliance with England and by cultivating friendly relations with Austria.

³³ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

from Venice, considered the convention as obsolete, but still never having denounced it, declined from deference to the Austrian government to sell salt to the canton of Ticino. That canton having purchased its salt elsewhere, demanded transit through Sardinia and obtained the necessary permission. The Sardinian Government asserts that its custom-house has received no profit whatever from the transit and contends that one nation cannot refuse the right to another friendly nation, unless the transit might be injurious to itself. The Austrian government conceived that this concession of the right of transit was a violation of the treaty of 1751 and by way of reprisals raised the duty on Sardinian wines imported into the Austrian States.

For some time past a coolness towards Austria (who although disliked is yet dreaded by all Italy) has been perceptible on the part of this government. Some say that she wanted to separate Genoa from the possessions of the House of Savoy and thus hand over Liguria to an Imperial Archduke. This, at least, was the popular idea, but it would be difficult to say, how far it was justified by the fact. Since that time several acts of the Sardinian Government have manifested but little deference to the wishes of Austria. Several persons compromised in the late *emeutes* in Romagna, have been not only received but actually employed at Turin. Several authors who have recently written against Austrian influence—such as the Count Balbo³⁴ and the Marquis D'Azeglio, enjoy merited consideration at Court. The sum of the matter seems to be, that Sardinia fearing Austria, has not dared to shew her hatred in an open manner, but disliking her, has shewn it in several indirect ways; and that Austria incensed at such a want of reverence and submission has seized the first occasion to vent her Imperial spleen.

It is not probable that these matters will lead to any serious result. As Sardinia is the most military power in Italy and naturally stands at the head of affairs in the peninsula, she naturally excites the constant watchfulness and jealousy of Austria, who can endure nothing but obedience and submission on this side of the Alps. With an energetic ambitious King, who would give his people a Constitution and place himself at the head of the liberal movement in Italy, she might control and consolidate the country and establish throughout the peninsula a single, independent, constitutional monarchy with a member of the House of Savoy on the throne. But the present sovereign does not enjoy good health—is very pious and thinks too much of the affairs of the other world, to occupy himself with revolutions in this. Things will continue to go on as usual—one day a liberal movement and the next a Jesuit retrograde—and the

³⁴ Cesare Balbo dei Conti di Vinadio (1789-1853). Born in Turin. Historian and statesman. Author of *Vita di Dante* (1839); *Meditazioni storiche* (1842-45); *Sommario della Storia d'Italia* (1846). Especially important was his *Speranze d'Italia* (Paris, 1844), in which he favored the expansion of Austria eastward and the subsequent abandonment of her Italian provinces—a fact which would have facilitated the unification of Italy. In 1847 he established the newspaper *Il Risorgimento*. From March to July, 1848, he was President of the first Constitutional Ministry at Turin. In 1849 he was sent on a diplomatic mission to Pius IX at Gaeta. See, E. Ricotti, *La vita e gli scritti di Cesare Balbo*. Florence, 1856.

government will thus at last remain at the same old obsolete point from which it started.

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

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No. 38

Legation of the United States,³⁵
Turin, May 20, 1846.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.

Sir:

The custom-house difficulty between Sardinia and Austria has been the cause of considerable excitement during the last ten days. In order to obviate the effects which the increase of the duty on Sardinian wine imported into the Austrian states, might produce, a company was forthwith organized for its sale, by way of the sea, in foreign countries. It was determined amongst the people to salute the King with extraordinary cries of enthusiasm and approbation the first time he should appear on the Campus Martini to manœuvre the troops. On the morning of the day appointed for the parade, all the streets leading to the Campus Martini and especially the one between the Royal Castle and that place were filled with dense and anxious throngs. The people waited the appearance of the King with great impatience. The Austrian Minister went to the Palace and informed His Majesty, that if any insult or outrage were offered His Majesty, he should demand his passports. At last the King caused it to be announced that he was extremely sensible to such a demonstration but that reasons of high prudence would prevent him from leaving his palace on that day. The police, it is said, had information that the people intended not only to cry "Vive le Roi," but "Vive le Roi d'Italie," "bas les Jesuites," "a bas le Comte Solar de la Marguerite," etc. A few mornings afterwards the King made this appearance very early and in a quiet way, but was still saluted with great enthusiasm. Every one hopes and each one after his own manner. Amongst the people it is currently reported and believed that the King has the promise of the Emperor Nicholas³⁶ to sustain him against Austria—that an English and French fleet will shortly make their appearance in the port of Genoa—that the Italian exiles will

³⁵ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

³⁶ Because of his alliance with Austria, Czar Nicholas was in no position to help Charles Albert. As a matter of fact soon after the opening of hostilities between Piedmont and Austria, the Russian minister was recalled from Turin. At first England and France had greatly encouraged the Piedmontese, but as the war loomed, the British minister, after having warned the King against making war, kept reiterating reproofs and dismal predictions. The French, too, gave Charles Albert great anxiety. Just as the King was leaving Turin for the seat of war, a troop of about four thousand French Republicans threatened to march on Savoy with the purpose of starting a rebellion. Throughout the war the official attitude of the French Government was a source of constant preoccupation to Charles Albert.

be allowed to return etc. These rumors, however, may be regarded as popular illusion, for I have seen or heard nothing to convince me of their truth.

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

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No. 39

Legation of the United States,³⁷
Turin, June 4, 1846.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.

Sir:

News has just arrived that Pope Gregory XVI³⁸ died at Rome on Monday 1st, ult. at nine o'clock in the morning. He had attained eighty-one or eighty-two years of age, and his pontificate had lasted sixteen years. He was not of a noble or distinguished family, but before his elevation to the Cardinalcy had been a simple benedictine monk, attached to the Church of St. Gregory outside the walls of Rome. His physical constitution was remarkably sound and vigorous and even after his elevation to the throne of St. Peter, he continued the habits of his order and always slept on a bed of straw. Although not remarkable for talents or learning, yet his character was good. For sometime past, however, all important affairs of state have been transacted by his ministers and especially by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Cardinal Lambruschini.³⁹

Although from his extreme old age, the Pope could not have been expected to live much longer, yet there is little doubt that over-exertion in the discharge of the religious functions of his high office, was the immediate cause of his death. About fifteen days since, on occasion of the feast of St. Lucy, the Pope with all his Cardinals, according to usage, celebrated divine worship in the Church of St. John the Lateran. This church is at least two miles from the Vatican, where the Pope resides. After the completion of the religious ceremonies within, the Pope pronounced a benediction from the balcony of the Church, upon the assembled throng without. These ceremonies lasted four or five hours and required considerable exertion. The day was excessively hot; the interior of the church (one of the largest and most magnificent cathedrals of

³⁷ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

³⁸ Gregory XVI (Bartolommeo Alberto Cappelari, 1765-1846). Created a cardinal in 1826, elected Pope in 1831. An ardent reactionary and a firm friend of Metternich, he supported the Jesuits. At the moment of his death the Papal States were seething with discontent and the papal prisons were full to overflowing with political conspirators. His successor was Pius IX (Giovanni Mastai Ferretti, 1792-1878), a young man with liberal views and independence of thought. Such was the enthusiasm he aroused everywhere for his liberal reforms that the United States appointed a minister to the Papal States in 1848. See H. R. Marraro, *American opinion on the unification of Italy, 1846-61*. New York, 1932; Sister Loretta Clare Feiertag, *American public opinion on the diplomatic relations between the United States and the Papal States (1847-67)*. Washington, 1933.

³⁹ Lambruschini, Luigi (1776-1854). Born in Genoa. Barnabite monk. Made a cardinal in 1831. Secretary of State in 1836. He was an avowed adversary of liberalism.

Rome) quite cold. Passing suddenly from the heat without to the cold within and vice versa, the Pope contracted a fever which produced constipation and caused his death.

His death happening at this particular juncture, renders the choice of his successor peculiarly important. As the affairs of Italy, at this moment, begin to attract peculiar attention throughout Europe, it is to be regretted that you have no one on the spot to keep you advised of the progress of events in so important a capital as Rome.

R. Wickliffe. Jr.

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No. 40

Legation of the United States,⁴⁰
Turin, June 17, 1846.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

. . . Since my last, affairs at Turin have almost subsided into their usual tranquillity, and monotony; of such a great explosion nothing remains but the echo, which comes bounding back from the foreign journals. The report, however, has been busily circulated within the last ten days, that the Count Solar de la Marguerite, Minister for Foreign Affairs, would be dismissed. It is well understood that there are in the Sardinian Cabinet, two parties, the Jesuit and the Progressists. The first is represented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the second by Villa Marina,⁴¹ Minister of War. During the late events, the Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed to shew in the wind. The Jesuits, however, came with all their forces to his rescue, and to all appearance, have succeeded in preventing his anticipated fall. Villa Marina and the Marquis Brignoli-Sale⁴² were spoken of as his successors. They are perhaps the two most enlightened statesmen in the kingdom and either would be very acceptable to the people. It is very uncertain, however, that any change in the Ministry at least for the present, will be made. The late ebullition of royal independence and popular enthusiasm, have not therefore, produced any immediate results, but they have served to shew "which way the wind blows." As you will have observed, I did not anticipate that the consequences would be more serious.

R. Wickliffe. Jr.

⁴⁰ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

⁴¹ Pes Emanuele, Marquis di Villamarina. Born in Cagliari. Minister of War in the cabinet of Charles Albert. See F. Bosio, *Il Marchese di Villamarina. memorie di un diplomatico*. Milan, 1877.

⁴² Antoni Brignole Sale, Marquis di Groppoli. (1786-1863). Born in Genoa. In 1836 he was Sardinian ambassador at Paris. Appointed a senator in 1848. He was profoundly religious and a conservative and therefore opposed to the liberal movements of 1848 and unsympathetic to the constitutional reforms.

No. 41

Legation of the United States,⁴³
Turin, July 15, 1846.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

. . . The difficulty with Austria will in all probability be amicably arranged. The better opinion seems to be that the King did not receive any promises or encouragement from the Emperor of Russia. On the contrary I learn from authentic quarter that the late manifestations at Turin were exceedingly disagreeable to the cabinet of St. Petersburg. Russia will forthwith offer her arbitration. Indeed there is no doubt that her Chargé d'Affaires (for the minister is absent on leave for a year) has received instructions to that effect. Her mediation will probably be accepted. Austria has acted from the beginning of the affair with great want of tact. She has wounded the pride and alienated still further the sentiments of the Piedmontese government and people. The natural effect is to draw Piedmont close to France, and to throw her further from Austria; in other words, to attach her to the constitutional and alienate her from the absolute powers.

No change in the ministry has yet taken place, though persons with good means of information still maintain that such will be the fact. In addition to Brignole and Sostegno,⁴⁴ the Marquis Saluzzo⁴⁵ is also spoken of as a probable addition to the Cabinet.

Of course I do not trouble myself with these matters, except to listen and to try to keep up with the progress of events. All my efforts are directed to the removal of the petty but annoying obstacles thrown in the way of foreign commerce by the Custom House, police, and financial regulations of the country. My success has not indeed been as great as I could wish. Still the commerce of the United States with this country has increased considerably. In the article of cotton, for example, ten thousand bales has been the usual average, whereas during the first six months of the present year eighteen thousand bales have been already imported. This is owing to the carrying out of the principle, the importance of which I have several times spoken of, and to the practical execution of which I have bent all my energies, viz, the direct exchange of commodities between the two countries without the intervention of a third nation. Therefore, great quantities of our produce, especially cotton and tobacco have been purchased in England, and have served as the basis of the commerce between England and this country. The loss to our shipping and commerce and the gain to those

⁴³ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

⁴⁴ Cesare Alfieri, Marquis di Sostegno (1799-1869). Born at Turin. From Nov. 30, 1847 to March 16, 1848, he was First Minister of Public Instruction of the Kingdom of Sardinia; on March 4, 1848 he signed the Constitution of the Kingdom. Appointed a senator in 1848. Was President of the third constitutional ministry, and from 1855 to 1860 he was President of the Senate.

⁴⁵ Alessandro Saluzzo di Monesiglio (Count) (1775-1851). Was Sardinian minister of war. In 1848 appointed a senator.

of England was manifest. I have not failed directly and through the vice consul at Genoa, to impress upon the mercantile men, the gain to themselves in buying American produce in the United States. In return, several merchants under my direction are trying to send the Piedmontese wines to America. In fine it is the interest both of Sardinia and the United States that their commerce should be emancipated from English intervention.

R. Wickliffe. Jr.

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No. 42

Legation of the United States⁴⁶
Turin, August 10, 1846.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

. . . The difficulty between Sardinia and Austria has been by consent of parties submitted to the judgment of Russia and that power has accepted the arbitrage. The decision ought to be and I have no doubt will be favorable to Piedmont. It is a singular fact that Austria deliberated several weeks before she agreed to accept the mediation of Russia. If you take any interest in this question or in the supposed political leanings of the Sardinian Majesty, I could send you some printed works that throw light on the subject—such as a collection of the official acts relating to the controversy between Austria and Sardinia—a small book on the late rebellions in Romagna by the Marquis d'Azeglio,⁴⁷ and the "Speranze d'Italia" by Count Balbo. The two last works pointed out the mode of establishing the unity and independence of Italy are generally believed to be not disagreeable to the House of Savoy. They are not permitted by the censure, yet still their authors enjoy great consideration at Court. The inutility of the censure is strikingly illustrated by the instance of these works. They are introduced, by contraband and consequently cost five times the real price. But such is the curiosity to read them, that each copy passes through the hands of hundreds and every body has read and talks about them. I still adhere to the opinion, however, that no great changes will be made. The ministry remains the same. The House of Savoy if it be wise and bold may achieve a glorious avenir in Italy but the time and circumstances have not yet arrived. . . .

R. Wickliffe. Jr.

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No. 44

Legation of the United States⁴⁸
Turin, September 22, 1846

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.

⁴⁶ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

⁴⁷ This refers to d'Azeglio's *Degli ultimi casi di Romagna* (1846) in which he exposed the evils of the papal government and for which he was expelled from Tuscany.

⁴⁸ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

Sir:

. . . In the affair between Sardinia and Austria, Russia has declined the *arbitrage* but offered her *mediation*. She was unwilling to take the responsibility of pronouncing a judgment, but was willing to use her good offices to put the parties in harmonious relations with each other.

A fortnight since the Minister of Foreign Affairs went to Rome and his voyage has given rise to many conjectures as to its object.⁴⁹ Some think that he went for the purpose of arranging a knotty question between the governments of Turin and Rome, with respect to former church lands in the Island of Sardinia. Feudality having been abolished in that island, the priests sold many of their lands with all the privileges which were attached to them, and among those privileges was immunity from taxation. The purchasers claim these privileges and the government having imposed taxes on their lands, they demanded indemnity from the priests and the priests remonstrated against the illegality of the tax. The matter has thus become a question between the two governments and one difficult matter to arrange to the satisfaction of all parties interested. It is a question, however, which could be negotiated with the Nuncio here or with the Secretary of State, in the ordinary way, without necessitating a special and extraordinary voyage on the part of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Others say that the Jesuit party having lost ground in the Sardinian Cabinet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs as its representative, finds himself in a delicate and uneasy position, for he cannot retreat from the principles or fulfill the hopes of his patrons. The voyage to Rome is, therefore, they allege, made for the purpose of preparing the way for his nomination as Ambassador near the Holy See. This motive although plausible is not sufficient, for there is no reasonable doubt, that should the Minister of Foreign Affairs retire from his present position, he could easily obtain from the King and without quitting Turin any embassy that might be disposable.

Others again say and with greater reason that the reforms of the new Pope have excited the fears of the Sardinian Government and that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is known to be retrograde in his ideas and to be high in favor with the Priests, has been sent to Rome to calm the ardor of Pius IX

⁴⁹ The liberal reforms of Pius IX were a threat to the Old Régime and to the reactionists. Therefore, in the words of Thayer, not only did Count Solaro ridicule his "absolutist counsels to Charles Albert, but went to Rome purposely to see with his own eyes the strange Pontiff who was amazing the world with his "liberalism." The Pope received the Piedmontese minister cordially and apparently calmed Count Solaro's fears by assuring him that he [the Pope] merely wished to give the remedies demanded by the times and giving positive assurance that he would not allow himself to be drawn into the whirlpool of revolution. Despite these assurances, Count Solaro foresaw the difficulties that were bound to arise. "Unless Austria and France interfere," he wrote, "a catastrophe is inevitable." [William Roscoe Thayer, *The dawn of Italian independence*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co. 1892., II, p. 38-39. Solaro della Margherita, *Memorandum storico-politico dal 7 febbraio 1835 al 9 ottobre 1847*. Turin, 1851. This is an interesting presentation of the creed and methods of the politician of the Old Régime]

"et de lui faire des petites observations." For such an embassy he would be peculiarly fit, and therefore, the statement in the papers that he has been sent to encourage the Pope in his new measures, you may reject as improbable and unworthy of belief. If such had been the object of the Government, it would have selected another agent for the Mission. Besides it is known that the Sardinian Ambassador at Rome, instead of sustaining, discourages the Pope in his great and useful reforms.⁵⁰

The King has formed a camp near Turin of nearly thirty thousand men. The encampment takes place biennially and lasts a month. Some of the foreign papers and especially the German amuse themselves with jests upon the supposed designs on His Majesty to undertake the conquest of Italy. Of course there is nothing in such an idea and it comes from the spleen of the Austrian Government, which can never forgive Charles Albert for aiding the construction of the Swiss and Piemontese railroad by which Genoa is to rise on the ruins of Trieste.

R. Wickliffe. Jr.

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No. 48

Legation of the United States⁵¹
Turin, December 10, 1846.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

. . . [Possibility of changing the Minister of Foreign Affairs—Count Solar de la Marguerite to be dismissed, and Marquis Bignole Sale to take his place . . .]

These reports are always ominous and generally fatal to the career of statesmen in this country. The government is weak and timid and rarely if ever takes a sudden and energetic step, with regard to any of its principal servants. When it wishes to get rid of a minister, it causes the report to be spread that he is to be dismissed; if the people receive the report favorably, he is immediately dismissed; if many cry out against his dismissal, it is postponed for a time. Six months or a year after the report is again spread about; the enemies of the minister are encouraged to redouble their hostile efforts; his friends believing him to be a doomed man and fearful of being involved in his fall leave him with precipitation, and the public so long accustomed to the idea of his fall, receive at last the intelligence, a part with satisfaction and a part with indifference. Such I observed was the case with Count Gallina,⁵²

⁵⁰ Pier Carlo Boggio, *La Chiesa e lo Stato in Piemonte sino al 1854*, Turin, 1854, 2 vols.

⁵¹ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

⁵² Stefano Gallina (1799-1867), Count, born in Turin. At one time minister of the Interior, in 1848 he was made a senator.

late Minister of Finance, and I should not be in the least surprised, if such should be the case sooner or later with the present minister of foreign affairs . . .⁵³

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No. 50

Legation of the United States,⁵⁴

Turin, March 20, 1847.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.

Sir:

A piece of scandal has recently occurred in Turin which has made a great noise and shows that the separation of the executive and judiciary departments is a nice distinction of constitutional law, not yet very well understood in Sardinia. There is of course no press but the official Gazette, and it is very difficult if not impossible to point anything secretly and without authority. Some malicious person, however, lithographed a pamphlet containing severe strictures and bitter sarcasms upon a lady of the court, a dame d'honneur of the Duchess of Savoy, a former favorite of the King, and of unenviable notoriety. The libels, however, were as full of truth as of malice and a considerable number of copies was privately circulated and eagerly read by all classes. The authorities immediately took the matter in hand; they suppressed the pamphlet and prevented its circulation as far as possible, but were unable to detect the author. In order to punish some one for the offense, the police issued an order that no person except a regularly authorized lithographer should be allowed to have in his possession lithographic stones and a heavy penalty was declared against those who should violate the law. Many persons, especially engineers, designers and others engaged in making sketches of machines, inventions, etc. have thus been prevented from pursuing their accustomed occupations and made to suffer in their business for the offence of another. Such is generally the case with the police in Europe, for they think it necessary for their reputation that some one should be punished for each offence committed, and whenever they are unable to detect the guilty party they avenge themselves by injuring one that is innocent.

The King continues to maintain with a firmness that was not expected of him his independent position with regard to Austria. If there were a moral or a political principle involved in the coolness between the two countries, perhaps it would have been long since settled to the mutual satisfaction of the

⁵³ In this despatch Mr. Wickliffe had requested a leave of absence. In his reply dated Washington, March 10, 1847, Secretary of State Buchanan informed Mr. Wickliffe that the President could not grant him the leave. "In this respect," wrote Mr. Buchanan, "he has acted towards you as he has done to all other diplomatic agents who have asked leave of absence, since the commencement of the Mexican war." During its continuance, the President believed that all foreign diplomatic agents should remain at their posts. [James Buchanan, *The Works comprising his speeches, state papers, and private correspondence*. Philadelphia, Lippincott Co., 1909, vol. VII, 239.]

⁵⁴ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

parties. But it is a question of dollars and cents; a railway surely, a battle between Trieste and Genoa. It sometimes happens that men who are yielding and plastic when opinion is involved, are resolute and brave when their purse is concerned.

Hence the domineering ill-will and unjust but powerless peevishness of the Cabinet of Vienna; hence the manly firmness, and unusual nationally, so much admired in the present attitude of that of Turin. Sardinia, I think, will triumph in the result, as she already has the vantage ground of principle in the controversy. The Genoa and Turin railroad will not only connect with the Swiss and German lines but probably also with the French. The King has taken into serious consideration the project of tunneling the Alps; his engineers declare it practicable and profess to have invented machines and concerted plans by which it can be done at much less expense than would be at first supposed. The distance would be between eight and ten miles and the work if ever completed one of the most gigantic ever finished and sufficient of itself to immortalize a reign.

Disturbances have recently taken place in various parts of Italy. On the confines of Lombardy and Piedmont they have been partial and have proceeded from the apprehensions of the people with regard to the scarcity of corn. In Piedmont, however, there is no real danger of scarcity, for although the price of flour has risen as in every other part of Europe, yet the crops have not been deficient; the peasantry live on maize and in the port of Genoa there is always an abundant supply of every species of grain. In Romagna and Tuscany, the disturbances have been instigated, as is believed with reason, by Austria. She dislikes and dreads the liberal measures of the Pope, and in order to convince His Holiness that he is going too far and too fast, gets up a petty *emeute* in some of the provinces. It is only, however, the lowest sabble that can be bought up in this way, for the mass of the people are enthusiastically attached to Pius IX. Several priests, however, not so much influenced, perhaps, by Austrian gold, as by the fear of losing some of their privileges by the religious reforms of the Pope, have also compromised themselves in the late disturbances. But such is the firm resolve of the people not only to sustain the Pope but to avenge the slightest injury that may be done him that none of his enemies, either clerical or laic, dare to touch a hair of his head. In Tuscany, Austria wants to send more of her troops and as the Grand Duke did not think additional regiments necessary and the people spoke out against the expense, Austria excites *ementes*, in order to convince the Grand Duke that he is mistaken and that he has need of increased protection against the liberals and revolutionists.

To give you an idea of the miserable state of popular education in this Kingdom, it appears from a memorial addressed by the Bishop of Chambery that in Savoy not more than sixty per cent of the population can read or write.

The first volume of the Italian translation of Bancroft's History of the United States has been admitted into this country, *sub semple censura*. I

doubt whether the authorities will be so indulgent towards the succeeding volumes.

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No. 51

Legation of the United States,⁵⁵
Turin, May 17, 1847.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

A circumstance has recently occurred in Turin which indicates that the influence of the Jesuit party in this country is on the wane. The Jesuits intended to hold a fair for the benefit of one of their female institutions called "Bon Pasteur." The King had deigned to grant the use of his garden for the purpose, and even the Duchess of Savoy (it was said) would have a stall and assist in the sale of the articles. The liberals or progressists looking with suspicion upon the institution of the "Bon Pasteur," as a mere instrument to extend the influence of the Jesuits, set to work in earnest and operated with such efficiency and success that the fair was abandoned in despair. . . .

R. Wickliffe. Jr.

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No. 52

Legation of the United States,⁵⁶
Turin, May 31, 1847

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

. . . Mr. Cobden⁵⁷ arrived in Turin about ten days since and on Monday last a dinner was given him at the Hotel de l'Europe. The permission of the King was obtained for the dinner and the party consisted of about sixty-five persons—all nobles. The Bourgeoisie was strictly excluded and no toasts were allowed but those in honor of the Queen of England, the King of Sardinia, and Mr. Cobden; no persons were allowed to speak but the President, Vice President, and Mr. Cobden, and all allusions to liberalism were strictly prohibited. Those were the conditions of the dinner, announced and understood before it took place. The gentlemen connected with the press and the young liberals were very much dissatisfied with the dinner and several who were invited declined to go because their friends were not included. They say that the affair was so arranged as to prevent a real enthusiastic reception to Mr. Cobden. It is, how-

⁵⁵ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

⁵⁶ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

⁵⁷ Richard Cobden (1804-1865). Cotton manufacturer of Manchester. As an English apostle of commercial emancipation, he favored free trade. On this trip to Italy, he was dined by prominent liberals. See Mrs. Salis Schwabe's *Reminiscences of Richard Cobden*. London, 1895.

ever, the first public dinner, having a political significance that has ever been given in Turin, of which I have ever heard and it therefore deserves to be noted as an *epoch* in the annals of the country. None of the Diplomatic corps was invited except the English Minister who declined (from diplomatic reasons) to attend. On Wednesday Mr. Cobden was presented to the King and received by His Majesty, with great kindness and distinction. He committed, however, a breach of etiquette in bowing himself out instead of waiting until the King gave him the signal that the audience was over. I heard him laugh at the mistake and say that he saw several gentlemen waiting in the ante-chamber and that he thought it was time for him to leave. On Friday he attended the University and listened to a lecture on Political Economy. The Professor both at the opening and conclusion of his address, paid him very handsome compliments which were received with cheers by the audience. As he left the hall the students and spectators formed a line and as he passed through it, made the air resound with "Vive Cobden." Mr. Cobden said that he was more moved by this demonstration of respect than any which he had received in the course of his travels, for it was as unprepared as it was enthusiastic. His whole journey through Italy has been a triumphal march.

R. Wickliffe. Jr.

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No. 53

Legation of the United States,⁵⁸
Turin, July 15, 1847.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

. . . The Marquis de Cavour (with whom I have very friendly relations) after a long service has resigned his office of Vicario and the Count Galli has been appointed his successor. . . .

A work recently published by Vincenzo Gioberti entitled the "Modern Jesuit"⁵⁹ has created a sensation at Turin and makes some developments calculated to annoy the Count Solar de la Marguerite. It appears that the Minister for Foreign Affairs (who is the chief of the Jesuit party in this country) devotes a great portion of his time and carried on an extensive correspondence for the purpose of making proselytes to the Jesuit cause. Gioberti is a Catholic priest but a sworn and redoubtable enemy of the Jesuits. The Minister entered into a correspondence with Monsignor Fornari, the Pope's Nuncio at Brussels and

⁵⁸ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

⁵⁹ Gioberti's *Gesuita Moderno* was first published at Lausanne in 1846, in five volumes. It is a diatribe against the Jesuits whom Gioberti earlier had praised in his *Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani*. Since he had been unable to enlist their powerful influence in support of the mother country, in his *Gesuita Moderno* Gioberti bitterly censured the doctrine and practices of the Jesuits and the system of education which they had established in Italy.

requested him to undertake the conversion of Gioberti, offering his protection to Gioberti, in case he would allow himself to be changed. The Nuncio, either with or without the consent of the writer, allowed Gioberti to read and finally to take copies of these letters. What is still more annoying is that there are some mistakes of orthography which expose still more the correspondence to the malignant merriment of the public.

R. Wickliffe. Jr.

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No. 55

Legation of the United States,⁶⁰
Turin, September 7, 1847.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

. . . Affairs in Italy are assuming a serious aspect and seem to be fast tending to a solution. Austria, alarmed by the reforms of the Pope and the progress of liberal ideas in the peninsula, occupied on the 13th ult. the city of Ferrara.⁶¹ The Legate and the Pope have protested. Pius IX seems to have given great offence to the diplomatists, because instead of addressing himself to the powers that signed the Treaty of Vienna, he has thrown himself for support on his people. France, it is clear, will let Austria do what she pleases and it seems to be the understanding between the courts of Vienna and of the Tuilleries, that Louise Philippe will be permitted to do what he pleases in Spain and that Prince Metternich will be allowed the same liberty in Italy. In a word, France has abdicated her ancient and chiefest glory—that of being the protectress of liberty throughout Europe. England seems ambitious to take her place, and protects liberalism in Switzerland as well as in Italy. As the British Cabinet, however, seldom acts without strong motives of interest, the Italians think that it has an eye on Sicily; but say that they would be willing to give up that island provided the unity, liberty, and independence of the residue of their country were secured by English aid. It is certain that England has been busy and to all appearances successful in Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg, Rome and Sardinia, in forming, not exactly a liberal alliance but a liberal understanding against the view of Austria as it regards Swiss and Italian affairs. The British Minister

⁶⁰ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

⁶¹ A troop of about one thousand Croats and Hungarians occupied Ferrara on July 17. Cardinal Ciacchi, the Papal Legate, drew up a formal protest which the Papal Secretary of State published in the *Diario di Roma*. The Austrians justified the occupation by charging that the citizens of Ferrara had become insolent. Metternich maintained that Austria had only exercised a right conferred upon her by the Treaty of Vienna, and sanctioned by custom during more than 30 years. Austria made no apology. The Pope sent protests to foreign powers. England sympathized with the Pope. France hinted that should Austria interfere in the Papal States, she, too, would send an army hither. (Thayer, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 50 ff). See E. Alberi, *Dell'occupazione austriaca di Ferrara*. Florence, 1847.

here is in fine spirits. This Government, it is understood, has addressed notes to Vienna and Rome, expressing its disapprobation of the violation of the Treaty of Vienna by the Austrian occupation of Ferrara. These notes, although not perhaps in the precise form of a protest, yet are intended, I am assured, to give the Pope the aid of the moral support of this government in his present difficulties with Austria. Whether this government, when the necessity arrives will go farther and sustain the Pope by an armed intervention, remains to be seen. I doubt whether such an intervention has been promised, as is confidently believed and asserted by the generality. Placed as this government is in a difficult and delicate position between France and Austria, it is its evident policy to support itself by a cordial understanding with the other independent princes of Italy. If Austria destroys the independence of the Pope, she may next attack that of Sardinia. Besides, if by any combination of circumstances, Austria could be driven from Italy, the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom would most probably fall to the King of Sardinia. The desire to drive her out is universal here; and while the liberals dream the unity of Italy, those in the interest of the government dream the transfer of the Sardinian Capital from Turin to Milan. As the Ministry, however, is at present constituted, it may be doubted whether any decisive measures will be taken. Half Jesuit and half liberal, it is scarcely capable of that unanimity and that energy which would be necessary to act efficiently and promptly against the Austrians. In Tuscany and Lucca, there are great excitement and loud demands for the national guard and in Sicily there is open and formidable insurrection. Here things are quieter, because the people seem to hope more from the government.

No importance should be attached to the rumor that Prince Metternich has demanded of this government the fortress of Alesandria. Such a demand would be an absurdity.

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

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No. 56

Legation of the United States,⁶²
Turin, September 27, 1847.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.

Sir:

It is now more evident than when I wrote you on the 7th instant, that the popular demonstrations which have recently taken place in Genoa and several other prominent towns were not agreeable to the government. Immediately after the King's return from his visit to lay the corner-stone of the bridge at Valenza, the Chief of the Police issued an order that the display of all other flags than the national should be prevented by the police. The flags thus proscribed are the Papal and the Italian tricolor.

From Genoa the people sent a petition to the King demanding 1. the

⁶² MS archives of American embassy, Rome.

civic guard; 2. the liberty of the press; 3. the dismissal of Count Solar de la Marguerite, Minister of Foreign Affairs. No written answer was given to the petition, for it would then have become a subject of discussion in the foreign journals. The Chief of the Police, however, sent an order for three noblemen who had been concerned in the petition to come to Turin. These noblemen, although very respectable characters and liberal in their principles were not the chiefs of the movement. On the contrary, it was observed that the three thus selected were all men of marked mediocrity. They were, however, instructed beforehand in the answers which they should make and in due time they presented themselves at Turin. The Chief of the Police commenced by making them reproaches. They replied that instead of receiving reproaches, they had expected to receive the thanks of the government for what they had done; for they had given a pacific direction to a movement which otherwise might have had unpleasant consequences. The Chief of the Police then changed his tone somewhat and informed the three gentlemen that the King would grant them an audience. A few days after, they were cordially received by His Majesty. The King was very courteous and said that as to the civic guard he appreciated its importance and utility and would grant it when the necessities of the country required it; that as to the liberty of the press, he was disposed to accord as much as was compatible with the present system of government; as to the removal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he is said only to have smiled; but what signification ought to be attached to that smile, it is difficult to divine. The whole affaire has resulted in nothing but dissatisfaction, which at Genoa was increased by a Proclamation of the Governor of that city, prohibiting the renewal of the popular demonstrations.

A letter has been published from the King to his private secretary, the Count Castagnetto,⁶³ in which His Majesty says it seems that we are on the eve of war with Austria; that if the standard of Italian independence should be raised, that he would mount his horse with his sons and act in Italy the part of Schamyl, etc etc. From the style of his letter, few at the time believed that it was genuine; yet it has been published everywhere and its authenticity has not been contradicted

⁶³ Casare Trabucco, Count of Castagnetto (1802-1888). Turin. Private secretary to Charles Albert, he was made a Senator in 1848. Castagnetto, who was general president of the Agrarian Congress at Casale, and the King's intimate friend, sent the King a report of the meeting in which he stressed the really Italian character of the demonstration. King Charles Albert wrote a letter to Castagnetto which he read before the astonished Congress. "Were I to write at length," wrote Charles Albert, "I could only repeat what I told you at Racconigi concerning the sentiments and views which must be expressed, for the present and the future. Add, only, that if ever God grant us the grace of allowing us to undertake a war of independence, it is I alone who will command the army, and that then I am resolved to do for the Guelf cause that which Schamyl is doing against the vast Russian Empire." W. R. Thaper, *op. cit.*, 67-8. See also Costa de Beauregard, *Epilogue d'un Règne* (Paris, 1890). 43-44. C. Vincenzi, *Il conte Cesare Trabucco di Castagnetto, segretario di re Carlo Alberto*. Milan, Marcolli, 1908, 46 pp.; V. Ferrari, *Carteggio Casale-Castagnetto* (marzo-ottobre 1848). Milan, Ripalta, 1909, 325 pp.

by the official gazette. And I am assured that Count Castagnetto received the letter at Casale and showed it to several members of the Agricultural Congress, lately assembled at that place.⁶⁴ It seems, however, to be the idea of those who are regarded as the leading statesmen of the country, that as long as Austria and France are united, Piedmont is obliged by her position and her traditional policy to observe a very prudent course. It remains to be seen, whether this traditional policy will not be modified by the force of circumstances and the new position of things.

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

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No. 57

Legation of the United States,⁶⁵
Turin, October 10, 1847.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

During the last week the public mind has been more excited at Turin than at any period since the present agitation in Italy began. The 2nd of the month was the anniversary of the King's birthday. The people had obtained from the Vicario permission to assemble in the public garden but were strictly enjoined to avoid all disturbance of the public peace. Accordingly, some five or six thousand, including a great number of the most respectable citizens assembled in the garden and amused themselves by crying "Viva Pio Nono," "Viva Carlo Alberto." Some one also cried "Morte ai Gesuiti!" But upon another warning the people to be on their guard against spies, the crowd applauded and refused to second the cry. It appears that the crowd desired to go to the Police and to salute the King and with that view began to march in that direction. It had not, however, reached the end of the garden, before it was met by the military and gendarmes. The people were brutally treated, for the police struck, with the butt ends of their pistols, several respectable citizens; even sabres were used and one advocate was bayonnetted. The pretext of this interference was that the people intended to proceed to the Hotel of the Austrian Ambassador and to insult him with offensive cries. There does not seem to be sufficient reason to believe that any such intention was entertained. It is indignantly rejected by those who were in the assembly as a calumny. The order for the military to interfere came from the Head of the General Police. The civil authorities of the city requested and obtained an audience of the King, to represent to him the facts of the case, as they really occurred. His Majesty, however, received then in a manner altogether different from the general expectation. When the subject was broachd, he quietly responded that he was already acquainted with the facts and immediately entered into conversation on commercial subjects, with a banker who was a member of the deput-

⁶⁴ See: A. Hortis, *Le riunioni degli scienziati italiani prima delle guerre d'indipendenza*. Città di Castello, 1922.

⁶⁵ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

ation. The more respectable citizens who were present at the disturbance drew up a statement and petition; eight hundred signatures had been already obtained, but when the reception given to the authorities of the city transpired, the document was burnt. They say that they took this course to express their indignation, though some are so uncharitable as to suppose, that they had not the courage to go farther in the course which had had marked out.⁶⁶

Up to the time of this affair, it was universally belived, that if any change took place in the Ministry Count Solar de la Marguerite would be dismissed. The Retrograde party however turned the matter to their account, and succeeded in persuading the King that Count Villa Marina, Minister of War and chief of the Progressist party ought to be deprived of his *Porto Folio*⁶⁷. Accordingly the King in a moment of vivacity, told that gentleman that his services were no longer needed, and on Friday last, he took leave of the employees of his department. The scene is said to have been very affecting and alike honorable to the late Head of the War Office and his subalterns. As the Chief of the Progressist party, Villa Marina is very popular with the mass, and his dismissal has produced a bad impression on the public mind. My last despatches will have enabled you to perceive that abroad too much was counted on the liberal tendencies of this government and therefore you will not be more surprised than I have been at the dismissal of Villa Marina. It will, however, be a source of disappointment and chagrin to the Liberal party not only in Italy but throughout Europe. Down to the first, the government seemed to be on the liberal track; now it seems to have taken the opposite direction. Perhaps before long it will again apparently return to the liberal course and thus continue its oscillations between the progressive and retrograde principles.

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

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No. 58

Legation of the United States,⁶⁸
Turin, October 12, 1847.

The Honorable James Buchanan,
Secretary of State.
Sir:

I had scarcely sent my last despatch to the post-office, informing you of the retreat of Count Villa Marina, Minister of War, when I received official notice of that of Count Solar de la Marguerite, Minister of Foreign Affairs. It appears

⁶⁶ It is suggested that the King had a philosophic contempt for the favor of the populace,—“which today shoults *Viva*, and to-morrow *Death*,”—and he saw no reason why his birthday, which had passed unnoticed for seventeen years, should be made a festival now. [W. R. Thayer, *op. cit.*, II, 68; Beauregard, *Epilogue*, 50.]

⁶⁷ Thayer suggests that Villamarina had not been unpopular, but that his reputation for liberalism was due to the contrast between his very moderate views and the very decided conservatism of his colleagues, rather than to any more positive reason. [Thayer, *op. cit.*, II, 68.]

⁶⁸ MS archives American embassy, Rome.

that the Council of Ministers held in consequence of the late affair between the people and the police was much more animated than usual. A short time after its adjournment the King addressed a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, intimating to him that his resignation would be acceptable. The Minister replied that he desired to submit a few considerations to His Majesty upon the subject and begged an audience for that purpose. The King, however, instead of waiting for the considerations, somewhat after the manner of Napoleon, sent his Aid-de-Camp with an order to the Minister to send in his resignation forthwith.⁶⁹ The recognized chiefs of the two great parties in the state have thus been dismissed and the reorganized cabinet must necessarily be colourless. If a conservative or retrograde policy be desired no Minister can be found possessing the confidence of those who favor such a policy more than Marguerite. If progress be intended, Villa Marina would be more acceptable than any one who may be chosen as his successor. The worst policy at the present moment would be a half and half policy. It will satisfy no one and cannot last long. Still the probabilities are that it will be adopted or rather continued.

R. Wickliffe, Jr.

⁶⁹ Thayer describes Della Margarita [sic] as "a typical exponent of the Old Régime—an honest, narrow man, and the loyalest of subjects, who looked up to his king as a divinely-appointed master, whom to serve was the first of duties, and the noblest of privileges." [W. R. Thayer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 69.]

NOTES

THE NEW CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT

On July 2, 1946, the formation of the new Czechoslovak government by Klement Gottwald, president of the Czech Communist Party, was announced. The new government is composed of the following members:

Premier: Klement Gottwald, Communist

Vice Premiers: Petr Zenkl, Czech Socialist; Msgr. Jan Šrámek, Catholic Peoples'.

Ján Ursíny, Slovak Democrat; Zdeněk Fierlinger, Czech Social Democrat;

Vilém Siroký, Slovak Communist

Foreign Affairs: Jan Masaryk, Independent

National Defense: General Ludvík Svoboda, Independent

Interior: Václav Nosek, Communist

Foreign Trade: Hubert Ripka, Czech Socialist

Home Trade: Antonín Zmrhal, Communist

Information: Václav Kopecký, Communist

Finance: Jaromír Dolanský, Communist

Food Supplies: Václav Majer, Czech Social Democrat

Education: Jaroslav Stránský, Czech Socialist

Post and Telegraph: Msgr. František Hála, Czech Catholic

Transport: Ivan Pietor, Slovak Democrat

Agriculture: Julius D'uriš, Slovak Communist

Social Welfare: Zdeněk Nejedlý, Communist

Justice: František Drtina, Czech Socialist

Industry: Bohumil Laušman, Czech Social Democrat

Health: Adolf Procházka, Peoples'

Ministers without portfolio: Alois Vosahlík, Peoples' and Mikulaš Franěk, Slovak Democrat

State Secretaries for Foreign Affairs and National Defense: Vladimír Clementis, Slovak Communist and Jan Lichner, Slovak Democrat, respectively.

The Premier and the five Vice-Premiers will form a political council of the central government.

The predominance of Communists in this new cabinet is quite in proportion to the victory of their party in the recent May elections from which the Communist Party emerged as the strongest in the Czechoslovak Republic. Out of a total of 7,583,784 electors, the Party polled 2,695,915 votes. The second largest party, the National Socialists, secured only 1,298,917 votes, not quite half as many as the Communists. This gives the Communists 114 of the 300 seats in the Parliament, or more properly at this moment, the Constitutional Assembly.

There is little doubt that the Communists' victory was due in no small measure to their appealing "Two Year Plan" for the economic reconstruction of the country. It is hoped that this program, which the new government is pledged to put into effect, will materially raise the standard of living of all Czechoslovak citizens. To this end special attention will be given to raising the pre-war level

of Czechoslovak industrial output. The production of coal, electric power, steel and iron, agricultural machinery, and the construction of new lines of communication, and vehicles of transport are to be specially emphasized. The Communist plan also envisions a tremendous building program to replace the houses and apartments destroyed or damaged by the ravages of war. It is expected that these two years will also see the rapid industrialization of Slovakia. This is indeed a program of some magnitude. Yet, recalling the outstanding success of the Czechoslovak Republic after 1918 in almost every department of national life, there is much reason to hope and to believe that such goals may again be achieved. It will be interesting to see how the various parties represented in the new cabinet will manage to get on together in spite of their ideological differences.

THE AMERICAN DEMAND FOR FREE AND UNFETTERED ELECTIONS IN POLAND

On August 20, 1946 United States Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane delivered the following note to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs calling for free and unfettered elections in Poland:

Under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government has been glad to learn that the Polish Provisional Government intends to promulgate electoral laws during the month of August and to hold elections early in the month of November. My Government is deeply conscious of the grave responsibility which it assumed, together with the British and Soviet Governments, by the decisions taken at the Crimea and Potsdam conferences with respect to the holding of free and unfettered elections in Poland. During the conversations which were held in Moscow in June, 1945, the Polish leaders agreed to the acceptance of the principles formulated at Yalta. Accordingly, the Polish Government which was then functioning in Poland was reorganized and there was created the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, with which the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States established diplomatic relations.

In departing from its traditional policy by assuming responsibilities in connection with the internal affairs of another state, my Government was motivated by the feeling that, as one of the principal powers engaged in liberating the peoples of Europe from the yoke of Nazi aggression, it had a special responsibility to assist in giving the Polish people who had suffered so greatly from Nazi occupation, an opportunity freely to choose the Government under which they would live. My Government feels, therefore, that it has both the right and the duty to bring the following to the attention of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

The United States Government considers that it had no responsibilities in connection with the referendum held in Poland on June 30. Nevertheless, as the Polish Ambassador in Washington informed my Government on April 4, 1946, this referendum was a measure preparatory to the election and the methods by which it was held bear a relation to the preparations for holding the election itself. The official representatives of the United States Government in Poland have reported that the voting in the referendum appeared

to have been generally carried out in a correct and fair manner but that the methods used in tabulating the ballots and reporting the vote have given rise to charges of serious irregularities, including removal of ballot boxes from polling places in contravention of the referendum law.

It has also been brought to the attention of my Government that the Polish Labor party was not allowed to hold its party congress and that, as a result of this and administrative persecution of the party by arrests, censorship restrictions, administrative interference and other oppressive acts which have prevented normal democratic political activity, the central committee majority leadership of the Labor party has requested the membership of that party to suspend all political activity until such time as the attitude of the Polish Provisional Government toward the Labor party has changed. The Polish Provisional Government is, of course, aware that one of the essential elements in the agreement for the holding of free elections in Poland is that all democratic, anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. To this end it is necessary that all democratic parties be free to engage in political activity in the period preceding the elections.

Furthermore, my Government has learned with great regret that steps have been taken depriving the Polish Peasant party of its right to assemble and to perform normal party functions in numerous points within Poland. According to reliable information, the facilities which other parties enjoy in publishing electoral or party material, in using the radio for propaganda purposes and the ability to make known the views of the party through public posters and other forms of advertisement are through censorship and other means either denied to the Polish Peasant party or restricted to a degree less than that accorded the parties adhering to the so-called Government bloc.

In view of the foregoing, my Government wishes to emphasize its belief that *inter alia* it is essential for the carrying out of free elections that (1) all democratic and anti-Nazi parties are allowed to conduct election campaigns freely without arrest or threat of arrest—the parties recognized as “democratic and anti-Nazi parties” include the following: the Polish Workers party (PPR), the Democratic party (SD), the Polish Socialist party (PPS), the Polish Peasant party (PSL), the Peasant party (SL) and the Labor party (SP); (2) all such parties are represented on all electoral commissions and ballots are counted in presence of representatives of all such parties; (3) results will be published immediately by local districts; and (4) there shall be an adequate system of appealing election disputes.

My Government is confident that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity will take into account the views presented above in making arrangements for the election.

The JOURNAL is happy to reprint the following appeal from The American Book Center. The need for American books in Central Europe at present and for some considerable time to come is tremendous.

BOOKS — WAR VICTIMS

During the war, the libraries of half the world were destroyed in the fires of battle and in the fires of hate and fanaticism. Where they were spared physical damage, they were impoverished by isolation. There is an urgent need—now—for the printed materials which are basic to the reconstruction of devastated areas and which can help to remove the intellectual blackout of Europe and the Orient.

There is need for a pooling of resources, for co-ordinated action in order that the devastated libraries of the world may be restocked as far as possible with needed American publications. The American Book Center for War Devastated Libraries, Inc. has come into being to meet this need. It is a program that is born of the combined interests of library and educational organizations of government agencies, and of many other official and non-official bodies in the United States.

The American Book Center is collecting and is shipping abroad scholarly books and periodicals which will be useful in research and necessary in the physical, economic, social and industrial rehabilitation and reconstruction of Europe and the Far East.

The Center cannot purchase books and periodicals; it must depend upon gifts from individuals, institutions, and organizations. Each state will be organized to participate in the program through the leadership of a state chairman. Other chairmen will organize interest in the principal subject fields. Co-operation with these leaders or direct individual contributions are welcomed.

What Is Needed: Shipping facilities are precious and demand that all materials be carefully selected. Emphasis is placed upon publications issued during the past decade, upon scholarly books which are important contributions to their fields, upon periodicals (even incomplete volumes) of significance, upon fiction and non-fiction of distinction. All subjects—history, the social sciences, music, fine arts, literature, and especially the sciences and technologies—are wanted.

What Is Not Needed: Textbooks, out-dated monographs, recreational reading, books for children and young people, light fiction, materials of purely local interest, popular magazines such as *Time*, *Life*, *National Geographic*, etc., popular non-fiction of little enduring significance such as Gunther's *Inside Europe*, Haliburton's *Royal Road to Romance*, etc. Only carefully selected federal and local documents are needed, and donors are requested to write directly to the Center with regard to specific documents.

How To Ship: All shipments should be sent PREPAID via the cheapest means of transportation to THE AMERICAN BOOK CENTER, % THE

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON 25, D. C. Although the Center hopes that donors will assume the costs of transportation of their materials to Washington, when this is not possible reimbursement will be made upon notification by card or letter of the amount due. *The Center cannot accept material which is sent collect.* Reimbursement cannot be made for packing or other charges beyond actual transportation. When possible, periodicals should be tied together by volume. It will be helpful if missing issues are noted on incomplete volumes.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHADWICK, H. MUNRO, *The Nationalities of Europe, and the Growth of National Ideologies*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945. Pp. 209. \$4.00.

Although Chadwick's comments concerning the basis of nationalism in Central-Eastern Europe, significantly using a subtitle, "The Growth of National Ideologies," are a definite contribution to the most misunderstood phenomenon of modern times, it is, at the same time, one of the most mishandled recent studies of this field.

To its credit is a compilation of numerous facts, gathered from far and wide, pertaining to the characteristics and causes and the ideologies connected with nationalism. In this respect, the specialist will have to have the handbook on his shelf, although he will frequently condemn Chadwick for his poor index.

But the weaknesses of the work are more glaring than its strong points. (1) In spite of the claim of the author that the word "nationality" is used in two different senses, "which are sometimes mutually exclusive," (p. 1.), Chadwick still neglects to come to terms with the definition. Upon the basis of his inappropriate and inadequately produced evidence, he assumes that he already knows the definition. If the following is the definition, then the reviewer is willing to retire to his academic shack and put ashes on his head: "We hear frequently of conflicts of nationality within the territories of a single state; and the persons who represent these different nationalities are all usually natives of the country. Such conflicts often lead to a demand for independence on the part of a section of the population. Or, again, a minority of the population of one country may claim the same nationality as the majority of the population of another country; and such conditions may lead to a demand for the redistribution of territories."

(2) Chadwick admits that "the question with which this book is concerned attracted little attention in this country [England] until recently." In other words, he condemns the isolationism of his countrymen in regard to the problem of nationalism, and, yet, his very treatment of the topic indicates how English scholarship can wallow in isolationism and insularity. Although libraries have been written on the topic in America and by the Continental scholars, there seems to be little evidence that he is acquainted with them. The German works seem to attract him—and, of course, Macartney (the good Macartney, who has saved so many English and American scholars from total ignorance).

(3) To cover up his weakness in regard to the pertinent literature, Chadwick devotes six pages to "An Institute of Imperial and International Studies," but not a single page to any kind of bibliography.

(4) Chadwick parades as a great specialist in Slavonic languages and proudly displays his "specialization" by spelling "Jurij Križanić" on one page, and "Kara-Gjorgje" on the other, together with "P. J. Šafařík."

All in all, the book is rather an indication of what a real specialist could do with such an important topic than a definite contribution to the field.

Hofstra College

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

MANN, GOLO, *Secretary of Europe, the Life of Friedrich Gentz*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946. Pp. 323. \$4.00.

Gentz, though a man of enormous talents, seems to have been born to be a courtier and a hanger-on. As a handsome and well-born youth, he was a student of Kant and an admirer of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The French Revolution, the philosophy of Burke, and the long service to the Prussian and then to the Austrian government transformed him first into a conservative and finally into a reactionary. At the center of Gentz's career lay his secretaryship of all the European congresses from Vienna to Verona. No wonder he dared boast, "I know everything; no one in the world is acquainted with so much contemporary history as I, for no one has enjoyed such deep intimacy with so many . . . leading men." His political memoranda and his correspondence are rich with material about the diplomacy and general political situation in the Napoleonic period and the succeeding age of Metternich. His writings will always remain a valuable historical source. Yet, withal he is neither a great political philosopher, nor a man with large influence in his time. After reading his life one can see why, as Dr. Mann says, he is often remembered "as a licentious old diplomat, a figure from an operetta, rouged, nibbling at bonbons, and slinking along behind court ballerinas." That, at the same time, he was, in the words of Dr. Mann, "the greatest political writer ever produced by Germany," is not only hard to believe, but, if true, is an amazing commentary on German civilization.

For the historian, the life of Gentz published by Paul Sweet in 1941, with its excellent bibliographical references, will long remain the definitive English biography. Nevertheless, Dr. Mann's study is an able and interesting presentation; its special value lies in its extended discussion of Gentz as a political analyst.

Oberlin College

FREDERIC B. ARTZ

KOHN, HANS, *Prophets and Peoples. Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. Pp. 213. \$2.50.

Professor Kohn has chosen as his theme one of the dominant forces in this modern world—nationalism. It is a subject with scope for a Thucydides or a Gibbon. Professor Kohn has done justice to his theme in this and other related volumes.

Prophets and Peoples is an amplified and annotated version of five lectures delivered at Northwestern University under the Norman Wait Harris Foundation. The objective of the lectures was "to explain the character of Europe's leading

nations as a background for an understanding of their policies in modern times." By a careful selection of his national spokesmen (John Stuart Mill for England, Michelet for France, Mazzini for Italy, Treitschke for Germany, and Dostoevsky for Russia) and a critical appraisal of their thoughts, Dr. Kohn has admirably fulfilled his purpose. Not the least of this success is due to the author's sharp intellect and ripe judgment.

Perhaps it is the reviewer's Anglo-Saxon upbringing and education which makes him concur heartily with the author's contention that only Mill, of the prophets, can "be called wise." Mill's notion that individual liberty was a prerequisite "for making people think and making them better" cannot be overemphasized in a time when there is a tendency, in some quarters, to underscore economic security at the expense of political liberty. There need *not* be a choice. A synthesis might be a nobler objective. Against the dilemma posed by "the selfish interests of individuals and classes who do not care sufficiently for their fellow men, and the threat to individual liberty implied in the growing power of the masses" Mill posed education. The reviewer wishes Mill's thought had been projected a step further to define the *kind* of education, but Dr. Kohn does not discuss this point. Did Mill support mid-nineteenth-century education as he found it in England? If so, what was its composition? Was it the Great Books! Have Mill or Dr. Kohn any thoughts or convictions on "General Education"? As education becomes more general, would it become more superficial? Or should it be, as Michelet suggested (pp. 64-65) "education in the religion of the fatherland"!

Throughout the study the reader is made aware of the fallibility of such national prophets as Mazzini, Treitschke, and Dostoevsky. Mazzini's "history" is properly exposed, but his great heart and faith are respected. Treitschke's evolution from a liberal to a nationalist is painstakingly charted, and Mr. Kohn makes a point when he attacks the illusion of good pre-1848 Germany and bad post-Bismarckian Germany. "In reality the German liberals of 1815 and of 1848 had in their large majority been more German than liberal." The basis of Treitschke's hope for peace—that war had become a tremendous risk—overlooked the reality that the world contained tremendous gamblers. An unpoetic Dostoevsky emerges. It is the Slavophile, Dostoevsky, who preaches anti-Semitism, a point of view at variance with the deep sympathy for humanity expressed in his great novels.

The notes at the end of the volume amount to approximately 20,000 words in a half-dozen languages. The reader's index finger will become thoroughly blistered in the process of studying them!

Professor Kohn has made another sound contribution to the historiography of nationalism.

University of Colorado

RICHARD M. BRACE

HOGG, R. D., *Yugoslavia*. London: McDonald & Co.

Mr. Hogg's qualifications as an authority on Yugoslavia are unknown to

this reviewer, but his "Select Bibliography" indicates that the author does not know the Serbo-Croatian language, so that, as a result, he has no access to the writings of Yugoslav historians, especially those who were able during the nineteen-twenties to write history with a measure of freedom from political persecution. During that period, Zhivan Zhivanovitch published his *Political History of Serbia*, which had the effect of an atomic bomb when the full significance of its criticism of the Serbian Radical Party and its leader, Nikola Pashitch, penetrated Yugoslav public consciousness. During the same period, Slobodan Yovanovitch published his extraordinary studies of the political history of Serbia during the rule of the Obrenovitch dynasty, which show the gulf that separated the villages from the town and the ease with which the wearer of the crown terrorized or seduced the "leaders of the people" into abject submission to his will. To the plot that led to the assassination of Alexander and Draga Obrenovitch in 1903 Mr. Hogg devotes only one sentence (p. 34). Nowhere in the book does the author mention the fatal feud between the conspirators of 1903, on the one side, and Pashitch's Radical Party, supported by Crown Prince (later King) Alexander on the other side, which ended in the gruesome Salonika affair of 1917, which, in turn, made it impossible for King Alexander ever to permit complete freedom of speech in Yugoslavia.

A basic trouble with Mr. Hogg's book is his propensity for identifying the ruling clique with the masses of the people. For example, he speaks (pp. 24-27) of the Serbian medieval Empire with the naiveté of a lover of historical romances. It is true that Emperor Dushan "planned to take Constantinople," but it is also true that Dushan's serfs welcomed the arrival of the Turks, who liberated them from their feudal masters. Mr. Hogg's failure to point out that the Turks made all Serbians equal before Turkish law is one of the significant omissions of the book.

In his treatment of the Serbian uprising against the Turks under Kara-george and Milosh Obrenovitch, the author does not mention the rôle of the oligarchy which dominated the political life of Serbia until its power was destroyed by Prince Michael Obrenovitch. But, while Prince Michael destroyed the irresponsible power of the wealthy village oligarchs, he did not begin his reign "with bold democratic reforms" (p. 32). Educated abroad during the era of reaction against the revolutionary forces of 1848, Michael was an admirer of "bureaucratic efficiency" and during his régime Serbia became a police state.

To the first King of Serbia, Milan Obrenovitch, Mr. Hogg devotes only one paragraph (pp. 33-34), and yet it was Milan (not Michael) who admitted the children of Serbian peasants to the Military Academy in Belgrade and thus made possible not only the creation of the Serbian army, which expelled the Turks from South Serbia and fought heroically in the first World War, but which also produced the group of national and social revolutionaries, who destroyed the Obrenovitch dynasty in 1903, put King Peter on the throne,

organized the "Black Hand" in 1911, fought against corruption in public life and were exterminated by Peter's son, Alexander, in Salonika in 1917.

Having failed to give the reader even a sketch of the forces that struggled for supremacy in pre-1918 Serbia, Mr. Hogg begins his book in a vacuum and ends it in a justification of dictatorship. The responsibility for the collapse of the parliamentary system he places equally on King Alexander, who destroyed it, and on the political leaders of the people who asked the king to form a neutral government, charged with the task of holding free elections for a constitutional assembly, which would give the people a workable Bill of Rights.

Mr. Hogg's book is a perfect example of how history should not be written. In describing the régime of Prince Paul, the author gives to the reader an intimate picture of Paul's mental processes, of his attitude toward the Serbians and Serbia, toward the Croats and Slovenians, toward Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain (he nowhere mentions the United States) and reaches the conclusion, which the reader must accept on the personal authority of the author, that the tragedy of Yugoslavia was caused by Prince Paul's failure to trust the Serbs from Serbia, "who are incapable of being daunted by dark prospects" (p. 149). The chauvinist Serbian thesis is, thus, perfectly stated. The book ends with the "legend of Kosovo," a Serbian legend, beautiful to be sure, but as far removed from the revolutionary upheaval that occurred in Yugoslavia during the Nazi-Fascist occupation as Valley Forge is from the present attempts of the CIO to organize the industrial workers in the "solid South."

One more comment. Mr. Hogg does not mention the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Since the leading rôle of that party in the Yugoslav resistance against the Nazis was recognized by the British Government in December, 1943, Mr. Hogg's omission indicates either ignorance or, to put it mildly, a desire to avoid "unpleasant" subjects.

New York City

VASO TRIVANOVITCH

KOLARZ, WALTER, *Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe*. London: Lindsay Drummond, 1946. Pp. 274. 12s. 6d.

This is a stimulating book—even if it will meet with disapproval from all the nationalities of Eastern Europe, including those the author has decided not to discuss at all, namely the three Baltic nations. It is stimulating because it is a hard-hitting attack on nationalism throughout the breadth and width of Eastern Europe, *i.e.* the lands inhabited until 1945 by the Germans on the one side and the Russians on the other. His aim, thus, is sound enough, commendable even: he wants to do away with the forces of mutually exclusive nationalist demands. Temperamentally unable to see beyond his own nose, the author therefore proceeds to demolish one dream-structure after another until he has reduced the whole Eastern European world to a shambles of absurdities and a mad-house peopled, to use his favorite phrase, by megalomaniacs.

Mr. Kolarz, however, while doing useful work in reducing to its innate absurdity the "historic rights" of many a nation, takes many things for granted which need equal scrutiny. He believes that Western Europe developed towards bigger States. What about Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Eire and quite a few others? Halt, says he, the Western States have access to the sea, hence they could also develop some small units; this the East cannot. I suggest again: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia (which leaves few of his Eastern European States unaccounted for). Small wonder then, that he goes out of his way to call Woodrow Wilson's principles "un-American"! He has made up his mind that he does not like Small States and in this he is not without company—he provides the arguments to "prove" his prejudices. The result is some special pleading.

The submerged nations of the East Mr. Kolarz calls nations "without history": I suggest they are nations without historians; and if they had been the proper subject of historical study, long ago—and this *Journal* is out to make good what has been neglected for too long—the world would be a better place to live in, would not have been overtaken by the last two murderous wars which both were set in motion in that self-same area. Our author is pleased to point out that the Rumanian fascist, Codreanu, was "a mixture of Ukrainian, Hungarian and German blood (*sic*)"—which just goes to show that he is blissfully unaware of the forces that go to the making of a nation. Nationality is, obviously, something far bigger than racial mixtures or un-mixtures and grips even people without any predestined nationality. In reducing to absurdity the extreme claims of nationalist cravings, nationality itself is neither explained nor explained away—nor is the scene thus purged ripe for a federal solution of which Mr. Kolarz dreams, as do all good citizens of the world.

Hungary and the myth of St. Stephen; Poland, both Jagiellonian and Piast; Greater Bohemia and Finnish Nationalism; the Daco-Rumanian Empire; Greater Serbia and Greater Yugoslavia; the Third Bulgarian Empire, Greater Albania and Byzantine Greece—all come in for some sound slashing. This is all to the good. Everything said against unjust demands must be welcomed everywhere. "Barriers Must Fall," we are told at the end: who would disagree, who would disapprove? None but the extremists (and they are rarely self-confessed). Yet, there remains the real question: "No doubt," Mr. Kolarz says in a quiet moment in his Finnish chapter, "there exists some reason for any national feud. . . There would be just as many reasons for friendship if only someone would try to select them. . . ." Neither of these tasks he has tackled. He has denounced the national feuds: we can rejoice in this. But will he now explain the reasons and thus truly dispose of the feuds and help us to select the reasons for friendship? If so, he will write a truly great book to which the present one is but a pathfinder through a jungle of nationalist cannibalism. And a great book will lead to great sweeping action of Peace in Eastern Europe.

The book is stimulating throughout, and there are many details—very important ones—which need correcting. Readers of this *Journal* will do this on their own much better than any reviewer who claims only some knowledge just in those three nations which Kolarz has excluded—the Estonians, Letts and Lithuanians. But there is one final incident worth singling out: the author condemns the expulsion of populations, as in the case of the Greeks in the twenties, as “a grave setback to civilization,” and he comments on the Greco-Bulgarian strife: “Even if all Bulgarians had been evacuated, the Bulgarian claims would not be silenced as long as nationalist myths and local egotism dominate in the Balkans.” Applied to more recent events on a larger scale in Central Europe, what lesson must be drawn? A lesson about expulsions? or about myths—or both?

London, England

F. W. PICK

SALOMONE, A. WILLIAM, *Italian Democracy in the Making: the Political Scene in the Giolittian Era 1900-1914*. Introductory Essay by Gaetano Salvemini. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945. Pp. xviii, 148. \$2.50

This book is misnamed. It might well be called *Italian Fascism in the Making*, for with patent accuracy it exposes the decline in the level of Italian political life from the assassination of King Humbert I to the War of 1914. The purpose of the monograph, in the author's words, is “to present an analysis of the significant problems and currents of Italian political life at the turn of the century during the time of Giovanni Giolitti.” In this the writer succeeds admirably. Working through a mountain of printed sources from the minutes of Parliament to the memoirs of assorted politicians, he has extracted most of the useful data from his materials and mirrored the period in concise, topical fashion. The most effective chapters in the book are the two on Italian socialism; the weakest is “Catholics in Politics.”

The need for such a study is obvious. Except for Cecil J. S. Sprigge's short history and H. Franklin Williams' summary (this latter written in the manner of the Berkshire series), there is little in English to synthesize Italian history, 1870-1914. Narrow studies are beginning to appear in ever-increasing number, but for the present, this era is without accurate appraisals in our language. In its manner, the Salomone book bridges an important gap.

There are two weaknesses that somewhat disappoint the expectations of the reader who hopes that Salomone will both explain the phenomenon of *Giolittismo* and show its importance in the drive toward Fascism. First of all, there should be a chapter of conclusions at the end of the volume. Salomone outlines an epoch in Italian history. What was its place in the larger panorama of European politics of the time? How did it lay the foundation for the coming of Mussolini? To the contrary, little is said about democracy, next to nothing about Fascism. Only occasional paragraphs at the ends of chapters sum up the author's judgments on his subject; and these paragraphs are scarcely broad enough to do the task justice. The second difficulty is the introduction

by Professor Salvemini. Ever the polemicist, Dr. Salvemini uses ten pages of his essay to chortle the cause of Italy right or wrong, accompanied by uncertain excursions into English and American history to support his contentions. Consciously or not, Salomone seems to exaggerate Salvemini's rôle as a spokesman of democratic prewar Italy. The book would give a better impression of solidarity with a foreword by a more dispassionate historian.

Particularly helpful is the bibliography. The writer has included critical notes on his books and documents. His evaluations of these are quite balanced. A chronology appended to the text is likewise useful. This reviewer hopes that Salomone will not stop at this point but will continue his investigations of recent Italian history. His talents are badly needed.

University of Miami

DUANE KOENIG

MARGOLIN, ARNOLD D., *From A Political Diary: Russia, the Ukraine, and America, 1905-1945*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946. Pp. viii, 250. \$3.00.

Unlike the neighboring Poles and Rumanians, the peoples of the Ukraine have never succeeded in pushing their national problems into the foreground of the European political stage. Partitioned among several states, and to a considerable degree absorbed by their Russian first cousins, the Ukrainians have made little progress as a national unit. Their leaders have in recent years actually served more as tools of the various powers desiring to gain control over their rich fertile land than as successful pleaders of an independent Ukraine.

Despite the relatively poor record of the Ukrainian nationalists as a group, however, a small number of their leaders has during the past generation consistently lobbied for a Ukraine which would be both autonomous and democratic. Arnold D. Margolin is a prominent member of this group, and his political career as sketched in these memoirs follows closely the ups and downs of the Ukrainian liberation movement. Margolin's first appearance on the political scene was as a delegate to the Union of Unions in 1905, representing the Union of Attorneys and the interests of the Jewish minority, and he describes briefly the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 from the point of view of an active political leader.

During the two years following the Revolution of 1917 Margolin, as a leader of the Labor-People's Socialist Party, was a close observer of the tortuous efforts of the Central Rada to find a secure place for itself amidst the triangular struggle of the new Soviet Russia, retreating Germany and a Poland backed by the Western Powers. Under the Directory, established after the departure of Skoropadsky in December, 1918, by Vinnichenko and Petlyura, Margolin served as Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of the Ukrainian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In this dual capacity, he conducted negotiations with the French mission in Odessa and with the representatives of the several great powers at the peace conference. He now discovered, to his

great chagrin, that there was little interest in Paris in the Ukraine's problems and that Russia was generally regarded as an indissoluble national unit. Later, as head of the Ukrainian mission in England, Margolin's experience merely confirmed this conclusion.

In 1921 Margolin, discouraged by the situation in Eastern Europe, severed his connection with the Ukrainian government. A year later he landed on the shores of the United States and soon established himself as a lawyer and businessman. Despite his new activities he kept in touch with the problems of Eastern Europe and, increasingly after the middle 1930's, he shared his views with Cordell Hull in frequent letters on the international problems of the day and also consulted with various officers of the Department of State. Now, however, he spoke not as a Ukrainian national leader but as an American citizen.

In reading through these memoirs one is struck by the fact that, in the latter three-fifths of the text which deal with Margolin's activities in this country, the problem of Ukrainian autonomy rapidly fades into the background and more of the writer's interest turns to the larger issues of American foreign policy. One cannot but recall W. H. Chamberlin's statement in his recent volume entitled *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (p. 73) that "The happiest Ukrainians are those who have found a new home on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, in the United States and Canada." Margolin's memoirs also leave the reader with the impression that, despite the genuineness of many of the Ukraine's grievances, the question of Ukrainian national autonomy is, after all, a domestic Russian problem.

Princeton University

C. E. BLACK

HARPER, SAMUEL N., *The Russia I Believe In*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945. Pp. 279. \$3.50. .

Professor S. Harper of the University of Chicago belonged to the small group of students of Russian problems, who knew both the Old and the New Russia, and did their utmost to spread knowledge and understanding of that country among the American people. Like his British colleague and friend, Sir Bernard Pares, he succeeded in being objective toward the Soviets, even at the time of the "purges" and trials, as well as during the Hitler-Stalin agreement in 1939, when everyone was shocked profoundly.

His lifelong interest in Russia was kindled very early and was, so to say, inherited from his father: "My father returned from his trip [to Russia] with a tremendous enthusiasm for all things Russian, and I believe that the many stories he told me about Russian life were the ultimate source of my own interest in that country." This book of memoirs, published by his brother, is "as much about himself in relation to Russia as about Russia itself."

It should be mentioned, perhaps, that the Soviet period (although covered in but a few chapters) covers about two-thirds of the book. A considerable part of the volume consists of Harper's letters home, and this material is often livelier than other parts of the book.

These memoirs are useful for those having sufficient knowledge of Russia's history in the twentieth century and of conditions under the Soviets. They present some new facts, aspects and comments upon the work of foreign students and correspondents of Old and New Russia.

The economic and other conditions in Soviet Russia can hardly be evaluated without a knowledge of the pre-revolutionary situation in Tsarist Russia. The present standard of life of the workers and peasants is often disadvantageously compared with that of Western European countries. But S. Harper, who spent many summers in pre-revolutionary Russia, could compare the new order with the Tsarist régime. He was in St. Petersburg in 1916 before the March Revolution and again in August, 1917 on the eve of Kerensky's fall.

Having connections with the State Department, Harper was working with E. Sisson, while the latter prepared his pamphlet on the Bolshevik upheaval. But Harper and his associate, Professor Jameson, "flatly refused to comment on Sisson's conclusions as to what the documents proved, that Lenin not only had had contacts with the German General Staff when he journeyed across Germany but had been and still was a German agent. Jameson and I were ready to state that in the given circumstances, by starting a social revolution in Russia, Lenin was objectively aiding the enemy from a military point of view" (p. 112).

Later he became intensely interested in the "Russian experiment" and published several books on it. His point of view was rather objective, even favorable. For instance, he defined Soviet "democratism" as "more for the result of their program, the achievement of mass participation in the activities of the social state, than for the methods used in reaching the result" (p. 241).

The reader should not expect Professor Harper to deal with the whole Soviet Russian question. His specialty is pure politics, domestic and foreign. He is not interested in cultural problems, such as literature, theater, music, etc.

This work stands out among many books on Russia as almost the only one without mistakes or misunderstandings concerning facts and events. Of the few mistakes there may be mentioned the assertion, which is not accurate, that "antagonism between Russians and Finns has been traditional for centuries" (p. 270). During almost the whole of the nineteenth century the Finns enjoyed, more than all other nations under Russia, the most untouched self-government while at the same time they were independent in their cultural development.

Harper's memoirs are very useful as the testimony of a man who was in the center of Soviet-U. S. relations. They tell much of American efforts to understand Soviet Russia. But at the same time they show the weakness, even of the Government, in obtaining enough knowledge of that country. His viewpoint was that of a liberal American who recognized that other peoples are entitled to have ideas and aspirations that may be different from the "American way of life."

The two themes of Harper's memoirs, besides his personal work, are: the internal development of Russia, and the attitude of the United States toward it.

This book should be read by everyone who is interested in Russian and world problems.

It may be suggested, that if a second edition of Harper's memoirs be published, an index would be very valuable.

Washington, D. C.

WASSILY W. LEONTIEF, SR.

RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, EGON F., *The International Secretariat*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945. Pp. 500. \$4.50.

At a time when the League of Nations has ceased to exist and the United Nations have begun to perform we are presented with a detailed and thoughtful analysis of the administrative peculiarities of the League's Secretariat. The author is qualified to speak. For years he was a member of the Geneva staff, and he exhibits in the present volume a complete familiarity with the inner workings of a type of international administration which was not confined to any specific task.

The most contradictory opinions were entertained in regard to the political rôle of the Geneva Secretariat. Some thought that its machinery created and moulded the celebrated *esprit de Genève* and that its influence reached far beyond the intentions of the drafters of the Covenant. Others, and among them the Secretary General himself, were inclined to believe that the Secretariat was a mere auxiliary organ of the Council and of the Assembly and had no political opinion whatsoever. Probably, the author thinks, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. While the policy-shaping authority was indeed in the hands of the Council and the Assembly the Secretariat functioned on a basis of permanency and the international bureaucracy in Geneva, because of its permanence and experience, knew more about League precedents and League formulas than any single representative of any single nation.

In the main the administrative activity of the Secretariat, bureaucratically organized under the Secretary General was rather functional than operational. The author finds no fault with the distribution of functions within the Secretariat although it was partly based upon topical and partly upon regional aspects. He thinks that the Secretary General, the sole responsible organ of the Secretariat, erred perhaps too much on the side of caution. His very title should have been changed so as to give him a greater degree of prestige when dealing with the world's diplomatists. While the author abstains from broader political considerations, he minutely evaluates the administrative processes within the limited framework of the League of Nations. He is of the opinion that, with the possible exception of the position of the undersecretaries, the Geneva officials developed a genuine practice of loyal international administration. It is only natural that the replacement of Sir Eric Drummond by M. Avenol modified the administrative practices in Geneva. The informal and empirical British approach changed into the more rigid and logical pattern of France.

Special attention is paid to the bi-lingual problems of the Geneva institution. Actually it created more difficulties, delays, and expense than might be generally

expected. It even led to an overemphasis of linguistic abilities at the expense of others. While Geneva succeeded in overcoming nationalistic bias within the organization, it failed to provide for an adequate representation of the various regions. Latin America and the Near East in particular should have been represented more fully. The personnel in Geneva suffered from being over-aged, a phenomenon which started with the inauguration of the League and was never wholly overcome.

The author describes at great length the various functions of the Secretariat and gives in each case a sober evaluation. He deals with the status of the members of the staff, with their diplomatic immunities, their compensations, classifications, appointment and retirement, and other relevant features. Taken as a whole, Dr. Ranshofen-Wertheimer thinks that the experiment in international administration was by no means without success. It is obvious that the general decline of the League during the 'thirties affected adversely the administrative accomplishments of the Geneva institution.

Students and statesmen who want to gather sound and reliable information about the problems and the significance of international administration should turn to the author's treatise, which will become the standard work in the field.

Michigan State College

HANS L. LEONHARDT

HALPERIN, S. WILLIAM, *Germany Tried Democracy. A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1932*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1946. Pp. 567. \$3.75.

That this is one of the best available accounts in English of the political developments in Germany from 1918 to 1933 there can be little doubt. It is very well organized. It is thoughtful. It is written in an interesting, clear, and eminently readable style. It is based on thorough familiarity with the published sources. The text is enlivened with brief but pointed biographical sketches of the leading personalities.

Certain subjects are handled particularly well. Thus, the first chapter, entitled "Crosscurrents in the German Empire, 1871-1914," is a splendid political summary of pre-1914 Germany. Moreover, there is an excellent description of the evils resulting in Germany from the system of proportional representation adopted by the republic. Again, the bungling, often, to be sure, well-meaning bungling, of the Social Democrats is brought out with great clarity. Similarly are brought out the sorry part played by the Communists between 1918-1932 and the virtually incessant attacks on the republic by its various groups of rightist opponents.

Although the author might object to this statement, it does seem to me that he develops three theses throughout the book. The first apparent thesis is that there are "good" Germans and "bad" Germans. The second apparent thesis is that the "good" Germans, generally speaking, were the Social Democrats who, though "often confused and faint-hearted," were generally "honest and well-meaning." By the same token, the Junkers, the military men, the industrialists,

the nationalists, the clericals, and similar groups were all "bad" Germans. The third thesis is that the Allies of the first World War are essentially responsible for the triumph of reaction in Germany because they did not do more to help the struggling democracy in Germany in the decade and a half after 1918.

This is not the place to argue either in support or in refutation of these views. But it does seem that, at least without further proof, they offer much too simple an explanation for a very broad and complex development. The net result is that one closes the book feeling somehow that one has finished an excellent account without being wholly clear as to what happened.

Despite all this, I repeat that Professor Halperin's study is outstanding among the recent histories of the Weimar Republic.

Wagner College

WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM

GUERARD, ALBERT, *Europe Free and United*. Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp. xi, 206.

When the author published this book, two of the things had already been decided, against which he tries to militate public conscience. The trusteeship of the Big Four had taken form at the Yalta agreement, "a new Holy Alliance, old fashioned power politics with a sanctimonious name." And it had become clear that the reconstruction of Europe would start from the basis of the 1938 order embodied in the return of the governments-in-exile and the revival of old boundaries. Nevertheless, the book is full of interesting observations and stimulating suggestions which render its reading valuable, even if matters are developing differently from what the author had anticipated.

The author clearly identifies himself with the spirit of George Washington who called himself "a citizen of the Great Republic of Humanity at large" and spurns Stephen Decatur's saying, "my country, right or wrong." He recognizes however, that a World superstate can be only a distant ideal and that nationalism is a hard fact. But neither ought nationalism to be connected with ideas of "Herren-volk" and imperialism, nor should the loose federation which should unite the globe, take the existing political units as a basis. Europe, with Great Britain but without the Soviet Union, should be one unit. He considers Europe ripe for such a union, rather than India or, by implication, the Western Hemisphere. Europeans have a common background; there is some common loyalty growing. The individual Pole and the individual German "can live side by side in peace, Poland and Germany cannot." Nation, language, and religion should be left to private conscience; a European parliament should be left to private conscience; a European parliament should establish a customs union, a Beveridge plan of social security, and a European constabulary. This done, the new boundaries could be drawn without arousing much resentment, because they would be little more than administrative boundaries.

Several objections may be raised. National sentiment could prompt the very first parliament to vote against union. Why not try, says the author. And

if Americans would allow the Soviet Union to fix her boundaries in a satisfactory way, if we stop treating communists in America herself as criminals, if we finally allowed the Europeans to make their long overdue revolution, the Soviet Union would have no reason for distrust. The reviewer has certain doubts about that and would ask quite generally whether regional unions of any kind will not replace the nations in a shrinking world for good or for worse.

A last objection is that a constabulary could easily be converted into an instrument of a military dictatorship in a disarmed continent. The author suggests employing the officers alternately in their military and in civilian positions. He admits that some danger remains, but he prefers this solution to a constabulary composed of national contingents.

Washington, D. C.

ERIC FISCHER

SOLOVEYCHIK, GEORGE, *Russia in Perspective*. Preface by Dr. G. P. Gooch. London: Macdonald, 1946. Pp. 173. 5s.

This is the last volume of a series originally begun during the last war which intended to set forth the history, aims and hopes "of the warring nations." The best in the series, edited by Miss Barbara Carter of the *People and Freedom* group in London, was Don Sturzo's volume on *Italy and the New World Order*. It seems strange that this present volume on Russia should be the last in this "Cross-Roads" Series—the publishers have not even included the United States, nor have they covered all vital regions of Europe.

The author of the present book is a rich Russian, equally at home in all big capitals of the world—hence his thesis that Russia (which he sees through the rosy spectacles of a sheltered youth in grand old Petersburg) is basically no different from any other country. "Russian history," he asserts, "does not fundamentally deviate from the general course of European cultural evolution." Of course, it does, as every history book can tell and show him. In fact, what he himself submits to his readers' judgment disposes of his thesis quite convincingly. He speaks of Ivan the Terrible, suggesting we should do as some Soviet historians and forget about the things connected with his "nickname." He mentions the introduction of serfdom in 1597—where is the parallel or, as he wills it, identical development in Western Europe? He goes as far as to say that Lincoln with his great Emancipation Proclamation receives more attention than Tsar Alexander II who—a year before Lincoln!—freed the serfs.

The vileness of the eighteenth-century Russian attitude to slavery is well brought out—"emancipation of the nobility and further enslavement of the peasant class," as Mr. Soloveytchik states, characterized the same century which is the time of enlightenment, of the American and the French revolution, to the rest of the world. As to the nineteenth century, however, our author believes that Russians are enjoying the utmost (*sic*) "emotional and spiritual freedom." He makes great play with Kennan's statement that the majority of exiles went to Siberia because they were expelled by their own village communities. If this

is a characteristic Russian trait, it certainly is not of the essence of Western cultural evolution.

Nevertheless, the book contains a great deal of interesting gleanings from various sources, including, of course, Russian sources, and it will therefore be found useful to stimulate thought and research. What it does not give is any clue to Russian foreign policy. But, used aright, it should help to understand the Russian mind as revealed through such an explanation by a Russian-born writer.

London, England

F. W. PICK

MORGENTHAU, HENRY, *Germany Is Our Problem*. New York: Harpers and Brothers. Pp. xiii, 239.

Sir Halford J. Mackinder, the famous English geopolitician, issued a warning to the Allies after the first World War. In a new edition of his *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, he attempted to prove that the "business was unfinished"; he even mentioned a conversation he had had with a Prussian officer whose entire life was devoted to one task: to shorten mobilization by half an hour.

Mr. Morgenthau, in his book, tries to show how to "finish the whole business" this time. And he finds as sufficient reason to do so, two world wars, six million executed and murdered in gas chambers, on the gallows, and by other means in Poland, two million in Yugoslavia, one million in Greece and numberless more in other countries.

The famous "Morgenthau Plan" should be studied for a variety of reasons. The original memorandum forms a historic document which President Roosevelt took with him to the famous Quebec Conference in 1944. Moreover, it constitutes the basis of the present policy in Germany. Furthermore, the book should be studied because it is, in actuality, different from what is thought of as the "Morgenthau Plan" by those who discuss the matter without ever having read it. Morgenthau's actual ideas vary as completely from what is sometimes said by "Morgenthauists" as Marx's ideas are removed from vulgarian Marxists, and Vansittart's from Vansittartists.

Mr. Morgenthau shows that in 1918 defeated Germany kept intact much more powerful forces for evil than those she had lost. "She kept her people's lust for conquest, her heavy industries, her general staff." Germany's general staff and her army must be abolished. Heavy industry, and this is the classic point of Mr. Morgenthau's plan, shifted to other European countries, would make Germany an agrarian state; only a definite type of light industry would be permitted. Mr. Morgenthau states that as long as Germany retains her heavy industry, she forms a threat to world peace, since she is capable of re-arming and starting another war. Therefore, Germany must not be permitted to be an industrial power after this war. Mr. Morgenthau proves with facts and figures that sixty million Germans can live on agriculture.

Nationalism is spreading rapidly in Germany. Press reports show that even

Communist leaders like Carl Ulbricht are using nationalistic slogans today. The youth, particularly the students, have remained nationalistic, and a large portion of the population shows no signs of repentance or change. Once again liberal and democratic forces in Germany appear too weak to offer any guarantee of lasting peace and security.

However, there are some weak spots in Mr. Morgenthau's important and penetrating work. Despite his array of facts and figures, despite his careful analysis of the problem, it appears doubtful whether Germany can, in fact, be transformed into a mainly agricultural state and still be able to feed its population adequately, especially in the face of drastic territorial cuts.

Furthermore, Germany is a part of Europe. There can be no competent solution of the German problem without a solution to the entire European problem. Mr. Morgenthau's plan solves the negative problem of Europe, the destruction of German war-potentials, but we need a solution of Germany within the plan of a constructive solution for Europe. The neighboring European nations must be properly organized to be able to counteract strong German pressure. Thus far, unfortunately, the Allies have only agreed upon negative issues as far as Germany, or Europe itself, is concerned. They have not reached any agreement on the positive issues of a great European reconstruction, as well as the necessity of reorganizing Europe to meet its new needs. Together with Germany, Europe has been dismembered: that was the mistake of Teheran. In place of a joint occupation of Germany, a division of Germany and of Europe has taken place. Co-operation between the Big Powers, thus, is difficult. The Soviet Union has its own plans for the future; this becomes increasingly clear. All this offers a new opportunity to Germany to play the Soviet Union and Anglo-American blocs against each other, as difficulties in co-operation increase. The Soviet zone has already established a different policy from that which has been instituted in other zones of occupation. As Mr. Morgenthau's plan has been prepared for all of Germany, its weakness lies in the fact that now Germany is divided, and there is only a very slim chance that a homogeneous policy could be applied to all zones. Even more important, this situation creates new difficulties in the re-education of the German nation, trying to make it conform to the great humanistic pattern.

With his plan as set forth in this book, Mr. Morgenthau becomes the Cato of America, and Germany a new Carthage. But there is still a great difference. Cato repeated: *Ceterum censeo Carthaginem delendam esse*. Mr. Morgenthau repeats: *Ceterum censeo Germaniam transformandam esse*. Without transformation in Germany, peace is unattainable.

Mr. Morgenthau's book belongs to the category of those which are making history.

New York University

FELIKS GROSS

CRESSY, GEORGE B., *The Basis of Soviet Strength*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1945. \$3.00.

This is a short geography of the Soviet Union: its land, climate, population, natural resources and economics, by the author of a valuable volume, *Asia's Lands and Peoples*, published in 1944.

The present book, dealing with Russia, is an enlarged part of that work. Almost all of the maps come from that volume, and that is surely why many of them give not only the territory of the Soviet Union, but that of all "Eurasia."

The geographical description is accurate, but does not go into detail, especially where economics is concerned. In this connection it should be noted that two books in English by a Soviet geographer, Nicholas Mikhailov, *Soviet Geography* (London, 1935) and *Land of the Soviets* (New York, 1939) are more complete. The value of these two books is ample reason for Mr. Cressey's use of them.

Written by a geographer, the book is free of technical inexactitudes or misunderstandings. Only one misleading note may be mentioned. It is a commonplace to state that socialism is in effect on a sixth of the World's surface. In the text of the book this assertion can be found on page one. But on the cover one reads "The USSR spreads across one-seventh of the globe." Mr. Cressey should decide which statement is more accurate (perhaps the first includes the water surface). But this point in itself is misleading, because not less than half of Russia's territory in the northern part of Asia is uninhabited by reason of geographical conditions. One should not misuse "one sixth of the land on earth" (p. 1).

Another inaccuracy should be mentioned. Mr. Cressey asserts that Kliuchevsky has written his history of Russia, which surely is the best one (translated also into English): "from a strictly geographical point of view" (p. 236). This is a new viewpoint on Kliuchevsky which cannot be proven.

During the last few years many books on Russia have been published; but they were often concerned only with individual aspects of Soviet Russia, many of them without fact or any real knowledge. Cressey's book, on the contrary, as a new short geography, can be useful for teaching and self instruction.

A good bibliography of English books on Russia, especially in geography, is added.

Washington, D. C.

WASSILY W. LEONTIFF, SR.

MADARIAGA, SALVADOR DE, *Victors, Beware*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1946. Pp. 304. 10s.6d.

The title of this book is, one hopes, typical of the twentieth century approach to problems of peace. In the days of power politics it was *Vae Victis*: now it is "Victors, Beware", victors take care how you rearrange the shattered world so that you may not, once again, lose the fruits of victory; so that, this time, you bring peace to Great and Small alike. How is it to be done? The author of this book, a Liberal and therefore an exile from his native Spain, gives no blue print. His warning, instead, consists of a series of re-definitions— he writes first on

"words and meanings." From a plurality of meanings he hopes to get to a single definite meaning because "peace is only attainable when common aims are sought by common means." And this will not be possible as long as different Powers mean different things when using the same words. Whether it will be possible, having established a single common meaning, remains to be seen.

The re-statement of the liberal concept of democracy, of liberty and a good many other things which are basic to the Western world is done with much charm, great wit and attractive lucidity. It is done with fine logic too, and it seems at least permissible to hint at the likelihood that it is these gifts which account for Salvador de Madariaga's great popularity in Oxford and London, not to forget the so-called "Brains Trust" of the British Broadcasting Corporation—a trust which has become a national institution throughout the monopoly radio system of the British. "Either we must give up thinking or we must think aright," he says early on. This might not be deep but it makes agreeable a good many other agreements as well, and brought misery to one of the foremost little democracies of Northern Europe. He then tells the agonizing story of Russo-Polish relations, down to the transformation of the Lublin Committee into a "National Government," leaving the Socialist Arciszewski a banned exile in England. Next comes Rumania. Next Bulgaria. There is no chapter on Persia, none on Turkey—the list cannot be complete since much of the book was written in 1945, much of it considerably earlier.

The lesson? There is a danger of a sinister agreement between the Big Three without regard to the life and happiness of the rest of the world. To state this danger in clear factual language, as our author does, might well help to kill it—at least, without such open discussion it cannot be avoided. He also considers the possibilities of tension, even of rupture, so as to reach, without illusions, a common basis of common action. In the last resort, he is hopeful: clear speaking and clear thinking must lead to general support for the Charter and thus to real peace.

London, England

F. W. PICK

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THE AMERICAN DENAZIFICATION PROGRAM IN GERMANY

*by Harold Zink**

IF ONE were to select the single item which received the most attention from military government officers of the United States in Germany, stirred up the widest controversy, occasioned the greatest perplexity among British, Russian, and French Allies, and gave rise to the most widespread publicity in the United States, it would without much question be the American denazification program. With public opinion in the United States at so high a pitch, American military personnel, whether they approved or not of what was being done, had to give detailed consideration to the problem of denazification, especially after General Patton, who had managed to do about as he pleased in every other matter, found his nemesis at this point.

Denazification came in for attention from the military government planners from the very early stages. No one had anything good to say about the Nazis of course and it stood to reason that one of the first jobs was to throw them out of their entrenched positions in Germany. But it is one thing to draft a plan and another thing to apply the provisions of that plan in the midst of about as difficult a combination of circumstances as could be imagined.

In the German Country Unit of SHAEF, which began to make detailed plans for the occupation of Germany early in 1944, it was recognized at the highest level that careful attention must be given to denazifi-

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cation. Indeed the problem was regarded as so important that it was lifted out of the general category and given a special status of its own together with a special chapter in the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*. Though the Interior Division of the German Country Unit was naturally much interested in this objective, inasmuch as it maintained a section dealing with German Government and Civil Service, it was decided that denazification had such ramifications that it could not be left to any one division to handle. Many hours were devoted by the Board of Editors and the Planning Section of the German Country Unit to the general problem of denazification and it was recognized that any general policy would be of little avail unless accompanied by a detailed guide listing the Nazis to be covered.

Inasmuch as the National Socialists had succeeded in permeating virtually every nook and corner of German government from the top to the bottom and, not content with that, had penetrated into the very heart of the social and economic institutions of the Reich, the task of drafting such a guide could not be dismissed lightly. Though reasonably well staffed by competent persons familiar with the Nazi system, the German Country Unit doubted whether it should, because of the time element and other factors, undertake the technical job of listing the positions to be purged. Therefore, it asked the Office of Strategic Services which had undertaken the compilation of black and grey lists of dangerous and doubtful Germans to contribute the basic data. After some delay the OSS furnished a list of the detailed categories of Nazis which it considered appropriate for arrest or for mandatory removal from office and this was incorporated in the text of the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*.

But despite the deadlines which had been set by half a dozen generals in completing the *Handbook* and the care with which the various provisions had been drafted, a very serious obstacle was suddenly encountered which had the effect of nullifying much of what had been done. The German Country Unit was unable to obtain policy decisions from Washington or London to guide it in preparing the basic plans for the occupation of Germany and hence it had to proceed as best it could, using its own judgment as to what should be done. Yet though the President did not see fit to furnish general American policy to the German Country Unit, he was more or less directly kept in touch with what was done through "a little dove", as he called it. Upon completion of the third preparatory and what it was hoped would be the first authorized edition of the *Handbook*, "the little dove", who was actually Secretary Morgenthau's personal

representative in the ETO, flew in the President's window with a mimeographed copy and succeeded in arousing the President to a point of indignation by arguing that the plans represented a far too "easy" treatment of the Germans. Though the German Country Unit planners had not considered it probable that a basic German food ration of more than 1200 to 1400 calories would be possible in actuality, they inserted a ration goal of 2000 calories because that figure had long been regarded by food experts as the standard acceptable minimum. The planners had appreciated the very great importance of prohibiting German industrial operations either directly or indirectly related to war, but on the other hand they could not be oblivious to the necessity of permitting a reasonable degree of industrial activity unless the Germans were to be supported out of the public treasuries of the Allies. Hence the economic plan called for emphasis on extending agricultural output and light industry, with such medium and heavy industry as would be required to keep the Germans self-supporting and European economy on a reasonably even keel. These provisions, which were later accepted as essential even from the standpoint of American military security, were portrayed to the President by the Morgenthau group as so outrageous that their authors, in so far as they were Americans, had forfeited all claims to confidence. The President consequently became so aroused that he called in the press to castigate the offenders publicly.

Though arrangements had been made for the printing and official issuance of the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* to the many military government officers who had long been waiting for a definite set of instructions as to what they were expected to do in Germany, the President's blast to the newspapers obviously made this step impossible for the time being. A certain number of bulky mimeographed copies were circulated without formal authorization for study purposes, but the chief of staff of SHAEF naturally was not in a position to give official approval to the *Handbook*.

The net result was that not only was the effort of many months of hard labor of several hundred persons under the most trying circumstances because of the lack of basic policy decisions more or less wasted, but more important the military government personnel ear-marked for Germany had no plans of any character at a time when it was extremely important that they become acquainted with their mission. With the decision to establish military government along strictly national lines, the Anglo-American German Country Unit came to an end at this time and the job of revising the *Handbook* in such fashion that it would be approved was handed

to G-5 of SHAEF. This took place in the early fall of 1944, several months after D-Day and while military government operations were proceeding apace. G-5 of SHAEF was not organized to take over where the German Country Unit had left off; indeed it never perfected a very adequate planning organization, handicapped as it was by the lack of specialists in such possessing only token facilities in public safety, education, and certain other areas.

When American military government detachments began to take over the German *Kreise* as the carpet was unrolled by the tactical forces, they should have had a very definite knowledge of what they were expected to do. But with the *Handbook* so long held up and then delivered at the last minute, still somewhat indefinite in status, when the exigencies of the situation demanded some sort of stop-gap, it is not surprising that they were ill prepared to take over the difficult job of controlling German government.

Nowhere was this unpreparedness more glaring than in the denazification field. With so many complications and intricacies that even the experts found the problem about as knotty as could be, denazification required more than cursory knowledge on the part of the military government personnel charged with direct control of German governmental units. But through no fault of their own, the field detachments in preparing for their jobs had not had at their disposal the detailed denazification plans prepared by the German Country Unit, OSS, and G-5 of SHAEF for their guidance.

As was to be expected under the circumstances, the early detachments in western Germany had little conception of the difficulties or pitfalls involved in denazification. Inasmuch as few of the military government officers had had any great amount of experience in dealing with Germans, they did not understand German psychology and found it difficult to distinguish dangerous Nazis from other Germans. Their general training had stressed the importance of dealing considerably with the German clergy, since a reverse course during the occupation in World War I had led to embarrassment. With little knowledge of their own as to denazification and little or no assistance from outside agencies such as Counterintelligence and OSS, which might have been expected to give substantial help, there was a tendency during the early days of occupation and even long after in some instances to lean heavily upon counsel given by the German clergy.

The shortcomings of this procedure came into the most glaring of limelights at Aachen, and military government took its first severe defeat in what was to turn out to be an almost pitiful series of maulings. There

had been a great deal of almost romantic publicity given to the AMG, military government, civil affairs, or whatever term may be used to apply to the administration of occupied enemy territory. The *Saturday Evening Post* had run feature articles illustrated with colored pictures; *Life*, *Time*, and *Newsweek* had given generous space; indeed there was scarcely a periodical in the United States which had not eagerly exploited the subject. Not to be left behind, the newspapers had reflected the widespread interest in this new military activity. Under these circumstances it was to be expected that the representatives of the press would be eager to file stories relating to the first military government operations on German soil. Perhaps few however had any idea of the number of correspondents who would surge in on the military government detachments or the feverishness with which they would write their stories. Aachen was of course not the first place to come under American control, but it was somewhat less of an empty shell than the earlier conquests and its population had not been dispersed to the extent of the very first towns. At any rate it was regarded by the press as the first major test of military government.

The military government detachment which was assigned to take over the administration of Aachen was probably fairly typical of military government detachments. Its officers included a variety of types and backgrounds; some were abler than others, but the average was not low. Like most other military government officers, the officers assigned to Aachen knew comparatively little about Germans in Germany. They were under considerable pressure to get a German government started at the earliest possible moment in order to deal with the emergency. Apparently they were impressed by the cordiality of the local German bishop and relied heavily on his advice as to the local inhabitants suitable for staffing that government. Unfortunately they chose as *Bürgermeister* a German business man who turned out to have a bad Nazi record and with his assistance they mired in more deeply by filling the other key positions with Germans whose pasts more often than not could not bear examination.

Of course the anti-Nazis expressed their indignation and the newsmen, given the cue, began to investigate the past records of the men used by military government to operate the local government. What they found was enough to fill many dispatches sent to their papers and to cause literally thousands of the most sensational headlined stories to appear throughout the length and breadth of the United States. Being newsmen most of them were of course looking for stories rather than attempting to report the routine operations or depict the over-all difficulties. A tremendous wave

of indignation, anger, disappointment, resentment, bitterness, and even horror developed in the United States, especially on the part of the Jews and others who had had to bear the brunt of the Nazi crimes. Military government, which had enjoyed the status of a favorite child, became anathema; the pressure that descended on Washington caused even the strongest to quail.

The combination of the delay in getting the denazification plans to the military government officers and the hornet's nest stirred up by the news stories from Aachen was, if not fatal, certainly most unfortunate. It got military government in Germany off to a bad start. Moreover, it immensely complicated the denazification problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, stung into action, issued a directive which, though somewhat vague in certain particulars, seemed to have the effect of barring all who had Nazi affiliations from holding public positions of any type, even if they were clerical or mechanical in character. When this JCS paper was received in the ETO it led to virtual paralysis in the denazification program for a time because no one on the ground in Germany could see how it would be possible to organize a German system of government under its ban on all Nazis. Not that many officers had a brief for any German with the slightest Nazi contact; it would have been far more desirable to use only those who amid all of the Nazi orgy had managed to keep themselves entirely unsullied. But the question was where to find such Germans.

The Nazis had not contented themselves with organizing a political machine, such as is familiar in the United States; they had aimed at integrating every possible phase of German life under their control. Teachers had to belong to the Nazi teachers' association or surrender their positions; doctors and lawyers were compelled to join the Nazi organizations for doctors and lawyers if they desired to practice; artists, who were writers, painters, musicians, and actors, could only engage in their art by affiliating with the Nazi culture organization. Laborers were brought together in the Nazi Labor Front; civil servants into the Nazi civil servants' group; railroad, steamship, postal, and communications employees into Nazi organizations designed for them. Young people were regimented into the youth groups and into the students' association, while housewives found it difficult to remain out of the women's organizations. German business men were of course not neglected in this mania on the part of the Nazis to engulf the entire German population.

It would not be accurate to state that there were no Germans in Germany who had managed to keep themselves free from the Nazi contamination. Jews were of course not permitted to enroll or become affiliated and those

Jews that remained after the Nazi regime were available for use by military government, but their number was not large and their misery was frequently so great that they were consumed by it to the exclusion of anything else. The inmates of concentration camps might or might not have kept entirely aloof from the Nazis; some of them had started out as Nazis but failed to get along as time passed. Many of those who had refused to be assimilated and consequently had gone to concentration camps had been so brutally dealt with by the Nazis over a lengthy period that they were physical or mental wrecks or both. Business men perhaps succeeded in keeping free from formal Nazi affiliations in larger numbers than any others, but they had rarely kept out of bankruptcy unless they had carried on business dealings with the Nazis and these seemed as contaminating in many instances as formal membership in certain Nazi-affiliated groups. The proportion of the German population with Nazi records has been variously estimated. Some would place the figure as high as ninety percent; others consider two-thirds or three-fourths a more accurate proportion. A good deal depends on the definition set up as a basis for classification. But the fact remains that a very large majority of the German population from whose numbers public officials, civil servants, and teachers would ordinarily be recruited had to be labeled as "Nazis" of a sort under any definition.

As it became more and more apparent that the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to remove and bar all Nazis from the public service was impossible of application, revisions were undertaken which finally produced a provision calling for the mandatory removal and future exclusion of all "active Nazis" from policy-determining and other public positions above the clerical level. Military government officers in general considered this modification a distinct step forward in that it laid down the basis for the denazification program that could be carried out, though at the same time it was realized that there remained a substantial degree of vagueness as to what was intended. Obviously the term "active Nazi" could be interpreted quite diversely, while the positions from which such persons were to be removed and barred might also come in for debate.

On the basis of the latest Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions (JCS 1067) from Washington a directive was drafted and issued in the ETO ordering military government officers in the field to remove all active Nazis from non-clerical positions. Under the system of regular command channels this directive went to the Army Groups rather than directly to the military government detachments. Army Groups did not consider it sufficient to transmit the directive to the Armies, but framed their own directives which

they then sent on to the Armies under them. With a similar psychology of independence and self-sufficiency, the Armies did not relish the idea of accepting and sending on at once the denazification directives from their Army Group headquarters to the corps and divisions for distribution to the military government detachments under their control. Instead they frequently prepared their own directives based on the Army Group directive. All of this required time and, when the Army directives finally went down to the field after several weeks of delay, their provisions, though all supposedly derived from the JCS decisions, actually varied substantially. One Army commanding general, not desiring to incur any risk arising out of the uncertain term "active Nazi", directed that *all* Nazis be summarily removed. Another feeling that the main job was to get things done as quickly as possible and inclined to regard denazification with suspicion used his discretionary authority to suspend the process of denazification for the time being. In another case those who had joined the party after 1936 were not considered as "active". The net result was that at one time during the early summer of 1945 the American military government detachments were operating under four different denazification directives. Not only did this produce anything but a uniform record, but it tended to destroy the respect which military government and other officers had for basic policies from above.

With all of Germany occupied and the lines of the American Zone established, the newspaper correspondents were not concentrated in a single area as they had been during the first entry into Germany, but with new additions to their numbers they were spread out throughout the American Zone. It is not strange that it soon became apparent to those who compared notes that denazification was not proceeding along the same lines in various parts of the American Zone. Some areas worked vigorously to remove Nazis; others did very little except give lip service to the program; perhaps the majority of military government detachments, harassed by many responsibilities which seemed to them urgent in character, proceeded with a fair amount of energy. Numerous stories began to appear in the newspapers of the United States pointing out the lack of uniformity in carrying out the denazification program and criticizing the slow progress in certain areas. Public opinion already active was further aroused, especially among certain elements of the population, and strong pressure began to be exerted in Washington in the direction of a more vigorous denazification effort.

Gradually this pressure in Washington resulted in decisive action in Germany. The deactivation of the Army Groups during the late summer

of 1945 removed one link in the long chain of command. The removal of General Patton from command of the Third Army and as district military governor of Bavaria because he had expressed his distrust of the denazification program to the press, remarking that Nazis were more or less like Republicans and Democrats in the United States, gave proof that the top authorities meant to proceed with the carrying out of the directive. Stronger steps were taken to insist that the Armies make use of the general ETO directive rather than draft their own denazification directive. But the problem was still far from a simple one. In general, the military government officers in the field were men whose civilian backgrounds had been those of business men, engineers and men of affairs. It is to be expected therefore that they would be more interested in pushing through positive reconstruction of German government than in a negative program of denazification. The fact that the mandatory removal of all active Nazis from key positions meant that most of the German officials with the know-how had to be discarded, thus seriously jeopardizing the military government accomplishments of the moment, did not add to its popularity in many quarters.

Long before the collapse of Germany, it was recognized by the planners that any denazification program beyond one of paper character would require careful guidance from above as well as definite organization in the field. It has already been pointed out that the German Country Unit with the aid of OSS prepared lists of those categories of Nazis that should be interned or summarily removed from public positions. As the basic policy became more inclusive in its coverage, the US Group, Control Council for Germany, gave more and more of its attention to extending these earlier lists. The Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) of the US Group CC received the responsibility for coordinating the denazification policies. Its staff members working with other subdivisions and agencies, especially with Public Safety and OSS, labored faithfully over several months on the problem. It was realized that the detachments in the field could not possibly carry out a denazification program unless they were furnished definite lists of those Nazis who were to be arrested, those who were to be removed from official places without discretion, and those whose records were such that they should be watched by the local military government staff and removed if it seemed desirable. It was obvious that the detachments had neither the familiarity with Nazism nor the time to bear the burden of determining who were "active Nazis."

It is difficult for anyone not directly involved in the work to realize the difficulties inherent in preparing the lists to be used by the military

government detachments. Of course, it was a simple matter to decide that the Reich ministers, the Gestapo, the *Gauleiter* (district leaders of the party), and others who had appeared in the limelight must either be arrested or at least subjected to mandatory removal from their public positions. The top officers in the Hitler Youth, the *Studentenbund*, and the various affiliated organizations including the lawyers, judges, doctors, and artists could hardly be regarded as safe. But how far down the line would one go before arriving at the point where "active Nazism" would not be involved? It was not enough to say that the leaders of the multifarious Nazi organizations were active and the adherents not active Nazis, for with the German love for ranks and numerous offices there was a complex hierarchy of grades of membership and minor and major offices almost beyond belief. The information available relating to certain of the affiliated Nazi organizations was very slight and it was not possible to determine where the line should be drawn among their officers and members until substantial knowledge had been accumulated.

To begin with, emphasis had been placed on the denazification of German government, but, as more and more pressure was exerted by the press and various groups in the United States, the denazification of German industry came in for attention. If the task of preparing lists to guide the detachments in handling those Germans who held offices and civil service positions was a heavy one, the job of extending these lists to cover business men was much more difficult. In the case of the former there was at least the holding of various offices and membership in certain organizations. Of course this applied to trade and industry to some extent also, but it could by no means be depended upon alone, since many business men for one reason or another kept clear of formal entanglement with the Nazis but actually had become seriously contaminated through business dealings. To ascertain what individual business relations had been with the Nazis was a major problem which could not be solved except through the examining of voluminous records and other time-consuming methods.

Progress was made however and various lists were prepared and after more or less delay passed back and forth between the ETO and Washington, then circulated among higher headquarters in Germany, and finally sent down to the field. After lists had been prepared new information not infrequently suggested their revision. Moreover, the pressure from various groups in the United States tended to force the American planners to add more and more names to the lists. Starting out with tens of thousands, the lists were extended to hundreds of thousands and still there was clamor to go farther. Some proposals made by serious persons would have involved

the arrest¹ or at least punishment of millions of persons, though the facilities for handling such vast numbers could only have been provided if the United States had been willing to dedicate a far larger proportion of its resources to Germany than seemed probable.

The machinery for preparing lists became more and more elaborate. The German Country Unit gave way to the US Group CC for Germany. The Political Division (Office of Political Affairs) of that organization started with a single officer working on denazification. Before long more of its staff were probably working on that problem than on any other. The Public Safety Division (Section) gave an increasing amount of its time to denazification. Every subdivision of the US Group CC for Germany became involved to a greater or less degree. After the US Group CC underwent metamorphosis into the Office of Military Government for Germany of the United States (OMGGUS), a board presided over by the director of the Legal Division was set up to give its attention to denazification.

During the early days the provisions in the field for denazification were comparatively simple. To start out, denazification was regarded as one of many jobs to be handled by the military government detachments, with no provision made for special denazification officers. But it soon became apparent that definite provision would have to be made for denazification machinery in the field and denazification offices known as Special Branches were set up as part of public safety sections in the detachments. As the magnitude of the task became increasingly clear more and more military and civilian personnel were recruited to deal with the "vetting" process. *Fragebogen* (questionnaires) were prepared by the Public Safety people at higher headquarters to be used as a basic guide by military government detachments in processing the Germans. Going through several editions these forms were printed in large quantities and made available to the field detachments. Every holder of a public office and virtually all holders of civil service posts, including teachers, railway workers, post office employees, and many others, together with those who were applicants for such positions, had to fill out *Fragebogen*, giving their personal history and revealing their connection with the National Socialist Party if any. False statements carried penalties of prison sentences.

The *Fragebogen* were examined as carefully as possible by the denazification office of the local military government detachment, checked with Counterintelligence, and investigated as far as resources permitted. New appointments were not as a rule made until "vetting" had been completed,

¹ Approximately 80,000 Nazis were actually arrested and interned in the American Zone. Of these 66,500 remained under arrest on September 1, 1946.

but those holders of positions who had been given their posts during the early period before denazification got well under way carried on pending "vetting." Despite all of the care given by military government to screen out Nazis in their initial appointments, the results of the "vetting" disqualified large numbers, at times up to eighty per cent or more of the incumbents.²

The efforts of the combat period and the first year after V-E Day left the denazification job far from finished. An amnesty was announced in mid-1946 which cleared the rank and file of the younger Germans who had been members of the youth organizations, though the leaders were not of course included. In the summer of 1946 the remaining job was largely turned over to the Germans themselves who organized local boards to consider each individual case remaining to be dealt with.³ Departments of denazification were set up under ministers in the three *Länder* in the American Zone to have general oversight. Many thousands of Nazis were then released from the internment camps where they had been held for a year or more and returned to their former homes for handling by the German denazification tribunals. Approximately two and one-half million Germans in the American Zone were considered sufficiently involved with the Nazis to bring them under the denazification tribunals. During the first five months of operation of the latter (June-November, 1946), 583,985 cases were examined. Of these 530,907 were dropped without trial. In the remaining more than fifty thousand cases, 116 were convicted as major offenders, 1,195 as offenders, and 3,442 as lesser offenders; 29,582 were placed in the follower category; and 7,447 were classed as non-offenders and exonerated. The net results were not considered satisfactory by American military government authorities and the deputy military governor threatened to take the responsibility out of the hands of the Germans unless distinct improvement were made within sixty days.

An evaluation of the denazification program of the United States depends in large measure upon the background of the person making the study. "There are those who feel that denazification has not been pressed far enough and that the net effect has been far less than it should have been.

² A total of 1,613,000 *Fragebogen* had been filled out up to June 1, 1946 when responsibility was transferred to German tribunals. 373,762 persons were removed or rejected on this basis.

³ These German agencies were set up under the Law for Liberation of National Socialism and Militarism which became effective June 1, 1946. A total of 316 denazification tribunals and 8 appellate tribunals were organized in the American Zone to handle the job.

⁴ An evaluation by a Naval officer may be profitably consulted. See Elmer Plischke, "Denazifying the Reich," *Review of Politics*, April, 1947.

To these observers denazification probably seems easily the most important job to be done by the United States in its occupation of Germany. Many others regard the record as eminently satisfactory and are inclined to maintain that the denazification program has gone neither too far nor fallen short, though it has of course encountered difficulties.

In comparison with the British, Russian, and French denazification programs the American effort has been by all odds the most comprehensive and energetic. The Russians started out with more of a dynamic effort in this field and ruthlessly liquidated numerous Germans whom they regarded as dangerous. But they have never been interested in an elaborate denazification organization. More has been left to the discretion of the local military commanders in their zone; less attention has been paid to the past records of individual Germans and more to the prospects of whether these individuals would contribute to the Russian goals of the future. Neither the British nor French have seen fit to expend anything like as much of their energy on denazification as the Americans. The British have used lists somewhat similar to those prepared by the United States, but they have not revised these at intervals so as to include more and more Germans, because there has been far less in the way of pressure arising out of public opinion in England. The British and French attitudes have stressed the big fellow and more or less ignored the little fellow on the ground that the latter was a victim or pawn who could not be blamed too severely because his very life and livelihood depended on submitting to the Nazis.

There is some basis for concluding that the United States has not been as wise as it might have been in devoting so great a part of its military government energy to the one problem of denazification. It is probable that no other single problem, whether it be democratization, education, economic reconstruction, or food has received as much attention over so long a period from both higher headquarters and field echelons as denazification. Denazification represents primarily a negative approach to the German situation; it harks back to the past more than it points to the future. The preoccupation with carrying out the campaign to get rid of Nazis even at the lowest levels has perhaps partially blinded the American occupying authorities to the very great importance of the constructive problem of filling the key positions with those persons who have both ability and democratic sympathies. That is not to say that no attention has been paid to the recruiting of able men with democratic beliefs, but this effort appears as a dwarf alongside of the giant denazification program.

The experience of the first World War in Germany seems to indicate

that it is more important to fill key positions with the strongest available men than it is to get rid of followers of the conquered régime, important as the latter may be. In that earlier occupation the Allied authorities ousted the supporters of the Kaiser, but they left in their stead bureaucrats who espoused other nationalistic cults and had little or no love for democratic institutions. It is a matter of record that the German bureaucrats did little to resist the scuttling of the Republic when the Nazis brought their guns to bear. The question remains to be answered whether a similar mistake has been made in the American Zone this time as a result of the concentration of attention on the negative approach as represented by denazification. If that should prove to be the case, the blame will in large measure be attributable to public opinion in the United States which was focused on this aspect of military government in Germany far above any other and demanded an expenditure of energy out of all proportion to such positive activities as democratization and reeducation. In fairness it should be added that many of the most ardent proponents of a denazification program that would seek to extirpate every root of National Socialism regard such an effort as an absolute prerequisite to any worthwhile attempts to establish a democratic system or a sound educational program in Germany.

DE PAUW UNIVERSITY

LATVIA AND THE LATVIANS

by Francis Balodis

LATVIA is situated in Northern Europe, on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea.¹ The country lies between Estonia and Lithuania, opposite to and parallel with South Sweden.

The borders of the Latvian Free State—subsequently the Latvian Democratic Republic—were established on the following bases: *with Estonia*,² in accordance with the treaties of March 22, 1920, November 1, 1923, and March 30, 1927, and with the decisions of the British Major Tallent, arbitrator, on July 1-3, 1920; *with the Soviet Union*, in accordance with the treaty of August 11, 1920, and the protocol of April 7, 1923; *with Lithuania*, in accordance with the treaty of September 25, 1920, the protocol of March 20, 1921 (based on the arbitration proceedings under the presidency of Prof. J. W. Simpson), and the protocol of October 15, 1927; *with Poland*, in accordance with the treaty of 1929. These borders comprise: a frontier with Estonia of 375 km., to the north, with the northernmost point situated on the property of Garlidumi, commune of Ipiki, Valmiera; a frontier with the Soviet Union, to the east, of 352 km., with the easternmost point situated in the rural commune Pasiene on the farm Sapatni; to the south, a frontier with Lithuania (570 km.) and Poland (105 km.), with the southernmost point situated on the property of Paseki, commune of Demene, in Ilukste. To the west Latvia borders on the Baltic Sea and on the Gulf of Riga, stretching from the River Svete, in the south, to a point north of Ainazi, a length of 496 km., or 26.1% of the entire length of Latvia's borders (1898 km.).

Thus, Latvia comprises 65,791 square kilometers,³ inhabited—according to the 1935 census—by 1,950,502 persons (675,282 in the towns and 1,275,220 in rural communities). The population, including foreign who

¹ N. Malta and P. Galenieks, *Latvijas Zeme, daba un tauta* (Riga, 1936-1937) i-iii; M. Skujenieks, *Latvia* (Riga, 1927), 3rd ed.; M. Skujenieks, *Latvija starp Eiropas valstīm* (Riga 1929); M. Skujenieks, *Latvijas statistiskais atlāss* (*Atlas statistique de la Lettonie*) (Riga, 1938); K. R. Kupfer, *Baltische, Landeskunde* (Riga, 1910); F. Balodis, A. Tentelis and P. Smits, *Die Letten* (Riga, 1930-32), i-ii.

² G. Albat, *Recueil des principaux traités* (Riga, 1930-1938), i-ii.

³ At the request of the British arbitral judges, Colonel Tallent and Prof. Simpson, the following border regions inhabited by Latvians were assigned *to Estonia*: a narrow strip to the North of Aināži, the province of Lauri ("Lauri Kolonija"), on the Livonian plateau, a small portion of the land near Ipiki, and the greater part of the town of Valka; *to Lithuania*, Latvian portions of the commune of Rucava and the surroundings of the watering-place of Polangen (in order to give Lithuania free access to the Baltic Sea), small tracts on the Missa and upper Venta Rivers (on the latter a stretch of the Liepāja-Jelgava-

were temporary residents, consisted of: Latvians, 1,472,612; Great-Russians, 206,499; Jews, 93,479; Germans, 62,144; Poles, 48,949; White-Russians, 26,867; Ukrainians, 1,844; Lithuanians, 22,913; Estonians, 7,014; Gipsies, 3,833; Livs, 944; British, 319; Swedes, 292; Danes, 236; Czechs, 200; French, 182; Finns, 118, Greeks 118, etc. The entire German minority mentioned above was repatriated to Germany in 1939 and thus disappears from the picture completely. Of all Latvian citizens Latvians by race constituted 77% or the absolute majority. According to information given in the Latvian paper "Tevija", a census, taken on August 1, 1941, revealed the total population of the country to be 1,795,997. This information stresses, besides the fact of the repatriation of the Germans during the years 1939-1940, that during the Soviet occupation of 1940-1941 35,828 Latvians were either shot or deported (1488 shot). The Jews are "not included" in the total population (these figures represent, of course, official data given out by the German occupation authorities).

* * *

Latvia stretches in a general west-east direction, the longest distance in this direction being 445 km., the straight line from Liepaja (Libau), on the Baltic Sea, to Zilupe, on the Soviet border. Latvia is separated from the eastern confines of Europe by the marshes of Velikaya, with the rivers Ritupe, Ludza and Zilupe, and the district of Rosica-Drissa, watered by affluents of the Daugava River. In fact, to the east of the Baltic region, stretching from the River Narva and the Finnish Gulf southward to the marshes of Pinsk, a well-defined and almost unbroken water-barrier lies

Riga railroad); to the Soviet Union were assigned Latvian lands in Surash and Velish (Gubernia of Vitebsk) and there are also Latvian colonies in the Gubernias of Novgorod and Pskov. Border settlements had to conform in part to the strategic requirements of the neighboring states. A part of the Latvian population of the Soviet Union proper was returned to Latvia during the years 1941-1942, according to the papers.

⁴ Latvia, with an area of 65,791 square Kilometers, is larger than:

Lithuania (56,000 sq. Km. or 85%)

Estonia (48,000 sq. Km. or 70%)

Denmark (43,000 sq. Km. or 65%)

Switzerland (41,000 sq. Km. or 63%)

Holland (34,000 sq. Km. or 52%)

Albania (28,000 sq. Km. or 42%)

Belgium (30,000 sq. Km. or 46%)

Luxembourg, Andorra and Lichtenstein;

Latvia is almost as large as Eire (69,000 sq. Km.) and it is larger than Dominica, Costa Rica, Haiti and Salvador.

The population count gave Latvia 1,950,502 in 1935 and in 1940, before the Soviet occupation, approximately 2,000,000. In 1941, after the Soviet occupation, there were 1,795,997 inhabitants (according to German figures, which do not include the Jews and

between the Baltic States and the Soviet Union, forming an excellent strategic frontier.⁵

Like Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia is marked, with the exception of the valley of the Lielupe region, which is a continuation of the Gulf of Riga toward the south, by many undulations, hills, ravines and steep

the 10,000 German nationals). From the point of view of the population, therefore, Latvia is larger than Estonia, Albania, Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama.

The number of inhabitants to the square Kilometer is 29 (in 1935); hence Latvia is more densely populated than Estonia, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union and even the United States.

⁵ The strategic situation of Latvia is created by the country's geography and by the nature of her relations with the neighboring states. The marshy stretches that mark the eastern confines of the European plateau can be well fortified and defended. They lie between Latvia and the Soviet Union and form a natural frontier. Of the 353 Km. stretch of the Kudupe River that separates the Soviet Union from Latvia, from the villages of Babino and Vymorskoye to the North down to the junction of the Rosica River with the Duna to the South (Piedruja, in Daugavpils province), 262 Km. run along river courses and only 89 through marshes or firm land. In addition to this, the banks of the rivers are mostly marshy. The highlands run in the general direction of this barrier and can be easily fortified. To the West, along the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Riga, the sand dunes rise to a height of 90 feet, and these provide good defensive positions. The mouths of the Duna, Venta and Barta Rivers were fortified throughout antiquity, and there were strong-points erected even higher up on these rivers, as for instance, at Daugavpils, not far from the Latvian-Soviet border.

The relations of Latvia with Estonia and with Lithuania can, naturally, be only excellent. Yet, the frontiers in the north end and in the south were also drawn with an eye to the strategic advantages of both neighbors. Of the 375 Km. length of the Latvian-Estonian border, only 58 Km. are formed by river-or lake-banks; the remaining 317 Km. go over marshes and forests. Of the 570 Km. length of the Latvian-Lithuanian border, 306 Km. follow water-courses and 26 cross marshes and dryland. The 105 Km. of the Latvian-Polish frontier have 66 Km. following water barriers and 39 Km. going over dry, hilly land.

The geographical situation of the three Baltic Republics presents a common strategic situation for all; they are similarly exposed to attack and their defenses are analogous.

Not only Russia, but also Poland repeatedly tried in the past to expand to the Baltic Sea. On almost every occasion the invasion of Latvia was carried out along the Duna River, through East Latvia, Latgale (Latgallia) or through East Lithuania, especially through the Vilna region. This consideration led Latvia to take the initiative of calling a conference of the three Baltic States in Bulduri, (August 3-September 4, 1920), designed to bind the three countries more closely together.

Thereupon Latvia and Estonia signed a political treaty on November 1, 1923. A similar treaty among all three was postponed by the events leading up to the Polish occupation of Vilna and was only signed in Geneva on September 12, 1934.

On March 17, 1922, a friendship treaty in the same sense was signed between Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Finland, in Warsaw; it was not, however, ratified by Finland.

A Latvian-Soviet non-aggression treaty was signed on February 5, 1932. It was renewed on April 4, 1934, at the emphasized wish of the Soviet Union. It was dishonored by that great power on June 16, and 17, 1940.

river-banks, sharply distinguishing the Latvian landscape from the flat uniformity of the Russian lands lying beyond the eastern confines of Europe proper. Latvia has 2980 lakes, totaling 1.64% of the entire area (108,143 square km.), numerous rivers capable of floating rafts, and several large rivers accessible in part to shipping. The total usable length of these many rivers amounts to some 3,000 km., while the entire waterpower of Latvia⁶ is capable of rendering some three hundred thousand kilowatts of electric power. Electric energy is generated particularly by the Daugava (at Kegums), the Brasla, the Amata and the Jugla rivers. The rivers of Latvia undoubtedly play an important rôle in the country's economic life. They are extremely favorable to the culture of cereals, hence also to cattle-raising, besides serving unnumbered water-mills and saw-mills, as well as several spinning mills. Twenty-six of the sixty towns of Latvia lie on rivers, the Daugava alone having ten on its banks.

Latvia belongs, furthermore, to the northwest section of Europe, which, on account of the Gulf Stream, has a generally mild, soft climate, unequalled by any other region lying so close to the North Pole. This fact distinguishes Latvia from the regions lying beyond the east-European confines along the same parallels (55°-58°) and may also account for the sharp difference between the cultural development of the Baltic region and that of Russia.

The marshy barrier to the east was instrumental in preserving a relatively unmixed population in Latvia. It is an unmistakable fact that the higher cultural development of the Latvian people has been demonstrated in the case of the uprooted Latvian communities living beyond the eastern frontiers. These Latvians, partly refugees from the harsh social and political conditions that marked the country's troubled past and partly deported peasants, have yet clung to their national characteristics in a most remarkable way.

The Baltic Sea and the larger rivers of Latvia, the Daugava or Duna,⁷ Gauja, Lielupe, Venta or Vindava and Barta, have played an important rôle in the development of the Baltic region, fostering trade and transit in Latvia herself. A great part was also played by the Latvian ports, Riga, Liepaja (Libau) and Ventspils (Windau), whose rapid development and excellent harbor facilities were supported by flourishing industry. Especially during the period of Latvia's independent existence that country played a successful part in world trade. In that period, the Latvian merchant

⁶ Stakle, *Die Wasserkräfte Lettlands* (Riga, 1927).

⁷ Daugava is a Latvian word and means "great water"; Duna (also Don) is a Gothic word and means river.

fleet grew from 87,959 net tons in 1914, at the beginning of the first World War (although registering a bare 8,916 net tons in 1920 at the end of the war for liberation), to a total of 113,661 net tons registered in 1938. These figures show an increase of 29.2% over the entire period from 1914 to 1938: but particularly an increase of 1175% during the period of Latvia's independence. This development naturally meant a corresponding increase in Latvia's material and cultural development, which increase is indeed clearly discernible when one compares the period of 1938-1939 to any other period of the past as well as with the corresponding year within the Soviet Union.

Simultaneously with material and cultural development came western civilizing influences, following the trade routes. Even in prehistoric times, as is demonstrated by Prof. L. Niederle,⁸ the influence of the West distinguished the Latvian and Lithuanian cultural development from that of the nearby regions of Russia, the latter, indeed, being strongly colored by the superior Baltic culture, up to around 1000 A.D. when Greek-Orthodox Christianity, spreading through Russia, reached the confines of the Baltic region. The Baltic region fell early under the influence of Western Catholicism and later of the Reformation, while Roman law and Western European style swept eastward through this region, stopping short at the confines of Russia. Latvia's eastern borders mark the limits of such cultural phenomena as the rich Occidental vocabulary, Latin characters and western costumes.

But Latvia's geographical situation also brought war from the West and the East, as the inevitable result of the endeavors of her more powerful neighbors to conquer the Baltic lands and the regions of the Daugava. The Germans in particular, from the time of their first appearance during the thirteenth century, to the present, have played havoc with the Latvian folk and land. The Russians, too, from Ivan the Terrible to Peter the Great, from the Czarist gendarmerie and the Cossacks of Nicholas II, in 1905, down to the Russian armies and the evacuation ordered during the first World War, in the time of Lenin's Tcheka of 1919 and the GPU of Stalin in 1940-1941, and again in 1944-1945, have added their full share of destruction.

Latvia lost approximately one million inhabitants during the first World War, sinking from a total population of 2,552,000 in 1914 to only 1,596,000 in 1920. Riga, which in 1897 had 282,230 inhabitants, had 517,522 on January 1, 1914, before the beginning of the first World War, but only

⁸ *Byt i kultura slavjanů* (Prague, 1924).

188,662 on June 14, 1920. After this date the increase was rapid: 337,699 in 1925, 377,443 in 1930, 385,063 in 1935 and in the spring of 1940 approximately 400,000. The material damages suffered by Latvia at the hands of her powerful neighbors were enormous. We will return to them in this study.

* * *

The Latvians,⁹ a Nordic race, related to the Lithuanians¹⁰ and to the ancient West-Baltic Prussians, the language of which has become extinct since the end of the seventeenth century, form together with these two peoples the "Baltic language group," belonging to the "satem" branch of Indo-Europeans.¹¹ Like the Lithuanian language, Latvian preserves to this day the original phonetic characteristics of the ancient mother tongue to a far greater degree than any other of the still existing Indo-European languages. This phenomenon indicates that the Latvians and Lithuanians have not mixed to any appreciable degree with other peoples.

An independent Latvian language, distinct from ancient Baltic and from Lithuanian, was manifested as early as the first or second century of the Christian era. It was preceded by a still earlier distinction between the ancient Prussian—as the "West-Baltic" tongue"—and the still unseparated Latvian-Lithuanian or "East-Baltic." In fact, Old-Prussian, more subject to

⁹ *Die Letten* (Riga, 1930); J. Endzelins, *Latvische Grammatik* (Riga, 1922); K. Milenbachs and J. Endzelins, *Latviešu valodas vārdnīca* (Riga, 1923-1932) I-IV. J. Endzelins and K. Milenbachs, *Latviešu gramatika* (Riga, 1934); N. Malta and P. Galenīeks, *Latvijas zeme, daba un tauta* (Riga, 1937) iii; M. Skujenieks, *Latvijas statistiskais atlāss* (Riga, 1938); O. Waeber, *Beiträge zur Anthropologie der Letten* (Dorpat, 1879); G. Knorre, "Kraniologische Untersuchungen ans Schädeln und Skelettgrabern Lettgallens," *Zeitschrift fuer Morphologie und Anthropologie*, Band XXVII, 3, Stuttgart, 1930; G. Backmann, *Anthropologische Beiträge zur Kenntniss der Bevoelkerung Lettlands* (Riga, 1925); F. Balodis, *Det Aldsta Lettland* (Stockholm, 1940); F. Balodis, *L'ancienne frontière slavo-latvienne* (Warsawa, 1928); F. Balodis, "Die baltisch-finnisch-ugrische Grenze in vorgeschichtlicher Zeit," *Mémoires de la Société Finno-Ougrienne*. No. 67. F. Balodis, *Ethnische Probleme und die archäologischen Untersuchungen der letzten Jahre* (Riga, 1935).

¹⁰ The Latvians and the Lithuanians differ today only through their respective national cultures, particularly by virtue of the fact that the Lithuanians are almost all Catholics, while the Latvians are 68.28% Lutheran-evangelical, 3.91% Greek Orthodox, 0.84% Baptists, 0.01% Calvinists, 0.19% Adventists, 0.3% Methodists and 0.60% of other Christian persuasions, having a bare 26.36% Catholics. It must be admitted that in the course of the Swedish occupation of Latvia (1629-1710) the Lutheran-Evangelical faith made great progress, while the Latvian people were drawn closer to the Northern (Scandinavian) culture. While Sweden did much for the cultural development and for the schools of Latvia, the people of Lithuania, during the time of the Polish-Lithuanian union, was strongly influenced by Poland.

¹¹ The first grammar of the Latvian language, *Manūductio ad linguam Lettonicam*, was put together in 1644 by Preacher Rehenhusen. The first Latvian dictionary *Lettus* was composed by Mancelius in 1638.

western cultural and linguistic influences, having its own roots and dialects, marks a separate entity, in people as well as in language, that was recognized as such in old historical sources, notably by Ptolemy, in the second century A.D.

The earliest Balts arrived in the region of the Daugava toward the year 200 B.C., supposedly migrating from the Baltic region and East Prussia. Later, about the year 100 A.D., the Latvian branch conquered the territories to the north of the Duna from the ancient Ugro-Finnish inhabitants and thus laid the foundation of contemporary Latvia.

It is certain that the Balts (that is to say the early Latvians) are distinct both from their northern neighbors, the Ugro-Finns, and from their Slavic neighbors in the east. Language and culture divide them sharply from the ancestors of the present-day Russians, who did not arrive in the vicinity of the Baltic and Ugro-Finnish lands until the seventh century, populating what is today central and eastern Russia.

Archeological research along the Baltic-Slavic (that is to say Latvian-Russian) borders reveal that in the course of the seventh to the twelfth centuries of our era there were not only great material differences (as in jewelry, etc.), but also physical ones to be observed in the study of the skeletons found on each side of the dividing line. This line, incidentally, corresponds almost precisely with the modern frontier between Latvia and the Soviet Union. In contrast with skeletons found both in Ugro-Finnish and ancient Slavic (Russian) burial grounds, dating from the second to the twelfth centuries, the powerful build of the Latvian skeletons, 171 to 195 cms. long and with dolichocephalous crania, notably long in the face, are quite recognizable. Their characteristics, indicating beyond doubt their Northern race, are still to be observed to this day among their descendents, the modern Latvians.

It is only later, particularly after the fifteenth century, that a further somatic development is to be observed in the Latvians. Later graves yield, particularly in respect to cranial characteristics, evidences that point to an absorption of foreign ethnical elements, notably Livs, into the original Latvian stock. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that similar processes of absorption took place at later dates. Thus, such fusions are to be observed in the seventeenth century in the west with Swedish and Finnish elements; to the southeast, during the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries with the Poles; since the thirteenth century and up to recent times, throughout the land with the Germans; and in the twelfth century and later from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries with Russian stocks, in the east.

In graves dating from before the seventh century, crania with the index 70 to 74.9 and very long ones with indices of 65 to 69.9 are predominant; medium crania are very rare, and short ones are completely absent during this period. After the seventh and up to the twelfth century, the number of shorter crania with indices of 75 to 79.9 increases, while since the fifteenth century they become more frequent and even some quite short ones have been found, though these remain rare.

It is obvious that absorptions have taken place at later dates, in addition to that of the Livs, some admixtures occurring during more recent times. This is shown to some extent also by the Latvian language, which contains, in addition to some few Ugro-Finnish traces, principally Liv influences, others which can be traced in accordance with the country's history to German, Swedish and even Slavic sources. It remains certain, however, that the Latvian language, in spite of these various influences, is a thoroughly Baltic tongue; and, like the Latvians themselves, whose physical characteristics so closely resemble those of their ancestors, it has remained basically the same throughout the ages. Similarly the Lithuanians, kinsfolk and neighbors of the Latvians, have remained closely related through time.

* * *

Speaking of the Old-Prussians, on the Baltic Sea, eastward beyond the Passargi River, and of the descendants of the earliest Balts in Latvia (the Latvian stock of the Cūroniani) dwelling between the "Kurisches Haff" and the Venta, Tacitus (98 A.D.) says in his *Germania* "The Svevian sea bathes the shores of the Aestiorum [i.e. Baltic] peoples. The customs and apparel of these peoples are Svevian . . . their speech is akin to that of the Britains [Celts] . . . they bring greater care and patience to the growing of their cereals and other fruits than do the Germans . . . they explore the seas and are the only people to gather amber." This testimony is the oldest we have on the cultural development of the Baltic.¹²

We learn from the Gutasage and from archaeological findings that in the course of the sixth century of our era an unsuccessful invasion of the Latvian land of Semigallia (Zemgale) was attempted by emigrants from Gotland. Later, toward the seventh century, the Slavs, forefathers of the Russians, arrived on the confines of eastern Europe, to the eastern borders of the Baltic lands, resulting in the active construction of defensive forts along these borders. On the further testimony of Snorre Sturleson,

¹² F. Balodis, "Letten und lettische Kulture in vorgeschichtlicher Zeit," *Geogr. Annalen*, 1929.

of the *Hervararsaga* and of the *Historia Norvegiae*, we find that these lands were invaded several times during the seventh to the ninth centuries, the invaders arriving from central Sweden, from Denmark and from Norway.¹³ According to Rimbert's *Vita S. Anscharii*, King Olav (b. 855 A.D.) marked the culmination of these invasions by taking the well defended Curonian harbor of Seeburg and the provincial center of Apulia. The magnitude of these conquests can be measured by the known fact that the Curonians had 7,000 men in Seeburg and a garrison of 15,000 warriors in Apulia. Yet Rimbert tells us in the work quoted above that: "jam tunc diu erat, quod rebellando (Chori) eis (Sveonibus) subjici dedignabantur" . . . this coming around 875, when the *Vita S. Anscharii* was being written. Apparently the Scandinavian conquests were relatively short lived, in spite of the fact that the presence of an important colony of Scandinavian merchants and perhaps even craftsmen is known to us in Seeburg, which is the modern Grobina. This colony continued for quite some time and attained a flourishing development.

The continued incursions from the East and from the West and the concomitant pressure from both the Scandinavians and the Slavs, led not only to an increasingly strong fortification of the ethnical borders, but at the same time caused the peoples of ancient Latvia to strengthen their political and national organization.¹⁴

The sites of the ancient Latvian forts testify to the excellence of the construction and of the overall planning of the entire system of defense. They would indicate a corresponding development in political and social organization. And indeed we know that toward this period the ancient Latvians lived not in villages, but in "villulae," or individual separate farmsteads, as we may gather also from the chronicles of Henricus de Lettis. Assuredly, too, a powerful and orderly state authority must have existed in order to allow such important constructions as fortresses to be undertaken. It is evident that the peoples were developing a sense of unity and of common purpose.

Archaeological discoveries and historical sources allow us, in any case, to speak of the following state organizations in the territories of Latvia,¹⁵ as early as the tenth century: the Kingdom of Lettia in the east, with the

¹³ F. Balodis, "Det äldsta Lettland," Stockholm, 1940. B. Nerman.

¹⁴ F. Balodis, "Die Burgberge Lettlands," *Studi Baltici*, VIII, Roma, 1942.

¹⁵ F. Balodis, *Det äldsta Lettland* (Stockholm, 1940); Aug. Bielenstein, *Die Grenzen des lettischen Volksstammes* (St. Petersburg, 1892); F. Balodis, "Die Burgberge Lettlands," *Studi Baltici*, VIII (Roma, 1942); F. Balodis, "Ein Denkmal der Vikingerzeit in Semgallen," *E.S.A.*, IX (Helsinki, 1930); F. Balodis, *La Lettonie du 9ème au 12ème*

capital Gerzeke, on the Daugava, comprising five relatively large provinces (Autina, Ciesove, Gerzeke, Ludza and Sela); the principality of *Tholowa* in the north, along the Estonian frontier, with the capital Tricatua, with 15 districts and the sister-land of the "Ymera Latvians" (to the west); the kingdom of *Semigallia* in the south, in the Lielupe region, comprising 7 provinces and having two residences—Mesothén and Terwethen—as well as the important harbor, the "portus Semigallorum" of Henricus de Lettis, established by archaeological research to have occupied the site of modern Daugmala, on the Daugava, and also possibly referred to by the inscriptions of the runic stone of Mervalla (dating from 1040 A.D.); the kingdom of *Curonia* in the southwest, with 5 counties (North-Curonia, Dovzare, "Terra inter Scrunden et Semigalliam", Ceklis and the Memeland) and including a province conquered by the Livs (Vredeturonia, in Liv "Wannema," today an integral part of Northern Courland), with the capital Kuldiga (Goldingen) and three other provincial centers on the Baltic Sea: Winda (Ventspils—Windau), Seeburg (today Grobina on Libau Lake) and Pilsaten (the modern Klaipeda or Memel). To the east of the Riga Gulf and to the west of Tholowa and Lettia, there is mentioned during the tenth and twelfth centuries the "terra Livonum," situated along the sandy strip bordering the eastern coast of the Gulf of Riga. According to Henricus de Lettis, the ruler of the "terra Livonum" is referred to in the chronicle only as "quasi rex et senior."¹⁶ Last, we find toward the end of the twelfth century and in the early part of the thirteenth century Koknese (Kokenhausen) on the Daugava, mentioned in the chronicle of Henricus de Lettis as an important trading center of Latvians, Livs and Russians of Polotsk. Koknese was ruled by a "regulus."

The 434 fortress sites that have been registered up to the present, forming a system of defense that girds the country, seem to have the utmost importance in the existence of the earliest independent Latvian states mentioned above. Thus, in 1035, an attack by the Vikings Anund and Ingvar was repulsed, and in 1106 even the King of Polotsk (David Vseslavitch?) was sorely defeated in Semigallia, apparently before the "portus

(Riga, 1936); F. Balodis, *L'ancienne frontière slavo-latvienne* (Warsaw, 1928); P. Dreimanis, *Senlatvijas politiska iekārta* (Jelgava, 1934); A. Švabe, *Talava* (Sejeis, 1936); A. Švabe, *Struomes un Avoti* (Riga, 1938), I; A. Švabe, "Jersikas karalvalsts," *Senatne un Maksla* 1936, I; F. Balodis, *Jersika* (Riga, 1940).

¹⁶ Caupo, the last of the Livonian kings, made a present of his country (also called "Livland") to the Catholic Church. Through this gift, after the German conquest of the Gauja-Duna region and of South Latvia, Livonia became an inclusive designation for a much larger territory, which later became the province of Livonia under the successive Swedish and Russian occupations.

Semigallorum." According to the Russian chronicle of Laurentius, nine thousand Russians fell in this battle. Similar attacks on Curonia seem to have been repulsed; and the Curonians became so powerful that in 1049, under Sven Estridsen, and in 1051, under King Magnus, they were even mentioned in Danish church prayers: "Save us from the Curonians, oh merciful Lord God!" This sounds very like the "Pomozi Boze" on the Daugava stone left by the Russian travelers on the Daugava in the twelfth century. From Henricus de Lettis we learn, too, that the Curonians were in the habit of raiding and plundering Sweden and Denmark. It was only Tholowa that had much to suffer from the continual battles against her neighbors, particularly the Russians. The country seems to have suffered heavily, according to the ancient Russian chronicles, in the year 1111 and 1180 at the hands of Novgorod and, according to Henricus, in 1200 from the Pleskovians. Lettia seems to have been perhaps the most important and powerful of these states. It has some 28,000 square kilometers (being as large as modern Albania), and its kings seem to have had treaty relations with Polotsk and with the Lithuanians. This may have accounted in part for the fact that as late as 1209 the country was relatively well defended, independent and secure. The system of defensive forts of Lettia was particularly formidable along the eastern borders.

Archaeological excavations, coins and written sources indicate that Latvian economic development and culture flourished after the tenth century.¹⁷

Foreign trade played an important rôle during this period. The Runic stone of Mervalla reveals the voyages of a Swedish merchant into Semigallia (Simkala), and Henricus speaks of the travels of the Curonians toward Sweden and Denmark as "in regno Danie et Svecie hactenus facere consueverant . . ." It would seem also, according to the charter of Friedrich I of 1188 to the city of Lübeck, that the lands of the Baltic (hence also Latvia) sent their ships to Lübeck and could leave the port without paying any duties. This is further confirmed by the discovery of great quantities of German coins, particularly of the tenth and eleventh centuries, throughout Latvian territories, which indicate a brisk trade as early as the tenth century. There have also been found numerous Arab coins from the eighth to the eleventh centuries, many Byzantine coins of the tenth and

¹⁷ F. Balodis, "Det äldsta Lettland" (Stockholm, 1940); F. Balodis, "Die Burgberge Lettlands," *Studi Baltici* (Roma, 1942); F. Balodis, "L'agriculture chez les Lettons," *Filologu Biedribas Raksti*, X, (Riga, 1930); F. Balodis, "Latviešu starptautiskie sakari ap 1000 gadu pec Kr.," *Latvijas Vestures Instituta Zurnals*, III, i (Riga, 1939); B. Abers, "Latviešu zemkopība un sadziedrība vācu ienākšanas laikā," *Senatne & Māksla*, 1940 (II).

eleventh centuries, as well as eleventh-century coins of Anglo-Saxon, Polish, Hungarian and Bohemian origin. A rather important Swedish import trade flourished during this period.

Thanks to the intensive trade, to the Latvian voyages abroad, and to the visits of foreign merchants, Christianity began to spread as early as the eleventh century, especially in Tholowa and Lettia. Numerous archaeological finds confirm this, and Henricus testifies to the existence of Christian (Greek-Orthodox) churches in Latvia even before 1209. He speaks of the plundering in that year by the Germans under Bishop Albert of the churches ("de ecclesiis") of the city of Gerzeke, when "they [the Germans] took churchbells, ikons and other church treasures, as well as money and other valuable things."

It is evident from this and other testimony that it was the Greek Orthodox Church which first took root in Tholowa and Lettia as early as the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and not the Roman Catholic Church. Yet it would appear that Danish merchants founded a church in Latvia in the year 1048, to wit, a Roman Catholic church in Courland.

Agriculture and cattle raising were flourishing throughout the Latvian lands well before 1200. Wheat, oats, rye, beans, barley, peas, lentils, hemp and flax were cultivated. Henricus speaks also of the "*fruges hiemales*" among other things. It would appear that there were fairly large properties, belonging to the "*nobiles*" (or "*divites*," "*primores*," "*meliores*"). The common domestic animals were horses, cows, sheep, pigs, goats and chickens as excavations have shown. Hunting and fishing constituted only secondary occupations. It may likewise be asserted that it was chiefly agriculture that decided the development and character of the Latvian "*villula*" and played an important rôle in forming the people's economic life.

In addition to considerable exports of pelts, leather, wool, wax, honey, amber, fish and even textiles, grain was the most important item of foreign trade, just as it was in Russian Novgorod. In exchange, metals, (bronze and silver) were particularly sought after, while weapons and even horses were imported from Gotland, as testified by written sources.

Known to us through excavations and through the writings of Henricus are several cities that flourished during these times. Thus King Visvaldis of Lettia referred to his town ("*civitas*") Gerzeke as "*hereditas patrum meorum*." Intricate stone and timber constructions have been found in excavations: houses, forts, mills, barns, bath-houses, cellars, smithies and foundries, the sites of manufactures using leather, bone and bronze, spinneries and looms, together with magnificent textiles, tools for the working of bronze, half finished silver objects, instruments used in metal-

lurgy and other trades, gold, silver and bronze ornaments, weapons, iron-bound wooden objects, iron lighting appliances and locks, keys of iron and bronze, weighing devices and the most diverse forms of metalware. We find, indeed, a flourishing and prosperous land and a well-developed culture in Latvia from the ninth to the twelfth centuries. The material culture was closely akin to that of Lithuania and Scandinavia (the latter particularly during the eleventh and twelfth centuries) but sharply distinct from that of the Slavic regions to the East, with which the Latvians had only the Greek Orthodox Church in common during the eleventh, twelfth and the early thirteenth centuries.

* * *

The German economic expansion that began toward the twelfth century in the direction of Gotland and eastward, toward the Baltic lands and Russia, was to bring heavy ordeals to the Land of the Livs (beginning in 1186) and to the Latvian principalities (beginning in 1200).¹⁸

Roman Catholic missionaries began to accompany the German merchants, protected by them, to the Liv-land, on the lower reaches of the Duna. The first to come seems to have been the Augustine monk, Meinhard, a priest from the monastery of Sieberg, in Holstein, who was subsequently named Bishop of Livonia (in 1186). He was followed closely by the Cistercian monk, Theodoric, later Bishop of Estonia. After the death of Meinhard (in 1196) came Bishop Berthold, a Cistercian abbot of the province of Hanover, and when Berthold was killed in battle in 1198, he was followed by Albert, canon of Bremen, who was ordained Bishop of the Livs by Pope Innocent III on March 28, 1199. His nomination was made in agreement with the German King Philip, the Danish King Canute (whose brother Waldemar, Duke of Schleswig, also agreed to this nomination), and the Archbishop of Lund.

Albert appears to have been exceptionally energetic. It seems to have been his intention to found on the banks of the Daugava a state that would be independent of the Archbishopric of Bremen. With a fleet of twenty-three ships and a well armed retinue, he arrived in 1200 in the land of the

¹⁸ Compare particularly the chronicle of Henricus de Lettis with the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle; also: A. Richter, *Geschichte der Deutschen Ostseeprovinzen* (Riga, 1857), I; A. Tentelis, "Die Letten in der Ordenszeit," in *Letten* (Riga, 1930); F. Balodis, *Jersika* (Riga, 1940); P. Dreimanis, *Senlatvijas politiskā iekārta un zemgalu simtgadu cīņas* (Jelgava, 1934); A. Švabe, "Jersikas karalvalsts," *Senatne & Māksla*, 1936; A. Švabe, *Straumes un Avoti* (Riga, 1938); A. Švabe, *Talava* (Sejējs, 1936); A. Švabe, "Rīgas senvēsture," *Senatne & Māksla*, 1936; the respective sources and texts: A. Švabe, ed., "Senās Latvijas vēstures avoti," I, in *Latvijas vēstures avoti* (Riga, 1937), II, and Bunge, *Urkundenbuch* (Riga, 1853-1914), I-II.

Livs, in order allegedly to "introduce Christianity." Innocent III had indeed promised absolution to all Crusaders to the Land of the Livs in his bull of October 33, 1199, just as the sins of those going to the Holy Land were being forgiven. It was the intention of Innocent III, as it was later that of his successor, Honorius II, to hold these conquered lands as the direct dependency of the Holy See. A double intrigue entered the picture with Albert, who swore allegiance to the Pope and yet remained with his newly-won lands as semi-dependency of the Archbishop of Lund and Bremen, while he partially recognized the overlordship of Denmark (particularly the time of King Waldemar), at the same time becoming the vassal of German King Philip in 1207.

After Albert's death, which occurred in 1229, his successors were forced to follow the more pronounced pro-German tendencies of the Bishop himself. This gained for the Livonian Bishopric the protection of the Order of the Swordbearing Brothers (after 1202) and later, after 1237, when this Order was dissolved, the protection of the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order. This protection created at the same time political aspirations of supremacy. The Masters of the Order tried to dominate the Archbishops, regardless of subsequent threats, commands, anathemas and interdicts that were heaped upon them from Rome. Bishop Albert's new state was to become one of the eastern outposts of German economic and political expansion.

In order to eliminate any local Latvian competition with the now German but formerly Liv trade settlements the entry into the "portus Semigallorum" (called at present "Daugmale") was closed to western ships and merchants through an interdict of the Church and by the expedient of murdering those who disobeyed. Near the "portus Semigallorum," on the upper Daugava, only 25 km. away from the Curonian-Livian city of Riga, two strongholds were established by the Germans: Burg-Holm (today Salaspils), and Uexkül, with the first Catholic church built in Livonia. In 1201, with the assent of the local Liv chieftains Kaupo, Anno and others, who had been caught in a trap through a stratagem, a German fort and city were built near the ancient (about 900 A. D.) settlement of Riga, belonging to the Livs and the Kuronians. This new German stronghold was easier to reach from the sea and less perilous of approach. It was destined to become not only a trading port and residence of the Bishopric, but also a rallying-point for the later expeditions that had still to conquer the rest of the Baltic lands. On the testimony of archacological findings, it seems

that soon thereafter the fortress and city of the "portus Semigallorum"¹⁹ were destroyed through fire and were never able to come to life again.

Owing to the help of the Order of the Swordbearers and the various crusades the Bishop soon conquered the whole of Livonia. The Livonian Elder Kaupo, received graciously in Rome by the Pope and presented by him with gifts in the year 1203, remained up to the time of his death, in 1217, a humble instrument in the hands of the Bishop. On his deathbed he made over his entire possessions to the Catholic Church.

* * *

Parallel with the conquest of Livonia, German expansion throughout the Estonian and Latvian lands met with success. In Latvia, the conquerors proceeded first to Lettia and Tholowa and, by way of the Gauja and Duna rivers, they opened free trade routes toward Russia (Polotsk and Pskov). Later came the turn of Semigallia and Curonia. In 1209 and again in 1214 Bishop Albert succeeded in surprising the town of Gerzeke and burned it down, taking the queen (a Lithuanian princess) prisoner. Visvaldis, the king of Lettia, was forced to accept a peace treaty dictated by the Bishop, a treaty according to whose terms he had to "present" his hereditary Kingdom of Lettia ("hereditario jure sibi pertinentem") to Albert, retaining only a part thereof for himself, and that only as a fief. At any rate, Visvaldis succeeded in rebuilding his city of Gerzeke and even tried to achieve a coalition against the Bishop, together with his ally and father-in-law, Daugerute of Lithuania, and with the "rex magnus" of Novgorod. But Gerzeke was finally destroyed in 1239 and Visvaldis himself seems to have met his death on this occasion. His kingdom passed thereby wholly into the hands of his liege-lord, the Bishop.

A similar fate had befallen Tholowa in 1224, although this Latvian duchy had entered into several treaty relations with the Bishopric and had loyally aided the Bishop with arms as an ally against foreign foes.

In 1230 and 1231 the Curonian king, Lammechinus (Lamekins), had treaties forced upon him, treaties that ostentatiously accorded "eternal liberty" and self-government to Curonia, under the overlordship of the Pope. In fact, however, these treaties led to the complete subjugation of the country. What remains remarkable is the way in which the name and the authority of the Pope were made use of by the German Bishop in order to further strictly German interests.

¹⁹ F. Balodis, "Zemgales osta" (in *Dzīvei Pērtim*) Rīga, 1936); R. Dukurs, "Vai Daugmales pilskaļns ir Indriķa Livonijas *Chronikā* minētā Zemgales osta?" *Senatne un Māksla*, 1939 (I).

²⁰ Mitau, 1944), vol. I.

Yet in the year 1236, at the battle of Saule, the German Order of the Swordbearing Brothers was met and defeated by revolting Latvians, aided by Lithuanian troops. The defeat was, in fact, a thorough annihilation. But, following the incorporation of the Sword-bearers into the Teutonic Order, and in spite of a further defeat administered to the Germans at Durben in 1260, the conquest of Curonia was finally achieved in the year 1267. The situation forced the Order to recognize certain privileges of the Curonian nobility in the ensuing negotiations, while the peasants saw their rights to personal freedom and to their customary hunting likewise upheld.

Semigallia was conquered by the Germans with the greatest difficulty and with fluctuating success that lasted a long time. The Order was several times severely defeated, in 1219 on the Missa River, where the Germans were badly beaten by King Vesthard and his Semigallians, in 1261 on the Daugava River, helped by Lithuanians, and in 1279 near Aizkraukle (Ascheraden) and on the Lake of Babite. In 1280 King Nameisis even succeeded in pressing on to Riga itself. Yet in the year 1281 Nameisis of Semigallia took part in a campaign in Prussia and died a hero's death on the battlefield far from his own beloved land. Thereupon the leading Semigallian nobles were invited to take part in peace negotiations by the Order and were treacherously assassinated. A forced peace followed and soon, in 1286 and in 1287, new Semigallian uprisings were so successful that they threatened Riga. However, this resurgence did not last long, and the last Semigallian strongholds succumbed to the ill fortunes of war. The year 1290 saw the last of the free Semigallians. A hundred thousand men and women, the bravest of the land, were forced to leave their country and emigrate to Lithuania, in order to continue on alien but friendly soil their fight against the Germans. This event marked the final downfall of the ancient and independent states of Latvia and the definitive mastery of the German occupation, after ninety years of the bitterest fighting. O. Mirbach, a Baltic-German writer, in his *Letters to and from Courland*, says: "Never has a people defended its liberty with smaller means and yet with greater courage." Indeed, the Master of the Order established in 1351 that in the course of these battles there fell on the German side: six Masters of the Order, 28 dukes and counts, 49 other members of the high nobility, 11,000 knights and gentry and many warrior-servants, a total number of German dead that reaches 117,000.

* * *

The period of German rule in Latvia²¹ during and after the complete

²¹ A Richter, *Geschichte der deutschen Ostseeprovinzen* (1857-58); O. Rutenberg, *Geschichte der deutschen Ostseeprovinzen* (1859-1860); L. Arbusov, *Grundriss der Gesch-*

subjugation of the land up to 1561, meant for the Latvian people a time of endless suffering marked by the grimmest robberies and murders. As early as 1225 Pope Innocent was forced to send his legate, Bishop William of Modena, to the lands ruled by Bishop Albert. The legate ordered, according to Henricus de Lettis, that the Sword-bearers and other Germans "should avoid unlawful impositions and demands from their wards that might embitter the latter." Latvian leaders, like King Visvaldis and King Vesthard, brought their complaints before the papal legate. In 1233 another legate was sent, this time Bishop Baldwin, who was forced to pronounce excommunication against the Order, for its terrorism, plunderings and complete irresponsibility, in order to obtain some measure of relief for the conquered Latvians and a modicum of order in the land. After 1290 the situation became even worse. The heavy oppression of the land was further embittered by conflicts between the Bishop, the Order and the city of Riga. Civil wars added to wars against foreign lands made life still more unbearable. The Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order particularly distinguished itself by its utter irresponsibility, quarrelsome disposition and complete lack of discipline. Riga, too, which since 1282 had become a member of the Hansa, was striving increasingly to gain the ascendancy and was even manifesting designs on such outlying lands as some in Semigallia. As late as 1299 two Semigallian "ambassadors" came to Rome in order to lay their wrongs before the Pope and to complain of the Germans. But everything was in vain. The Teutonic Order continued unrestrained as hitherto, in defiance of the Papal anathemas of 1305 and of 1354 and of the interdicts concerning the ostensibly papal lands. The Order defeated the obstreperous city of Riga in 1330 and during 1330-1397 one member of the Teutonic Brotherhood became Archbishop.

It was only the final downfall of the Order at the famous battle of Tannenberg (1410) and the concomitant rise in the fight of the Hansa, to which already several more towns had been added, that brought about a change. After 1421 a new institution, the Landtag, came into being,

ichte Liv.-Est.- und Kurlands (Riga, 1918); J. Krodnieks, *Iz Baltijas vēstures*, A. Tentelis, "Die Letten in der Ordenszeit," in *Letten* (Riga, 1930); A. Spekke, *Latvieši un Livonija* 16 g.s. (Riga, 1935); A. Švabe, *Latvju kultūras vēsture* (Riga, 1921), I; A. Švabe, *Straumes un avoti* (Riga, 1938); H. Bruiningk *Livländische Güterurkunden* (Riga, 1908), I; P. Johansen, *Siedlung und Agrarwesen der Esten* (Dorpat, 1923); P. Johansen, *Liber census Daniae* (Reval, 1933); A. Švabe, *Grundriss der Agrargeschichte Lettlands* (Riga, 1928); R. Vipper, *Latviešu zemniecības tiesības un stāvoklis pirms dyimtsbūšanas ieviešanas, Vēstures atzinas un tēlojumi* (Riga, 1937). The following from *Senāne un Māksla*: A. Tentelis, "Senās Rīgas tirgotāji un amatnieki latvieši," 1936, III; B. Abers, "Kuršu brīvības gramata," 1937, IV; A. Švabe, "Kas bija latviešu Indriķis?" 1938, IV and A. Švabe, "Jersikas karalvalsts," 1936, I.

bringing together representatives of the Church, of the Order and of the vassals and cities. Even this hardly succeeded in curbing the selfish and wayward Order. It is almost impossible to imagine a more dreadful and oppressive existence than that under the feudal authority of the Bishop (later Archbishop) and under the actual power of the Order in Latvia.

The country suffered, in addition, a number of years of ruthless wars. In 1466 the Order was forced to abandon several territories to Poland, recognizing at the same time Polish supremacy in some other regions. The Poles, however, had designs on the whole of Latvia. In the meantime, the Grand Duke of Moscow, Ivan III, had subdued the Tartars and conquered Pskov and Novgorod. In 1481, he marched on Latvia. Here the civil war between the Order and the city of Riga had flared up again. The energetic authority of Walter von Plettenberg (1494-1535) was no longer able to prevent the disintegration of the Order. At the same time, the Lutheran Reform movement was reaching Latvia, leading to still further disruptions and disorganization. In 1502 von Plettenberg defeated the Russians at Pskov; but, with Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible, Latvia began a new period of sufferings and damage in spite of an alliance with Poland (1557). For almost twenty years the country endured the "Livonian wars" of Ivan IV, the first between 1558 and 1570 and the second from 1577 to 1582.

These "Livonian wars," marking the westward expansion of Russia, the march toward the more prosperous West, were still further encouraged by the selfish and power-mad policies and conflicts of the Archbishop and the Order, now fully disorganized. The continual friction between the contestants for power and the newly-arisen "landed aristocracy," which was striving for more and more recognition, were well calculated to make these wars drag on. Archbishop William, seeking to overthrow the Order, tried to establish an episcopal supremacy and succeeded in bringing about another civil war imperiling the country still more. With the capture of Archbishop William in 1556, it came to an end, but not before it had opened the way for the invasion by the Muscovite armies.

Gothard Kettler, the last of the Grand Masters of the Order, in spite of his alliance with the Poles, was unable to stop either the Russian hordes or their acts of terrorism and brigandage. Here and there, sporadic acts of heroism by isolated townships were even less able to dispel the menace of the conqueror. It was during these wars that the entire city of Wenden (Cesis or Kesj), men, women and children, blew itself up in a tower of the citadel, rather than fall alive into the hands of the victorious besieging Muscovites (1577). As late as the seventeenth century thanks were being given in church services throughout the land on the anniversary of the peace

with Russia. This is mentioned in the "Latvian Postill" of Mancelius of 1649, where the sermon mentioning this event says: "The Great Russians frightfully destroyed the land of Livonia—that is to say the ancient lands of Tholowa, Lettia and the Land of the Livs—and they also tortured the inhabitants, martyring them, quartering them alive and burning them at the stake . . ." The chronicle of Russow states that in the opening years of the second of the "Livonian wars" there were so many dwellings destroyed and so many people killed that there were "a multitude of wild dogs that fed on corpses . . ." Also "many tens of thousands" were taken to Russia in captivity and enslaved there. As late as 1610 Bishop Schenking of Wenden could write to the Pope that "the situation of Livonia is deplorable and the greatness of her sufferings surpasses all tears . . . all castles and farms are now destroyed and overgrown with bushes, sheltering the wild beasts only . . . the churches are burned down . . . of the numerous inhabitants few remain alive . . . corpses lie everywhere, making a terrible impression."

* * *

Seldom has there been a more inefficient rule than that of the Germans (the Bishop and the Order) in Latvia; it can well be imagined that the relations between the Germans and the Latvians were not of the best. As we have seen, papal legates were sent as arbitrators and Latvian "ambassadors" went to Rome in vain. There were revolts. As late as 1492 prominent Semigallian elders were making well-founded complaints to the Master of the Order against unjustly imposed burdens.

Yet, in spite of the German oppression, the productive capacities and the activities of the Latvians did not cease. Even under oppression Latvian merchants and craftsmen of all sorts settled in the cities, and there they continued their work. They seem even to have taken some part in the strife between the cities and the Order. In the Riga register of debts for the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries can be found a series of Latvian names such as Plikke, Darbeslave, Wadune, Veisbalde, Virebalde, Meservarde, and "Johannis piscator Semigallus." Since 1220 Latvian fishermen in Riga enjoyed a special privilege. In the year 1252 we hear of Latvian craftsmen mentioned in connection with the "Brethren of the Holy Cross"; these "brethren" were Latvian fishermen who had an altar in the St. James church in Riga. It was in this church that Latvian smiths, masons and weavers attended prayers. In the year 1458 we find two Latvian sculptors, the brothers Evert and Hans Besup, making the statues of St. Christopher and Erasmus. In 1464 the Latvian burghers obtained a new altar in

the St. Peter church as well. Also in Riga there have been preserved some scripts of various guilds, notably one relating to the smiths, dated 1382, another concerning the masons of 1390, and a third relating to the weavers from 1458. Since 1150, as well as later, the guilds of the salt-and-beer-handlers, of the hemp-workers, granary-wardens and the weighing-masters were exclusively Latvian. These guilds, which regulated the traffic of the harbor, were at the same time the most ancient fire-fighting organizations of Riga. These are but a few examples of Latvian urban activities chosen from the most recent collected archival material.

Historical sources mention Latvian intellectuals during this period. Thus, Henricus de Lettis, writer of the *Chronicon Livoniae vetus*, which is the oldest Latin chronicle of Latvia and of Livonia, dating from the beginning of the thirteenth century (it was ended in 1225-1227), was himself of Latvian stock. The first editor of this chronicle, J. D. Gruber (1740), believed that Henricus was a disciple of Bishop Albert himself and a Roman Catholic priest in the district of Ymera, where he was born. The remains of what seems to have been his church have been discovered in Tilgali (department of Dugeri, in Volmar, or Valmiera), while the tomb of Henricus was identified in the nearby cemetery of Kapukalne (near Dunkeri), which dates from the thirteenth century. The researches of Professor A. Schwabe have finally established the Latvian origin of Henricus.

The Greek-Catholic monk, Georgius, the son of a Latvian priest in Gerzeke city, ("Jurgi syn popow") was a scribe and miniaturist. He composed the "Moscow Manuscript" of the New Testament of 1270.

The city of Gerzeke had a number of Christian churches prior to the German occupation; these were subsequently burned down by Bishop Albert in 1209, as has already been mentioned.

It is regrettable that we do not yet know the names of the other Latvian priests of that particular period with certainty; but one may hope that further research will reveal such names to us. The Vatican archives should yield much precious information in this matter.

The Latvian nobles, too, continued to exist and to enjoy a measure of freedom in the possession of their lands in the period of the Bishops and of the Order. Dr. August Bielenstein has established the fact that the majority of Latvian manors were situated in the immediate vicinity of the ancient castle-mounds that were the seats of the "labiesi," the "seniores," "divites," "primores" or "meliores" of the old Latin texts. The archives of Semigallia, particularly those referring to the districts of Sparnene and Dobene, show that several descendants of these "nobiles" continued to possess their lands even during the German occupation. There are instances

of the leasing of such properties, motivated by the fact that they were too far distant from one another. The honors attached to such "seniores" also continued to exist, even in the case of a "princeps" or "dux," often remaining hereditary in the family. An example is furnished by the hereditary privileges attached to the family of the Count of Tholowa, Thalibaldus, in Tricatua. Tricatua was in 1224 the "termini possessionum viri Rameke" of Thalibaldus' son (Thalibaldus: Latvian Talvaldis," that is to say "the farreaching ruler"). Some forty families, descendants of the Curonian King (in Latvian "konini") and of his nobles, have continued throughout the centuries down to our times to retain possession of their properties not far from Goldingen (Kuldiga), and to enjoy "rare privileges."

From earliest times these people have kept their family arms and some have in their possession documents dating back as early as 1320. General M. Penikis, commanding general of the Latvian army from 1928 to 1934, is a descendant of such "Kings." During the Russian rule, as late as the nineteenth century, the descendants of the Curonian "Kings" were exempt from compulsory military service. In the year 1208, we find a certain Maneginte of Ydove receiving a grant of land near Nitau; in 1316 his descendants exchanged this property for one near Segewold, where as late as 1500 the death of the Brothers Theodoricus, Conradus and Nicolaus Idewen was commemorated. It is likewise known that the family of the Freiherr von Maydell was not of German origin; according to the family traditions it can trace its origin to Old-Prussian stocks. However, in Estonian and Livian, "maidel" means "groundling," which would indicate that the family is more probably from the later Curonian provinces of Vredecurlonia (if it really came from the South) from the Old-Prussian-Curonian lands. Also from Curonia, finally, came the family of von Hahn (it was originally "Gailis" in 1520 Gaile, in 1570 becoming Gayll). "Hahn" is the translation of the Latvian "gailis," or "cock."

As late as the fourteenth century, the Latvian nobles enjoyed the same privileges as the Brethren of the Order, with jurisdiction over "neck and hands." For instance, the charter granted in 1320 to the Latvian noble Tontegode of Curonia contains exactly the same formula as that granted to the German Albert von Helmwardeshusen, a fact which was pointed out by Dr. P. Johansen. We have already mentioned the recognition granted to King Visvaldis by Bishop Albert after the Germans had conquered Latvia. Visvaldis continued to enjoy possession of three of his five provinces "as a liege." The letter confirming this on behalf of Bishop Albert was still to be found in 1939 in the archives of Warsaw. The grant was solemnly

made in 1209, in the presence of potentates, both laymen and churchmen, in front of the church of St. Peter in Riga, where three banners symbolized the investiture. The Princes Lieven were descended from King Kaupo, from whom they had inherited the latter's most valuable possessions which he had been allowed to keep, even after his kingdom had been made over to the Church, in recognition of his loyalty to the Christian faith. As late as 1492 the Order consulted the Latvian elders of Semigallia in the matter of the peasants' demands. Even at a later date the Latvian peasantry were allowed to elect their own elders to the "Stadmark" of Riga.

The peasants during the early times of the Bishop's and Order's rule retained the property of their lands; their personal possessions and liberty and the "right to complain of injustices" were also recognized. Remembering the Curonian-German treaty, we find that, in addition to the above, the peasants were guaranteed their traditional hunting rights. Yet we must also remember that this treaty was stolen from the Curonians through treacherous machinations of the Order. These privileges, however, did not prevent the peasants from suffering most severely, particularly during the numerous wars, under the ever-increasing burdens that were placed upon them throughout the land. The impositions exacted of them during these wars were almost unbearable. By the fifteenth century the servitude of the peasants was thoroughly established and, after 1424, even their personal liberty was almost completely lost, though they may have retained the rights to their personal possessions. It is evident that the Latvian peasant could not have considered the German rule, characteristic for its injustice and mismanagement, anything but oppressive and hateful.



Hated throughout the land, divided within itself, unable to defend the subjected country against external foes the German supremacy finally had to fall apart. In 1560 the Master of the Order, Gotthard Kettler, found himself obliged to cede to Sigismund August II of Poland nine castles for the latter's help against the Russians. He also had to part with a series of Curonian strongholds and even whole provinces, in order to guarantee the sums of money he was obliged to borrow continually. The Bishop of Courland actually sold his own lands to Denmark. During the course of the fourth and ninth year of the Russian wars, Gotthard Kettler found himself further pressed to conclude two new treaties (1561 and 1566); in 1562 the Archbishop of Riga had to do likewise. As the result of these treaties, Lithuania obtained the "Ducatus Ultraduniensis," or Livonia and Lettgallia, the lands of the former Lettia, Tholowa and "Terra Livonum,"

north of the Daugava (Duna) River, together with the administrative districts of Riga, Wenden and Dunaburg (Daugavpils, or Dvinsk). Gotthard Kettler himself became Duke of Courland and Semigallia south of the Duna, but with the King of Poland as Suzerain. After the union between Poland and Lithuania, in 1569, the complete incorporation of North Latvia and nominal incorporation of the "Duchy of Courland and of Semigallia" followed.

Thus began a new era, from 1561 to 1721 (or, more precisely, to 1710) in the history of Latvia.²² During this period the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia flourished remarkably, while Latgale (East Tholowa and East Lettia) remained throughout, and indeed up to the year 1772, a province of Poland. Livonia, however, composed of West Tholowa, West Lettia and the land of the Livs, after several wars (1600-1629) and after some fifty years of Polish rule, became, in accordance with the peace treaty of Altmark (November 16, 1629) a province of Sweden.

Polish rule proved to be relatively favorable for the nobles and for the cities; but for the peasants, subjected to the same rules that applied to the Polish peasants, it was a time of great tribulation and suffering. Among these oppressive statutes we may cite the laws of 1496 establishing the obligations of the peasantry, those of 1557 concerning land ownership, and those of 1573 subjecting the peasantry to the final judgment of the squire, who had the right to impose even the death penalty and from whose sentences there was no appeal. Thus the juridical, personal and material rights of the Latvian peasant were jeopardized, and he finally sank into servitude. If he fled, he was arrested and sent back, even to a possible new master; he had to furnish new heavy services to "his master"; he lost the right to his own land and he fell completely under the domination of the squire, who obtained the right of life and death over him.

It was only with regard to vassal properties that the rights of the squires were somewhat circumscribed, while the householders, unlike those in Poland, were allowed to acquire landed properties. Also in contrast to

²² O. Rutenberg, *Geschichte der Ostseeprovinzen* (Riga, 1859-1860); Th. Schiemann, *Russland, Polen und Livland* (1887) II; K. Landers, *Latvju vēsture* (1908-1909); A. Švabe, *Latvju kultūras vēsture* (1921-1922); A. Švabe, *Grundriss der Agrargeschichte Lettlands* (1928); J. Vasar, *Die grosse livl. Güterreduktion* (1931); R. Vipper, "Vom XV bis XVIII Jahrh.," in *Letten* (Riga, 1930) I; V. Liljendahl, *Svensk förvalning i Livland, 1617-1634* (1933); J. Juškevičs, *Herzoga Jēkaba laikmets Kurzemē* (Riga, 1932); *Vēstures atziņas un tēlojumi* (Riga, 1937) (articles by R. Vippers, J. Berzins and M. Stepermanis); *Senatne un Māksla*; M. Stepermanis, "Kurzemes hercoga Jēkaba palīdzība Anglijas ķēninam Kārlim I" (1936-II); R. Vippers, "Kurzemes Zemnieka tiesiskais stāvoklis 1617 (1937-I); E. Dunsdorfs, "Latviešu Zemnieku turība XVII.gs." (1937-IV).

the situation in Poland, the Latvian peasantry was allowed to own movable property and the peasants were still not quite in the situation of slaves, even though their yoke became increasingly heavy. King Stephen Bathory tried in 1586 to lighten the burden of the Latvian peasants; in fact, by 1582 a revision of the rights of the squires and of the peasants' servitude had already been decreed. It was, however, only much later, during the subsequent period, that the situation of the Latvian peasantry began to be effectively ameliorated. By 1601 King Charles IX of Sweden had found it possible to promise to better the conditions of the Baltic peasants; they were to become beneficiaries of a "free Landstand," and were allowed to send their children to schools or to have them learn a trade. Gustav II Adolphus, Queen Christina and particularly Charles XI decreed a series of liberal reforms for the peasants, which were greeted with the utmost enthusiasm throughout the land. By 1629 the peasants had been taken from under the jurisdiction of their squires and placed under that of the Swedish laws. To this effect courts were established in 1630 in Riga, Wenden and Kokenhusen, under whose jurisdiction those belonging to other civil clans were also to come. Likewise an Orphans' Court also for the peasants was ordered established in 1648, higher courts of appeal and lesser judiciary bodies were decreed in 1671, and in 1696 the common courts were also established. The Swedish government also founded schools, accessible to the peasants, whose children were even allowed to go to the higher schools of Riga and of Tartu (Dorpat) and to enjoy bursaries during their studies.

When the University of Tartu was founded on June 30, 1632, J. Skytte stated in the opening speech that Sweden had the widest sympathies for the masses of the Latvian people, sympathies that were **fully reciprocated**. That the Latvians were well disposed toward the Swedish crown is evidenced by the fact that numerous Latvians took part as volunteers in the wars against the Russians. The archives prove, for instance, that in 1704 the Latvian peasants, Inkis and Schmide of Wenden, loaned Charles XII 615 and 430 thalers, to help in the war against the Russians. Similarly we find the peasant, Jukums Ziemelis, of Jaunburtnieki, in 1705, donating 650 thalers; and the following year the peasant, Juris Voitins, donated 225 thalers for the same cause.

In 1701 a voluntary detachment of peasants had helped to repulse the first attack against Livonia of Peter I of Russia. We know also that the Latvian peasant, Krauklinsh, acted as guide for the armies of Charles XII marching on Narva and helped to avoid an enemy trap. All these instances show the traditional fear and hatred of the Russians that were characteristic

throughout Latvian lands as a consequence of the wars of Ivan IV and Peter I.

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The situation inside the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia was similar to that of the Swedish province of Livonia. In addition to the agricultural development of the fertile Lielupe region, a rich industry was flourishing in the Duchy, especially during the time of Duke William, Duke James (Jekabs), and their successors. Duke William (1587-1616) had built in Windau both shipyards and iron foundries; in 1605 he even exported to Holland 38,000 ship-buildings nails. During his reign there was a ship-owner in Goldingen, a Curonian, who had no less than twelve ships.

Duke James (1642-1682) owned seventeen iron-and steel-foundries, seven copper foundries, a prosperous timber industry, ten wool-mills, three sailcloth-mills, four tapestry-weaveries, of which one specialized in Gobelin tapestries and one in brocade, ten glass and cut glass factories and numerous dye factories, mills, powder-plants, chemical factories and an important navy of forty-four men-of-war, fifteen unarmed vessels and sixty merchant ships. He even acquired colonies in the tropical South Seas: first Gambia (1651) and then Tobago (1664) with its rich tobacco and sugar-cane plantations. This island he obtained from England, in exchange for the former colony (Gambia), but he maintained even there, in spite of the vassal position vis-à-vis the English crown, full navigation and commerce rights on the Gambia River. Duke James' good relations with England were based also on the help he had given to Charles I during 1646-1649 when a shipload of grain, 200 quintals of powder, 48 guns and 1000 muskets were shipped from Courland to England, in addition to six fully manned ships with 256 guns. His subsequent relations with Cromwell were also very good, and it cannot be denied that the Duke took the greatest pains to maintain the best of ties with England herself, without regard to her rulers. Characteristic of his policies was also the fact that, like the other Duke of Courland, he tried to loosen the bonds of vassalage that bound the Duchy to Poland. This, too, may explain his efforts to maintain the friendship of England and to bring about similar ties with Holland and France, as well as his purchase for 7521 Gulden from the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Ferdinand III, of the rights attached to a Duke of the Holy Roman Empire.

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The Russian domination formally began in Livonia with the Peace of Nystad in 1721, but existed in practice in 1710. In Lattgallia it existed

after the partition of Poland in 1772, while in Courland it dated from 1795 and lasted until 1918. The Russian domination imposed heavy ordeals on the Latvian people,²³ which were until 1819, even more unbearable than in any previous century, and therefore especially strongly felt after the period of Swedish domination. It was only later, toward the very end of the nineteenth century that the Russian court and tsarist governments began to be influenced by more liberal ideas. Conditions at the time of Catherine II are reflected in the writings of Johann G. Eisen, those during the reign of Alexander I in the works of G. Merkel, whose books *Die Letten* (1796), *Early Livonia* (1797-1799) and *Vanem Imanta* (1802) vividly portray the situation. The writings of Merkel and the efforts of A. W. Hupel (*Topography of Livonia, Estonia and Courland*) and of J. Jannau (*History of Slavery*) finally resulted in a modicum of amelioration, notably in 1817 the abolition of servitude in Courland in 1819 followed by the same measure in Livonia, thus bringing to an end the fearful conditions that had been imposed during the course of the preceding centuries. During the nineteenth century the Russian and German social oppression of the land began to yield ground. However, toward the end of this century it was replaced with an increasingly forcible Russification, beginning with religious persecutions, based on advantages granted to the Russian Orthodox Church. In fact, the Russian occupation was and remained hateful and oppressive, and it strengthened the traditional mistrust and hatred of all things Russian in the spirit of the Latvian people. The great "Northern Wars" and the Russian mass murders and other cruelties remain to mark an almost unparalleled misfortune for the Latvians.

Tsar Peter I, being quite uncertain of succeeding in the conquest of the Latvian province, ordered Sheremetiev "to spare nothing"; cities, manors and farms in the enemy lands were to be destroyed and plundered, cattle were to be slain and the people were to be either killed or deported,

²³ Th. Shiemann, *Russland, Polen und Livland* (1887); E. Scraphim, *Livlaendische Geschichte* (1904) III; A. Švabe, *Latvju kultūras vēsture* (1922) II; A. Tobien, *Die Agrargesetzgebung Livlands im XIX Jahrh.* (1899-1911) I-II; L. Arbusov, *Grundriss der Geschichte Est-, Liv- und Kurlands* (1908); A. Švabe, *Grundriss der Agrargeschichte Lettlands* (1928); *Latvieši* (Riga, 1932) II; R. Vīpers, "Vidzemes apgaismotāji XVIII g.s."; L. Adamovics, "Latviešu brālū draudze dzimtbūšanas laikos"; L. Bērziņš, "Tautas atmoda latv. rakstniecībā" and A. Tentelis, "Latviešu brīvības cīņās"; R. Endrupe and A. Feldmanis, 1905.g. revolūcija (1930); G. Nonacs, *Macitāju ziņojumi par 1905.g. revolūciju* (1930); K. Bachmanis, 1095.g. revolūcijas cīņu un sodu dienas (1926). A. Hedenström, *Rigaer Kriegschronik 1914-1917* (Riga, 1922); A. Plēsners, *Latvijas atbrīvošana* (Riga, 1928); *Senatne un Māksla*: R. Vīpers "Budberga-Šradera kodeksa projekta izstrādāšana," 1936, IV; K. Ozoliņš, "Latviešu skolas līdz XVIII g.s. beigām," 1936, IV; R. Vīpers, "Dzimtsbušana Vidzemes juridisko dokumentu gaismā," 1937, I; B. Abers, "Latgali zemnieku grūtie dzimtlaiki" 1940, I; F. Balodis, *Valdock Frihet* (Stockholm, 1941).

"because they are favorable to the Swedes." By 1705 many thousands had been murdered in the most atrocious manner and Sheremetiev was able to report to the Tsar that "there was nothing left to destroy." Contemporary testimony shows that, after the famines and pestilences which followed the atrocities of Sheremetiev, "there was no human voice to be heard for miles; no dogs barked and no cocks crowed."

The fate of the surviving peasantry became especially terrible, since under the Russian rule the peasant became completely dependent upon the will of the squire, the latter obtaining a "jus domini" not only over the former's property but also over his very person. The squire could now impose any servitude he saw fit upon his luckless dependent. An unexampled trade in human labor and slavery began, men being separated from their wives and parents from their children. The schools founded in Swedish times gradually disappeared, and it is evident that the Latvian peasantry endured not only severe property and civil losses, but also suffered an intellectual decline during the eighteenth century, contrasting sharply with their condition throughout the preceding hundred years of Swedish rule. It was only in isolated cases that, owing to the strong traditions of national feeling as well as to those of religious life, some measure of continuity could be maintained and preserved. There were examples of community readings on Sundays and feast days from the Bible, from the sermons of Mancelius' *Latvian Postill* and some choir singing of spiritual songs. At the end of the day's work, when the women were spinning or weaving in the dim light of a burning chip, the older people would recount ancient tales and legends, and folk-songs would be sung. These customs were responsible for the preservation to our day (and this is certainly most unusual) of no less than 650,000 Latvian folk-songs (including variations) and of 51,905 ancient tales and sayings, which have been scientifically collected in modern times. It is easy to understand that, since the squire's will was law and since it was enforced by Russian military garrisons without any previous examination of the case, the hatred against both the squirearchy and the Russians grew steadily. It continued unabated even after the abolition of actual servitude, and led to a number of peasant uprisings, like those of 1771, 1784, 1805, 1802-1823, 1844 and 1899. In Latgallia, which was considered a part of the Russian Gubernia of Vitebsk, the abolition of servitude came into effect only in 1862, at which date it was abolished throughout Russia proper. The school system continued to be execrable for much longer.

A characteristic of Russian rule was the steadily mounting influence upon the tsarist court of the reactionary German nobility. During the

time of Tsar Paul, for instance, in the years 1796-1797, a "Russian commission," composed of four German senators, succeeded in quashing a project of relatively liberal reforms for Latvia. This same influence caused the naming of German nobles as governors of the Latvian provinces of Livonia and Courland, they were as a rule, conspicuously reactionary in their views. Thus in 1803 the governor of Livonia was able to countermand all reforms by his efforts. So, too, it was that the final reforms throughout Latvia were held back until the eighteen-sixties, when the Latvian peasantry began at last to see their material and social conditions improved. Many instances might be cited to show that the intention of the Russian government, partly influenced by the German advisers, seems to have been to circumscribe progressively Latvian prosperity and co-operation even in the cities. The life and tribulations of the Latvian merchant, Steinhauer, provided an outstanding example of this policy.

Latvian schools and literature were persistently oppressed; yet, in spite of this, the country's national intellectual life began to develop, particularly since the twenties of the nineteenth century. Latvian teachers appeared in ever-increasing numbers. Teachers' seminaries were opened in 1823 in Cirava, in 1839 in Valka, and in 1840, in Irlava. In 1822, the first Latvian political periodical was allowed to appear in Mitau, the *Latvieschu Awihses* followed in 1832 by *Tas Latvieschu Drangs*. The latter was, however, forbidden to appear in 1846. In 1856 the *Majas Viesis* began to appear while, between the years 1862 and 1865, we find the very active political paper *Peterburgas Avizes* coming out in St. Petersburg, thus avoiding the pressure and the censorship of the local officials in Latvia. The number of Latvian students grew so considerably at the Tartu (Dorpat) University that by 1850 the idea of a Latvian student fraternity could be seriously considered. It was from among the students of Tartu of this period that the two ideologists of the Latvian freedom movements arose. They were K. Waldemars (1850) and A. Kronvalds (1860). The number of Latvian papers was allowed to grow, and after 1864 the periodical Latvian singing festivals began to be a national feature. It was these festivals that brought about a strong national awakening, a powerful spiritual consciousness, and a growing Latvian patriotism.

In the eighteen-eighties the Latvian influence began to be felt in the administration of the cities and to develop still more in consequence. In 1868 a Latvian national-political club was founded in Riga, the "Rigas Latviešu Biedriba", although great difficulties had to be overcome to obtain the necessary authorization. It began to activate an ever-growing number

of similar organizations throughout the country, in addition to those of a purely economic character.

A Russian revision of conditions in Latvia, brought about by Senator Manasein, established in 1887 a series of reforms strongly colored with tsarist Russian tendencies. It was only later that the economic and national life began to shed its Russian tinge. The Russians took up the task of thoroughly Russifying the language, the faith and the culture, while at the same time Latvia's economic life was forced to integrate itself ever more in that of the tsarist Empire. In 1887 the teaching of Russian became obligatory, and all schools, including the higher ones, underwent a thorough Russification, which was closely followed by severe restrictions of the churches in favor of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The Russian government strove at the same time to increase its land holdings by bringing Russian colonists into Latvia. The political police and the gendarmerie were greatly strengthened. Political arrests of Latvian citizens followed in increasing numbers. Deportations to Siberia and executions became more frequent.

All these oppressive steps, however, succeeded only in building up increasing resistance and strengthening the national movement, which now aimed at complete liberation from tsarist Russia and the establishment of an independent Latvian republic. The revolutions of 1905 and 1917 followed. The first was soon suppressed in blood by powerful Cossack and Guard troops under the command of Generals Beckmann, Zwegintsev, Orlov, Wendt and Chorunchenko. An inconsiderate and ruthless administrator, Governor General Baron Möller-Sakomel'skij, finally achieved the pacification of the country. This German-Russian general was responsible for mass shootings, terrible tortures, wholesale deportations and the destruction of innumerable houses in towns and in rural districts.

The fate of the second revolution, that of 1917, was different. It was coeval with the final dissolution of the Russian Empire, so that its development and success merged with the wars of liberation which culminated in 1920. The event was hastened by the extremely rigorous measures taken in the country, in the course of the Russian retreat, which embittered the people of Latvia to the point where liberation from Russian oppression became imperative. The capricious and badly organized evacuations cost the Latvian people much loss of life and completely disrupted the country's economy through the dismantling and transportation into the interior of Russia of all means of production. Not only factories, shops and plants were thus taken away, but also libraries and scientific establishments. They were heavily damaged in transport and often failed to

reach their destinations. Peasants, too, were forced to leave their homes and to proceed together with all their cattle and movable property in long caravans eastward, marking their progress with rows of hastily dug graves and improvised crosses. Thousands of Latvians, intellectuals, pastors, industrialists, teachers and state officials, were forced to retire to Siberia, freely if agreed to, under arrest if not. Obviously this could not last forever, although the governor general of that time, General Kurlow, contemplated the forcible evacuation of the entire population of Latvia to Siberia. The natural Latvian reaction was armed revolt. Successful rebellion was made easier by the fact that the fortunes of war were going sorely against Russia and that the downfall of tsarism brought in its train unrest throughout the Empire.

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Both the World War itself and the Latvian troops in the Russian armies were to play important rôles in the final liberation of Latvia from Tsarist Russia.²⁴ The misfortunes of the Russian Empire allowed the Latvian people to organize their own armed forces to strike an effective blow for the country's liberation. In order to stop further evacuations of Latvians, the German invaders had to be halted, at least on the line of the Duna. On August 1, 1915, the Latvian troops were organized with the aid of the Russian High Command and from the following August 16 up to March 16, 1916, eight Latvian battalions, which later became regiments, the "Latvian Rifles," were put together. These troops took part in several battles in the years 1915, 1916 and 1917 and by their valor did much to enhance Latvian national consciousness. Then they played an active part in the revolutionary movement and helped in the overthrow of tsarism.

German occupation of Latvia followed close on the heels of the revolution of 1917 and the downfall of the tsarist Empire, which was marked by the almost complete disintegration of the Russian armies. One year later, however, Germany's collapse followed, and the armistice of November 11, 1918, brought with it a still more favorable opportunity for the Latvian national movement to proclaim the full independence of the new state.

Already some time before this, during 1917, certain Latvians in Russia had actively and energetically worked for the idea of an independent Latvian state. The Latvian newspaper *Dzintenes Atbalss*, which appeared in Mos-

²⁴ M. Valters, *Le peuple letton* (Riga, 1926); A. Winning, *Am Ausgang der Deutschen Ostpolitik* (Berlin, 1921); S. Paegle, *Kā Latvijas valsts tapa* (Riga, 1928); J. Ligoņis, *Latvijas valsts dibināšana* (Riga, 1925); A. Plensners, *Latvijas atbrīvošana* (Riga, 1928); P. Zalīts, *Kā Latvija tapa* (Riga, 1928); F. Balodis, *Vald och Frihet* (Stockholm, 1941); F. Balodis, "Lettland under framlingsöket," *Svensk Tidskrift*, 1943, III, part 6, pp. 385 ff.

cow, propagated this idea openly. In the autumn of 1917 there had been founded in Walka a Latvian "National Council," which, in the name of the people remaining in the country, on November 18, 1917, declared Latvia's secession from Soviet Russia. In German-occupied Riga, too, a "Latvian democratic bloc" was organized for the same ends; its activities had to be pursued secretly for a long time, since a "Democratic Latvian Republic" could hardly have met with the approval of the German occupation authorities. The German government had the fullest intention of annexing to Germany the Estonian-Latvian Principality. Events decided differently.

The "Latvian National Council" on November 11, 1918, recognized by Great Britain as Latvia's *de facto* government, and the "Democratic Bloc" established contact and merged, giving birth to the "Latvian National Assembly." On November 18, 1918, this new organization proclaimed in Riga the Free State of the Latvian Democratic Republic, electing J. Tschakste as President of the Assembly, with Messrs. M. Skujenieks and G. Zemgals as Vice-Presidents. K. Ulmanis was chosen to be the first Latvian Premier and entrusted with the formation of the new government.

But there were some heavy battles yet to be fought before the young state could be effectively established. In December, 1918 an attempt was made by the Soviets to overrun Latvia anew, and for five whole months (January-May, 1919) a large part of the country, including even Riga, was occupied by the Russians. The population was harshly treated by the Soviet troops and suffered great damage. In April, 1919 came a putsch by the German Landeswehr, stationed in Liepaja, and a German-supported illegal government was set up by Pastor A. Niedra. For several weeks the legal Ulmanis government had to flee temporarily on the steamship Saratow. Eventually the Niedra government vanished like the wind. In October, 1919 a joint German-Russian attack, under Bermont-Awalow, an adventurer from old Russia, took place. But the Latvian military forces and the Latvian youth, particularly the students and schoolboys, were most enthusiastically with the Ulmanis government, and placed themselves at its entire disposal. The Latvian commanders, Colonel O. Kalpaks, General Balodis and Berkis, and Colonel Zemitans succeeded in securing the borders of their newly-won land, after much bloody fighting on several fronts at once. Latvia was completely liberated in January, 1920.

Democratic and free elections were held on April 17 and 18, 1920, which allowed the Latvian Constituent Assembly to come into being on May 1, 1920. The Constituent Assembly proclaimed on May 27, 1920, "the free and independent democratic Republic of Latvia" and the sover-

eighty of the Latvian people, sole masters of their land. This was also confirmed in articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution, as it was accepted by the Constituent Assembly of February 15, 1922, and published on June 30 of that same year. The land became free and independent, and the future of the democratic Latvian republic was assured. The new state was soon recognized by the other countries of Europe and by the rest of the world. Latvia was recognized by the neighboring big powers in 1920 at the conclusion of peace negotiations, by Germany on July 15 and by Russia on August 11, both solemnly giving up any claims against the Republic of Latvia. In the treaty with Russia the latter renounced for all times the territory of Latvia.

It is evident that the first World War and the fight for freedom caused the country losses in men and material goods. By 1920 the whole country was in ruins; of the 2,552,000 inhabitants which it had in 1914, there remained in 1920 only a scant 1,596,000 alive in the whole of Latvia. Yet, through unexampled energy and work that entailed the most complete self sacrifice, the ruins were rebuilt, schools were established anew, the sciences prospered (aided by a newly established Fund for the propagation of culture) the devastated countryside and factories were rehabilitated, the land enriched and cattle-raising started afresh. The peasant was especially helped in his life and activities. Shipping was revived and Latvian commerce prospered again; railroads were repaired and built anew; roads were put in good condition; the country's cities were rebuilt and new constructions appeared; electrification proceeded energetically to provide the country with light and power. The entire country worked and once more became prosperous. Its culture flourished richly. By the summer of 1940, Latvia was a rich and progressive country. It would still be so today, if the Russian occupation had not intervened on June 17, 1940, followed by that of the Germans in June, 1941. These new misfortunes brought ruin and death once more to the Latvian people.

Yet during the first period of Latvian independence, between 1920, (after peace with Germany and with Russia had been gained), and 1940, the most important advances of Latvian life were achieved. In the first place, we must turn to the economic rehabilitation, truly remarkable when we consider how thoroughly ruined the country was when it emerged from the first World War and from its wars of liberation. It is not our purpose in this study to quote the abundant statistics which prove this. However, we can give here a few available figures, proving in particular the concrete results of the industrious efforts of the Latvian peasant and showing the improvements achieved during the period under consideration. In 1920

Latvia possessed only 261,000 horses, most of which were unfit for work. In 1937 there were 391,900 good working-horses of fine breed. In 1920 only 196,700 ha. rye, 15,700 ha. wheat, 123,800 ha. barley and 215,600 ha. oats were planted; these yielded as follows (in quintals): 1,131,200 rye, 106,000 wheat, 665,500 barley and 1,130,700 oats. Whereas in 1937 the Latvian peasant had already under rye 288,500 ha., wheat 136,700 ha., barley 181,700 ha. and oats 335,700 ha., and these yielded as follows (in quintals): 4,214,500 rye, 1,715,200 wheat, 2,184,200 barley and 4,050,100 oats. Flax was cultivated only on 30,500 ha. in 1920; in 1937; 69,300 ha. The average yearly crop of flax for the years 1933-1937 was 195,200 quintals. In 1920 only 1430 industrial establishments could operate employing 61,054 workmen. In 1937 there were 5717 establishments, employing 205,000 workers. The industrial production for the year 1937 was totaled at 637,000,000 Lats. Whereas Latvian exports in 1921 amounted to only 29,300,000 Lats and the sum for that year's imports was 73,000,000 Lats, the 1937 exports were valued at 260,000,000 Lats, the imports for that year being 231,200,000. The bank deposits of Latvia (private) were in 1938 estimated at 379,000,000 Lats, while the Latvian National Bank possessed gold and foreign currency holdings amounting to 91,700,000 Lats.

All these are dry figures to be sure. But they are sober representations that allow an idea to be formed of the measure of material progress achieved by Latvia during twenty years of her independent existence. It should be stressed, however, that this remarkable achievement was not due solely to the diligence and work of the Latvians. It was to a great extent conditioned by the peaceful social situation that obtained, largely as the result of the Agrarian Reform, which had been instituted on September 16, and 17, 1920, by the **Constituent Assembly**.

A total of 1,695,823 hectares, expropriated from school, church, communal, state and private estates, were divided among a numerous and able mass of peasants. At the same time, in 1920 to 1934, the East-Latvian villages were divided into individual holdings, which likewise, allowed an intensification of agricultural production to take place.

The urban workers were taken care of through liberal social legislation. The eight-hour working day was established, child labor forbidden, collective contracts enforced, professional and labor unions came into being, state inspections were instituted, and state-organized insurance against accidents, unemployment and sickness. The enlightened intervention of the state was felt in all matters pertaining to the workers' security and well-being, and created an atmosphere of trust and contentment.

The Latvian state also paid great attention to the development of national culture. In 1933 there were 2057 elementary schools, 96 high schools, 16 commercial schools, 8 teachers' colleges, 25 professional schools (elementary), 46 agricultural schools, 15 technical trade schools, 2 navigation schools, 5 middle agricultural schools, 4 state and 6 private higher institutions (including the German Herder Institute, with 192 students and 35 German teachers, and the Russian University courses, with 109 students and 13 Russian and Jewish teachers).

It must not be forgotten that the ethnical minorities had not only their own universities, but also elementary and secondary grade schools. Twenty-nine and nine-tenths per cent of all elementary schools belonged to the minorities, and they were state-supported like the others. The minorities had also 14.4% of the high-schools, likewise state-supported or supported by various cities. Characteristic of the liberal educational policies of Latvia is the fact that there was one state-supported elementary school for every 929 Latvians, while the State similarly supported one elementary school for every 74 Germans and one for every 855 Russians.

The University of Riga had in 1939, on its twentieth anniversary, 446 professors and 7247 students, distributed among 12 departments. There have been no less than 6841 pupils graduated "summa cum laude" up to date, and the part played by the University in the development of Latvian national culture can hardly be exaggerated. It has not only prepared whole series of specialists in the various branches of knowledge, but it has also been instrumental in the production of numerous works of permanent value, research and original theses, most particularly studies bearing on Latvia and the Latvian people. During the period of 1919 to 1940, Latvian scientists have started to explore fields that had remained unexplored in the past, and they have done so with outstanding success.

A full survey of the development of Latvian science and art would be out of place in the present study. The numerous international scientific congresses that have met in Riga, the art exhibitions of Latvian artists and the numerous recitals and guest performances of the Latvian Opera Company and of many individual artists have given the world ample opportunity for an objective appraisal.

Latvia's international position seemed to be assured from the moral, cultural and economic points of view. Numerous international treaties and accords further strengthened and confirmed this belief.

In disregard of the existing solemn obligations, Russia saw fit to occupy Latvia forcibly, to "nationalize" by force her wealth, to Russify

the land and, finally, to incorporate the country into the Soviet Union. Both country and people suffered severely as the result of this indefensible procedure. Germany, the Soviet Union's foe, upon occupying Latvia in her turn, far from attempting to remedy the situation, brought still greater tribulations to the unhappy victims.

Germany, indeed, disregarding the provisions of the repatriation treaty of 1939, whereby all Germans living in Latvia returned to the Reich and renounced forever their immovable properties in exchange for adequate payment, showed nothing of the "everlasting friendship" expressed in that treaty.

The years 1940-1944 were destined to be the blackest in Latvia's history. Soon after the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty of August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union began to put forward a series of demands that marked a breach of treaties almost without parallel in modern European history. In addition to the peace treaty of August 11, 1920, by which the Soviet Union recognized Latvia and renounced forever all territorial claims, a treaty of commerce regulated the economic relations between the two countries, non-aggression treaties had been signed on February 5, 1932, which were prolonged for 10 years on April 4, 1934. Both nations were signatories of the treaty of 1933, which defined an aggressor.

Yet on October 5, 1939, under successful pressure from the Reich, Latvia was forced by the Soviet Union to sign an additional "reciprocal guarantee pact", providing the latter with defense bases on Latvian soil, which the Soviet Union solemnly promised would in no way constitute an interference with Latvian internal affairs.

In spite of all these treaties, on June 16, 1940 (at a moment when all Latvian transportation facilities were overtaxed with conveying some 16,000 performers and a numerous public to the singing festival in Daugavpils) the Soviet Union presented an ultimatum that implied evident interference in Latvia's internal affairs. This ultimatum demanded neither more nor less than an immediate change of government and announced the entry of Russian troops into the country "for the protection of Soviet interests." The twenty-four hours allowed by the ultimatum had not even expired before a large Russian army, estimated at 200,000 men, marched over the border, accompanied by numerous tanks and hundreds of airplanes. The Latvian government was forced to surrender.

The occupation of Latvia was followed up by the appointment of a new government, under an old and characterless man, August Kirhensteins, under the threat of overwhelming Soviet military power. Spurious

elections set up a so-called Parliament and, under open threats of the Soviets, the alleged vote of this constitution transformed Latvia into a Russian province, though the ostensible title was that of "the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic."

The next step was the deportation into the interior of the Soviet Union of 34,340 Latvian patriots and the murder of 1488 of their outstanding leaders. Latvia's entire economy was geared to that of the Soviet Union, which meant that the country's entire resources were ruthlessly plundered, while her cultural life was brought to a standstill.

Latvia's large resources of timber, so important to a country that has neither coal nor oil of its own, were considerably decimated. Grains, cattle, horses, and other domestic animals, railroad equipment and rolling-stock, automobiles, trucks, ships, everything was plundered and taken out of the country. Securities valued at 800 million Lats (one Lat = 19.3 cents), savings totaling 30 million Lats, gold to the amount of 9.8 million Lats, nickel coins for 6.6 million Lats, bronze coins (500,000 Lats), in addition to capital goods and stockpiles valued at 220 million Lats, either left the country or were stolen from their rightful owners. The country's soil, including individual properties large and small, was nationalized and divided into Kolkhoz establishments. The Latvians were forced to subscribe 110 million Lats to internal loans of the Soviet Union, while some 50 million were lost through the forcible introduction of the Soviet ruble at an artificial rate of exchange. The Soviet occupation led to the wanton destruction of 328 bridges, while 6437 buildings were demolished and 4516 partially ruined.

In June, 1941 an uprising of Latvian patriot partisans took place and in July German armies marched into the country. The Germans brought with them not freedom, but a new foreign occupation and further oppression and sufferings to Latvia.

The German official news agency, *Deutsches Nachrichtenbureau*, declared on July 31, 1941, a month after the German occupation of Riga, that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia henceforth were going to be parts of the new German colony, *Ostland*. The German official press organ, *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland*, declared on October 19, 1941, that all property nationalized by the Bolsheviks since August 6, 1940, would be considered the "legal inheritance" of the Reich. The Berlin radio broadcast to the world on November 1, 1941 that "Latvia has no chance to regain its independence," because "The twenty years of Latvian independence have proved to be a succession of fatal mistakes . . ."

There could be no doubt after such declarations that Germany intended to annex Latvia and the other Baltic countries. This notion was confirmed by the creation of a ministry for the *Ostland*, with Alfred Rosenberg in charge who, on his part, appointed a Reichs-commissar for the Baltic, and a commissar-general for Latvia. The German designs of annexation were further confirmed by an address of the commissar-general on the occasion of a Nazi-sponsored convention, June 21, 1943, in the auditorium of the Latvian University at Riga.

Thus the Germans prepared for Latvia a new martyrdom, being eager to exploit the resources and the energy of the Latvian nation for the benefit of Germany and its total warfare, just as they did in Norway, Holland and Belgium. The German military and civil authorities tried, with all means at their command, to impress their will and overlordship on the Latvian people. The German commissar, F. Witrock, for instance, renamed ninety-two streets of Riga, capital of Latvia, in honor of prominent Germans and Nazi officials; Baron von Medem, another German commissar of Baltic descent, did not hesitate to boast to an assembly of high-school graduates, that "Latvia must return to the orbit of German civilization, as a child returns to its parental home."

Mass arrests and deportations of Latvian patriots into German concentration camps started as soon as the German occupation was completed; but when the Eastern Front once again approached the frontiers of the Latvian republic, the activities of the German political police increased considerably. The Gestapo was supported by a host of spies and paid informers, among them many Russian refugees and released Russian prisoners-of-war.

After February, 1943, a severe censorship was clamped down on the Latvian press. On April 15, 1943, a decree was issued which forbade all travel without special permission. On May 1, 1943, the free use of radio receiving sets was prohibited, and on May 12 the use of private automobiles. All correspondence with foreign countries was suppressed.

German imposition on Latvia's national economy was severe beyond measure. The Germans confiscated all stocks of metals, even church bells. They imposed special taxes on the national production of meat, butter, milk, wool, flax and grain. By utilizing the Bolshevik nationalization of wealth and means of production, and not returning the bulk of private property to the lawful owners, the Germans seized 170,000,000 Lats worth of deposits in savings banks, 306,900,000 Lats from credit banks, and 119,300,000 Lats in bank funds. All plants, factories and other gainful enterprises were declared the "legal inheritance" of the German state. When

the Germans, owing to reverses on the Eastern Front, deemed it wise to decree, on February 18, 1943, the "reprivatization" of nationalized property, they restored only such property and enterprises as did not yield profits. The rest remained under the management or ownership of various German organized companies.

On February 19, 1943, the Nazis came forth with a decree of mobilization into the armed forces; on May 11, labor conscription followed. These measures served as signals to the Latvian youth to hide in forests and to organize guerrilla groups. But the mobilized Latvian "legionnaires" defied German orders to move to front sectors outside the Latvian frontiers. Yet, they were alert and prepared to defend their homes and country against a new and bigger menace, gathering in the East. When the Bolsheviks in the summer months of 1944 once again succeeded in invading the eastern part of Latvia, their pillaging, looting, killing, rape and burning were signs of evil augury.

In April and the beginning of May, 1945, when the German military might was already on the verge of collapse, the Latvian patriots, at last, organized in Courland an underground National Council of seventy-three nationally elected members, resolving to fight for the restoration of a free Latvian republic. In May the Council endorsed a Provisional Government under the premiership of Colonel Osis. This attempt, unfortunately, came too late. Between May 8 and May 12 the Red Army occupied Courland. New punitive expeditions against Latvian patriots were organized by the Reds, and the Latvian people were worse off than during the first Russian occupation in 1940-41.

At the end of 1944, when the Red Army had already conquered all Latvian provinces, except Courland, the Bolsheviks started to mobilize all men, except those born after 1926, and sent them untrained to their fate in the front lines, as a measure of revenge and punishment. The Reds did not spare either the old or sick or crippled. They all had to go, to be mowed down by German machine guns or left wounded in the wintry battlefields without care or medical aid.

Up until March 1945, 8,000 inhabitants of Riga were deported to Siberia, but between January 15th and May 1st, 14,000 Latvian farmers, labeled as "kulaks" and members of their families, about 50,000 men, women and children, were sent away under the "care" of the NKVD. Their property and land was turned over to colonists from Russia, 50,000 "landless proletarians," according to Soviet radio comments. Some 38,000 Latvian laborers, according to other Soviet reports, had already "volun-

tarily" left their homes and country, "hitch-hiking" into Russia, eager to take part in "building up socialism." The remaining Latvian farmers were entitled to hold not more than 15 hectares (38 acres) of land for cultivation, but all means of production and gainful enterprises again became the property of the Soviet Union.

As much as the Latvian people in general had to suffer, the severest fate was reserved for Courland, the last province subjected to Bolshevik rule. Beginning with March 31, 1945, the Communist-controlled Madona broadcast station repeatedly threatened Soviet revenge for those who refused to recognize the incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union and still dreamed about the restoration of a free and independent republic. The broadcast openly threatened them with "deportation to Siberia" and with "elimination". After May 7 these threats increased in violence. The Soviet announcer demanded in superlatives that Liepaja, the last unoccupied big city in Latvia, should be occupied at once, in order to get even with the hostile Latvian capitalists.

According to reports received after May 12, 1945, all men from 16 to 60 years of age, and women from 18 to 45 years, were mobilized in Bolshevik-occupied Courland. All of them, no doubt, were deported to Russia, because they were instructed to prepare themselves for a long journey and to take along food for ten days.

Such was the answer of the Bolsheviks to the will of the Latvian nation to regain its freedom, as declared by the National Council on May 7, 1945. The fate of Latvia depends now on the conscience of the civilized world.

* * *

We have tried here to give a brief review of the many centuries of Latvia's history. We have spoken of the country's geographical features and have attempted to give a sober picture of the Latvian people.

The Latvians belong neither to the Russians nor to the Germans. They have had close cultural ties with Scandinavia in the past, ties that have been strengthened repeatedly. We hope that we have succeeded in demonstrating that the Latvians neither desire nor can accept union with either the Soviet Union or with Germany.

It was stated in a solemn sermon given in Westminster Abbey on February 21, 1943, that: "Every people has the right to fight for its freedom, since the idea of liberation from foreign oppression is rooted in the nature of man and it is in agreement with the teachings of the Church." The people of Latvia have every right to their liberty and independence.

Fate seems to have tried in the course of many centuries to break the Latvians. Fate has not succeeded. In spite of wars, in spite of starvation and in spite of pestilences; in defiance of foreign oppression and the yoke of slavery, the Latvians have not been broken.

They have the full right to expect to regain their freedom. The Atlantic Charter, beacon of hope of all peoples, great and small, whether occupied by the enemy or free, recognizes and affirms that right.

The thesis upheld by Mr. S. Zaslawski in *Pravda* of February 8, 1943 and by other Russian sources, which has also been accepted by the *Economist* and the *Times*, of London, corresponds neither to justice nor to reality. It is absurd to consider the Baltic States as necessary to the security of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union seized these States solely on the way toward further expansion to the West.

The American journalist and "specialist" in Soviet affairs, Negley Farson, resorted to prevarication when he wrote in the *Daily Mail* that "a trustworthy plebiscite after the war in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would show that everyone in these countries desires incorporation with the Soviet Union."

We have seen above that the Latvian Free State, proclaimed on November 18, 1918, was fulfilling the warmest desires of the Latvian people; we have likewise seen that the Constituent Assembly, which was lawfully and freely elected on April 17 and 18, 1920, proclaimed an "independent and free democratic republic" as the country's form of government and furthermore recognized that "the sovereign power in the country belongs only to the Latvian people." These decisions, solemnly made, can be changed only through a plebiscite, according to Article 77 of the Latvian Constitution. Parliament alone does not constitutionally have this right. The last Latvian government of Karlis Ulmanis declared formally on May 16, 1934, that the democratic form of government and the sovereign powers of the people remained forever intact, even though reforms intervened in a legal manner. Hence, Latvia was at the time of the Russian occupation and remains to this day an "independent and free democratic republic," whose destinies only the Latvian people may decide, by means of a general plebiscite. This Latvian Republic was, as we have seen, formally recognized by both the Soviet Union and Germany.

The Soviet Union followed up the military occupation of Latvia (1940) with the imposition of a new government. This government carried out elections for a new parliament, which in turn decided the incorporation of Latvia in the Soviet Union. By this procedure, the Soviet

Union and its tools have clearly disregarded the lawful constitutional provisions. This they did knowingly and willfully. The incorporation should have been decided upon by a plebiscite and, in any case, the parliament should, in order to correspond to the constitutional requirements, have been elected "by a general election with an equal, direct, free, proportional and secret ballot." Instead, the provisions of the electoral law were utterly ignored.

An electoral commission, appointed by the Soviet Legation in Riga with the advice of the juridical Councillor of the Soviet Legation in Riga (Buševics), who presided over the commission, nominated a list of candidates chosen by Moscow, a list which even included twenty Soviet citizens, communists sent from Moscow for the purpose. The people were constrained to march to the polls in ranks, according to their occupations, factories, institutions and commercial establishments, under communist supervision and even with "military protection." The ballot tickets, i.e. the only list admitted, had to be placed in the urns openly, in full sight of the presiding officials.

Under these circumstances, it is impossible to speak of "free and secret" elections in connection with the tragi-comedy of July 14 and 15, 1940. Neither is it possible to consider the resulting parliament anything but a fraud.

Nevertheless, on the very first day of its session, the parliament thus "elected," under Soviet menaces, passed a resolution (July 21, 1940) proclaiming the "Latvian Soviet Republic" and requesting its incorporation into the Soviet Union.

Latvia was certainly not thus incorporated by the will of its people; it was transformed into a Russian province by force of arms. This was amply proven during the months immediately following. Indeed, according to the Communist dogma itself and according to the Stalin Constitution, which provides for "free" entry into and "free" secession from the Soviet Union, the act we have just described was nothing more than outright annexation. Lenin himself stated that such acts are forcible annexations, when there is no free consultation of the people, preceded by the withdrawal of the troops of the stronger nation.

We must affirm with warm candor that the people of Latvia have never at any time expressed the desire to join the German Reich. Germany throughout her forcible occupation of Latvia and the other two Baltic States considered them to constitute her own *Ostland*, rightfully conquered from the Soviet Union. Germany, moreover, declared the lands and properties of the Baltic States, which had been illegally nationalized by the

Soviets, to be her "rightful heritage." This was completely at variance with international law, as was the forcible mobilization for military duty of the youth of the Baltic States.²⁵

During the twenty-two years of her independence, Latvia gave ample proof of mature statehood; politically, socially, economically, and culturally, the endeavors of her people are undeniable. The first World War cost Latvia 700,000 lives, and her land was more thoroughly ruined than that of any other country. By 1940 these severe wounds had healed and the country was prosperously marching toward the future with confidence. At the end of this second world struggle, Latvia, having suffered even more than in the first, can and must be allowed to rise again.

STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN

²⁵ F. Balodis, *Vald och Frihet* (Stockholm, 1941); F. Balodis, "Lettland under framlingsoket," *Svensk Tidskrift*, 1943, III, part 6, pp. 385 ff.

Note: for measurements in metric system given in this work:

- 1 hectar: approximately 2½ acres
- 1 Kilometer = 0.6214 mile (8 kilometers = 5 miles approx.)
- 1 square Kilometer = 247 acres.
- 1 metric quintal = 100 kilograms : 220 lbs. Avoir.
- 1 Lat (unit of currency in Latvia): 19.3 U.S.A. cents.

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF AUSTRIA'S RECONSTRUCTION

by Victor Heller

THE familiar axiom that history never repeats itself rings with the sound of hollow mockery in the ears of contemporary Austrians. The situation today is, of course, not exactly the same as that in 1918, but there is sufficient similarity to warrant a re-examination of the Post-World War I experience. Our discussion will therefore be centered around the provision of the 1919 peace treaties which concerned Austria and the efforts of the League of Nations to reconstruct Austrian economy. We shall then consider the present plight of the country and her needs for the future.

I

The Austrian Economy after the Treaty of St. Germain

Austria after the Treaty of St. Germain was economically a torso, a rump state, which might best be characterized in Clemenceau's own words. He was asked by a member of the Council, as the old Hapsburg Monarchy was being partitioned, "What about Austria?"—"Austria? Why Austria will be what's left over," said Clemenceau.

After 1918, Austria was no longer an almost self-sufficient territory of fifty million people. Within the framework of the old Monarchy, a natural division of labor had taken place during many years of economic and commercial union. In Bohemia where coal and iron are found in close proximity had been centered heavy industry and textile production. Hungary had been the wheat belt of Austria, in whose other provinces agriculture on a large scale was scarcely developed, since it could not compete with the far greater productivity of the soil and the more plentiful supply of agricultural manpower in both Hungary and Slovakia. Whereas formerly the visible and invisible exports and the services with which Austria paid for these goods were absorbed freely by the large territory of which she herself formed a part, it was now necessary for her to buy wheat from Hungary and coal from Czechoslovakia. The breaking-up of the Empire clearly showed the dependence of the rump state upon others. Austria was now forced to live by international trade and the export of manufactured goods, resembling in this respect England, Belgium and Switzerland. A difficult structural economic disequilibrium had been forced upon the country; and this situation was reflected in all phases of its economic activities.

During the immediate post-war years, Austria experienced a breakdown of war controls, followed by uncontrolled inflation. Help was promised to the country by the Peace Conference. It took time, however, to set up the technical prerequisites for the materialization of this promise through the agencies of the League of Nations. In the meantime political and economic disorganization and disintegration continued. In some respects the situation was even worse than during the War. This was particularly true of inflation, which, for the duration, had been suppressed by price regulations and restrictions on free trading. With the removal of these after the war, inflation entered the explosive stage.

As one would expect, there was a frenzied flight of capital after the war from the inflated countries to gold standard countries. The wave of currency readjustments, depreciation, and stabilization operations, beginning with the British pound sterling, caused a devastating drain of gold from the defeated nations. At the same time, there was a great demand by Central European business for gold credits to make possible the purchase of raw materials, and replacement of machinery. Added to this was the demand of the cities and other local governmental units for gold credits to meet emergencies. The result was a wild speculative fever in the international currency market. Legitimate business lost its solid footing and was forced to give up its position to outsiders, war-profiteers, and upstarts.

In Austria, money was obtainable only by those who were willing to pay high rates of interest and, in addition, to give the money lender a share in the profits of the undertaking. Even worse than the credit situation of private enterprise and of local governments, was that of the Austrian federal government. Business adapted itself quickly to the new conditions. Prices were set and contracts made based upon the gold currencies of other countries. But the federal government could not repudiate its own currency—inflated paper Crowns. The money printing press acted as a boomerang, destroying the purchasing-power of the government's income from taxation by causing an inflationary rise in prices.

Evidence of the desperate plight of the Austrian Government is to be found in its attempt to procure cash in the spring of 1919 by selling some of its famous art treasures. The government was faced with the necessity of supplying food for the population, while having no money with which to buy it in foreign markets. Furthermore, she had no collateral to offer for foreign credit. The negotiations for the sale of art works progressed slowly, partly because of the energetic protests of the people, including organized labor groups. In the meantime, relief credits and some

credits from international banking groups arrived. These helped greatly during the transition period until credit from the League of Nations could be procured. The fact that the country was able to survive this difficult period is evidence of the ability of the old bureaucracy to muddle through and of the strong will of the Austrian people to exist as an independent nation.

II

Austria's Political Problems during the Interbellum

The Austrian Republic in 1918 was faced with the demand of the people for comfort, reassurance, and full and secure employment. The Monarchy had given the masses a feeling of security and a faith in the ability of the bureaucracy to handle economic, social, and political problems. It is not surprising that now totalitarian governments sprang up in neighboring countries by sustaining the people's childlike political mentality. Centuries of bureaucratic government in the monarchic states had conditioned the people to demand authoritative guidance, regardless of the form it took or at what price it was exercised. Consequently, the politico-psychological problem of Austria was a two-fold one: first, to create an effective state authority; and second, to find a substitute for the monarch-father who had been deposed as a result of the outcome of the war. In fact, the special feature of this political "revolution" was the fact that it was more of a political gesture than a real overthrow of the monarchical system. No radical changes, either in the economic system or in the public administration were made by the Social Democratic government when it came into power.

The tradition of being guided by the monarch-father was so strong among the Austrian people that the lack of an outstanding personality as, for example, the Czechoslovaks found in Masaryk, was felt in countless ways in the early as well in the later gropings of the newly established state. It is not surprising that the Austrian Republic with its undiminished monarchistic bureaucracy, its Court Councillors (*Hofräte*), its intrinsically conservative social and political structure, was often derisively called the "K. and K. Republic," just as the Monarchy had been called the "K. and K. State." (*Kaiser-und Königtum Österreich-Ungarn*).

It was during this period that Victor Adler, a physician, offspring of a wealthy "bourgeois" family, became politically important. As the founder and first leader of the Social Democratic Party in Austria, he paid homage to the Marxian philosophy, and upheld the banner of the "Class struggle" against the "bourgeois governments." But Adler was able to guide his

followers in the direction of a fruitful and beneficial opportunism which preferred compromise and actual achievement to revolutionary gestures and tactics.

The Social Democratic Party was the sole spokesman and representative of the politically enrolled "class conscious", not only of the manual workers, the employees in trade and industry, and for their trade unions, but also of a great mass of intellectual "proletarians." In spite of the fact that the party held no posts in the government, it exerted an important influence on legislative and administrative measures. This indirect influence was used effectively to improve the living and working conditions of the people. Actually, much social security legislation had already been put into effect during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy—collective bargaining, labor arbitration, workmen's compensation, compulsory safety devices, socialized medicine, child labor laws, and maternity benefits.

During the early post-war years, no government could have dared to attack the social benefits which were part of the old régime, even though there was great danger of overburdening the budget. Consequently, during this first period of the New Austria, it was necessary to extend the legislation for social betterment to include paid vacations for all workers, including domestic help; compulsory health insurance; compulsory payment of wages during a stated period of illness; expansion of compensation for dismissal; limitation of dismissal rights of employer; and introduction of the eight hour day. In urban districts, particularly in Vienna, the federal legislation was supplemented by extensive municipally managed social projects, including housing, child welfare, and health measures. Austria's social welfare undertakings were well in advance of those in most other European countries.

There is little doubt that this social security and welfare system was overly ambitious for the resources of the country. Austria at this time was economically and financially unbalanced, and was partially dependent upon the relief afforded by the League of Nations' guaranteed foreign loans. However unjustified the undertakings may have been from an economic standpoint, the public housing constructed in Vienna was most remarkable. Pictures of these housing projects were shown in American newsreels, magazines, and newspapers. But the commentary accompanying the pictures omitted some rather important and politically illuminating facts. It was not that, of the thousands of tenants, ninety per cent were members of the party ruling in municipal politics; the undertakings had rather the character of party subsidies because the rents charged did not cover the running expenses or amortization; and the housing was financed by exceedingly high taxes on capital, rents, and consumer goods, which depressed business and

helped kill the spirit of enterprise. The foreign visitors who were shown these wonders of municipal housing were not told that many of the inhabitants were unemployed because of the depressed state of industry.

Victor Adler was succeeded as the leader of the left wing Social Democratic Party by Otto Bauer. Otto Bauer was well versed in the political and philosophical dialectics taught by Hegel and Marx. He flirted with a romantic type of Communism, following a course which led more or less playfully towards the Soviets, but he was not willing to align himself and his party with the Russian Communist Party. Without having a concrete program for reconstruction, his party wasted its time and resources with amateurish experiments in "Socialization." Actually, the most constructive work done by the Social Democratic Party was the reemployment program which it carried out in the cities. But the Party could not supply a strong, able, and determined ruler for a democratic Austria.

The Christian-Social Party also claimed to be the representative of the working people and their interests, but it was, in fact, to a much greater extent the spokesman of the agrarian population and the petty bourgeoisie. It was, on the whole, a conservatively and religiously dominated group. The most prominent leader of the party was Dr. Ignaz Seipel, a Jesuit priest, who was a devout adherent of the universalistic Catholic policies embodied in the Pope in the Vatican.

His successor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, was a man of pure character, but weak as a leader. Perhaps his greatest shortcoming was the fact that he had no politically and economically clear plan for the task at hand.

Clinging in their minds to their traditional "father," the Hapsburgs,¹ and with them, to the monarchical tradition, the people of Austria vacillated in their choice of the various party politicians who presented themselves as father-substitutes. Perhaps lack of proper leadership is the real underlying psychological reason for the Austrian ups and downs during the years from 1918 to 1938, and for the revolutionary tendencies which were followed by conservative authoritarian régimes. It was just not possible to sell the Karl Renners, Otto Bauers, Ignaz Seipels, or Kurt von Schuschniggs to the Austrian population in its majority. No one came forth during this period who was capable of assuming the needed leadership.

Without the courage and the power to weld the various group interests into a constructive whole, and without having a planned practical program for restoring full employment, the various governments, recruited from

¹ The psychological interpretation of the public mind in Austria is inspired by a paper of Dr. Paul Federn, a noted pupil of the late Professor Sigmund Freud, now living in New York.

the followers of the Christian Social Party, became the playthings of different political and capitalistic cliques. Their starting point was a policy aiming at make-believe—at a kind of collectivism where rigid and really effective control of prices, wages, profits, investments, consumption, imports, foreign exchange, and currency values was to be achieved without concentration camps, secret police, and the shadow of impending prison and death. But finally, when there was not even the "synthetic" boom which was to be followed by the natural upswing of recovery, as had been promised, the governments found themselves at the cross-roads of business cycle policy. They had reached a point where the balancing of the budget apparently made little or no impression on the private investor and on "idle money." Austria faced an economic crisis with unemployment steadily increasing and a condition of economic stagnation which threatened to become permanent. Greater than ever was the temptation to look at the apparent order and prosperity in the authoritarian countries.

This would have been the time to tell the Austrian people the price of obtaining the results which they saw on the other side of the fence, and the right time to offer them a positive and well planned program for reconstruction. A systematic study should have been made of all the economic institutions which had been taken over from the discarded monarchy with an impartial appraisal of what was worth keeping and what was to be discarded. A tariff and credit policy and a social security policy based upon such a study might at least have mitigated the financial catastrophe which overtook the Austrian economy when the largest industrial bank, the Creditanstalt, failed in 1929.

The road toward a democratic form of government was blocked by the ultra-conservative Dr. Seipel who put down the popular uprising, the so-called "red revolt" of 1927. The feelings of the democratic masses were thus to be ignored by the government. After this, the government initiated in part the practice of the totalitarian countries of raising the spectre of "Marxism" and "Communism" to frighten the people. In the end, the government succumbed to the methods of a semi-fascist state and tried to lull the growing tide of dissatisfaction by instituting a confused, superannuated, medieval form of guild economy. This was the concept of the so-called "Ständestaat" (corporate state) in which the interests of the employer and employee were to be submerged in a system of co-operation based upon fraternal comradeship in a common task. This concept was so vague that it never became practically effective but only led to more confusion in public administration.

The liberal bourgeoisie had been the most loyal supporters of the Haps-

burgs, and they freely acquiesced in the politics of the "authoritarian" republic. In spite of the pseudo-fascist policies which later excluded them from practically all participation in administrative public offices, they leaned over backwards to support the existing régime and the "Fatherland Front." In fact, so strong was their fear of communistic trends that they gave freely from their own pockets to found and to further fascist measures, such as the creation of the "Heimwehr" and similar military groups. This then, was the political and psychological background of the "Deutsch-Österreich" as Schuschnigg called it in his fatal speeches.

III

Economic Problems in Austria during the Interbellum

After the war, Austrian banking and business as a whole decreased greatly and scores of formerly prosperous industrial enterprises and banks failed. As a result, many Vienna export industries lost their badly needed financial backing, and had to resort to short term credits at high interest rates from foreign banks. To the extent that the inflow of capital from outside countries was insufficient to cover the adverse trade balance, it was necessary to make up the deficit by capital consumption. Inasmuch as Austria was not able to diminish its imports in foodstuffs by developing its own agricultural production, or to increase its exports of manufactured articles, the country was forced to live on its capital or on foreign loans.

Many of Austria's sources of national income were doomed to shrink or to disappear entirely. The adverse trade balance was, in 1924, over a billion gold crowns, and exports amounted to only 57% of imports. This deficit of 43% was offset in part by the payments received for services rendered to other countries and by the expenditures of foreign tourists in Austria (invisible exports). In addition, a considerable amount of revenue was being received from Austrian investments in what had now become foreign countries, namely, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. But the remainder of the deficit had to be offset by capital consumption. The dependence of Austria's financial organization upon foreign capital markets, and the dependence of its industry upon exports to foreign countries made the Austrian banking system a vital factor in the country's recovery.

By 1925, depression had reached a very low point and more than one fourth of the industrial workers were unemployed. The unemployed plus their families amounted to more than one-third of the entire population. As a result of the depressed condition of the Austrian economy, more than one-third of the national expenditures up to 1930 was paid in unemploy-

ment insurance and in pensions to a large group of former government employees who had become superfluous after the war and the dissolution of the monarchy.

During the war, Austrian industry had been placed under state control by the "Kriegszentralen" or Central War Boards. These great trusts, created by uniting all branches of an industry, had been managed by bureaucratic military-minded boards. Some of the war-time controls were continued after the war. In the case of cereals for making bread, sugar, and some other staples, the control formerly exercised by the War Boards was taken over by government controlled cartel bureaus.

Even though the Central War Boards were not dominated by neutral experts, it would probably have been wise to continue such control in some instances. For example, instead of dissolving the Boards in the huge textile industries and exposing the individual textile enterprises to a ruinous competition during the transition period of changing and greatly reduced economy, it might have been wiser to preserve the best features of control by the Boards. In fact, the main thought of Riedl's, the Commissar for the war organization of industry, "Denkschrift" is based upon the premise that the new forms of control introduced during the war should have been retained during the transition period. He thought that this would make easier the task of rehabilitating and restoring the Austrian economy on a competitive basis. His plan implied that there should be continued regulation and even regimentation of Austria's economic life for another indefinite period. The main goal of his program, as Riedl expressed it, was the substitution of a planned and regulated form of economy for the apparently inadequate methods of price and consumption control. However, it is quite possible that such a policy might have been extremely dangerous under the prevailing conditions, with the power in the hands of the masses guided by left-wing politicians. There might have been a much more dangerous tampering with the economy than was actually the case. The fact that Austria had to lean heavily upon the arm of the Western powers forced the government to adopt a more liberal policy than that advocated by Riedl, and prevented the trying out of rigid controls.

When considering Riedl's plans for post-war controls, it is interesting to examine the spirit in which the population had accepted the forms of control imposed by the government during the war. These controls (*Durchorganisierung*) had been regarded as an inevitable evil, a curse which one tried to escape by evading or circumventing the various regulations and by patronizing the convenient but demoralizing black markets which existed in almost every field of buying and selling. In spite of the public's attitude,

however, some controls should have been continued after the war. Foreign trade and foreign exchange controls did continue under strict regulation and supervision by the state. But on the whole, a strict regulatory policy was contrary to the ideas of the planners and leaders of the Austrian reconstruction policy. According to them, economic salvation lay in the direction of destruction of controls, accompanied by the return to unrestricted capitalism and free trade along all lines. In 1925 when the rate of unemployment and the desperation of the masses rose to unprecedented heights, those who had been responsible for the "real value" stock exchange boom in which the middle class lost their last reserves, explained that the situation was caused by excessive rates of interest and by a "temporary" extinction of purchasing power. This view was expressed by those responsible for the situation, in spite of the fact that it was evident that the decrease in purchasing power had resulted from the enormous losses by participation in international currency speculation, and partly from the steady elimination of employed workers resulting from the rationalization of productive processes. The planners of the Austrian reconstruction policy were still unaware that Austrian industry as a whole, quite aside from intermittent disturbances, would not be able to cope with the international market and tariff conditions.

By this time, Austrian industry could compete in the world markets only in specialties of a luxury nature. For the most part, Austrian staple products were too expensive owing to high cost of production. This situation could not be altered, because the basis of cheap prices for export trade, a large and ready market of home consumers, no longer existed since the home market had been largely destroyed by the dismemberment of the Monarchy.

One of the important characteristics of the economic evolution of the nineteenth century was the great extension of economic intercourse among nations. Even the tariffs established between 1879 and 1914 failed to check this tendency, for these tariffs were comparatively moderate. Besides they were mitigated by multilateral trade agreements and the most-favored-nation clause and the continuous recession of prices during the twenty years preceding the war served largely to neutralize their efforts. Hence the exchange of goods between the big industrial nations of the world steadily increased, in spite of these countries' artificial barriers, and their wealth increased immensely.

Post-World War I nationalistic foreign trade policies were based primarily upon the idea of economic self-sufficiency, and they sought to make the national units independent, economically and politically. The attempt

to carry out this policy in an area such as former Austria-Hungary would be expected to yield chaotic results; for until 1919, there had been freedom of trade and freedom of migration of capital and labor among the units of the Empire. After 1919, the arguments usually marshalled in favor of a protectionist policy were supplemented by some new ones based upon the abnormal conditions in Europe after the war. Disordered currencies and fluctuating exchanges, and uncertainty as to the new goals of trade and the potency of international competition, served as additional excuses for protecting national industries. Also, tariffs were often raised and currency devalued in order to obtain a favorable balance of payments—a policy which ignored the fact that the restriction of imports reacts unfavorably upon the exports of a country.

The waste of capital resulting from the post-war tariff protectionism was great. In Austria, many new industries were created with the aid of tariffs, even though the same industries had been in existence in neighboring countries for many years. Before the war, the spinning and weaving factories in Austria represented a characteristic example of specialization. The woolen and cotton spinning factories were concentrated in Deutsch-Österreich (German-Austria), and the weaving mills were concentrated in Bohemia. After the war, Austria established thousands of looms to avoid the necessity of having her yarn woven into cloth in Czechoslovakia. Similarly, Hungary more than doubled both its spinning and weaving facilities, while Czechoslovakia was forced to reduce her production.

It was only natural that Austria's economic and political difficulties should strengthen the psychological predisposition of the Austrian people for a closer union with Germany as a means of widening the market for Austrian goods. The first action of the Austrian Parliament on November 12, 1918, had been to pass a resolution calling for a union with Germany—(*Anschluss*.) This gesture was doomed to remain merely a resolution because of the prohibition imposed upon such action by the Treaty of St. Germain. Between 1925 and 1928, when industry and employment were at the lowest ebb, Austrian commercial and industrial circles were almost unanimously in favor of the *Anschluss*. The government responded to this demand by changing laws to conform to German regulations, but it could not take the really decisive step towards a closer relationship with German commerce. This step would have been the introduction of preferential tariff rates, but it could not be taken because Austria was bound by the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty of peace.

To the difficulties of reconstruction of private enterprise already discussed should be added the psychological hindrances arising from the inroads

made by the war on public and private business morale. Not to be overlooked also, is the decline of the spirit of enterprise caused by the war and later deflation. Stabilization of the currency was an easier and more quickly accomplished task than the re-establishment of ethics and fair play in business. How long it took to heal these sores is illustrated by the fact that even ten years after currency stabilization had been achieved, the government considered amnesty for tax infringements as an effective stimulant for the subscription to government bonds. No less far-reaching and long lasting in its psychological effects was the immediate post-war inflation which caused industrialists and manufacturers to yield to the temptation to make large profits from currency speculation instead of devoting their energies to building up sound business yielding moderate profit margins.

The Austrian "real value" stock exchange boom in the middle 1920's was based upon the assumption that industrial and commercial enterprises could and would regain their pre-war earning capacity in spite of the change in economic conditions. The end of the boom started when speculators began to shift to what they believed to be more promising business, that is, to international speculation on the depreciation of the French currency. A real panic began with the sudden collapse of this speculation and the withdrawal of carry-over funds which had been supplied to speculators at high interest rates. Ten large banks under the traditional leadership of the Austrian house of the Rothschilds "saved" the situation by taking up the securities which were thrown upon the market by a panic-stricken public at a fraction of the price at which they had been bought from these same banks a few months previously.

The boom had thus collapsed with great loss of capital which was badly needed for the reconstruction of the Austrian economy. And yet, the "real value" theory survived this collapse. This theory continued to play a part in the minds of the League of Nations experts when, in their famous report of 1925, they criticized its fallacy on the one hand, and in the same breath, adhered to it by expressing their optimistic belief in the future of the large Viennese banks in Central and South-Eastern European finance. The failure of the Rothschild controlled Creditanstalt five years later was sufficient evidence of the bad judgment of the experts.

In discussing the Austrian Creditanstalt, it is important to remember that its economic role had undergone a complete transformation since its beginning. The Austrian branch of the Rothschild family had founded the bank in the middle of the nineteenth century to implement their financial dealings with the government. From the funds supplied by this group and their powerful affiliated foreign financial connections, the transportation

system and the major industries had been built up in the Hapsburg monarchy. The Creditanstalt also had provided the credits needed for the operation of the undertakings which it had financed. Since it held nearly four-fifths of the stocks of Austria's large industries, the Creditanstalt was the chief loser when the post-war inflation occurred. That part of the former tremendous fortune of the Rothschilds which had escaped the ravages of war and of the post-war inflation had to be sacrificed, under political pressure, to reconstruct the Creditanstalt. The reconstructed institution, weakened by the loss of its movable capital and its foreign credit, could no longer perform its function of investment banker for the whole country. The Creditanstalt now assumed the function primarily of a state bank of deposits, and, as such, was wary of entering upon new ventures. Government control of the bank was so close that the managers of the Creditanstalt lost their former initiative and lacked the courage to take new commercial responsibility upon themselves.

As a consequence of the destruction and ruin of what had once been thought of as a fabulous and charmed hoard of wealth, Austrian self-confidence received a severe and enduring shock. The fall of the Rothschilds and the failure of their bank dealt the final and decisive blow to liberalistic economic tendencies in Austria. From this time on, the way was cleared for the Christian Socialist Party to pursue its petit-bourgeois reactionary economic policy of the "Fatherland Front." This appeared in the guise of a romantic revival of the concept of a medieval "corporate state," behind which smoke-screen the Austrian government pursued its fateful course towards the *Anschluss*.

IV

The League of Nations' attempt to rebuild Austria

In 1927 Mr. Layton and Mr. Rist, the investigators whom the League had sent to Austria, reported with satisfaction to the League that the work of salvage had been completed. A few years later the crash of the Creditanstalt, the largest investment bank of the country, and of a number of other financial and industrial organizations demonstrated to the world how much was rotten in Austria's economy, notwithstanding monetary stabilization and the rehabilitation of Austria's fiscal policy and credit organization. That the League's experts regarded these features as a salvage was in accord with the League's reconstruction concept. Ignoring the tremendous problems with which Austria's economic reconstruction and foreign trade policy were faced as an aftermath of the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian

empire, the League limited itself to financial assistance only in the above-mentioned directions. Otherwise the newly-created Austrian Republic was left to itself. The League had no plan for the reorganization of Austria's rump economy and for its adaptation to the fact that this country which formerly shared in the division of labor within a market of 55 million people was now forced to balance its economic life for six and a half million people.

This task would have required planned cutting-down of certain business activities and the development of others, neglected hitherto owing to free intercourse of goods and services within the Empire.

But the League had no such plan. It was not even authorized to give the Austrian government directions for a plan. On the contrary, the hands of the League were definitely tied in this respect. It was forbidden to take any direct action or to interfere in Austria except in fiscal matters.

No wonder that the reconstruction policies of the Austrian governments vacillated between more or less opportunistic, more or less successful phases.² Likewise Austria could find no help from the League in its endeavors to overcome the ultra-protectionist foreign trade and tariff policies of the successor states. The greater part of what was formerly Austria's inner market had now become sovereign states with independent tariff barriers. The successor states used their newly-found sovereignty for political resentments, to make Austria's reconstruction efforts harder instead of easier.

The presupposition for the League's negative policy in respect to economic reconstruction apparently was that once the currency system and the budget had been reconstructed with the help of foreign loans, business would automatically readjust itself to a state of equilibrium. The results point to the contrary. It is true that the figures which the President of the Austrian National Bank, Dr. Kienboeck, submitted to the League in 1937 gave evidence of some success.³ However, this success was merely skin-deep as could be seen by the tremendous extent of unemployment at that time. It was clearly noticeable that this seemingly harmonious picture had been obtained by a deflationary budget policy which tried to fit the economic

² How deeply the lack of long-term planning for Austria's reconstruction was felt, not only by experts but in the subconscious of the masses, is illustrated by a Viennese witticism which obtained wide publicity: "Have you heard that Chancellor Schuschnigg has stopped going to the theatre?" "No, why?" "Because he dislikes being reminded by the usher that he needs a program."

³ According to a League of Nations source (Balance of Payments. Economic Intelligence Service, 1938) Austria's foreign liabilities amounted in 1937 to 1831.3 million Schillings, while they amounted in 1932-1933 to 4251 million Schillings. The considerable decrease is due largely to the depreciation of the currencies in which the debts are due.

development of the country into too narrow a frame by lopping off the very limbs which gave it breath and air. Large amounts of money remained idle in the banks because the spirit of enterprise was paralyzed by political insecurity which increased with the growth of the underground Nazi movement. Another unfavorable factor was the open discussion of Austria's capacity to live revived by the Nazis as they pointed to the above mentioned economic and financial disasters.

V

Austria's Reconstruction after World War II

An attempt to outline a definite program for the reconstruction of Austria's economy would be quite premature. The intention of this analysis is merely to indicate some principles and trends which may direct planning for a successful reconstruction.

The following observations start from a balance of payment as it presented itself before the *Anschluss*.⁴

The plan should, first of all, provide for the resumption and the continuation of the efforts which pre-*Anschluss* Austria made to diminish imports of fuel and of food by the development of national resources. The prospects are particularly good respecting fuel: Austria's dependency on imports of fuel had basically greatly improved already before the war by the discovery and the development of the Zistersdorf oil fields in the vicinity of Vienna.⁵

⁴ Only fragmentary official statements were published on Austria's balance of payment before the *Anschluss*. For the average of the years 1935-1937 estimates have been given in the *Jahrbuch 1939 des Arbeitswissenschaftlichen Instituts der deutschen Arbeitsfront*, (Berlin, 1939).

Austria's Balance of Payments (Average 1935-1937)
in Millions of Austrian Schillings.

<i>Liabilities</i>		<i>Assets</i>	
1. Trade Balance Deficit	300	1. Tourist Traffic	300
2. Interest and Capital		2. Commerce and Transit Trade	200
Transfer for Foreign Debts	200	3. Invisible Exports, Capital	
3. Travel expenses of Austrian		Interest on foreign investments	
Tourists and Diplomatic		and other items	300-400
Representatives	100		
4. Other Items	200-300*		800-900
	800-900		

* The League's estimate is 367 million Austrian Schillings. (Balances of payments, Economic Intelligence Service, 1938). The explanation of this item is apparently to be found in capital consumption.

⁵ Austria started production of crude oil shortly before the war with the aid of international capital. Increase was rapid and when output reached 1,210,000 metric tons in

Simultaneously the financial means should be secured for the construction of some of the many projects for the mobilization of the vast energy supply contained in Austria's water power potentials. Just as in the case of the dairy industry, the productive capacity of electric energy exceeds by far domestic needs. The surplus can be exported for the improvement of Austria's balance of payment. How great the chances of exportation of energy will be depends in practice on Germany's industrial recovery.

More limited than the prospects of diminishing fuel imports by the development of fuel resources are the chances of diminishing the necessity of food imports. Doubtless the food balance of foreign trade could be improved by further development of the dairy industry as an export industry. Likewise fruit and vegetable imports could be considerably diminished by the application of more intensive methods of farming in Austria; and the yield of grain per acre could also be raised. However, there will always remain a great deficit of breadstuffs, importation of which has to be paid for by exports of manufactured goods.

The crucial point of the reconstruction plan for Austria therefore remains the foreign trade policy. A courageous attempt made in the spring of this year at a Paris conference by the United States to develop the policy inaugurated with the Foreign Trade Agreements Act of 1934 into a network of multilateral trade agreements, failed. Only if these attempts are renewed with greater success by the United Nations is there hope for the prevention of a revival of pre-war protectionism, which was the main cause for the failure of the first reconstruction of Austrian economy.

Simultaneously with the consolidation of Austrian direct exports of manufactured goods by multilateral trade agreements, attention should be given to the expansion of invisible exports and to other activities with which they were functionally connected,—namely to Austria's tourist traffic.

Before the *Anschluss* Austria was able to compete with Italy and with Switzerland as a tourist country. These chances are considerably improved by the development of air travel. The inclusion of West Austria and in

1944 (*Foreign Commerce Weekly*, June 29, 1944), Austria became Europe's third largest producer. During 1945, under the impact of fighting and bombing, production declined sharply,—a figure of 550,000 metric tons is estimated by one source. To claim the Zistersdorf oil fields as German assets which are subject to reparations because during the Nazi occupation additional capital was invested in them, seems as justified as it would be to consider some of the Austrian water power works subject to British, American, Dutch reparation claims, because of the investment these countries made in them. Besides, the loot of gold and gilt-edged securities alone which the Nazis made in Austria, surely exceeds the amount of their investment in the Zistersdorf oil fields.

particular of Vienna in the itinerary of tourists from the West will be greatly facilitated whereas it was formerly omitted by many owing to the great distance from the point of debarkation.⁶

How much attention the reconstruction of Austria's big industry deserves depends upon the principles of Austria's future economic and social policy. It is known that under the leadership of the conservative political groups the Austrian government has hurriedly climbed on the nationalization bandwagon with a resolution for the nationalization of Austria's key industries. Whether this resolution will remain what it obviously was, a political demonstration, or whether it will become a reality depends upon the outcome of the struggle between greater forces than Austria can control, because they are of an international character. Those who have pinned their hopes on the foreign loan policy of the United States to check nationalization trends have been disappointed by the fact that the United States recently approved a considerable credit to Czechoslovakia in spite of its nationalization policy. The subsequent suspension of this credit has no direct relation to the larger question of nationalization of industry by Czechoslovakia.

At all events, the nationalization of key industries is of less revolutionary importance in Austria than elsewhere because already before the war much state control existed. The transportation system—railways and Danubian shipping—were owned by the state. Public utilities (water, sewage, light, ware-houses, housing projects) were run by municipalities. Tobacco manufacturing and salt-mining were century-old government monopolies. Capital imports and exports had come under government control years before the *Anschluss* under the system of foreign exchange control.

The most important point is, however, that nationalization of key industries leaves the main problem—the rehabilitation of Austria's small business—unsolved.

It should be borne in mind that the bulk of exports of manufactured goods (on the average up to 60% of Austria's exports of manufactured goods—direct and invisible exports—before the war were products of small business), were produced in plants where the owner worked himself with 1 to 5 employees. These owners were chiefly artisans with much skill but little or no business training, and no capital or other assets which were acceptable to commercial banks as collateral for commercial credits. The link between these small entrepreneurs and the foreign markets was the

⁶ The prospects of Austrian tourist traffic and of Italian as well seem to have been considerably increased by the recent agreement between Austrian and Italian delegates to the Paris peace conference, providing "the greatest possible freedom for passenger and freight traffic between northern and eastern Tyrol."

Jewish agent, the "commissionaire." With his knowledge of foreign languages and with his traditional foreign business contacts he helped these small manufacturers not only to find the foreign customers but also to adapt production to their specific wishes. He also was the financier of the small producer. He provided him—collateral or no collateral—with the necessary credits for the purchase of material, for wages, and for other outlays during the period of production until the order was filled. This traditional Jewish promoter of Austrian export business being now destroyed,—including most of his backers, the small commercial banks having been liquidated,—the reconstruction plan will have to replace his function with some substitute.

In any case the future of Austrian small business for export will remain questionable. Owing to the great changes which this war has brought about all over the world in the distribution of income and the distribution of wealth, markets of luxury goods—for example, fancy articles and fashion goods, so-called "Wiener Artikel," which were a large item—have potentially diminished. We may point only to Germany, which formerly was one of Austria's best customers for semi-manufactured and manufactured goods. Besides some markets for "Wiener Artikel," in particular London and New York, are now being supplied by local industries which immigrants from Austria have established. In the international trade of an impoverished world, standardized products may constitute a proportionately larger part than specialties. Austria's small industry will have to have help to adapt itself to this new situation.

Considering the problematic prospects for the rehabilitation and expansion of Austria's exports, more attention should be given to another important asset of Austria's balance of payment, that is the revenues which it received from international commerce and from financial transactions connected with this. Austria has always played an important role as an intermediary in business between the East and the West. To resume this role, it is necessary that Vienna's formerly excellent commercial and banking organizations be rehabilitated, and some projects of long standing for the technical implementaton of this policy—which were shelved after the *Anschluss*—be carried into effect, for example the enlargement of Viennese facilities to serve as a transit port for Danubian shipping should be carried out.⁷ The promotion of a freer international flow of capital is obviously indispensable in this connection.

Last, but by far not least, the reconstruction plan will have to deal with

⁷ The reconstruction of Austria's commerce and transit trade, notably that of Vienna, is tied up partially with the peace negotiations respecting the port of Trieste. The Hapsburg tradition had been, since 1866, to favor the development of this gateway for the Austrian

Austria's national monetary system and its budget. While the reconstruction program of the League considered this problem exclusively, we deal with it last because, once the fundamentals for an equilibrium of Austria's economy and its balance of payment are secured by a sensible long-term reconstruction program, the rehabilitation of the monetary system and of the budget become merely a technical problem. The basis for the new currency is still under discussion. Unlikely as the return to the gold standard may be, a certain percentage of gold coverage seems to be indispensable as a foundation for the international transfer of trade balances and for international accounting. This amount of gold could perhaps be secured by giving Austria priority in the reparation plan for Germany, to recompense it for the loot of gold and gilt-edged securities by the Nazis. The Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its turn may then accept these claims as a collateral for a currency reconstruction loan to the Austrian government.

To sum up: we may say that, as far as international aid is concerned the prospects of Austria's reconstruction in the sense of a Moscow Declaration are infinitely better than they were after the first World War. The League was fundamentally much too weak an organization to enforce the co-operation of Austria's neighbors, the successor states. The United Nations, however, is in its conception endowed with broader authorization to enforce a constructive world trade policy and a sensible division of labor. Besides, it has the support of powerful financial instruments such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and the International Monetary Stabilization Fund.

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hinterland and make it a rival of Hamburg. These tendencies had been interrupted for twenty years following the Peace Treaty of Versailles because Italy neglected Trieste in favor of Genoa. With their claims the Yugoslavs seem to be heirs to the Hapsburg tradition.

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The facts and opinions contained in Parts IV and V of my article are based for the greater part on experiences gathered during almost twenty years of service in various departments of the Austrian government and, after leaving this, as an economic consultant to Austrian business.

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

YUGOSLAVIA

On August 9, 1946 an American C-47 air transport on regular flight from Vienna to Udine was forced down by Yugoslav military air craft, involving the wounding of one passenger. There followed representations from the American Ambassador in Belgrade, Richard C. Patterson, and Acting Secretary Acheson presented the following note to the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, Sergije Makiedo, in Washington on August 21:

Sir:

The American Embassy in Belgrade has informed me of the contents of the message received from the Yugoslav Foreign Office on August 20. The replies of the Yugoslav Government to our inquiries are wholly unsatisfactory to the government and shocking to the people of the United States.

Your government expresses regret because of what you call an unhappy "accident." Your government is aware that this was no accident; that fighter planes of your government deliberately fired upon a passenger plane of the United States Government. Your government states that one reason for the "accident" was that since August 10th there have been forty-four instances where American planes flew over Yugoslav territory. The records show that since August 10 the total number of flights scheduled for that route was only thirty-two. These flights were made under instructions to avoid flying over Yugoslav territory and if in any instance a plane was over Yugoslav territory it was only because the pilot was forced by bad weather outside of the corridor.

But this attack of August 19th was not the first. On August 9 a United States passenger plane while in the vicinity of Klagenfurt was fired upon by a fighter plane of the Yugoslav Government. It was forced to make a crash landing. When it landed, the crew and passengers were taken into custody by Yugoslav authorities and are still held as prisoners of the Yugoslav Government.

For some days the representative of the United States Government was unable to communicate with these American citizens. Finally he was permitted to do so but only in the presence of the military authorities of Yugoslavia. Twelve days have passed and these American citizens are still held by Yugoslavia.

The message now received from our representative indicates that on the 19th of August when this second passenger plane was fired upon, some if not all, of the occupants were killed. They met their death not by "accident" but by the deliberate acts of Yugoslav authorities. The excuse for taking the lives of these American citizens is that the plane in which they were traveling was a few kilometers inside of Yugoslav territory. Your government asserts that for twelve minutes prior to the attack the pilot of the plane was "invited" to land. At the time you claim the pilot was "invited" to land the records at Klagenfurt show the pilot advised the Klagenfurt station that he was over Klagenfurt, which is well outside of Yugoslav territory, and was all right.

These outrageous acts have been perpetrated by a government that professes to be a friendly nation. Until we have had opportunity to confer with the survivors of these two attacks and we receive such other evidence as is available, we make no statement as to the exact location of the two planes when they were attacked.

Regardless of whether the planes were a short distance within or without the corridor, they were unarmed passenger planes enroute to Udine, in Italy. Their flight in no way constituted a threat to the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. The use of force by Yugoslavia under the circumstances was without the slightest justification in international law, was clearly inconsistent with relations between friendly states, and was a plain violation of the obligations resting upon Yugoslavia under the Charter of the United Nations not to use force except in self-defense. At no time did the Yugoslav Government advise the United States Government that if one of its planes should, because of weather conditions, be forced a mile or two outside of the corridor or, because of mechanical trouble, should find itself outside of that corridor, the Yugoslav Government would shoot to death the occupants of the plane. The deliberate firing without warning on the unarmed passenger planes of a friendly nation is in the judgment of the United States an offense against the law of nations and the principles of humanity.

Therefore the Government of the United States demands that you immediately release the occupants of these planes now in your custody and that you insure their safe passage beyond the borders of Yugoslavia.

The Government of the United States also demands that its representatives be permitted to communicate with any of the occupants of the two planes who are still alive.

If within forty-eight hours from the receipt of this note by the Yugoslav Government these demands are complied with, the United States Government will determine its course in the light of the evidence then secured and the efforts of the Yugoslav Government to right the wrong done.

If, however, within that time these demands are not complied with, the United States Government will call upon the Security Council of the United Nations to meet promptly and to take appropriate action.

The Department of State later published the telegram from Ambassador Patterson containing the following letter from Marshal Tito which he had received at eight o'clock the evening of August 23 concerning oral statements made to Ambassador Patterson the previous day:

Excellency:

With reference to our yesterday's conversation I have the honor to advise you as follows:

Regarding the factual state I have nothing to add to the note of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 9860 of August 20, but solely that subsequent reports do not confirm the first ones according to which two members of the crew would have bailed out in parachutes. It appears now that the parachuting object eye-witnesses mistook for occupants of the plane

might have been two gasoline barrels wrapped in two sheets. Investigation still being carried out.

It is not possible for the moment to produce a definite detailed report of what had happened apart from that I can on this occasion emphasize only once again the statements of the Ministry's note quoted above which correctly described the circumstances which were causing this regrettable occurrence. In connection with the statements put forth during our conversation yesterday, I have first to point out that it is not correct that the plane had only been a mile or two within Yugoslav territory in the moment when forced down. The plane was 50 kilometers from the nearest point on the frontier. Further I have to underline once more that the Yugoslav fighters were, during almost a quarter of an hour's time, inviting the plane to land. They also wanted to show the route to the airport only three miles far away but the aircraft definitely refused compliance with the landing order. Accordingly it does not correspond with the facts the Yugoslav fighters had not warned the plane nor is it correct that the plane had been forced because of weather conditions to deviate from its course. It is notorious in the country where the accident took place that the day was absolutely clear and of perfect visibility.

As for the occupants of the plane forced down August 9th once the investigation got terminated the Yugoslav Government suspended on August 21 any movement limitation imposed upon the persons concerned. During, and for the purpose of the investigation itself, Mr. Hohenthal, the American Consul, was informed thereof and at 730 hours on August 22 he took over. It is evident that they are allowed to leave Yugoslavia whenever they want to. Your Government may also, of course, dispose at any time over the aircraft question.

As for the occupants of the plane which crashed on August 19, as already mentioned, none has been found so far. The Yugoslav Government will be only glad to permit the representative of your Government to communicate with any of them who might have survived.

Respectfully yours,

August 23

J. B. Tito

* * *

ALBANIA

The State Department published the text of the following note to Albania on November 8:

The proposal made by the United States Government on Nov. 10, 1945, to recognize the Albanian régime headed by Col. Gen. Enver Hoxha specified as a condition that the Albanian authorities affirm the continuing validity of all treaties and agreements in force between the United States and Albania as of April 7, 1939, the date of the Italian invasion of Albania.

The requirement of such an assurance from the Albanian régime as a prerequisite to United States recognition is in accord with the established practice of this Government to extend recognition only to those Governments which have expressed willingness to fulfill their international obligations.

The Albanian régime on Aug. 13, 1946, after a delay of nine months,

indicated its acceptance of the multilateral treaties and agreements to which both the United States and Albania are parties, but it has failed to affirm its recognition of the validity of bilateral instruments between the United States and Albania.

In view of the continued unwillingness of the present Albanian régime to assume these bilateral commitments and obligations, which are in no instance of an onerous character and concern such customary subjects as arbitration and conciliation, naturalization, extradition and most-favored-nation treatment (see the appended list), the United States Government has concluded that the American mission can no longer serve any useful purpose by remaining in Albania.

This decision has been notified to General Hoxha by the acting American representative in Tirana, Mr. George D. Henderson, in a letter of Nov. 5, the text of which is as follows:

"Since arriving in Tirana on May 8, 1945, to survey conditions in Albania in connection with the question of United States recognition of the existing Albanian régime, the informal United States mission has sought to bring about mutual understanding and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Governments of the United States and Albania.

"Despite United States endeavors in this regard, and in the absence of a satisfactory response from the Albanian Government to the offer of recognition which was tendered by the United States Government in November, 1945, the mission has been unable to achieve the purpose for which it was originally sent to Albania.

"In the circumstances, although my Government retains its sentiment of warm friendship for the Albanian people, it does not feel that there is any further reason for the mission to remain in Albania. The United States mission is accordingly being withdrawn."

The London office of the Associated Press published on Nov. 14 the text of a reply from Premier Hoxha of Albania to the note from the Department of State of Nov. 8. The text of the note was taken from a broadcast of Radio Moscow. The Department of State has not made public at the date of going to press any reply to this note.

I have the honor to inform you that I have received your letter dated Nov. 5 of this year in which you inform me that, in your opinion, there is no basis for the United States of America mission to remain in Albania, that therefore the mission is recalled.

More than eighteen months have passed since the American Government addressed itself to our Government for permission to send to Albania an official American mission headed by Mr. Jacobs, who would inform the United States of America about our Government.

From our side the American mission was received with satisfaction and it received everything it required for the performance of its task. For the whole eighteen months your mission has freely traveled about the whole of Albania, our villages and towns, and has met with no obstacles in its activity—which

was to bear a purely informative character connected with the recognition of our Government.

Although the American mission had, as I have said above, a definite character, and in fact completed its work with the reception of the note dated Nov. 12 of last year in which the conditions for the recognition of our Government were laid down, it continued to remain in Tirana.

Moreover, our Government, with the greatest cordiality and amiability, permitted the arrival and replacement of many officials and other missions who from time to time asked permission to enter the country.

With the greatest amiability, our Government gave the American mission countless opportunities the better to acquaint itself with the situation in Albania and with the most important events in the country—for example, the elections in December, 1945, and many others. The head of the American mission, Mr. Jacobs, has repeatedly expressed to me his admiration for the constructive labor in our country, for the heroic fight of the Albanian people, for our healthy democracy and for the most peaceable sentiments of the Albanian people and their Government.

The head of the American mission, Mr. Jacobs, himself repeatedly told me that his statements to the American Government in regard to the recognition of our Government were highly positive and that it even amazed him that the American Government made conditions for the recognition of our Government.

After his first return from Washington, Mr. Jacobs deemed the conditions for recognition which were added by certain United States of America State Department experts as something new, about which he, in any case, knew nothing at all. The conditions about which Mr. Jacobs spoke to me and which were added at the last moment by certain experts of the State Department were nothing but a demand for our recognition of the treaties which existed between the United States of America and the former Government of Albania.

The condition proposed for the recognition of our Government was not merely a "technical" question, as Mr. Jacobs wished to present it; on the contrary, facts testify that this is purely a question of principle, which the American Government has raised and utilized as a first-rate obstacle to the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries. We have seen, unfortunately, that the American Government over this entire period has made use of the question of the treaties as an argument for opposition to all our legitimate rights won by blood, international relations.

But to the extent to which the question of the treaties is a question of principle for the American Government—and the American Government stubbornly defends this position—to that extent it is a question of principle also for us, and we also have every right to defend our position in the interests of our people.

Our Government has always endeavored to find a solution to this question, which hindered the establishment of diplomatic relations between our peoples in accordance with the sincere friendship that is demanded by the recent past of the common war and the present situations.

The Albanian people continues to harbor deep sympathies for the friendly

American people. It much regrets that various reasons are put forward for hindering the further development of that friendship. Over the entire period of the negotiations on the question of the treaties, not only did the American mission fail to make every effort to find a solution for this question—but, on the contrary, its lengthy unjustified stay was taken advantage of to create even greater difficulties in the achievement of a satisfactory decision.

The most convincing proof that the Albanian Government was always ready to solve the question of the treaties and of the recognition of the Albanian Government in a friendly way, and without hurt to the interests of either country, was our note of Aug. 13 of this year, in which we agreed to recognize all international treaties that existed between the United States and Albania; and as far as the two or three remaining treaties of a bilateral character are concerned, we agreed to examine them immediately after the arrival of an American Ambassador in Tirana.

[The broadcast said that Premier Hoxha declared here that the United States Government had not replied to the Albanian note of Aug. 13.]

The Albanian people and its Government have confidence in the American people, and express in a friendly spirit their desire to strengthen this friendship on a just and stable basis, which many persons in the United States of America State Department and in the American mission in Tirana do not reciprocate.

ROUMANIA

Burton Y. Berry, United States political representative in Bucharest, delivered the following note to the Roumanian foreign office on Nov. 16. The representative of the British government delivered a note of similar content. The notes declare the interest of the United States and Great Britain in the conduct of the elections scheduled for Nov. 18.

I have been instructed to express to you my Government's disappointment with the Rumanian Government's reply of Nov. 2 to its note of Oct. 28 concerning the forthcoming elections in Rumania. My Government deeply regrets that the Rumanian Government did not see fit to consider the substance of its comments on the electoral preparations, but instead sought to avoid a discussion of these observations on the excuse that they did not represent the collective views of the powers signatory to the Moscow Agreement.

My Government has taken note, however, that the Rumanian Government has again expressed an intention to implement fully all the obligations which it assumed following the Moscow Conference Agreement, to the end that the elections may freely represent the will and aspirations of the Rumanian people, and must therefore assume that the Rumanian Government shares the view expressed in my note of Oct. 28 that all parties represented in these elections should participate on equal terms.

Because of the obligations which my Government assumed at Yalta to assist in bringing about the establishment of a Government of free men in Rumania, any suggestion that my recent note was "incompatible with the attributes of a free and sovereign State" is in my Government's view wholly

inadmissible. I am constrained to believe that the Rumanian people, if they could freely express themselves, would regard my Government's interest in this matter as a compliance with its obligations under the Yalta Agreement and a welcome manifestation of general American interest in Rumania's welfare and progress. My Government desires to assure the Rumanian Government that it will not fail in its support for the democratic principles of liberty, freedom and justice by which the United States endeavors to live and upon which, it is convinced, the future peace and welfare of the world depend.

* * *

THE FRENCH PROPOSAL ON TRIESTE

The French delegation to the Paris Peace Conference submitted the following compromise proposal for the Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste and Free Port Régime on Nov. 12. It was adopted by a vote of 15 to 6 in the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Soviet Union made some specific counter proposals which failed to meet the approval of the Council.

- I. Having taken note of the report of the subcommission on the statute of the Free Territory of Trieste [the Conference of Paris] APPROVES these provisions in the draft statute on which unanimous agreement has been reached by the subcommission.
- II. APPROVES Paragraphs 2, 4 and 6 of the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers of July 3, 1946, which appears under Article 16 of the Draft Peace Treaty.
- III. And in order to facilitate the elaboration by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the permanent Statute, the Free Port Régime and the Provisional Régime, the Conference recommends that:
 - (1) The integrity and independence of the Free Territory is assured by the Security Council. This responsibility implies that the Council shall,
 - (a) Ensure the observance of the Permanent Statute and in particular protect the basic human rights of the inhabitants.
 - (b) Assure the public order and security in the Free Territory.
 - (2) The Free Territory shall be demilitarized. No armed forces, except upon direction of the Security Council, shall be allowed in the Free Territory.
 - (3) In conformity with the principle that the legislative and executive authority of the Free Territory shall be established on democratic lines, the Permanent Statute of the Free Territory shall provide for the creation of a Popular Assembly elected on the basis of proportional representation by means of an universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage, and a Council of Government formed by and responsible to the Assembly.
 - (4) By reason of the responsibilities imposed upon the Security Council in the Free Territory it is inevitable that certain limitations shall be

imposed upon the powers of the Popular Assembly and the Council of Government. These limitations result from the rights now conferred upon the Governor, subject to any modification which the Security Council may subsequently determine.

- (5) The Governor shall be appointed by the Security Council after consultation with Yugoslavia and Italy. He shall be the representative of the Security Council in the Free Territory, and shall in particular have the duty of supervising the observance of the Statute.
- (6) In matters which in his view affect the responsibilities of the Security Council as defined in paragraph (1) above, the Governor shall have the right to process legislation to the Popular Assembly and to prevent the entry into force of legislative measures subject to reference to the Security Council if the Popular Assembly does not accept his views and recommendations.
 - (7) In the meetings of the Council of Government, the Governor shall express his views on all matters affecting his responsibilities.
- (8) The primary responsibilities of the Governor would be:
 - (a) the maintenance of public order and security;
 - (b) the conduct of foreign relations in the closest liaison with the elected authorities of the Territory;
 - (c) the appointment of the judiciary on the advice of the Council of Government, and, subject to safeguard to be established by the Constitution, the removal of members of the judiciary for conduct incompatible with their judicial office.
- (9) When, as a result of exceptional circumstances, the independence and integrity of the Free Territory, public order and security of the human and civic rights of the inhabitants are endangered, the Governor may take all necessary measures subject to his making an immediate report to the Security Council. Under the same reservation he may proclaim a state of siege.
- (10) Citizenship.
 - (a) domicile in the Free Territory on June 10, as provided in Article 13 of the Peace with Italy shall be the qualification for original citizenship of the Free Territory.
 - (b) the conditions for the acquisition of citizenship by persons not qualifying for original citizenship shall be determined by the Assembly of the Free Territory and embodied in the Constitution.
- (11) Free Port and Economic Questions.
 - (a) a Free Port Régime is desirable irrespective of whether or not it is ultimately decided that the whole territory shall be a free Customs Zone.
 - (b) the establishment of special zones under the exclusive jurisdiction of any country is incompatible with the status of the Free Territory and of the Free Port.

- (c) freedom of transit will be assured to goods and means of transport between the Free Port and the states which it serves without any discrimination, and without customs or fiscal charges, by the states whose territories are traversed.
 - (d) economic union or associations of an exclusive character with any other country are incompatible with the status of the Free Territory.
- (12) Provisional Government.
- (a) from the date of the entry into force of the treaty of peace until the entry into force of the Permanent Statute, the Provisional Government of the Free Territory will be organized by the Security Council, which in particular will appoint a Governor and define his powers.
 - (b) the Security Council shall fix the date or dates for the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in the Free Territory.
- (13) The Council of Foreign Ministers will give an opportunity to a representative of the People's Federated Republic of Yugoslavia to present his views before final decision is reached. A representative of Italy will likewise be heard by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

BOOK REVIEWS

DORAZIL, OTAKAR, *Kroniky mluvi*. Prague: Vilímek, 1946. Pp. 375. Kčs. 140

Source-books can be frightfully dull. But to a people who have been forbidden to read their own history, or have had it presented to them in a completely falsified form by a hated conqueror, a collection of extracts from chroniclers of their glorious past can only be a delight. This collection of such extracts from the early chroniclers from the ninth to the sixteenth century was intended by Professor Dorazil to remind the Czech people of the accomplishments of their forefathers.

By control of all the media of instruction, the press, the radio and the schools, the Germans hoped to be able to convince the Czechs that they belonged, and in fact historically had belonged, in the German sphere. They published many books in the Protectorate, in Czech and in German, presenting Czech history in that light, and the controlled press and radio supplemented that perversion of the truth.

Quite confidently and simply Dorazil lets the record speak for itself. He entitles the collection: "The Chronicles speak." Each of the extracts is prefaced by a note explaining the known facts concerning the author, the time and circumstances of composition, the writer's point of view, and pertinent bibliographical data as to original publication, translation and whatever selection or abridgement may have seemed desirable. The earliest legends concerning Cyril and Methodius, the *Chronicon Cosmae*, the chronicle of Dalimil, the autobiography of Charles IV, the *Historia Bohemiae* of Aeneas Sylvius are perhaps the best known to Western historians. But the so-called *Staré letopisové české*, the chronicles of Bartoš Písař and Hájek of Libočan, with their wealth of detail and vigorous presentation, richly illuminating the period before the Battle of Mohács, deserve more attention than they have received from European historiography.

University of Colorado

S. H. THOMSON

SHANNAN, WILLIAM O., *Prussian Military Reforms—1786-1813*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. Pp. 270. \$3.25.

The book under review is based on a thorough study in Germany of printed sources, primary and secondary, contemporary and modern, alike. Thus the author has acquired knowledge of the material remarkable for a non-German. Nevertheless, he does not possess the same intimate familiarity with his subject which makes Rosinski's book on the *German Army* so attractive. It is distinguished from the latter by dealing in more detail with a restricted period.

The main value of the book lies in its making available to the English-speaking historian a welter of information not easily accessible otherwise. On the other hand, its main deficiency consists in the author's not showing the military

reform as only a phase of a complete reform of the Prussian state. Furthermore, one aspect of the military reform is overstressed while others equally important are neglected; such as the adoption of Napoleon's strategical conceptions, or the change of spirit and morale of the army, or the revolution of tactics. Thus the picture has become lopsided.

As to the presentation and interpretation of the material, the reviewer has his doubts. As indicated above, the author has used archival material only secondarily; specifically, he has not based his research on the *Geheime Staatsarchiv* in Berlin. Going back to the primary source was, in fact, hardly necessary since the subject lies in one of the best investigated fields of German history, had the author chosen to follow the interpretation well established by more than a hundred years of German research. This, however, he does not do.

The reviewer was rather surprised by the title: *Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813*. 1786 was the year of the death of Frederick the Great. For a decade to follow that year there was no military reform whatsoever. Consequently, the reviewer would have considered it sounder to accept the generally held German view that military reform began in 1807, and that earlier attempts like those of Scharnhorst at improving military education, or York's changes in the tactics of the troops under his command, and others mentioned by the author, were *Vorläufer*, to use the term common with German historians. This, however, is only a minor point.

So far, the *Krümpersystem* has been generally considered as a subterfuge, as a means to evade the conditions of the Treaty of Paris of 1808, and to build up a secret reserve army. This tradition the author characterizes as a legend. To him, the *Krümpersystem* served only to build up the units to their proper strength and to form a war reserve (p. 163).

There can be no doubt that much too often errors in research have created legends and the historian who shatters such legends deserves praise. On the other hand, the reviewer feels strongly that the historian who undertakes such a task has the obligation to go to the primary archival material. The reviewer does not consider it permissible to characterize a historical tradition as legend on the basis of printed material only. The fundamental thesis of the book must be characterized therefore for what it is, a mere suggestion which its author himself has not even sufficiently tested in the archives.

While the author attacks well-established tradition as legend, he repeats a story which is actually one, namely the old version of York's role at Tauroggen. He has not made use of the diary of one of York's aides-de-camp, published prior to World War I, which shows the general in a different, though not less favorable light. The reviewer does not wish to go into detail, but he thinks it should be mentioned that in the early days of 1813, when the uprising against Napoleon was shaping up in Königsberg, York and Stein were bitter antagonists. In the book, they seem to be presented as cooperating.

The author follows a widely used practise and translates the names of Prussian government and military agencies and titles into English without giving

in parenthesis the actual foreign name. The reviewer considers this practise unsound. As a matter of fact, although he was once thoroughly familiar with Prussian constitutional and administrative history, he was unable to retranslate some of the author's translations, and therefore did not understand what the author was talking about. This statement is not meant to reflect on the author, but is rather an appeal to all American writers to give up a method which makes for smooth reading, but not for historical accuracy.

Belmont, Massachusetts

FRITZ REDLICH

DICKINSON, ROBERT E., *The Regions of Germany*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp. \$3.50.

A favorite pastime in Germany after 1918 was the drawing of maps to give a more nearly uniform size to the states (*Länder*). Prussia's overwhelming area and population as compared with Schaumburg-Lippe was more anomalous than the disproportion between Delaware or New York or Texas. Most notable of the proposed geographic and administrative reforms were those of Preuss in 1919, of Weitzel and of Scheu in 1928, and of Brüning, Brecht and others in the *Länderkonferenz* of 1930. Not much was accomplished then, or even later under Hitler, in securing more reasonable boundaries and greater uniformity of size for the federal states.

Dr. Dickinson, in this little volume with 29 helpful but rather crude sketch maps and a very useful bibliography, reviews these and other abortive proposals. His main attention is devoted to a factual economic description of what he considers the thirteen "natural" geographic regions of Germany, having regard primarily to population density, transportation, services, and industrial and agricultural production. In his zeal for "planning" he pays relatively little attention to historic frontiers and traditional administrative arrangements. He groups his "regions" around great urban centers which in turn are ringed about at a distance by a zone of lesser urban centers. Some of the important factors are densities of population, the distance that workers have to travel to their daily work, and the homogeneity of the region whether for agriculture, industry or trading. He seems to think a favorable region would be created if it consisted largely of small agricultural holdings, or a conglomeration of industries, or a large seaport or central river trading area. He appears to overlook the fact that agriculture and industry together, being complementary, can form a very healthy balance for a region. Other writers, he says, have emphasized the historical aspects of the problem; he goes to the other extreme of emphasizing the geographical factors as "even more fundamental." He is thus much more sweeping in his proposals than Arnold Brecht's *Federalism and Regionalism in Germany*, an excellent companion volume.

Dr. Dickinson apparently wrote his book in some haste in order that it might appear prior to the collapse of Germany and therefore exert some influence on the Allied reorganization of the country. Whether his precise and rather

doctrinaire regional planning would have been wise if put into effect is open to question. In any case it could not have been worse for the Germans than the four rigid zonal barriers which for more than a year have kept the country sharply divided. The volume is a useful factual account of the economic characteristics of the different parts of Germany, but it is not exciting reading.

Harvard University

SIDNEY B. FAY

MANNING, CLARENCE A., ed., *Taras Shevchenko: The Poet of Ukraine. Selected Poems.* Jersey City, N. J.; Ukrainian National Association, 1945. Pp. 217.

This book is an excellent introduction to the English-speaking world of the life and literary work of the greatest bard of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko. Professor Clarence A. Manning of Columbia University has accomplished an excellent work, in rendering the original thoughts and motives of Shevchenko from Ukrainian into English. In a word Taras Shevchenko is Ukraine. National poet, leader and seer of Ukraine of the last century, Shevchenko and his works remain an inspiration to Ukrainians the world over. Appearing in the early part of the nineteenth century when Ukraine was enslaved and politically oppressed by Russia, Shevchenko gave a notable impetus to the national *risorgimento* of the Ukrainian people. His works are a faithful reflection of their national, social and political aspirations.

It may be argued that Shevchenko's poems and ballads, tense and emotional in nationalistic character, are not on the same plane with those of Pushkin or Mickiewicz. Yet the cosmopolitanism of Shevchenko is expressed in his deep love for freedom, and in his perpetual struggle for universal justice for the so-called "common man." Though first and foremost a poet of Ukraine, Shevchenko's moral and political creeds range beyond nationalism. Because Shevchenko is a revolutionist in the ideal sense of the word, he is to be considered an exponent of the most vital principle of mankind: liberty.

Manning's translation of his poems is extremely faithful to the almost flawless text and only rarely too literal. His selection of Shevchenko's works is representative. His account of the Ukrainian bard's life, work and struggle is done simply and effectively as a result of his knowledge not only of Ukrainian history and literature but of Polish and Russian as well.

In the present day political turmoil that is sweeping over Ukraine once again, Shevchenko's works and his prophetic vision can well point to a better world not only for his countrymen but for humanity as a whole.

New York City

WALTER DUSHNYCK

FRIEDRICH MEINECKE: *Die deutsche Katastrophe. Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen.* E. Brockhaus, Wiesbaden, and Aero-Verlag, Zürich, 1946. Sw.frs. 14.70.

FRIEDRICH MEINECKE: *Erlebtes, 1862-1901.* Koehler, Leipzig, 1942.

The flood of books on Germany and things German continues. Having

shirked the German problem far too long, the English-speaking world is rightly concerned about its lack of knowledge and of understanding which prevented timely action and brought us to the brink of 1914 and 1939 without the means—mental and material—to avoid the German wars. Even now, after the disaster twice occurring, there is no proper chair for Central European History at any of the British universities. The greater the importance, therefore, of the series of sound books which have been devoted to the study and an explanation of the German past and present. What, however, of the future? The final answer to this question must be given by the Germans themselves—by Germans 're-educated' in the school of their own experience and taught in the light of the results of the historical research of which we spoke. About the chances of such German re-education we hear little. The little we hear is sometimes perturbing, as e.g. in Lord Beveridge's recent reports; it is more reassuring if we look at the very real success achieved by the men who lectured to German Prisoners of War in this country on such subjects as freedom of the press and the United Nations organization.

Both perturbing and reassuring is the voice of the oldest surviving historian of great standing inside Germany—Friedrich Meinecke. He had survived as by a miracle—a physical feat for so frail a man and a political wonder for a personal friend of many of the men who were hanged by Hitler-Himmler after the rising of July, 1944. On the intervention of the British Prime Minister he was rescued from Goettingen and returned to his little home at Dahlem, outside Berlin. At eighty-four, he was the doyen of German historians. No doubt his voice carries great weight, and the answer he gives to the questions: how did Germany fall? how may Germans hope to rescue themselves from the catastrophe that has befallen them?—the answer he gives, must influence the mind of Germans and thus the chances of their re-education.

Professor Meinecke was born before the First Reich was founded. As an eye-witness, therefore, he is able to communicate what he calls the *Hauch der Zeit-atmosphäre* of the four Germanies he has seen for himself—Bismarck's, the Imperial Germany of William II, Republican Germany, and Hitler's Third Reich. His prologue would be the pre-Bismarckian world (and the Prussian world to which he has dedicated some of his most important studies as a historian); his epilogue the future which we must shape rightly so that our children shall live and not die. Dr. Meinecke's basic belief is reassuring: it is his knowledge of the human need of the *unbedingte Freiheit im Gewissen* of which he speaks on the very first page of this little book of memoirs, published in the midst of the recent war. It was the lack of freedom of thought and expression, he rightly reminds his countrymen now, after the passing of the tyrant, which separated them from the Western Powers and gave to the West, in its fight against Hitler, something of a true crusader's spirit. The lesson for Germany is plain: by regaining the freedom of the spirit Germans can cleanse themselves of the vile inheritance of Hitler's gangsterdom; they shall, he tells them, regain religious liberty and become world citizens of the mind who have foresworn power politics and

all that smacks of the *Machtstaat*. Have not Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzerland forgotten their dreams of expansionist imperial policy? Let us, he advises his German listeners, join in a voluntary federation of Central and Western European States and thus bring about a peaceful United States of Europe.

This answer to the German problem is assuredly sound, sensible and promises well for the future. Can we then rest assured that all is well—can we point to Professor Meinecke's own tribute to compulsory military service, to his belief in the immaculate greatness of Bismarck and the positive values of Prussian Militarism ("man muss ihn in sich selbst erlebt haben, um seine Macht über die Gemüter zu verstehen") and glow in the satisfaction caused by his conversion? Shall we be safe in overlooking that he still speaks of a healthy kind of militarism without which no people can live in Central Europe? We might—if it were not for the disturbing side of the picture he draws, even now, a year after Hitler's suicide. He calls his survey of Germany's desperate gangsterdom *The German Catastrophe*. To us it was a world catastrophe first and foremost. In this difference there is hidden more than a simple difference of approach to the same problem from two separate sides. It goes deeper than that—and is the more perturbing for it.

Dr. Meinecke explains the events leading up to 1939 and 1945 by showing two forces at work, one social and socialist, the other national and nationalist. It is, he says, the task of our century to merge these two "waves" as he calls the two forces at work in our world. Hitler, he explains, Mussolini, he says, tried it. We must solve the same problem by different means. The professor is thus unaware, or is he not, that he only rejects Hitlerian methods of devilish criminality (and his sincerity on this point is beyond any shadow of doubt) but that, at the same time, he admits their aim as having been fundamentally right?

This, indeed, is perturbing—might let us well despair of his guidance for a re-educated German youth. Hitler's "socialism" was a mere cloak used for his own advancement; so was his "nationalism"—truly, his was the revolution of nihilism; he believed in nothing but his own personal profit. But this apart: is not the real problem of our time the combination of the nation state, the national forces if you will, with other states of similar derivation and aim. Is not, in short, our task the creation of an international order which will prevent further catastrophes, world catastrophes (not to mention the one, called German, of which Professor Meinecke speaks)? Our author looks, as hypnotized, on the German scene—one of misery and devastation. Instead of lifting his eyes to the horizon and beyond whence alone peace can come, he still speaks of the purely parochial German "problem" of combining national forces with social ones. Out of such mergers, whether brought about by Hitlerian methods or any other, say of sweet reasonableness, there cannot come the salvation of the world from wars. It must grow out of a new "foreign," not another "home" policy: i.e. out of the German will to serve an international order which is higher than any national order of whatever brand.

Stanford Hall, Loughborough (England)

F. W. PICK

NOVOTNÁK, MILIDUCH M., *Lužičtí Srbové* Prague: F. Kosek, 1945. Pp. 103. 2 maps. Kčs. 33

As after the end of World War I, when the Sorbs of Upper and Lower Lusatia sought liberation from German oppression and progressive extermination, so today they are pleading for consideration of their cause. Since May, 1945 their representatives have sought support among their nearest Slav kinsfolk, the Poles and the Czechoslovaks. It is also reported that a mission was sent to Moscow to gain the support of the Soviet Union. Their *démarches* have met thus far with words of sympathy, but, so far as can be seen, little concrete has been achieved. Their situation remains difficult.

The present work, by one of the nationalist Sorb leaders, is a review of their history and their struggle for national and cultural survival. Written with restraint, it presents in short compass the story of their resistance to germanization. Joined at various times in the past to either Czech or Polish states, they have maintained their consciousness of a common Slavic origin and culture. Novotňák recounts their mythology, their native poetry, their society and literature, and points out parallels with their nearest Slav neighbors. The gallantry with which they resisted coolly calculated denationalization at the hands of successive German régimes from the earliest times through the nineteenth century and the more brutal acceleration of the process before 1945 calls for more than passing notice, and their right to more than a casual nod of dismissal from the makers of the peace. Their present numbers—roughly 150,000—could hardly withstand another period of rigorous oppression.

University of Colorado

S. H. THOMSON

WEBER, AUGUST, *A New Germany in a New Europe*. Trans. Moray Firth. London: Lindsay Drummond, 1945. Pp. 208. 10s. 6d.

Dr. August Weber, the leader of a fractional democratic party in the Weimar Republic until Hitler's advent, has written an attractively planned book. If Dr. Weber had not been a public figure in Germany until 1933, and if he had not remained in Germany until the Spring of 1939 as a sideline observer, then the book would have been just another contribution in the spate of writings on contemporary Germany. His comments on Stresemann (pp. 25-28), Brüning (pp. 28-31), the failures of Versailles and reparations (pp. 110-112) add nothing to the literature extant. Nor does his analysis as to why Weimar democracy failed give us any new insights.

The very first chapter, "Germany's Political Immaturity," sounds attractive and, although it constitutes one-fifth of the volume, the only trenchant ideas he submits are that the churches in Germany share responsibility with the other elements for the Nazi success and that "the Prussian generals had moved toward the Left" (p. 34).

It is surprising that Dr. Weber as the leader of the *Deutsche Staatspartei* should indulge in such *Schlagworte* as "People of the world, unite!" (p. 118),

or that he should really believe that in "the New Europe" international currency and a common language are feasible panaceas. But it must have been the war-time idealism that evoked such notions. That Dr. Weber is serious may be deduced from his suggested land reforms. He suggests that the post-war German government subsidize land-settlement based on acceptable business procedure but "the transactions" could end without payment of interest or even of principal (p. 145). What the author really foresees as the agricultural base is the co-operative.

Dr. Weber wants the Nazi leaders punished, and he even cautions against "such humanitarian stirrings" as were already emerging in Great Britain and the United States during the War. He nevertheless rejects Vansittartism because "there is no way in which chains can be rivetted permanently on a people of nearly seventy million" (p. 172). The result: The question of the extent to which Germany should be punished is still left nebulous. Similarly, the author admits "that not many tears were shed for the Weimar Republic" but he explicitly denies that there is a contradiction in "the assertion that millions of Germans have opposed Hitler and still oppose him" (p. 43).

Since the author was writing while the war was still on, his suggestions for the German territorial reorganization (pp. 65-70) are of mere academic interest by now. That Dr. Weber didn't foresee the German territorial losses is surprising in the light of his perspicacity with respect to Russia. As he stated it: "With the defeat of Germany, Russia's voice on the Continent will be decisive. This categorical assertion may not be welcome to all ears, but it is an indisputable fact" (p. 171).

In the section entitled "After Hitler" Dr. Weber has eighteen specific suggestions which encompass all conceivable activities within a community.

University of Houston

LOUIS KESTENBERG

HEYMANN, HANS, *We Can Do Business with Russia*. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1945. Pp. xiv, 265. \$2.50.

This is an argument as well as an account of the necessity, in the post war years now upon us, for closer trade relationships with the Soviet Union. It may also be considered a practical manual on "how to do business with Russia" based on past experience. Eric Johnston contributes a foreword lending his weight to the main thesis of the book, which is namely that reciprocal trade relationships can be extremely beneficial both to the United States and the Soviet Union. Dr. Heymann, who has had past experience in dealing with the Russians, in his earnestness occasionally belabors the obvious; and in his desire to anticipate objection is led sometimes to stress contingent rather than main issues. Nevertheless the book contains some extremely pointed and astute observations, despite the fact that it suffers from a certain disjointedness and loose construction.

The author shares the conviction that "many of the great ideals of modern peace-creators are still awaiting realization. The greatest is that of world-wide

collective security fortified by the indispensable direction of a more sovereign world-democracy . . . economically, socially, politically, and intellectually." (preface, p. xii.) The achievement of this ideal rests, inferentially, in large part on the Soviet Union and the United States. His chapter on "men who broke American Sales Resistance" is an account of a successful, more or less, economic *rapprochement*, in terms of business done in the period before 1939. Yet since his book was written and since the San Francisco Conference the world has witnessed a rather halting attempt to achieve an international, political, *modus vivendi* under the structure of the United Nations with the Soviet Union. This experience amply demonstrates the necessity of a mutual breakdown in the political "sales-resistance" if his dream of world-democracy is to be achieved, of which this reviewer has much doubt.

It is extremely difficult to place, yet one gets the impression that American "realism" would constitute a disregard of Russian ideology, and the placing of economic relations between the two nations upon a purely pragmatic, utilitarian basis. This is a very large order. One is led to ask: would the Soviet type of realism stand a similar test? When did the divorce between economics and politics occur? The author is aware, as his arguments show, of the fear of communism in America and quotes E. R. Stettinius (p. 95) to support his own belief in the possibility of the co-extensive existence of the two systems. Granting this, the crux of the matter becomes the question: "how can a production-for-use economy with a balanced budget like the Soviets . . . co-operate practically with our more or less free enterprise and private profit economy." The final answer lies in the historical future yet Dr. Heymann allows himself a prediction as to the form, due to the two systems' interaction, which the new socio-capitalistic world will take, calling it *world social capitalism*. (his italics)

While the book will do little to change the mental climate of Russophiles, suffering from excessive adulation, or the Russophobes, victims of hate chants, it should help to clear the air for the average, fair-minded American, whose admiration for the Russian military achievement during the war waits for an understanding of his relationships with one of the great powers of the contemporary world, during peace. The impossibility of an economic conversion either way merely makes more urgent the finding of some method of living in peace and order if the hopes of mankind for an enduring tranquillity are to be realized.

Hunter College

GEORGE WASKOVICH

DEAN, VERA MICHELES, *The Four Cornerstones of Peace*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1946. Pp. 267. \$2.50.

The Foreign Policy Association, with headquarters in New York and some twoscore branches throughout the country, performs a unique and invaluable service in providing the intelligent citizen with reliable and comprehensible information concerning international relations. This it does notably through the publications of its Research Department, of which the author of the present

volume has been for some years the Director. Like Mrs. Dean's other works, "The Four Cornerstones of Peace" is factual, intelligible by ordinary mortals, and not devoid of that idealism and hope without which "experts" in world affairs soon degenerate into misanthropic cynics.

Mrs. Dean's four cornerstones are the conferences held between August, 1944 and June 1945 at Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, Mexico City and San Francisco—with a sort of postscript on "Potsdam and After." In a prefatory chapter she outlines clearly and briefly "the job to be done" in order to create an organization among the states of the world capable of substituting co-operation for armed conflict. Having laid down these premises, she shows how each of the four cornerstone conferences contributed to this objective. Mrs. Dean was consultant at the San Francisco Conference and thus personally observed its course. In general, however, her account contains nothing not available in the public prints. The value of her exposition resides in its clarity and its objectivity.

In the concluding chapter she confronts the American voter with a statement of his responsibilities and opportunities in an atomic age. She does not hesitate to point out what she regards as weaknesses and mistakes in American policy, or to suggest reforms. Her preface is dated August 31, 1945, and much water has gone over the dam since then, but not enough to detract from the enduring value of the work. The last two-fifths of the book contain the texts of various documents related to these conferences, including the treaties between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom (May 26, 1942), France (December 10, 1944) and Czechoslovakia (December 12, 1943).

Denver University

ROBERT GALE WOOLBERT

German Crimes in Poland, I. Published by Central Commission for Investigation of German Crimes in Poland. Warsaw, 1946. Pp. 274. 3 maps, 44 illustrations. Złotys 300.

It has already become fashionable in Western countries to make light of German atrocities. But the Poles, among other peoples who felt the German boot, may be assumed to have a longer memory. For the record the Polish Government, acting through the Ministry of Justice, appointed in the spring of 1945 a commission of lawyers, judges and professional persons to collect evidence—while it was still available—of the nature of German rule in Poland from the outbreak of war on September 1, 1939, to the final Allied victory. The findings of this commission are here presented in both an English and a Polish edition. The latter bears the title: *Biuletyn Główniej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Niemieckich w Polsce*. The Polish edition is slightly more extensive, and lists in detail (pp. 27-62) the 435 concentration camps and 18 Transit Camps the Germans maintained in Poland.

The position taken by the members of the Commission is clearly stated in the introduction (p. 8): "The crimes that were committed in Poland cannot be treated as transgressions by individuals against laws, regulations or orders.

They are not merely the criminal acts of individual people, in breach of valid laws. They were planned and prepared for by the chief German governmental authorities, who explicitly instructed offices and government officials as to the way in which they should be carried out. They were committed in accordance with Nazi law and with Nazi ethics and ideology; not only by members of the Gestapo, SS and police, but also by officers and soldiers of the German army, German administrative officials, railway officials, doctors, and by representatives of German industry and science." The corporate responsibility of the whole German people is thus clearly assumed.

Three extermination camps—out of the many—are described in some detail: Oswięcim, Treblinka, Chelmno, the systematic extermination of Polish Jewry, probably over three million, the public executions at Warsaw, the nature of German "law" in Poland, and a resumé of German crimes against Soviet prisoners of war in Poland, make up the text of the report. Numerous depositions are reproduced, and the illustrations are all from captured German photographs. For brutality and debauched if scientific sadism not even the records of the Spanish Inquisition can compare with what one finds here. I have seen several of these camps in Poland and Czechoslovakia and I have talked at length with a few survivors and relatives of those who did not survive. Any effort to minimize the awfulness of the German guilt seems unimaginably unrealistic. After reading the records and depositions of this Commission I reread the chapter "Deutsche Ordnung im GeneralGouvernement" in the official publication *Das General Gouvernement* (Würzburg, 1942) edited by Dr. Max Freiherr Du Prel at the order of Governor General Frank. German *Ordnung* seems to mean murder of less powerful neighbors. In this publication there was no mention of concentration camps, but there was repeated reference to the Poles' inability to know what was best for them. The enormity of the German crimes is considerably enlarged—if that were possible or necessary—by a juxtaposition of their declarations of intention and their actions.

University of Colorado

S. H. THOMSON

GROSSMAN, VLADIMIR, *The Pan-Germanic Web: Remaking Europe*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945. Pp. viii, 179. \$2.00.

With a few exceptions the books published during the war on an enemy state like Germany reflect the prevailing emotional tension. They range from the attempt to prove that Germany is the perpetual aggressor (Hearnshaw) to those which try to establish with documentation the basis of the future German apologetics. The present volume is a book with a thesis, frankly declared, and it makes no pretense of doing more than supplying some of the evidence for its *a priori* assumptions. In this field it is distinctly better, therefore, than the recent attempts to exculpate Germany and to minimize her responsibility for the tragic turn of European affairs.

History, to paraphrase an old statement, is what the historians say it is.

Nevertheless if any degree of truth is to be attained the historian must avoid both the *bête noire* theories of historical causation as well as the "knight-in-shining-armor school." If he persists in presenting a profile pleasant or unpleasant without noting that corollary or cognate developments have been suppressed, he should accordingly be discounted. Dr. Grossman's object is to demonstrate "some historical data important to the history of all Europe." The fact that Germany has expanded at different times at the expense of her neighbors is not regarded by the author as requiring "any interpretation." How this demonstration is to be achieved without considering German history in large chunks and interpreting it must remain a mystery. This book is in fact an interpretation in terms of the pan-Germanic thesis. That the history of any country can be understood in terms of any particular thesis is to be gravely doubted. The life of a nation is far too complex for that.

While he has produced no definitive study, he has written a popular work casting a strong light on an important phase of modern German history. He has exposed to public view the duplicity, brutality, faithlessness, and the complete lack of a moral code in present-day international affairs. Permeated with a strong sense of indignation it is in a way a moral revulsion at the facts which he has had to expose. Wertheimer and Tims have gone over the ground in certain aspects more thoroughly: he shares the same fear of Germany that characterised Chéradame. Dr. Grossman has included some rather extensive quotations for such a small book and somewhat meager personal reminiscences, which could have been longer, although hardly decisive evidence.

It is interesting to note that his account of possible Polish border difficulties has proved prophetic. His account of the rape of Czechoslovakia reaches a pitch of restrained indignation. And the present score on "what-to-do-with-Germany" may be tested against the march of events. He well says that "our problem is not the rebirth of Germany but of a reconstruction of Europe," proving him to be a man of perspicacity. The book is in short merely an introduction to a tremendous historical problem, useful to untraveled laymen only.

One minor point. A check of a number of Byron authorities does not substantiate the author's assertion that Lord Byron died at Argirocastro. (p. 69) Argirocastro, in southern Albania, is about 200 miles from the scene of Byron's military activities. While differing as to year (Fyffe says 1823) they unite in placing his death at Missolonghi, on the northern shore of the Gulf of Patras.

Hunter College

GEORGE WASKOVICH

ODLOŽILIK, OTAKAR, *Tvář Ameriky*. Prague: Václav Petr, 1946. Pp. 49. Kčs. 7

Professor Odložilík, well and warmly remembered on many American campuses from his four years' stay among us, has reprinted, somewhat reworked, several articles he wrote for *Zitřek* (New York, 1942-44) and *Obzor* (London, 1942). These essays were originally intended for Czechoslovaks abroad, during the war, but now collected under the title "The Face of America" they are

evidently destined for Czechs and Slovaks at home. Throughout they bear witness to the closeness of his observation, the aptness of his choice of the essential. He was not dismayed by the manifold nature of American life, its penchant for "gadgets", nor by some of the excesses of an ebullient people. He emphasizes with warmth as well as humor, the passionate desire of the American people for freedom and the missionary fervor with which they engaged in a worldwide and costly war to help win it for other peoples. America is fortunate in having such a sympathetic interpreter.

University of Colorado

S. H. THOMSON

BRANNANDE ÖSTERYJOPROBLEM. No. 1. August Rei, *Balticum och Sovjetunionens Säkerhet*, Uppsala, 1944, Pp. 53; No. 2: Birger Nerman, Robert Murray and Ignas J. Scheynius, *Balticums Rätt*, Uppsala, 1944, Pp. 24; No. 3: Olle Nystedt, Sven Danell and Birger Nerman, *De Baltiska Folkens Lidanden*, Uppsala, 1944, Pp. 17; No. 4: Paul Olberg, *Baltikum. Fantasi och Verklighet*, Uppsala, 1946, Pp. 61. Published by Baltiska Kommitten.

To Swedes today the problem of the Baltic is the current phase of a question that is about as old as Swedish history. These four pamphlets were published in Sweden during and after the second World War under the general title of "Burning Baltic Problems." At least two of the authors, August Rei and Paul Olberg, are natives of "Balticum"; the others are Swedish pastors and publicists. The first three issues appeared in 1944; the fourth, by the Latvian editor, Paul Olberg, was composed in 1945 and published in the following year. All four pamphlets constitute an ardent plea for the independence of the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Russian claim that the inhabitants of all three states gave an overwhelming majority in favor of union with the U.S.S.R. in 1940 is flatly denounced as fantastic nor do they admit the validity of the Russian argument that the territories are needed for defense. Sir Stafford Cripps in his effort to defend the imperialism of Stalin by comparing it favorably with the policy of Trotsky,—made in an interview with a Swedish weekly journal in 1942,—is charged with ignoring completely Stalin's published letter to Ivanow of February 14, 1938. The emphasis throughout is on the right of the three states to a restoration of their national freedom on cultural, ethnographic, political, and geographic grounds. In his "Balticum, Fantasy and Reality" (Uppsala, 1946) Olberg presents statistical and other data to support his claim for the progress made by these states in trade, agriculture, agrarian reform, and social consciousness. He maintains that the Russian social experiment has completely failed to fulfill Soviet promises.

University of California, Los Angeles

WALDEMAR WESTERGAARD

KALLAS, AINO, *Leinretkedel Londonis. Kaksteist aastat Eesti Londonisaatkonnas, aastail 9122-1934. Mälestusi Inglismaast, Ameerikast ja Hollandist. [On Journeys of Discovery in London. Twelve Years in the Estonian Legation,*

1922-1934. Memories of England, America and Holland.] Translated by Johannes Aavik. Stockholm: Estonian Publishing Co., 1945. Pp. 304. Swedish Kr. 10.

This new book by the Finnish-Estonian writer, Mme. Aino Kallas, commands particular interest because her husband, the late Dr. Oskar Kallas (who died at the beginning of 1946 in Stockholm, an exile from his native country), was for twelve years Estonian Minister to the Court of St. James. The book contains no diplomatic revelations but is rather a collection of impressions gathered by a writer of great creative gifts whose zest for life led her to explore London society. She gives the reader a good picture of the life of a representative of a small nation and it will be gratifying to Englishmen and Americans alike—there is a record of a journey through the United States—to find themselves depicted with great understanding and warm sympathy. Chapters on Buckingham Palace, visits to Princess Beatrice and the Princess Royal are followed by meetings with writers at the PEN club. There is a special tribute to the International Women's League on whose behalf Mme. Kallas worked. The memories of her American visit are enlivened by a lunch with Adolf Ochs at the *New York Times* office and a Debate, in 1926, on Fascism, organized by the Foreign Policy Association. Presumably Mme. Kallas intends to add a volume on the life of her husband to show how one of the outstanding folklorists of his days became a successful diplomat.

F. W. PICK

BULLITT, WILLIAM, *The Great Globe Itself. A Preface to World Affairs*. New York: Scribner's 1946. Pp. vii, 310. \$2.75

In this book Mr. William Bullitt, United States Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1933-1936) and to France (1936-1940), appraises the world situation and offers suggestions to policy-makers in Washington. Like so many recent discussions of world affairs, this one focuses upon Russia. Mr. Bullitt returns a verdict on Russia which differs sharply from that of the author of *Mission to Moscow* and which, two years ago, might have been classed as Nazi propaganda. However, in the bright light of 1947, German defeat, and recent Russian imperialism, Mr. Bullitt's argument will find more support.

As Mr. Bullitt sees it, the democracies are in an unfortunate predicament vis-a-vis Russia because they (particularly the United States under Franklin D. Roosevelt's leadership) attempted to appease the unappeasable Stalin. The basic difficulty stemmed from Franklin Roosevelt's "ingrained" optimism which failed to get a written guarantee against Russian expansion at the time lend-lease privileges were extended to Russia. Moreover, argues the author, Mr. Roosevelt overestimated his own ability to sell Premier Stalin the doctrine of good faith in mankind, which perhaps meant convincing him that he did not need Central Europe, the Balkans, the Near East, and large additional sections of the Far East for *Lebensraum*. The reader is given the picture of Roosevelt the schoolmaster at Teheran, patiently instructing Premier Stalin in the failure of American

dollar diplomacy and suggesting the advantages Russia might gain in initiating a good-neighbor policy. Stalin liked the schoolmaster and profited from the lesson to the extent of declaring that "he had no desire to own Europe" (quoting Mr. Mullitt, p. 18). Premier Stalin received an A in the course when he suggested that Russia was underpopulated and reconstruction would occupy the national energy. Fourteen months later the weary Roosevelt journey to Yalta to agree that his apt pupil should have the Kurile Islands and control of the Chinese ports of Port Arthur and Dairen, perhaps for reasons of strategic necessity. President Roosevelt died before it became generally apparent that he had lost his gamble on Stalin. The pupils had done brilliant work in the course, but he had failed to develop character. The list of countries in which the Red Armies are camped is too long to bear repetition. But would there have been a different outcome if Harry Hopkins had obtained a signed statement of Stalin's non-interest in Central Europe and the Balkans as a *quid pro quo* for lend-lease aid?

This misplaced confidence in Stalin places the United States in a position where her vital interests—the Monroe Doctrine, the Atlantic Doctrine (prevention of "the west coasts of Europe and Africa, or the waterways to the Atlantic or the islands of the Atlantic" by "any nation, which might in the future attack either North or South America")), and the Open Door Doctrine—can be threatened by the Soviet Union. Why does the Soviet Union pose a threat to these vital American interests? Chiefly, believes Mr. Bullitt, because the leadership of the Soviet Union is dedicated to the destruction of bourgeois states, and the leadership is willing to resort to the use of "ruse, cunning, unlawful method, evasion, concealment of truth" to gain a world victory for communism. France dominated by the Communist Party would, the author believes, violate the vital interest of the United States' Atlantic Doctrine, since the French Communists would be taking orders from Soviet Russia, a power capable of attacking North or South America.

But all is not yet lost. Mr. Bullitt submits the theory that now is the time to stop Soviet aggression and to convert the armistice into peace. The United States should not attack the Soviet Union; that would reduce us "to a moral level not far above that of the Communists." But "we should not hesitate to use the atomic bomb to stop new crimes of Soviet Imperialism." Such a threat, the author believes, would curb Soviet imperialism. The distinction between using the atomic bomb to attack Russia and using it to stop crimes of Soviet imperialism is almost too subtle for the reviewer's comprehension. And then, too, as Mr. Bullitt admits, the threat value of the atomic bomb is reduced to nil the moment Russia manufactures atomic bombs. More feasible, or at least so it would appear, is the suggestion that the United States support a democratic federation in Western Europe. Such a federation should include some Germans. "If we do not admit the Germans as equal citizens of a free Europe, the Soviet Union will incorporate them as subjects of an enslaved Europe. The Communists

have at least the negative virtue of not being racists. They accord to all the hundred and sixty-five races and tribes of the Soviet Union equal and impartial bondages" (p. 201).

Despite Mr. Bullitt's persuasive argument and literary skill, certain of his shortcomings may be noted. Perhaps he might have made greater effort to understand the Russian mentality. At least part of the secret of success in living in a world with the Soviet Union will depend upon such an understanding, though it need not involve a defense of Soviet policies. Mr. Bullitt believes the Russian leadership resorts to concealment of truth and evasion, yet he has employed the public utterances of these leaders to construct his case. How can he be sure he has deduced his conclusions from lies rather than facts? The value of the Straits to the Soviet Union appears to be distorted. Historians who read the book will be disappointed to learn that Austria shared in the Second Partition of Poland (p. 43), but they will not be disappointed to find an index and three appendices containing some interesting material.

University of Colorado

RICHARD M. BRACE

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PEACEMAKING IN PERSPECTIVE

by F. W. Pick

PROGRESS in the making of peace after six years of Hitlerian warfare appears so slow and protracted that it seems necessary to survey the path the world has traveled so far and to view our pursuit of peace in perspective. With a public still in two minds about the results, even the nature of the decisions, reached at Teheran and Yalta there is real danger that the new chapter of peacemaking as it is being written—at Potsdam, London and Moscow in 1945, and at Paris and New York in 1946—become blurred and unintelligible. The very size of pressing day-by-day problems, together with the protracted procedure adopted by statesmen who are feeling their way towards a more peaceful world, may well cause a lack of interest when a supreme effort of public participation is most needed; it may cause a lack of understanding which would lead to a new sense of frustration and impatience. Yet it is patience that is of the essence of peace, just as ruthless and swift action is of the core of war. And in surveying the field to be tended by foreign secretaries—and the road travelled so far—we shall see that patience is well rewarded and it is simply untrue to dismiss the whole work as "Poker at Paris" (or London, Moscow, New York). Instead, we may report progress.

I

"Peace" was quickly made in 1919. On January 18 the Paris Peace Conference held its first plenary session: by June 28, after half a year's work, the Covenant of the League had been written, the Versailles Treaty with Germany, the Anglo-American Guarantee Pact of France and even the Minority Treaty of Poland had all been signed. In a mere six months, it was believed, peace had been found and secured. We know now that the work was a mixture of principles of the past with the new forms of

international collaboration. If it did not secure peace, it was because the two component parts blotted one another out till neither force nor good neighborliness was able to save the world from Hitler's war. It had been hastily conceived in the over-optimistic spirit which had moved the great President, Woodrow Wilson, to state on November 11, 1918: "My Fellow Countrymen: The armistice was signed this morning. Everything for which America fought has been accomplished . . ."¹ No man could have repeated these words in 1945. Nobody did. Instead, on May 8, 1945, President Truman said: "If I could give you a single watchword for the coming months, that word is—work, work, work . . . We must work to bind up the wounds of a suffering world—to build an abiding peace, a peace rooted in justice and in law. We can build such a peace only by hard, toilsome, painstaking work—by understanding and working with our Allies in peace as we have in war."² This is much more than the mere expression of the fact that it must be harder to move out of the world of Hitlerian warfare than it was last time: it is clear expression of the truth that peace is no by-product of military victory but must be built carefully and patiently. We should take courage from this absence of facile optimism—so long as it does not deteriorate into absence of idealism.

Lloyd George, like Woodrow Wilson, was too certain of success. "It is not difficult," he thought, "to patch up a peace that may last until the generation which experienced the horrors of the war has passed away."³ A similar argument can still be heard: surely, the knowledge of the devastation wrought by atomic bombs, coupled with the daily and nightly experience of "orthodox" aerial bombardment suffered by millions, must lead to peace. Lloyd George argued thus—"it is comparatively easy to patch up a peace which will last for 30 years." These words, written on March 25, 1919, for the benefit of the Paris Peace Conference before they finally drafted their terms, have been proved wrong. They are doubly so, because he was certain to have built better and to have assisted in framing a lasting peace, not a patched-up expediency. Within fourteen years, by 1933, the basis of the work of Paris of 1919 had been shaken. This lesson assists us in seeing the task of peacemaking in the right perspective.

If the process of peacemaking was too hasty in 1919 nobody should give way today to impatience with the cumbersome swaying of the peacemaking machinery which rumbles along from Conference to Conference, spending each time very many weeks on procedural questions. It is all

¹ *The Paris Peace Conference*. Foreign Relations series. vol. I, p. 1.

² The Department of State *Bulletin*, XII, 307, p. 885.

³ Cmd. 1614. Memorandum circulated by the Prime Minister on March 25, 1919.

part of the healing process: clear-cut decisions, if insisted upon too early, would either lead to an uneasy compromise of mutually exclusive methods and aims or to a head-long clash on the morrow of the armistice. Neither would provide the world with a peace which we owe the dead and the maimed everywhere. What we pay now—by way of uncertainty, by haggling, turning and revolving—is well spent if it leads to a better peace, i.e. to better understanding and co-operation.

Important as these facts are, can it be denied that the public in many countries appears disappointed, critical, often exasperated? Such criticism is wholly mistaken if directed against the time spent or the procedures adopted—but appears wholly sound and healthy, promising even, if directed against some of the decisions themselves which often have little bearing on the principles which must underlie a true peace settlement and, worse, even flatly contradict such principles. We need but recall the promise of the Atlantic Charter and compare it with the present-day picture to see how far short of fulfilment we are to realize what are the short-comings of our world.

II .

Preparations for peace were begun all too late last time: when the end came, in 1918, plans had to be improvised. Even the American preparatory commission, the so-called "Enquiry" had set to work too late and had largely acted along the wrong lines (as late as December 22, 1917, they thought of a Greater Bulgaria, forgetting Greece altogether; as late as November, 1918, they collected data according to which Italy wanted Tripolitania, English and French Somaliland, Ethiopia, Fiume, etc., etc.,)⁴ The marvel was that the expert commissions eventually set up at Paris worked as well as they did. In fact, many of their deliberations can serve as a model to this day and no student should neglect to read their full protocols now so generously published by the American Department of State. Whenever they were given clear directives—e.g. to fix an ethnic frontier leaving a minimum of minorities on either side—they gave quick and competent and wholly practical answers.

This time, previous to 1945, preparations for peace were taken in hand at an early date. Even the outsider must have been struck by the fact that practically all the leading men of the universities of the free world disappeared from their class room and study and could be found "on active service"; to quote but one example, Chicago University and the

⁴ *The Paris Peace Conference, op. cit.*, I, p. 41-53, 416-47.

Journal of Modern History has had to do without Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt who later caught the eye of the outside world as "Special Adviser" to the Secretary General of the San Francisco Conference in 1945.⁵ The material collated and marshalled by our greatest experts in their own field is available to the Governments of the free world, assuredly to those in London and in Washington. Since it remains unpublished the public cannot judge it—and in so far remains without guidance. It cannot be proved therefore, and yet it may be stated with confidence, that "all the solutions worked out for Europe by the men called upon to do so have been thrown overboard." In other words: what had been agreed upon by expert opinion to be the fairest and most workmanlike solution of the European problems has not been applied. Why? The answer is to be found in Teheran and Yalta. Of the published agreements then arrived at in the name of the American, British and Russian peoples we know almost too much: it was then that Persia was promised independence and integrity of her territory; it was then that the Big Power right to veto almost any action by the Security Council was invented and sanctified. Of the unpublished agreements we see the effect throughout partitioned Europe: the misery of the European masses is but Teheran and Yalta writ large.

Where preparations were both begun early and brought to fruition was not in the field of European problems but in the long-term aim of making peace secure: in the erection of the peace structure of the United Nations. Last time the League of Nations was quickly formed under the urging impulse of Wilson; it was made part and parcel of the actual peace treaties signed immediately afterwards. This time, the two are kept distinctly apart: the United Nations organization is already at work at a time when the major victors have not even agreed on a draft to be kept in mind while administering their separate zones of Germany, a draft eventually to be transformed into a peace treaty eventually to be submitted to a German State,—an imaginary unit of the future. Whether this separation can work may sincerely be doubted. As silently accepted so far, the United Nations is to be the machinery for the promotion of long-term peace in all areas except those of the defeated enemy. However, viewed by itself, the new structure, building upon the experience gained under the old League, can claim admiration and inspire trust: given the will to make it work, the machinery can work. No less than 49 States have renounced the right of exclusive sovereignty in so far as they shall not remain judge in their own case, but shall submit to the findings of the

⁵ Graph facing p. 8; *Bulletin*, XIII, 314.

Eleven of the Security Council. If the other five (or, if we leave the legal world and look at the Powers themselves, the other two) act likewise, peace is secure.

III

The solution of the questions posed by the end of hostilities has been attempted first at Potsdam (July 17-25 and July 28-August 2, 1945), next in London (September 11-October 2, 1945), then at Moscow (December 16-26, 1945) and at Paris (April 25-May 16, 1946) this is but the opening series of further such meetings. What has been achieved by these meetings?

Potsdam

It must be remembered that the war with Japan was still being waged when the Big Three met at Potsdam on July 17, 1945—the two atom bombs were only then assembled and the surrender of Japan did not come before another month had passed, i.e. on September 2. The first nine meetings were attended by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden; only the last four days found Mr. Attlee at the head of the British delegation, with Mr. Ernest Bevin as the new-comer to the Conference. The press was completely excluded, but there were several lengthy communiqués by way of summaries of the work done.

It was then decided to set up permanent machinery in London to prepare the ground for the five foreign Secretaries of Great Britain, Russia, China, France and the United States who were to meet periodically—hence the subsequent meetings in London and Paris. The immediate task they set themselves was the "submission to the United Nations [of] treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland." Thus it was the community of the United Nations which was to remain final judge. Next, this machinery was to be used "to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe." Again, the verb was "to propose," not "to decide." Finally, the Council of Foreign Ministers (and their deputies) "shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the government of Germany when a government adequate for that purpose is established." This Council of Five was to be used as an additional instrument of, not as a substitute to, the Council of Three envisaged by the Yalta agreement. The European Advisory Commission, sitting heretofore in London, was dissolved—part of its tasks being transferred to the Control Commission in Berlin, part to the secretariat of the Conference of Five.

There was widespread agreement on Germany, both in the preventive measures to be taken forthwith and in the long-term policy to be carried out over a longer period of time. Disarmament was to be complete. No central German government was to be established, but there were to be "essential (sic) central German administrative departments, . . . particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry." We know now that these decisions and the whole lengthy part headed "Economic Principles"—all formally initialled by Messrs. Stalin, Truman and Attlee—read as so many pious promises. They remain unfulfilled. The chapter on Reparations, however, reads as a series of decisions largely carried out: they provided for the dismantling and transport of German industrial equipment. The same holds true about the disposal of the German navy and merchant marine, the transfer of the Königsberg region to Russia and the trial of war criminals. On Austria there was no agreement: Russia had asked for the immediate extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria; agreement was postponed until the arrival of British and American forces in Vienna. On Poland agreement was reached: free elections were to be held; the final frontiers in the West were to await the peace settlement, but the Oder-Neisse line was to be the administrative frontier of the Polish State. This was clearly meant as a face-saving device,—the Anglo-Saxon Powers confirming Teheran and Yalta by giving way in the territorial question, Russia giving way on the question of the internal structure of Poland which was to be fixed through secret ballot of "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties."

No agreement could be reached on the Russian proposal concerning trusteeship territories: it has not been published and may therefore be taken to have implied Russian participation in the future administration of former Italian colonies. The suggestion was passed on to the deputies of the Four Foreign Secretaries who were to work out the Italian peace treaty. Finally, there was agreement on what was described as the transfer of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to be effected in "an orderly and humane manner."

The text of these agreements gave rise to the hope that Central Europe would soon find itself following an agreed road. Instead, the world was to see not only a deviation from this text but an open breach; what had looked like the beginning of cooperation proved, for the time being, the end of an agreed policy for Central Europe. Europe was partitioned. There only remained President Truman's impressive statement,

delivered at the raising of the Stars and Stripes over the United States Group Council Headquarters in Berlin on July 20, 1945: "There is not one piece of territory or one thing of a monetary nature that we want out of this war." Great Britain has said as much again and again. Russia, for a variety of reasons, has deviated from this fundamental principle of peace. In her expansion, and in the reasons which made her travel so different a road, must be found the evil that bedevils the world and hinders the process of peacemaking.

London

The first session of the Council of Five Foreign Ministers began in London on September 11, 1945: it broke up on October 2, no agreed texts of decisions having been accepted; in fact, there were no decisions worth mentioning. For the first time French and Chinese Delegates took part; when they turned out not to be a mere addition to the Russian voting power within the Council, a fact which had become clear by September 22, M. Molotov asked for their exclusion from the discussion of the Balkan Treaties, adding that China should withdraw altogether from the discussion of European questions and the United States from the negotiations with Finland; France, he thought, could safely be admitted to the preparation of the Italian treaty (the reason for this was to appear in Paris in May, 1946). Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes for the Anglo-Saxon Powers refused to rescind decisions already taken and were not ready to erase the previous agreement on the participation of the Powers from the record of their discussions. Whereupon the conference adjourned *sine die*.

The deputies were left behind to piece together what they might find amongst the tentative directives worked out by their chiefs. Italy should undertake to secure the four freedoms; she was to disarm and trust the United Nations; the Italo-Yugoslav frontier was to follow—"in the main"—ethnic considerations and Trieste was to become a free port irrespective of which side it was eventually to belong to. This demand appeared within the reach of the possible since, on June 9, 1945, the Government of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia (to give it its self-chosen name) had signed a formal agreement with Great Britain and the United States and had withdrawn its troops to a line not very far short of the ethnic frontier. "The Yugoslav people are hurt," Tito's Government had then declared, "that upon the request of our Allies the greater part of the Yugoslav Army must withdraw. Yugoslav authorities made no deportations or confiscation

of property and no arrests save on grounds of military security."⁶ The clue to the need of such Yugoslav withdrawal must be found in these words on deportations, confiscations and arrests which were producing a *fait accompli* to clear the whole land of people openly loyal to Italy. Eventually, a Commission was sent out to fix an ethnic line after a visit to the disputed area; it led, however, simply to a reiteration of the Yugoslav claim by the Russian member of the Commission. Unlike the various Committees set up by the Paris Conference of 1919 similar machinery to-day proves of no avail as long as there is no unity of purpose in the political field.

At the London session some days were spent in discussing the international opening up of Europe's waterways, a system which has proved its worth on the Danube for almost three generations and which had been widened in its beneficial application to all main German waterways in 1919. It was Hitler who—unilaterally—destroyed this system as far as his arm could reach: and the Danube system too had naturally been suspended during the war. The Anglo-American Powers pleaded for speedy re-introduction so as to free the choked channels of European trade. Russia blocked progress, and it appears that she considers such a proposal to be a reimposition of the terms of the Paris Peace of 1856 when, after the Crimean War, the Danube was first freed from exclusive sovereignty and opened up to all comers on equal terms.

German reparations (actual progress of dismantling of industries), the Ruhr (production for prosperity with security for all), Displaced Persons (forcible return to former place of residence or freedom of choice), the feeding of Austria and, finally, an American proposal to enter into a twenty-five years' pact for the disarmament of Germany were other subjects touched upon. During the last days of the session Mr. Byrnes urged the early assembly of a full Peace Conference but the Soviet Delegation was not empowered to discuss so far-reaching a proposal.

Moscow

Since the first session of the Five Ministers, i.e. the organization agreed upon at Potsdam, had produced no results, the American Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, proposed to revert, for the time being, to the Yalta machinery (Mr. Byrnes had been present at Yalta too, as an adviser) and to call a meeting of the Three. This took place in Moscow on December 16, 1945. There Mr. Molotov's London request was granted at the outset—France and China were excluded from all Balkan Treaties, France only participating

⁶ *Bulletin*, XII, 312, p. 1096.

in the Italian settlement, and America withdrawing from the Finnish discussions. Only afterwards was there to be a fuller conference, of the Big Five together with Australia, Belgium, Belorussia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia and the Ukraine. "The conference will be held not later than May 1, 1946."

Rumania was to be given a new Government by M. Vyshinski, Mr. Harriman and Lord Inverchapel (then Sir A. Clark Kerr)—the Government thus broadened was subsequently recognized by the Anglo-Saxon Powers. In Bulgaria "the Soviet Government takes upon itself the mission of giving friendly advice. . . ."; when it turned out that this advice did not include the dissolution of the single-list Parliament already established, no broadening of the Government could be carried out and no Anglo-American recognition was granted the Bulgarian minority system.

The three Ministers agreed to the establishment, by the United Nations, of a Commission for the control of Atomic Energy; it was hoped that a road had been opening to a lessening of mutual suspicions of which secretiveness on the one side and spying on the other were but an open sign. The major work achieved, however, was a survey of the Far Eastern problems where it appeared that the United States was accepting the Soviet Union as a complete equal: in fact, Mr. Byrnes, on coming home, was charged with having sold Eastern Europe for the American concession of half-partnership in the Far East. Put this way, the Moscow meeting would indeed have to rank with Teheran and Yalta rather than with the peacemaking assemblies after the end of hostilities.

There was no agreement on Persia. But M. Stalin promised "wholeheartedly to support" the American proposal for a 25-years' pact on German disarmament—this promise was made during the interview he gave Mr. Byrnes on December 24, and this, together with the date of May 1 fixed for the general Peace Congress, explained the buoyancy of the returning Mr. Byrnes.

Paris — Part One

Again, the deputies resumed work on the draft peace treaties in the light of the directives of yet another meeting of their chiefs. Invitations were sent with remarkable promptitude to the Five Foreign Secretaries to assemble in Paris a week in advance of the meeting of the Twenty-one, fixed for May 1, to give the draft treaties their final form. Mr. Ernest Bevin for Britain, Mr. James Byrnes for the United States, Mr. V. Molotov

for the Soviet Union and Mr. Georges Bidault for France began their "final preliminaries," which were to lead up to the Peace Conference proper, at the Palais de Luxembourg on April 25, 1946. They had before them the draft treaties with Italy, the Balkan countries and Finland. Proceedings opened with a quiet declaration by M. Molotov that—having convened at Paris—he thought it right if France were to participate throughout the Conference, and so should the United States, while the Finnish Treaty would be discussed even if the latter two were not to vote on the agreements. He thus suddenly reversed the attitude taken in London and Moscow: China alone remained excluded from European affairs; France was re-introduced (as originally requested by both Britain and America). The reason for this became clear soon enough: France was to vote with Russia or, in the absence of a formal vote, to side with Russia over the question of Trieste and even over the Italian colonies. In short, France was ready to assist the Russian attempt to sway Italian opinion in her favor by restoring to Italy an African foothold (and thus make them forget the loss of Trieste).

Italy was put first on the agenda. Agreement was reached about her elimination as a naval power—she was to keep four cruisers, the rest of her fleet being divided between the Four as well as Greece and Yugoslavia (details of actual distribution to be worked out by naval experts). The French claim to minor frontier rectification near Mt. Cenis and the small villages of Briga and Tenda—the wider claims in the Aosta valley having been waived—was also accepted; the communities involved are only a few thousand souls and the economic argument advanced by Italy (the need to preserve the power station of Tenda which serves Genoa) was not found convincing. Next came Italy's Northern frontier: here too agreement was quickly reached, the Austrian wish for the German-speaking part of South Tyrol south of the Brenner being rejected. Thus the transfer of German-speaking peoples, first offered to Italy as part of the price she was paid for entering the war of 1915,⁷ was to be sanctified once more: both France and Russia urged this step since they were to propose a far-reaching loss of Italian-speaking populations to Yugoslavia; neither Britain nor America felt strong enough to resist the demand. Instead of discussing this question as part of the problem of Austria's survival as an independent democratic State, based on self-determination at home and abroad, they had allowed

⁷ Cmd. 671. Agreement between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, London, April 26, 1915.

themselves to be manoeuvred into a position where the Tyrolese frontier became a mere side-show of the vast Italian problem.

The future of the Italian colonies was repeatedly discussed: again, it was Russia which made a sudden turn, giving up her original demand for a Trusteeship administration under a Russian official of Tripolitania. She was now ready to be satisfied with an administrator for Tripolitania minus Cyrenaica, to admit an allied advisory council, with a corresponding arrangement for Cyrenaica where Britain might supply the chief administrator. Italians, she thought, might be admitted as deputy administrators. France more than echoed this suggestion: she was prepared to see North Africa return to Italy so as to make certain that no system of colonial administration more progressive than her own would be installed beyond her own Tunisian lands. The United States, on the other hand, held fast to the original suggestion of a United Nations Trusteeship administration at the end of which, in ten years' time, there was to come complete independence for the populations concerned. It was the fear of the latter which made France join hands with Russia. And Britain? She still could not see how a general UNO administration could work. Independence within ten years appeared to her a noble aim which, indeed, should be accepted all round: but meanwhile individual Powers must be given the task of administering the territories involved which Mr. Bevin proposed to call Libya. This, M. Molotov suggested, smacked of a British desire to establish her own influence behind "a fair-seeming screen." It is true he himself had not even bothered to erect a screen when he demanded first Tripolitania, and then at least Cyrenaica. Moreover, Britain could point to her record—the Mandates over the Middle Eastern lands which have been transformed into independent States and become members of the United Nations; to the case of Egypt, of the new India—and thus doubly repudiate such a charge.

Both sides then reconsidered their position. Russia accepted the French proposal—i.e. the return of the territories to Italy under what M. Molotov had previously called a "fair-seeming screen." Britain was ready to forego her suggestion of a united Libya to be erected a free State within ten years and to give Italy a Trusteeship over Tripolitania (for which France held out too), provided Britain were given the Trusteeship over Cyrenaica: without it she could not fulfill her pledges to the Senussi (nor safeguard her Mediterranean interests which must be based on the friendship of the peoples along its shores). But no further advance was made. The proposals were repeatedly reconsidered, for the last time on May 14; the bundle of mutually contradictory drafts was then handed on to the deputies.

As to Eritrea, where Mr. Bevin had supported Ethiopian claims, and as to Italian Somaliland, which he hoped to see united with British Somaliland and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (if possible under British trusteeship), no decisions were reached. Thus the whole colonial question continued to hang fire.

The demand for reparations to be paid by Italy, made by Russia on her own as well as on behalf of Yugoslavia and Greece (\$100 million to the Soviet Union, another \$200 million all told to Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece) was repudiated by America and Britain who have both supplied large amounts by way of relief to Italy, sums they should want to see refunded first. Perhaps part of this demand appeared to some to be "a fair-seeming screen" for a Russian come-back in Greece. When M. Molotov refused to give priority to the Italian debts for relief supplies by Britain and America and further refused to consider as part-payment the Italian ships Russia was to receive (they were booty, he claimed, not reparations), no agreement was possible. And the same proved true of the main issue, the disposal of Trieste. M. Molotov was not ready to stand by the London decision envisaging a frontier as close to the ethnic line as at all possible: he claimed the whole region for Yugoslavia, including about half a million Italians, on the strength of economic considerations. Without both Trieste and Fiume, he argued, Yugoslavia could not prosper. France followed suit, in spite of the fact that the French member of the Frontier Commission had proposed an ethnic line very similar to the American and British. To his other listeners the demand appeared economic imperialism writ large—an attempt to close the Southern outlet of Central Europe except through Russian-dominated lines of communications. Would Russia make a similar attempt in the North when the future of northern ports would come up? Those who were at Yalta have spoken of a discussion about the future of the exit from the Baltic which must make them pay particular attention to the demand for Trieste.

Thus Italy, having surrendered unconditionally on September 3, 1943, was no nearer a definite peace treaty or admission to the United Nations; instead, she was given—temporarily—less severe armistice terms as proposed by Mr. Byrnes.

On May 8—one year after Germany's surrender, one week after the date fixed for the general peace conference of the twenty-one—the Ministers turned to the Balkan Treaties: since Bessarabia and Bukovina have been incorporated into the Soviet Union M. Molotov suggested that the blow be softened and the whole of Transylvania be returned to Rumania. The

others acquiesced. Hungary, on top of this, was asked to pay the standard rate of reparations—\$300 million, as in the case of Italy, to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Mr. Byrnes thought this sum excessive and a decision was postponed but not before M. Molotov had spoken of the United States holding \$3,000 million Hungarian assets, whereupon Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the gold held in trust at Frankfurt was a mere \$32 million!). The United States and Britain then asked for the opening up of the Danube, on equal terms, to all and sundry: a suggestion M. Molotov refused even to entertain. Thus, to Trieste, there was added a second stumbling block. Again, it was the same—and century old—clash between the demand for exclusive rights, closed spheres and priority rights of commerce and communications on the one side and the wish for a free interchange on the basis of equality for all. No agreement was possible.

There was some desultory talk on Bulgaria, M. Molotov thinking of a bargain with Britain and the United States. if they would withdraw their troops from Italy (the only possible line of approach for Britain to her zone of Austria) he would withdraw from Bulgaria. Of course, he had promised the latter as far back as London—nothing could come of such a suggestion. It brought the Ministers, quite naturally, face to face with the Austrian problem: a withdrawal of troops from there would open the way to a withdrawal all round, from Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and would also make unnecessary any further passage through Czechoslovakia. But Austria was not on the agenda. The other treaties having been reached, M. Molotov refused to consider an additional item. Again, complete failure.

Finally, what of Germany, the power which, after all, was the crux of the whole matter? France had waited, patiently, to see her plans discussed for a separate Ruhr region, a Rhenish province, a Saar basin within her own economic system etc. But when the discussion came, at the very end of the conference, it was to prove disappointing to her as to others. Mr. Byrnes had repeated his proposal for a 25 year pact to keep Germany disarmed, and M. Molotov refused to entertain it: he wanted to know how far Germany had been disarmed. The American Secretary of State then put on the table an additional set of proposals which showed careful preparation: at Potsdam it had been agreed to dismantle German industry in all zones but to treat her as an economic unit. The first America had faithfully fulfilled—the latter had not been kept by the other parties concerned. Unless the unitary system was applied, as promised, he would stop carrying out the other half of the agreement; he could not continue

shipments of industrial plants if he had to send in, in their stead, food and more food. He proposed five definite questions to be put to a special committee which should work out a draft treaty for Germany of the kind they intended eventually to submit to a reformed German State — such draft to serve meanwhile by way of directive to all four zones.

To this M. Molotov did not agree. He was obviously little concerned about the scrapping of the other half of the Potsdam agreement as far as the American zone was concerned. Neither did he show any sign of being impressed by the alternative set of proposals the State Department was known to have worked out in case of permanent Russian refusal to apply the unitary arrangements of Potsdam. It provided for an appeal to the General Assembly of the United Nations to set up an European sub-organization, presumably in Geneva, with a customs union and economic organizations for Western Europe. Such decisions could be reached with a mere two-thirds majority, no veto right being applicable in the General Assembly. Having adopted the attitude of a *beatus possidens*—as late as April 23 he attended the dinner M. Stalin gave to the four Finnish Ministers ordered to come to Moscow to put their signatures to a "final instrument" of peace—and having staked his claims to Trieste and an unspecified base in the Eastern Mediterranean, M. Molotov did not budge. He accepted, however, the proposal to have a second part of a similar Paris Conference on June 15, 1946. The remaining sixteen Foreign Secretaries, due a fortnight earlier, would have to go on waiting, though some, like Dr. Evatt of Australia, had arrived in good time.

STANFORD HALL, LOUGHBOROUGH, ENGLAND

(To be continued)

REMINISCENCES FROM LWÓW, 1939-1946

by Zygmunt Sobieski

WHEN, on September 22, 1939, Soviet troops entered Lwów, that town, normally about 320,000 inhabitants, had a population of at least half a million, a great number of refugees, Poles and Jews, having sought shelter there from the advancing German front. On September 17, Russia had officially broken off diplomatic relations with the Polish government and had sent its troops into the chief centers of Eastern Poland, Vilna and Lwów. During an interval of about three days (September 19 to 22) the people of Lwów had been uncertain whose prize the town would become. The Russians, advancing from the East, met scarcely any resistance from Polish troops, who were inclined to consider them as allies against the Germans. But they were to learn better. After several hours of fraternization the Polish garrisons of Tarnopol and of other towns of Eastern Galicia were disarmed, interned and afterwards deported to the interior of Russia. Years were to pass before the more fortunate among them were permitted to join Anders' corps and leave Russia. Many of the officers were to meet cruel death at Katyń.

The Polish commander of the Lwów garrison, General Langner, had been in great doubt as to whether to surrender the town to the Germans, who had unsuccessfully tried to capture it by a sudden onslaught on September 12 and were preparing a push into the interior, or to let the Soviet troops enter. To defend the unfortified town against the massed forces both of the Germans and the Russians would have been impossible. General Langner had preferred the "neutral" Soviet troops to the official enemy.

The appearance of the Soviet troops and the peaceful retreat of the Germans, pointing to a Soviet-German understanding, was received with mixed feelings by the heterogeneous population of the town. The Polish majority were awe-struck and deeply depressed. The Soviet-German understanding seemed to indicate a new partition of Poland between its two powerful neighbors. The Ukrainians, although not at all russophile, had waited long for a chance to get home-rule for Eastern Galicia with its Ukrainian majority of peasant population. To their minds such home-rule represented the preliminary step towards an independent Ukraina comprising not only Eastern Galicia, but also the remaining Ukrainian territories with their chief area belonging to the U.S.S.R. The urban population of Eastern Galicia was mostly Polish and Jewish, its chief centre, Lwów, having an Ukrainian majority of only fifteen per cent. The Jewish population of

Lwów (thirty per cent, i.e. about 100,000 people) consisted of two different elements: an orthodox mass living mostly in difficult economic conditions, and a well-to-do class comprising mostly culturally polonized individuals. The relief of the Jews was unanimous when they saw the terrible danger of a German occupation definitely avoided. It seemed clear that they were going to be favored by the new masters of the town. The Soviet policy was, in the first place, anti-Polish because of Polish cultural superiority; and in the second place, anti-nationalist as regards the Ukrainians. Ukrainianism was favored only as an antidote against the strong Polish influence which radiated from Lwów all over Eastern Galicia and, in spite of national antagonism between Poles and Ukrainians, had protected that province from communism. Ukrainian nationalism was therefore played up against the Poles to direct attention from communistic reforms and the heavy economic sacrifices they implied. But naive Ukrainian nationalists who took the official word at its face-value very soon disappeared, being either arrested or deported. Others, more prudent, either held back for future action or crossed the frontier illegally to join the German occupation forces. The Jews were prepared to bear certain economic losses, especially the abolition of private trade, in exchange for political influence and key posts in the economic administration. They were trusted by the Soviet occupation authorities unreservedly, a fact which largely accounts for subsequent antisemitic tendencies in Eastern Europe.

The first activities of the new masters of Lwów involved "nationalizations" on a large scale at the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940. Not only big industry, banks (including private deposits), shops, cinemas, but also private houses were nationalized, i.e. taken over by the State. As regards shops and private houses, exceptions were allowed in some cases. If the house contained no more than one family flat and the proprietor had built it with money earned personally by manual work or from his salary as a public employee, it was as a rule exempt from nationalization. As regards shops, they remained private property if the proprietors were running them personally or with the aid of their families only. Nevertheless, exceptions due to political or private favor were not infrequent. There were people who continued, as land-owners of two-storied houses, to collect rent from the parties living there. But on the whole the first nationalization of private houses, which took place in early winter 1939-40, was carried out ruthlessly. The proprietors of houses were obliged to leave their flats, and were stripped not only of their personal property, such as money, furniture, etc., but even of such immediate belongings as clothing, furs

or linen. Cases of suicides occurred and the Soviet authorities and their henchmen (largely a local element) were obliged to take a less rigorous line. Many personal belongings, even if "representing the capitalization of unlawful revenues," were henceforth exempt from nationalization. Landed property was not directly nationalized, but was distributed among the Ukrainian peasants of the neighborhood. In most cases, previous acts of Ukrainian massacreing of Polish families and of illegal appropriation and distribution of their land were subsequently tacitly legalized by the Soviet authorities. Before introducing the kolkhoz system, they considered it necessary to taper off old antagonisms, political and economic, between Polish landowners and Ukrainian farmers. A premature sovietization of agriculture might have had undesirable consequences by throwing Poles and Ukrainians together into a common anti-Soviet camp. Therefore, during the first days of Soviet aggression (September 18 to 22), Soviet airplanes had thrown down leaflets inciting civil war—"drive the landowners out with scythes and axes," signed "Timoshenko" (subsequently Marshal, 1941-42).

Land belonging to churches and monasteries was of course also confiscated, although the churches and monasteries themselves were permitted to continue their activities. Having lost their normal revenues, the churches had recourse to public charity which, being considered by the authorities as a new kind of revenue, was in its turn heavily taxed. Charity served not so much to satisfy the immediate needs of the clergy and the poor as to pay taxes, and thus prevent the closing of churches by the Soviet administration.

The chief political event of the first period of the Soviet occupation was the plebiscite arranged in October, 1939. The question to be decided was whether the population of Eastern Poland wished it to be incorporated into the Western Republics of the U.S.S.R. (Ukraine and White Russia, i.e. Bielorussia). Lwów, with Eastern Galicia, was to become Western Ukraine, i.e. a part of Soviet Ukraine. The plebiscite preceded by arrests of well-known Polish politicians, such as Leon Kozłowski, the Polish ex-premier, Stanisław Grabski, ex-minister (now vice-president of the so-called National Council—*Krajowa Rada Narodowa*) Stanisław Głubiński, former minister and head of the Nationalists, Stanisław Ostrowski, mayor of the town of Lwów—all of them University professors—and many others. Denunciations were in full swing and the terrorized population of Lwów dared not even abstain from voting. Rumors of technicalities facilitating access to the ballots, deterred many people from casting a negative vote. No one dared

initiate any anti-Soviet propaganda. The whole pre-war press, Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish, had been suppressed and replaced by two communist newspapers, "The Red Banner" (in Polish) and "Liberated Ukraina" (in Ukrainian). The members of the plebiscite committees, appointed from above, were nearly all unknown to the masses. Significantly enough, the average man in the street did not ascribe any importance to the published results which gave an overwhelming majority of "yes". In the first place, the reliability of these results met with general mistrust, just as in the case of the recent Polish plebiscite (June 30, 1946); and, more significantly, the organization of a plebiscite under the above conditions and under military occupation was considered by the people as legally null and void.

It is only after the publication of the results of this plebiscite, i.e. after gaining a pseudo-legal base for their activities, that the Soviet authorities started economic reforms and political persecutions on a large scale and in a systematic way. Deportations of Poles on an unheard of scale began in December, 1939, and continued until June, 1940. The chief categories of "reactionary and capitalistic" individuals suffering proscription and banishment were: (1) judges and public attorneys; (2) employees of the Polish political administration; (3) army officers; (4) merchants and industrialists; (5) landlords; (6) politicians belonging to right wing parties; (7) so-called Polish settlers, i.e. farmers who had bought land in Eastern Galicia after 1918; (8) refugees from Western Poland, i.e. from the German occupation; (9) families of all arrested and deported people.

These categories comprised mostly Poles, under (4), (6), (8); there were also Jews who frequently proved influential enough to escape the fate of their poorer and therefore less lucky countrymen. It is very difficult to estimate the exact number of deported people from the whole territory east of the Ribbentrop-Molotov line. The minimum number quoted was 500,000; the maximum claimed by German anti-Russian propaganda, 3,000,000. The current opinion favors 1,500,000, including about 300,000 Polish officers and soldiers interned by the Soviet Government in 1939.

The deportations took place in three substantial installments, in February, April and June, 1940; the February quota comprising chiefly settlers, whereas in June it was the turn of the refugees. During the memorable night of April 13, 1940, Lwów was thrown into panic by the appearance of numerous trucks and lorries escorted by the town militia and the N.K.V.D. (political police, now called N.K.G.B.) who roused sleeping citizens and summoned them to pack immediately for a journey of weeks or even months, mostly to the deserted steppes of Kazakhstan or of the subarctic regions of

Arkhangelsk. Many people deported during the severe winter months of 1940 died on the way in unheated and locked cattle-wagons, no care whatever having been taken to provide them with food and hot water. A great number, principally of the older generation, succumbed during the following months to hunger and exhaustion in the wilderness of Kazakhstan. The relatives and acquaintances of the deported, alarmed by occasional letters, tried to help them by sending food, money and clothing to the East. The post-offices of Lwów became overcrowded to such a point that the authorities instructed the post-office clerks to receive no packages addressed to the interior of the U.S.S.R. Customers then traveled to Stanisławów (85 miles from Lwów) or to other provincial towns in order to post their packages.

It is of course quite hopeless to try to reach an estimate of Poles still surviving in the vast territory of Russia. During the period from August, 1941 to December, 1942, when Polish-Russian diplomatic relations had been temporarily readjusted, the Polish government tried, through its accredited representatives in Russia, to collect evidence of all Poles arrested and deported or interned between 1939 and 1941. Polish committees were formed all over the immense territory of the U.S.S.R. in order to undertake their difficult task. A certain number of prisoners, military and civilian, left the Soviet territory in 1942; here again no official numbers have been given. In December, 1942, the remaining Poles "spontaneously" signed applications for Soviet citizenship in order to escape the consequences of a new strain in Russian-Polish relations. In 1944 a new agreement was signed by the so-called Polish Committee of National Liberation and Russia granting the possibility of option to ex-Polish citizens. But owing to "technical" difficulties hundreds of thousands of them still remain on Soviet territory.

Some time after the occupation of Lwów by Russian troops, when the whole bluff of an "economic and social liberation" had become transparent, the Poles began to form secret organizations of a political and even a military character. Illegal typewritten newspapers spread the news of the diplomatic successes of the Allies (England and France), and of Russian defeats in Finland. Great expectations were attached to the existence of a combined English and French Army in the Near East. The Poles expected a crusade of the whole civilized world against Germany and Russia. They were persuaded that Italy would not refuse to march on the side of the Allies if the latter supported Finland energetically. The military power of the U.S.S.R., especially as regards technical equipment, was lightly rated.

The consequence of the rise of secret organizations and of an illegal press were severe persecutions on the part of the Soviet authorities. The

population of Lwów was under permanent observation by the Soviet political police who had their spies everywhere, frequently among janitors. Continual arrests took place; several prisons were permanently filled with political prisoners who were submitted to torture and then either killed or sentenced to penal servitude. In many cases personal revenge motivated ex-convicts, especially when dealing with former judges and attorneys. The methods of trial applied by the Soviet political police was first known only by hearsay. But on June 29, 1941, when the Russians had left the town and no troops, either Russian or German, were in sight, many inhabitants of Lwów, both Poles and Ukrainians, visited the two chief prisons (in Łąki Street and Zamarstynowska Street) to look for their relatives and acquaintances. In the prison-cells they found the stripped bodies of the dozens who had been shot, some of them showing distinct traces of previous torturing (broken limbs, burns caused by acids, wires sticking out of the abdominal parts, etc.), or violation in the case of women. Subsequent excavations of the courtyards and of the caves of the prisons brought to light hundreds of victims slaughtered during the preceding winter and spring. Trying to overcome their horror and disgust, people wandered among the bodies trying to identify members of their families in order to give them decent burial. A physician, not easily impressed by the sight of dead bodies, avowed himself horror-struck at the sight of a large cell arranged as a slaughter-hall, with chains attached to a big table, hoists serving to lift bodies, and canals destined to catch the blood. Many snapshots were made by curious on-lookers; and directly after entering the town, the Germans filmed the whole scene for purposes of anti-Russian propaganda. As in the case of Katyń, anti-German world opinion ignored the facts: only in some neutral countries, e.g. in Sweden, did the German revelations produce a strong effect, which might to a degree account for Sweden's reserved attitude in the German-Russian conflict.

After the plebiscite of October, 1939, both public and economic life underwent a thorough reorganization. The administration was rebuilt along the Soviet model, with "councils" (soviets) on each level. Its activities were watched and supervised by party committees organized according to the same territorial and professional principles as the administration. There were district party committees, municipal party committees, a party committee of the University, of the Railway Administration, etc. For the purposes of administration the local element, Ukrainian or Jewish, was used in a large measure. The "ukrainization" of Lwów became a fixed idea in the mind of the new masters. Polish inscriptions, whether in public

buildings or private shops, tablets with street names, every public trace of the Latin alphabet was condemned. At the University, Polish professors and assistants were given a definite term to learn the Ukrainian language if they seemed indispensable; others were replaced by local or Soviet Ukrainians without regard to the latter's scientific qualifications. The whole Polish system of University teaching which had been analogous to the German one, was reversed and closely adapted to Soviet models. A prominent feature of the new program was a certain number of lectures and examinations to which every student was obliged to submit whatever his special study might be: "Marxism and Leninism," "Dialectic materialism," "Political economy," "History of the nations of the U.S.S.R.," etc. Owing to this political and ideological training, reminiscent of the Nazi universities, the student was unable to devote more than half his time to his special subject. Both students and professors were expected to attend various meetings, political and professional, arranged by the University authorities. Every aspect of interior or foreign political affairs which the Party wanted discussed and made an argument of propaganda furnished the occasion for such a meeting. The members of the audience knew better than to state their opinions publicly and in free discussion since the "board" of the meeting, controlled by the *politruk* (abbreviation for *politicheskij rukovoditel*, i.e. "political guide") exercised severe censorship if the discussion threatened to develop in an unwelcome direction. There were cases of local speakers, imprudently continuing to stick to the forms of "putrid" Western democracy, being arrested directly after the meeting.

In order to render the control of public opinion more efficient, a reorganization of professional unions (trade-unions) had been inevitable. Instead of grouping people of identical profession, they comprised those working in the same institution or factory. Thus, the University of Lwów functioned as a professional unit, although from the professional point of view it comprised scientists, administrative employees (managers, accountants), and manual workers. Similarly the managers, engineers, commercial employees, janitors etc. of a factory belonged to the same professional unit represented by the given factory. Such an organization had a double advantage. It permitted control of such a "professional" unit by means of a small "personal bureau" which, although forming a part of the given institution, was in reality an organ of the political police (N.K.V.D.). In the case of a real professional union comprising members working in different institutions or factories such a control would have been much more difficult and complicated. The second advantage was the juxtaposition

of several professions in the same "professional unit," the immediate consequence being that in order to get an audience, people were obliged to drop special professional subjects and speak about things more general and less disagreeable to the régime. The reader should be reminded that, whereas the Russian term for "blackleg" (*Streikbrecher*) when applied to Western countries denotes an antisocial criminal, in the U.S.S.R. mere passive abstention from work means imprisonment, and an organized strike would be punished with penal servitude or death.

In the last months before the outbreak of the Russian-German war (Spring, 1941) the mental attitude and the expectations of the inhabitants of Lwów might be summarized as follows:

(1) The Poles, being eliminated from every domain of public life, considered the Russians as open enemies not less dangerous than the Germans. The breaking down of the Western front in 1940 had been a terrific blow to their hopes of prompt relief. But the determination of Great Britain to fight it out victoriously and the British military successes in Africa (1940-41) very soon revived their hopes. They awaited the impending conflict between their two enemies with enthusiasm, although they remained fully conscious of the fact that a possible German occupation of Lwów might be an even greater menace to their biological survival than was the Soviet one. They were determined to remain rather than leave with the Russian troops.

(2) The Jews, who had occupied the leading posts in public and economic life and had rather prospered during the whole period 1939-1941, dreaded a conflict. They knew German and Soviet organization well enough to foresee correctly that the Russians could not withstand the first onslaught of their mighty enemy and would be forced to give up big territories, including of course Lwów, situated only about 60 miles from the Ribbentrop-Molotov line. They spread rumors, reflecting their hopes and desires, about the possibility of a German-Russian compromise which would place the agricultural output of the U.S.S.R. and the control of its heavy industry at the disposal of Germany. They expected big business in which they could play the part of middlemen.

(3) To the Ukrainians the imminent German-Russian conflict promised the fulfilment of their national program. After the unification of the principal Ukrainian territories by Soviet Russia it now looked as if the moment had come to shake off the Russian yoke and to lay the foundations of a great and independent national Ukraina with 40 to 45 million inhabitants. After such a loss, Ukraina representing both the granaries and the

chief industrial centers of Soviet Russia, the U.S.S.R. could scarcely recover as a first-class political power.

The week between the outbreak of hostilities (June 22) and the capture of Lwów by the Germans (June 30) was marked by guerilla incidents, directed against the Russian troops, inspired and arranged by Ukrainian nationalists. The Poles observed the strictest neutrality. Owing to the low percentage of Ukrainians in Lwów, these incidents were on a small scale, but they nevertheless succeeded in making the Russians nervous. They left the town 24 hours before the appearance of the first German patrols (June 30, 1941) after having arrested and shot a number of people, among them a part of the town militia consisting of the local element.

The German policy in Eastern Galicia differed from that followed by their authorities in the *Generalgouvernement*. In Eastern Galicia the Germans liked to pose as liberators of a European population from the terrors of the Soviet régime. Although a month afterwards (August 1) Eastern Galicia was incorporated into the *Generalgouvernement* and thus became reunited with Poland, the orders and decrees issued by the *Generalgouverneur* Frank at Cracow were executed by the *Gouverneurs* residing at Lwów (first Lasch, then Wächter) with certain local modifications. Gestapo, deportations to German concentration camps or factories, sequestration of private lodgings, systematic plundering of museums, libraries, factories containing objects of artistic, scientific or industrial value—all these occurred in Lwów, but on a smaller scale than elsewhere in the *Generalgouvernement*. Public executions, which took place in 1943-44, were restricted to cases of common banditry. Perhaps such moderate conduct would have earned the German authorities the sympathy of the more naive part of the population, had it not been preceded by a "tactical error" on the part of the *Feldgestapo* which had entered the town together with the front troops. In the night of July 3 it arrested 22 professors of the University, of the Polytechnical and of the Commercial Institutes, some of them with their families, and executed them during the early morning hours of July 4. Among others were Professor Longchamps de Bériet, rector of the University, with three sons; Professor Stożek of the Polytechnical Institute with his two sons; the surgeons Ostrowski, with his wife, and Ruff with his wife and son; in all about 40 victims. Shortly afterwards Professor Bartel, ex-Prime Minister, was arrested and shot after having refused political collaboration with the German authorities. In all these cases the Gestapo was relying upon denunciations made by Ukrainian nationalists. Such atrocities could hardly be compensated for by a certain amelioration of the condition

of the Polish population as compared with its situation under the Soviet régime.

We have seen that during the Russian occupation the different nationalities of Lwów were favored in the following order: 1. Jews, 2. Ukrainians, 3. Poles. Under the Germans this order was partially reversed: 1. Ukrainians, 2. Poles, 3. Jews.

The case of the Jews was clear: they were to be totally eliminated. The whole "Judenaktion" lasted about two years, until the summer of 1943, when, officially, there was not one Jew alive except certain specialists working under strict supervision, chiefly in camps. This "action" comprised several stages:

(1) Isolation of the Jews by obliging them to wear badges. Every person who, being a Jew under the Nürnberg act, concealed his origin was immediately arrested and executed. Many suicides occurred during this phase of the action.

(2) Stripping the Jews of all their material means by imposing heavy contributions consisting not only of money, but of gold, jewels, furniture and other valuable objects. A Christian concealing Jewish property was liable to heavy penalties, most frequently a concentration camp.

(3) Creation of a ghetto, i.e. of a special Jewish quarter which was progressively cut off from communication with the rest of the town. A Christian hiding a Jew in his lodging was punished with death.

(4) In 1942 began the direct extermination of the Jewish element in several stages: (a) old people and children and some of the women; (b) the unproductive element; (c) specialists. During the severe winter months of 1942 the first victims, toally stripped of their clothes, were loaded into cattle-wagons and transported to the small town of Belzec, to be mechanically destroyed directly after leaving the wagons. The stench of the shallowly buried corpses spread for miles around. In 1943 the Germans began to disinter the bodies and to burn them. They succeeded however in doing only a part of this sinister work.

A considerable number of Jews having escaped during the Russian retreat or fled abroad or into the woods before the persecutions, the number of the destroyed Jewish population of Lwów was, according to reliable information, about 70,000. A few survived the German occupation thanks to the help of Christian friends, or by paying an exorbitant price for their survival or for false papers. The risk of hiding a Jew was very serious because of house-searchings, and many who did it, either disinterestedly or from pecuniary motives, paid with their lives. After the return of the

Russians in July, 1944 the surviving Jews of Lwów and its environments numbered no more than about 800.

With regard to the other nationalities, the German policy was more complicated. It favored the Ukrainians, but urged them to political activity in Soviet Ukraina, organizing national propaganda, guerilla warfare, sabotage and insurrections against the Soviets, and enlistments in the German Army. The Ukrainian intelligentsia of Eastern Galicia, being culturally though not nationally assimilated by the Poles, wished to replace the Polish intelligentsia of Eastern Galicia by eliminating the Poles totally. The Germans, however, were reserving Eastern Galicia like the rest of Poland (i.e. the *Generalgouvernement*) for germanization. The Polish population was to be partly assimilated and partly exterminated and replaced, not by Ukrainians, but by Germans. In subordinate posts, Poles were not only tolerated but even preferred to Ukrainians. For the sake of efficiency Polish employees of railway, post-office and partly of municipal and administration who had been dismissed by the Soviets were reinstalled, replacing the Soviet, Jewish or Ukrainian element. All leading posts were occupied by Germans.

The authorities tried to restore, as far as political considerations permitted, the pre-Soviet conditions of life, declaring all Russian innovations as legally null. Eastern Galicia was henceforth to be considered not as Ukraina, but as a province with the mixed population of the *Generalgouvernement*. The official language was German only, although unofficially both Ukrainian and Polish were admitted. Private property was as a rule restored to its legal owners. But in certain cases it could be bestowed upon another person who was economically more efficient or politically more reliable than the previous proprietor. Personal influence and bribery played an important part in each individual case, though one must remark that often the property could not have been restored because of the deportation of the legal owner by the Soviets. Houses and big landed property were not "reprivatized" but remained the property of the State, the ancient proprietors being sometimes appointed administrators. Such a solution gave the German authorities a permanent roster of available lodgings and of food production. The rights of ownership of small farmers continued to be respected, though they were liable to heavy food contributions. The property of churches and monasteries was restored, at least theoretically, under the legal provisions of the pre-war period.

As regards schools and cultural institutions, the Ukrainians continued to be favored at the expense of the Poles. The number of Ukrainian Public Schools and High Schools was in proportion larger than that of Polish

schools. The Ukrainians were allowed gymnasiums (classical schools), whereas this type of school was not permitted in the remaining *Generalgouvernement*. The theatre and the Opera, which under the Soviet régime had given performances only in Ukrainian, performed alternately in German and in Ukrainian. The Superior School, the University, the Polytechnical Institute, etc., were inactive until 1942 when the authorities organized technical and medical courses in the German language, in order to have a more qualified staff for the enormous war-machine. Although both students and lecturers were Ukrainians and Poles, the German language was imposed as obligatory in order to prevent quarrels between the two nationalities and to prepare the students for work in Germany or at least under German command. All other scientific fields which did not directly serve the war (sciences, letters, law) lay fallow during the whole period of the German occupation (1941-1944).

Towards the end of 1941 the Poles of Eastern Galicia had resumed relations with the remaining *Generalgouvernement*, chiefly with its leading political centers, Cracow and Warsaw. In 1942 the underground political and educational life was already fully organized according to instructions from the Polish Government in London. Parachutists and couriers from London appeared sometimes at Lwów though more often via Warsaw. In Lwów a delegate resided, appointed from Warsaw with a council representing the chief political parties; there were also committees of the different political parties themselves, and an illegal press of about half a dozen periodicals representing the various political programs. Not a trace of communistic propaganda existed. A secret military organization called the A.K. (*Armia Krajowa*, i.e. Territorial Army) was directly dependent upon the High Command residing in Warsaw, which itself was in close touch with London. Officers were being secretly trained from among the intelligentsia.

Much attention was devoted to higher education from which the Germans sought to exclude the Poles totally. Small groups of young people assembled in the private lodgings of teachers and professors to study the gymnasium curriculum or to attend scientific lectures on some definite subject. Secret examinations were held and diplomas issued. The teaching staff received regular salaries from Warsaw.

Life became one great conspiracy. The London Government made a clever move in permitting and even authorizing Polish employees to reenter or to continue civil service under German occupation without ceasing to consider themselves loyal to the Polish Government. In most cases employees, teachers, etc. received two salaries, a meagre one from the German author-

ities of the *Generalgouvernement* and another, generally more substantial—although paid at irregular intervals—from the Polish Government in London. Thus, the Polish staff of the Civil Service was trusted by the population who knew of its status, and no element of distrust threatened to split the national unity which was so necessary in case of an insurrection.

The reaction of the German authorities to this rapid regeneration of Polish political and national life was, as already mentioned, at first less brutal than in the rest of the *Generalgouvernement*, especially during the year 1942 when German successes in the Caucasus, in Africa and on the sea reached their culminating point and when their allies, the Japanese, still held the initiative. Arrests of people belonging to political organizations or to the staff of the illegal press took place sporadically, but there were few executions. The situation gradually changed when the Germans realized that the Polish population was fully conscious of the crisis brought on in November by the Russian offensive from Stalingrad, by the English offensive in Africa and the American landing in Algeria. The Poles were preparing to take an active part in events in Eastern Galicia where they formed only a minority. The time had come for the Germans to play up the Ukrainians as their allies against the Poles.

Up to that moment the Ukrainians had only the privilege of constituting the militia, which served to brutalize and persecute the Polish population not only of Lwów but also of Warsaw and of other towns of the *Generalgouvernement*. They often played the part of spies and informers, as in the above-mentioned case of the 22 professors or in the memorable case of the massacre of the Polish intelligentsia of Stanisławów, in the autumn of 1941, when about 250 teachers, physicians, engineers, and merchants, were arrested and executed by the Gestapo. Last but not least, they actively co-operated in the destruction of the Jewish element.

In 1943 a secret agreement was reached between the political and military German authorities on the one hand and the representatives of the Ukrainian population of East Galicia on the other. The Ukrainians agreed to place several S.S. divisions at the disposal of the German Command. They promised to start a guerilla warfare against the Russians if the latter reentered Galicia. In return, the Germans allowed them a free hand with regard to the Poles of East Galicia, at that time about three quarters of a million.

An analogous political move was made by the Soviets in Volhynia at about the same time. Following the German revelations concerning Katyń (April 14, 1943) Polish-Russian diplomatic relations were again broken

off by Russia. (It may be remarked here that, owing to the objective proofs at the disposal of the families of the victims, the Poles have never doubted the fact that the Katyn massacre of nearly 12,000 interned Polish officers had taken place in the spring of 1940 and had been therefore the work of Soviet hands.) During the ensuing period of ten weeks (ending with the tragic death of the prime minister General Sikorski, July 4, 1943) feverish diplomatic and propaganda activity on both sides deepened the gap created by the Soviet aggression of 1939. At the start of the summer offensive in July, 1943, Russia began preparing the sovietization of the Eastern border territories of Poland which, presenting a Polish minority and a low cultural level, were susceptible to communist propaganda. Massacres of the Polish population first occurred in the province of Volhynia, half a year before Russian troops entered, committed by peasant gangs calling themselves partisans but avoiding meeting the German forces face to face. The latter remained neutral inasmuch as they considered it a national Ukrainian movement directed against the Poles only. The Polish population, finding no protection on the part of the German authorities, first resorted to active self-defence by offering armed resistance. This however was objected to by the Germans who were afraid of anything resembling a military organization. The Poles were therefore left with the choice of seeking shelter in larger towns or of migrating west and abandoning Volhynia altogether. The number of the massacred Polish population (chiefly peasants) amounted to at least 60,000 or 80,000. In many cases the victims, men, women and children, were cruelly tortured before death. The villages were burnt down totally, even stables containing live cattle. In the capital of Volhynia, Luck, thousands of peasants spent weeks in the open, expecting either suppression of the mutiny or transportation to the West or to the South. The Germans availed themselves of this situation to send a part of the refugees to the farms and the factories of the Reich.

The German-Ukrainian agreement in East Galicia became effective when the fury of the Volhynia atrocities had already begun to spend itself. In the autumn of 1943 and in the spring of 1944 similar events took place in East Galicia. In Volhynia they had been the result of communist instigation; in East Galicia they met with the tacit approval of the German authorities. Whole villages were anonymously summoned to leave within 24 hours under penalty of being burnt down and having their population killed. Sometimes they obeyed and left with cattle and movables for the towns or for the West; occasionally they offered armed resistance which proved effective. Such resistance, however, was rare, because the Ukrain-

ian S.S. formations and militia not only intervened and arrested the defenders for the unlawful possession of fire-arms (a crime punishable by death), but also took an active part in the massacres of the Polish population. Atrocities equalled those in Volhynia, the number of victims being scarcely less. Panic broke out even in the towns. People began to leave for the West, owing partly to the real danger of a massacre organized by the Ukrainian militia, partly to the potential danger of the approaching fighting front. The Soviets, having recaptured Kiev (November 6, 1943) stopped about 8 miles east of Lwów, in the neighborhood of Tarnopol, and were there preparing for a spring offensive.

Owing to their collaboration with the Germans, the Ukrainian nationalists were far more afraid of the Soviets than the Poles. Their not very numerous intelligentsia were fleeing west, to the *Generalgouvernement*, to the Protectorate, even to the Reich. In the autumn and winter of 1934-44 their fury at the German defeat vented itself on the Poles who suffered both at the hands of the Gestapo and of the Ukrainian militia searching everywhere for secret organizations and for surviving Jews hidden among the Polish population. Trucks covered by tarpaulins, escorted by Gestapo and Ukrainian militia, containing several horizontal layers of stripped victims, men and women, whether members of secret organizations, hostages, common criminals, or Jews raced through the streets of Lwów going east to the "Sands" (piaski) outside of the town where ditches had been prepared for new executions. After dark the Ukrainian militia stopped travelers and shot without further ado those who answered in Polish or carried Polish documents. At times lists of 50 or more persons sentenced to death for venial offences were published by the authorities with the announcement that their lives would be spared or their execution postponed if the population helped the authorities to catch an important political criminal, e.g. the murderer of an S.S.-man.

On the evening of Easter Sunday (April 9, 1944) Lwów experienced the first Russian air-raid carried out by 80 to 100 airplanes, on a larger scale than the German air attacks of 1939 and 1941, when the number of planes did not surpass two dozen. The bombs used by the Russians were of medium calibre and normal house caves proved sufficient shelter against them. The number of victims was, therefore, relatively small. The air raids were repeated on April 17 and 27 and on May 1 and 2. The Soviet Command, being informed by its spies that owing to the lack of bombing precision the casualties and material losses of the Germans were too small in proportion to the damage done to private buildings, stopped the raids

entirely. At least, so common opinion alleged. It is a fact that between May 2 and July 22, when the first Russian patrols entered Lwów, not a bomb was dropped on the town by Soviet airplanes.

The direct psychological effect of the April bombardments was an accelerated evacuation of the town. The German authorities favored it by providing special evacuation trains without, however, compelling people to leave. The German civilians who had come with the military forces were of course the first to be taken out of danger. Then came the collaborationists, chiefly Ukrainians, and the different categories of *Volksdeutsche*, chiefly Poles; finally, a considerable number of people who after the experiences of 1939-1941 could not bear the sight of a Soviet citizen, whether military or civilian. The ebbing away of the population, lasting several months and reaching its highest point in May, 1944, shifted the numerical relation between the Poles and the Ukrainians in favor of the former. The Jews and the Germans having disappeared, and the chief bulk of the Ukrainian intelligentsia having followed the Germans, the town had never been more Polish in its character than during the summer months of 1944. Against the 50% of pre-war times, it now counted a 70% to 80% Polish population. The absolute number of inhabitants had of course decreased, but no reliable figures were available.

The Polish character of the town revealed itself during the street fights which took place from the 22nd to the 27th of July. The German Command had ordered the garrison to prolong the resistance as long as possible in order to retard the Russian offensive. The sudden appearance of detachments of the A.K. with officers in Polish uniform was a rude shock to the Germans. They engaged the German forces chiefly in the environs and suburbs of Lwów and proved, according to the opinion of the highest Soviet officers, an essential help to the Russians. The street fights did some damage to the buildings, but scarcely any to the civilian population.

For the first time since 1939 the town was spontaneously decorated with Polish colors. The partisans helped the Soviet military authorities by mounting guard over military and public sites, keeping order and directing the movements of Soviet columns. The Polish-Soviet collaboration remained friendly until the Russian authorities received instructions from Moscow.

In order that the reader may fully understand the situation we would remind him that at the beginning of 1944 the Soviet Government had offered to resume diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London if the latter accepted a demarcation line between Poland and Russia practi-

cally coinciding with the Ribbentrop-Molotov line (i.e. the Curzon line plus the annexation of Eastern Galicia by Russia). The offer had not been accepted because the Polish Government, although ready to make certain territorial concessions, was not willing to renounce the two large Polish national and cultural centers of Vilna and Lwów. On July 22 (the day on which both Vilna and Lwów were captured by Russian troops) the Kremlin created a second Polish Government, the Committee of National Liberation, consisting chiefly of pre-war communist refugees scarcely any of them known to the general public, which of course accepted any territorial changes the Soviet Government desired.

Direct action against the Polish London Government began as early as the 30th of July. The delegate of the London Government, Adam Ostrowski, was arrested with several other civilians belonging either to the Council or to the secret administration. All officers of the A.K. were summoned under military pretext and arrested. Public opinion was informed that incidents proving the hostility of the A.K. towards the Soviet forces and the political police had taken place which necessitated the dissolution of the A.K. This "dissolution" consisted of the persecution of those who had worked actively against the Germans. Every person who had been imprisoned by the Germans and was therefore suspected of having belonged to a secret Polish organization and of being politically active was liable to new imprisonment as a potential A.K. man. Principally young men were spied upon and followed, and their acquaintances and neighbors harassed for information as to whether they had been seen carrying arms or Polish badges during the street fights. Wholesale arrests were to take place some months later, being retarded by Churchill's move to bring about a final understanding between Russia and Poland. The prime minister of the Polish Government in London, Mikołajczyk, flew to Moscow on the 1st of August, the day of the outbreak of the Warsaw insurrection. The Polish-Russian problem had become very complicated, inasmuch as, besides the territorial problem, the question of a reconciliation of the two Polish Governments had arisen. After ten days of unfruitful negotiations, Mikołajczyk returned to London. No help was given to the defenders of Warsaw by the Soviet Armies watching the hopeless struggle from the opposite bank of the Vistula. When, after nine weeks, Warsaw had been subdued by a German division, Mikołajczyk undertook a second journey to Moscow, this time in the company of Churchill himself (October 10 to 20, 1944). The communists demanded a majority of at least two thirds in the future Polish cabinet, whereas Mikołajczyk, considering them only as a fifth political

party besides the four already represented in the London Government, allowed them one third at the most. As regards the territorial claims of the Soviets (46% of pre-war Polish territory), Mikołajczyk, under the combined pressure of Stalin and Churchill, was willing to make large concessions except in the case of Lwów and its surroundings. Further negotiations were to take place if the Polish National Council (representing the Parliament) and the Government in London accepted Mikołajczyk's point of view concerning both problems. But the Polish Nation and Government, protesting against being treated by Russia as a defeated enemy country, did not accept the Moscow propositions, and Mikołajczyk resigned on the 25th of November.

Until then the Soviet authorities of Lwów had been uncertain of the political future of the town. Even Krushchhoff, the head of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party, when visiting Lwów in the beginning of November, 1944, said to one of my informers: "We do not know yet to whom Lwów will belong." After Mikołajczyk's dismissal the Soviet Government decided to collaborate only with the Polish Committee of National Liberation. It was raised to the rank of a Government and exchanged accredited representatives, first with Russia, then with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

The Russian point of view, according to which Eastern Poland (and, implicitly, Eastern Galicia) had been annexed by Russia legally in conformity with the desire of the population expressed in 1939, was obediently accepted by the Committee of National Liberation. Starting from the supposition that the Polish inhabitants of that territory were no longer Polish citizens but had become Soviet citizens, the Soviet Government and the Committee signed an understanding (autumn, 1944) permitting them to recover Polish citizenship by leaving home and migrating to the West of the "Curzon Line." The Ukrainian inhabitants of the territory in question, though former Polish citizens, were not permitted to leave it. On the contrary, the Committee of National Liberation bound itself to encourage Ukrainians, White Russians and Lithuanians living west of the "Curzon Line" to move east, thus contributing to the establishment of a clear national delimitation between Poland and the Soviet Union. The surviving Jews were permitted to leave for Poland and to become again Polish citizens.

Besides the legal aspect of this convention (apparent legalization of the plebiscite held in 1939) it had another and more important result. The Soviet authorities wanted to eliminate the Polish population and thus create a *fait accompli* by depriving Poland of ethnographical arguments at the future Peace Conference. They knew that, given the right to leave, nobody would stay in the U.S.S.R., and that the Poles would declare for Polish

citizenship. Therefore they put certain time limits to this right of option, expecting to create a state of haste and panic among people afraid of remaining for life in the U.S.S.R. They did not reckon with the political education of the man in the street. The final decision concerning the ancient Polish territories was to be rendered only at the Peace Conference, and therefore the common man was resolved to stay, hoping that even in the worst case, i.e. if Lwów was awarded to Russia, the Peace Treaty would leave its inhabitants the right of option. The months of November and December, 1944 elapsed with scarcely anybody spontaneously leaving Lwów.

The authorities became impatient. Being bound by considerations of international policy they wanted to keep up the appearance of a spontaneous migration. To accelerate it they resorted to indirect but drastic measures, chiefly extended arrests during the night of January 3, 1945. Here again it is difficult to quote even an approximate number, but in Lwów itself it must have been in the thousands, since one party of prisoners alone, transported to Voroshilovgrad and released successively during the second half of 1945, numbered 1600 persons, out of whom 15% died before returning. In comparison with 1940 the charges brought against those arrested were completely changed. Not capitalistic or antirevolutionary members of society but various kinds of *Volksdeutsche*, members or sympathizers of the A.K., collaborators or adherents of the Polish Government in London, were the chief categories incriminated. Every accusation, even an anonymous one, if directed against a Pole, had a chance of being effective. The chief aim was to eliminate the Polish population clinging so persistently to Lwów. Lwów itself being looked upon as a stronghold by the Polish population of the surrounding villages. Therefore the authorities used every means to terrorize the people, causing them to flee before arrest or, if arrested, releasing them only after a severe injunction to leave the town immediately. Another means of diminishing the Polish element was the handing over of males aged from 18 to 50 for military service to the Polish authorities west of the new frontier. This levy, which had begun directly after the recapture of Lwów, discarded the weak, non-working element, and retained people who were still useful to the Soviets from the economic or military point of view. Finally, there were minor measures, such as oustings from lodgings, the nationalization of private shops started during the German occupation, the imposition of exorbitant taxes,—all forcing people to quit business and leave the area.

The war was approaching its end, and the spirit of the Poles was not broken by these persecutions; since they implicitly trusted the Allies and

the Government in London, and attached great hopes to the forthcoming result of the Crimean meeting of the three powers. It may be said without exaggeration that the announcement by the Russian radio and press of the resolutions of Yalta (February 12, 1945) was to the inhabitants of Lwów the most terrible blow since 1939. The Allies not only supported Russia in its territorial claims with regard to Poland but acknowledged the communist Committee of National Liberation rather than the London Government, as the foundation of a Temporary Coalition Government. If optimists still hoped that the territorial concessions defined by the term "Curzon Line" did not comprise Lwów (inherited from Austria and not from Tsarist Russia), Churchill's commentary on the Crimean Convention left no doubt about the matter. A few days after the meeting, when speaking about the Polish problem in the House of Commons, he spoke of "The Curzon Line, including of course the exclusion of Lwów from Poland."

The Russian press and its affiliated Lwów organs were becoming more and more aggressive towards the Polish Government in London, its subterranean administration in Poland and the A.K. In February the intelligentsia of Lwów was summoned to sign an insulting proclamation directed against the London Government. Besides the communists and their sympathizers, few people were induced by open threats to sign. Shortly afterwards the two chief promoters of this pro-Soviet policy, (the physician Bielecki and the professor of chemistry Lenganer) were sentenced to death and executed by a secret organization.

But the power of resistance of the population, hitherto unshaken, was reaching its breaking-point. The spring of 1945 represents the beginning of the great migration movement to the West, agreed upon by Russia and the Committee and tacitly approved by the Allies at Potsdam. Train upon train left Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, the territory of Vilna etc., carrying many people materially ruined, morally on the verge of collapse, still desperately clinging to their homes, but obliged to leave them under the threat of losing their liberty and life. This "spontaneous" migration proved an arrangement destined to rob people of the rest of their movable property. The first published text of the convention allowed the departing Poles the possibility of taking with them all goods and chattels. Gradually, different paragraphs of Soviet legislation were referred to by the mixed Polish-Soviet Commission residing in Lwów, in order to enable the half-nomadic masses of the Soviet population moving into Lwów to acquire the appurtenances of sedantary life at a cheap price. It was therefore strictly forbidden to take with one any kind of furniture or objects of artistic value. One could sell

them cheaply, but one was not permitted to export the money, because the export of gold, silver and paper money, both Soviet and foreign, was prohibited. Gold and silver objects, even watches and rings (except plain marriage rings), jewels of all kinds were liable to confiscation. The Poles leaving Lwów were allowed to take along money up to 1000 zloty (10 dollars at the official rate, nowadays in reality about \$1.00). Since people preparing for the journey and selling their movables often had thousands of rubles at their disposal, they tried to invest them in goods which they intended to sell in Poland in order to get back their investment. Here again they met with difficulties, the frontier authorities confiscated coffee, tea, spirits, cameras, typewriters, radios and even tinned goods under various legal or specious pretexts. Luckily the corruptibility of the Soviet officials occasionally helped Poles to rescue their property. But there were cases when the passengers of a migration train were completely stripped of their belongings, as in May, 1946, at the frontier station of Rawa Ruska.

The migration movement comprised not only local Poles and Jews but also those returning from exile in the U.S.S.R. Among the latter, Jews (both former Polish and Soviet citizens) predominated, trying to get as rapidly and as far as possible to the West. In the case of Jews, the Soviet authorities did not object to their citizens leaving the country for two reasons: they expected from them communistic propaganda in the West and in the Near East; antisemitism was rapidly gaining ground among the masses of the Soviet population, leading even to local pogroms, as in Kiev, in 1945, where the Jewish element formed a majority after the war. To deflect the attention of the population from this problem, particularly delicate because of the strong Jewish influence in the Party, the Party instructed all authorities not to appoint Jews to any prominent or leading posts, not to allow either anti- or pro-Jewish publications, and to favor the emigration of Jews.

Even people belonging to the Ukrainian intelligentsia occasionally tried, by procuring false documents, by bribing Soviet officials or by marrying Poles, to get the right of option in order to leave the Russian zone of occupation. A great change had taken place in the attitude of the Ukrainian masses towards Soviet Russia. In 1939-1941 they had considered the Soviet occupation as a temporary stage leading to a united and independent Ukraina. In 1941-1944 they had declared themselves pro-German, hoping to realize their national aspirations. But in 1944 the Soviets returned with the slogan "death to Ukrainian nationalism!". Nevertheless, the anti-communistic peasant movement proved too deep-rooted to be rapidly eradicated. Organized during the last stage of the German occupation, the Ukrainian

guerrilla warfare did not so much harm the Russian forces as hamper the Soviet administration. Nor did it cease with the defeat of Germany. Districts removed from lines of communication—woods and mountains—had been in the hands of the partisans since the German capitulation. The Soviet authorities tried to suppress the movement, first by force, then by persuasion (thus revealing their weakness), finally by force again. These Ukrainian partisans were called "Banderists" after their ancient organizer and leader, Bandera, assassin, in 1934, of the Polish minister of the interior, Heracki. He had found shelter in Berlin, becoming a political instrument in the hands of the Germans who, since the beginning of the twentieth century, had availed themselves of discontented Ukrainians to create political tension in Poland. It is a well-known fact that the present Banderist movement is being supported from abroad. From time to time airplanes with parachutists are signalled whom the authorities try to catch by offering big rewards, though as a rule in vain. It is furthermore a fact that at the present Polish-Russian frontier the Banderists are in touch with the Polish partisans (N.S.Z., *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne* or National Armed Forces, a continuation of the subterranean A.K.). Towards the end of 1945 a tacit Polish-Ukrainian armistice was concluded in order to establish a common front against the Bolsheviks.

The chief stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism in Eastern Galicia has always been the Greek Catholic Church. It differentiates the Ukrainians from the Roman Catholic Poles, thus preserving them from national assimilation. On the other hand, it creates a serious gap between them and the much more numerous Soviet Ukrainians who are either Orthodox or atheists, and culturally inferior to them. To storm this rampart of different confession, which safeguarded the Galician Ukrainians against dissolution and absorption by the Soviet mass, the authorities undertook an attack on a large scale against the Catholic Church of Lwów.

That town has been for centuries the residence of three Catholic Archbishops: Greek, Roman and Armenian Catholic. Whereas the Armenian Catholic Church of East Galicia numbers only a few thousand souls, the Greek Catholics represent the absolute majority of the population. Not only do the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians belong to the Greek Catholic Church, but also thousands of Poles profess the same creed. Historically they continue the Orthodox tradition of the Seventeenth Century which became Catholic though retaining certain external peculiarities in rite, liturgy and Church Law, e.g. the Old Slavonic language in liturgy or the permission for priests to marry before ordination, though only unmarried priests may

be consecrated bishops. The supremacy of the Roman Pope is fully acknowledged.

The influence of the Vatican also greatly irritated the Soviets. For several months they tried to persuade the Greek Catholic Bishops, with Archbishop Slipiy at their head, "to shake off the yoke of the Vatican" and to join the Orthodox Church of Russia by doing homage to the Patriarch of Moscow. The bishops remaining firm, they were all arrested (April, 1945), deported to Kiev, tried for collaboration with the Germans and sentenced to death, though as far as is known at the present time the sentence has not yet been carried out.

The Soviets then succeeded, chiefly by threats, in winning over a certain number of village priests, about 200 out of several thousands, who were summoned to Lwów and there held a Council at the See under the beneficent auspices of the N.K.G.B. (security or political police). After a plenteous banquet the decision was reached to return to the maternal Orthodox Church, and a declaration was issued representing the spread of Catholicism in East Galicia to be a result of cruel political persecutions on the part of Polish landlords in the seventeenth century. The Council elected an Orthodox Archbishop who acknowledged the supremacy of the Patriarch of Moscow. Letters of allegiance were sent to Stalin and Khrushchhoff. The Greek Catholic population was officially informed that, although all confessions received equal treatment in the U.S.S.R., in Western Ukraina (i.e. in East Galicia) the Orthodox confession would be the privileged one. The Orthodox Church authorities, backed by the political police, started their work in the villages. The Greek Catholic priests were summoned either to surrender or to leave. In the latter case they were obliged to flee, as a refusal to join the Orthodox Church was often followed by arrest and deportation. The Greek Catholic priests, being family men, did not offer as much resistance as would have been expected from a Catholic priest; the majority of them passively accepted the new hierarchy, more especially as the two Churches, Greek Catholic and Orthodox, differ only in dogmatic subtleties whereas the external rite and the liturgy are nearly identical.

When the Greek Catholic churches were changed into Orthodox (January, 1946), the reaction of the Ukrainian population was quite unexpected. Many abstained from going to church at all, others preferred to frequent Roman Catholic churches in spite of the unintelligible Latin language and the unfamiliar ritual. The Roman Catholic Easter processions in April, 1946, often consisted of more Greek Catholic Ukrainians than Roman Catholic Poles, both in Lwów itself and in the country.

But the days of the Roman Catholic Church, which the Ukrainians regarded as a refuge, were also numbered. It was slowly but systematically eliminated by the Soviet authorities, *pari passu* with the removal of the Polish population. For political reasons the Soviets dared not revert to such drastic measures as they adopted in the case of the Greek Catholic Church. They restricted themselves to injunctions and threats, sequestrations of Church buildings, monasteries and episcopal residences, for public purposes. Ordered by the authorities, the Roman Catholic Archbishop Bagrák left Lwów on May 15, 1946, and was followed by the various religious orders, Bernardins, Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, etc., who left the town during the second half of May. The lay clergy awaited the departure of their parishioners before leaving themselves. Church after church was closed or immediately changed into a store-house or an office. To stamp out Catholicism completely, the Soviets had also arrested the Armenian Catholic administrator with his priests, so that out of about twenty-five Catholic church-buildings of Lwów there is only one functioning at this moment, namely the Roman Cathedral where the mass is celebrated once a week.

Little remains to be said about the period subsequent to the Armistice. On May 9, 1946, the boisterous jubilation of the occupiers contrasted with the deep sadness of the population who had waited six years for the appearance of Polish and Allied troops. The depression grew still stronger when, in June, the Allies acknowledged the Communist Temporary Government and abandoned the representatives of the London Government to be arrested, tried and sentenced in Moscow. People were shaken by the apparent weakness of the Allies, and this impression was confirmed by the decisions of Potsdam. In the autumn, 1945, the ebbing away of the Polish population became very pronounced. By the end of the year about 60,000 Poles had left the town and migrated to the west. The rest were still hoping for a change in the international situation or for the activation of the Peace Conference. But the endless talks at the London Conference, the first Paris Conference, and second Paris Conference brought no material change in the situation. Discouraged by the prospect of a hopeless future, by the moral, cultural and material decay of the town, exhausted by the effort of lifting a half-Asiatic mass culturally, the remaining Polish inhabitants began to leave during the spring and summer of 1946. By the middle of August, 1946, 120,000-130,000 Poles had left the town; 15,000 at the most still remained, resolved to stay for better or for worse. Lwów was no longer a Polish city.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK TWO YEAR PLAN

by George Gibian

EUROPE is moving toward a controlled economy. With the exception of certain western and Scandinavian countries, European governments took an active part in the regulation of commerce and industry since very early days. The principles of free private enterprise, *laissez-faire*, and the doctrine of the sphere of business being independent of the legitimate sphere of action of government never sank their roots in Central and Eastern Europe as they did in England and in the United States. On the contrary, it was usually the government which even directly helped establish, and fomented, key industries.: Peter the Great brought iron foundries to Russia, and the railroad systems of Central Europe were developed by the governments.

Since the end of the war a renewed trend towards government-managed economy has been apparent in Europe. Governments are nationalizing key industries; not only have Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia done so, but even England has nationalized a segment of its mining and other industries. But nationalization is only one aspect of the increasing control exercised over economy in Europe. Its complement is planning. And we have seen one country after another promulgate plans for the direction and reconstruction of the national economy. Russia is already engaged on her fourth Five Year Plan. Poland this summer announced a Three Year Plan, Sweden has a Five Year Plan, Holland also has a Fiscal Plan, and Czechoslovakia has been the latest country to set its economy on a steered path.

What are the reasons for the shift and landslide in the direction of nationalization and planning? Partly, we have seen, some elements and principles of government participation have always been recognized in Central Europe. In Czechoslovakia, state-owned and state-managed enterprises in the year 1937 already constituted a large fraction of the national budget. Their total working expenses amounted to 7452 millions Crowns (Kč), and receipts to 8329 millions Crowns. The most profitable state enterprise was the Tobacco Monopoly, which had a net profit for the year of 1936 of 1186 millions Crowns, a considerable amount in comparison with the total state receipts of 10,323 Crowns for that Year. The state lottery, post office, postal savings bank, railroad, forests, mines, and foundries were some of the other governmental enterprises.

Neither is the theory of state planning new to Europe. Wagemann

in Germany, Keynes in Great Britain, Maiwald, Slechta, Verunáš, and Hajda in Czechoslovakia favored economic planning to one degree or another. Czechoslovakia even had a governmental economic plan prepared in February 1939, shortly before the final German occupation.¹ But it is only now that planning is being carried out in practice on a large, comprehensive scale.

There are many reasons for the present turning toward state planned economies on the part of the peoples of Europe. The depression of the pre-war years is one factor. The ideas of Keynes and the instability of the economy with its business cycles and inability to maintain the level of investment, and on the other hand, the theories of Marx, constitute another. The power of trusts and cartels in Central Europe was such that economic planning in the form of control by gigantic chains of corporations already existed; it was a simple step for the people to take to demand the transfer of control to the state.² The war supplied the final impetus: many of the financiers and business heads were discredited by collaboration with the Nazis, others were killed by the Nazis for refusing to collaborate; the countries were left in a devastated state in which a general shortage of raw materials and goods necessitated the allocation of essential goods and services and the control of, and establishment of priorities over, the flow of materials and labor; and finally the strength shown by the Soviet Union in the war moved many peoples to resort to measures similar to those of the Soviet economic system.³

The general governmental program of action announced by the Czechoslovak Government in Košice in April, 1945, indicated increased governmental participation in economic matters. Nationalization of key industries was decreed in October, 1945. As for economic planning, the Communist Party took the main initiative and was the only party to incorporate a Two Year Plan as part of its program in its election platform in the National Elections in May, 1946. After the relative success of the Communist Party in the elections, and the formation of a government headed by K. Gottwald,

¹ Jiří Hejda,

² Antonín Basch, *Industrial Property in Europe*, New York, 1944 gives an account of public ownership and controls in Europe.

³ See the excellent article "Europe Debates Nationalization" by Barbara Ward in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1946. There was extensive discussion of the plan in the Czechoslovak press. Typical of the best of this discussion are the articles in the July 18, Aug. 17, 22, 23, 27 and Sept. 13, 1946, numbers of the *Svobodné Noviny*, the most highly regarded of the Prague dailies.

⁴ The Prague daily, *Lidová Demokracie*, and others of July 9, 1946, carry the full extensive text of the governmental statement of program of July 8.

the new Czechoslovak Cabinet, representing all political parties, directed the Economic Council on July 8 to work out a Two Year Plan for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation⁴ for the years 1947-48. The General Secretary of the Economic Council, Dr. Edvard Oustrata, became Acting Chairman of the Planning Commission under the nominal Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, Klement Gottwald.

The actual work of establishing a detailed program for the plan was done by 12 sub-committees, under the control and supervision of the Central Planning Commission. The main over-all tasks and directions of the Plan were decided on by the Cabinet, being considered political decisions. The committees were to work out the body of the plan, the amounts of raw materials, labor, and aid which would be necessary to reach the levels set, and the details of the plan, but the principal levels and tasks had already been established by July 8. Sub-committees were set up for individual branches of the national economy, for agriculture, industry, transportation, construction industries, for co-ordination, for labor, for raw materials, for investment; and others for special problems (the settlement and stimulation of industries in backward sections, for reform of public administration, for wages, prices, and finance, and for industrialization of Slovakia.) Detailed questionnaires were sent out to all industrial branches and plants, and hearings were held. The Central Planning Commission concluded its work on October 6. Some censure was expressed of the fact that through leakage of information the Communist Party paper *Rudé Právo* was able to announce already on October 7 that the drafts of the plan had been agreed by the Central Planning Commission, whereas all other papers were informed of this later.⁵

The draft of the plan was placed before the government and after approval by the cabinet was sent to the National Constitutional Assembly, which passed it as law and proclaimed it formally with a great deal of celebration and festivity on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day.

In order to evaluate the provisions and aims of the Plan adequately, it is necessary to compare the tasks set by it with the production and economic situation of Czechoslovakia before the war and with the production today. To gain better perspective, it is also instructive to compare the Two Year Plan of Czechoslovakia with the Three Year Plan of Poland and with the present Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union in order to observe what differences and what similarities may exist.

⁵ *Dnešek*, No. 29, p. 452, October 10, 1946, expresses its indignation at this "scoop."

The Czechoslovak economic system is at present a mixed one. It consists of nationalized enterprises, of co-operative enterprises, and of private enterprises. Thus in October, 1946, 19.3% of industrial enterprises were nationalized, employing 61% of the country's industrial labor, and the rest, consisting of smaller plants, were either cooperatives or private enterprises.⁶ In the Two Year Plan only about one third of the national economy is provided for. In some fields exact production figures are set up for industries; this is the case in those sections of industry which work for the internal market exclusively, and in which the need is the greatest. In other sections, such as those industries which produce primarily for export markets, only rough total figures are set, since elasticity will be needed in meeting uncontrollable demand. Thus, for instance, the exact numbers of tractors and agricultural machines to be manufactured are set, and specific individual hydroelectric power stations are designated and planned for construction, but in the textile industries, working largely for export, only the overall total goal to be reached is given.

The main efforts are to be made in coal mining, in electrification of the country and in construction of power plants, in mechanization of agriculture, and in the relocation of industries partly to Slovakia and partly to areas at present neglected by industries.

The coal problem is one of the crucial ones. Coal is the basis of the country's economy. Upon a sufficient supply of it depend the steel, iron, and metal working industries, the synthetic gasoline manufacture at Most, the transportation system, and most other branches of industry. The production of hard coal in the 8 months, January to August, 1946, was 9,205,000 tons, for the 8-months period, May to December, 1945 it was 6,046,000 tons, and for an 8-months period under the Two Year Plan the quantity of 11,136,000 tons is called for. In soft coal the amount mined in an 8-months period in 1945 was 8,666,000 tons, in 1946 12,960,000 tons and the aim for an 8-months period under the Plan is 15,936,000 tons. The increase in ratio of production necessary is 23% in the case of soft coal and 21% for hard coal. However, even the present rate of production is only made possible and kept up by the use of emergency "brigades" of volunteer miners, composed of schoolboys, students, workers from other industries and from cities. The lack of labor is and will increasingly be a serious one. Many Germans have left the coal fields, especially the Duchcov-Most and Falknov fields in Northwestern Bohemia. The

⁶ Statement of Minister Boh. Laušman to the Committee of Industries of the Czechoslovak National Assembly, October 3, 1946.

problem of finding enough manpower, accentuated by the removal of over 2 million Germans, is the most difficult of all the phases of the Two Year Plan. In August 1946 600,000 German laborers and their families had already been transferred to the Reich; in mining alone, 30,000 German miners will have to be replaced. By November 1946 800,000 German laborers had gone.⁷

The 1937 production of hard coal was 16.9 million tons, of soft coal 18 million tons. The yearly production aimed at under the Plan is 16.7 million tons of hard and 23.9 million tons of soft coal. Thus while the hard coal output aimed at is not quite up to the prewar level, the soft coal production is to exceed considerably the prewar level. But one important factor to keep in mind in evaluating the coal program will be the method of mining and quality of the product, as well as the quantity achieved. The over-intensive exploitation of the mines by the Germans has left the mines poorly timbered, and many veins prematurely exhausted and ruined. A great amount of work should be done to make good these war damages, and not merely to increase immediately the net amount of coal mined without regard to long-range needs.

Electrification is the second main field of emphasis under the Plan. Many new hydroelectric plants are going to be built during the Two Year period. Most of these are to be in the valleys of the Vltava (Moldau) in Bohemia, and the Váh in Slovakia. The current produced is to increase to 7400 millions kWh, which represents an increase of 35% over the present production, or 75% over the prewar level. The real significance of this lies in the consideration that the development of the latent hydroelectric resources of Czechoslovakia will make possible a large saving of coal which is now being used for the production of electric current, and will make possible the greater use of coal either for export, or for industrial use domestically, and for the production of synthetic gasoline. Further, the power plants of Slovakia, where less than one half of the population is able to use electric current at present, will supply a source of energy for new industrial areas, and will be of benefit in raising the standard of living of hitherto neglected areas.

The transfer of many industries to Slovakia is the third main point of emphasis under the new plan. There are 15 small districts in Bohemia and Moravia which are also to receive extraordinary financial and material help in order to industrialize. Many industrial plants are already being

⁷ *Obzory*, Prague, (weekly), August 3, 1946. The November figure is from *New York Times*, November 5, 1946.

moved to these districts, especially from the "Sudeten" frontier districts. But Slovakia remains the main area to which resettlement of plants and industries will be directed. Especially the area along the river Váh, and a section of eastern Slovakia are earmarked for construction of numerous dams and hydroelectric works. The output of the mines of Central and Eastern Slovakia, better known in the Middle Ages than in modern times, is to be stimulated. Existing foundries and rolling mills of Filakovo, Podbrezová and other areas are to be modernized. Thus a large part of the railroad-carriage plant of Varnsdorf has already been moved to Podbrezová which promises to become an important industrial center. The natural wealth of Slovakia consists of some coal deposits, of large forests, and of rich agricultural lands in the eastern part of the province along the Danube. Here the completion of another part of the plan, the increased production to replenish railroad rolling stock, would help to move the timber and other building materials from Slovakia to the populated centers to rebuild destroyed homes. United States methods of food packing are being studied and it is planned to establish new food processing plants in southern Slovakia. A chemical industry is to be developed on the basis of the coal available in the fields of Rožnava and Filakovo. At Nováky a coal field will be utilized by a new power-plant using coal.⁸

An interesting feature of Slovak industry is the shipbuilding plant at Komárno on the Danube. It is at present the only shipbuilding plant working full blast on the whole length of the Danube. At the end of the war it lay inactive, largely destroyed by bombardment. On August 20, 1945, the Škoda Works were commissioned to take over the plant, and tremendous work of repair has already been done. Ships have been salvaged, repaired, and new ships built and launched. Orders and inquiries have already been received not only from Balkan countries and the Soviet Union, but also from Iceland, Scandinavia, and even from Latin American countries.⁹ One good reason for development of Slovakia is that previously Germany was Czechoslovakia's chief commercial partner, but Russia is now being stimulated as a market and as a supplier for Czechoslovakia. Geographically Slovakia is favorably located with respect to the shift. It adjoins the Danube, and is also located on the railroad lines of communication between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia.

Ravaged and destroyed more than any of the other provinces, Slovakia will have the greatest task of reconstruction before her. In 1944, working

⁸ *Svobodné Slovo*, Prague, July 9, 1946 (daily newspaper).

⁹ O. Knapp, "O industrialisaci Slovenska a dvouletém plánu," *Dnešek*, August 1, 1946, and Karel Katteš in *Československý Průmysl*, September, 1946.

under the Germans before the war front moved into the country, destroying towns, homes, industries, and farms, Slovak metal-working industries employed over 50,000 workers, textile 20,000, wood-working plants (including sawmills) 18,600, and mines 17,000. On June 1946 only 25,600 workers were employed in metal working industries, 23,500 in the building materials industries, 14,700 in textile and 12,100 in mines and foundries, still below the 1944 figures, although the total population employed in industries in Slovakia has been steadily increasing (from 123,000 on March 1, 1946 to 150,000 on June 1.)¹⁰

In iron and steel, more modest levels of production are aimed at. By 1948 1.4 millions tons of pig iron and 2.2 million tons of steel are to be produced, compared with 1,675 and 2,315 respectively in 1937. Even such sober aims will mean an increase of 36% and 38% respectively over the present-day production. It will remain to be seen whether such a quantity will be sufficient for the maintenance of all the far-reaching expanded programs of diverse industries which depend on steel and iron as basic materials.

Of the means of transportation, the railroads will need the most attention. Before the war Czechoslovakia had 102,702 freight cars, of which only 33,900 are left. It is planned to have 110,000 at the end of 1948. This is a very ambitious program even on the assumption that Germany and some other countries at present still holding some Czechoslovak freight-cars will return them to her. The manufacture of 1144 freight-cars in Czechoslovakia in the month of August, 1946 set a record for 28 years. River transportation is also important to Czechoslovakia. The Elbe, the Danube, and the Moldau need extensive harbor-works repairs. Navigation equipment, barges, river vessels will be rebuilt and repaired. The program for the Oder-Danube-Elbe Canal, connecting the Baltic, Black Sea, and the Northern Sea will not be begun directly under the Two Year Plan. Such a project would presumably be beyond the forces of the country at present. However, there is talk to the effect that if the preparatory work on the river waterways is successfully completed in the Two Year Plan, it will pave the way and provide experience for an Oder-Danube-Elbe Canal to be built in a possible Five Year Plan in 1949-54. Negotiations with U. S. Army occupation authorities in Germany and Austria have brought about a release of Czechoslovak Danubian shipping formerly held in the U. S.-controlled portion of the river

¹⁰ These and other figures and tables are compiled from various Czechoslovak periodicals, current newspapers and government releases.

The situation in motor transportation is on the whole excellent. The density and efficiency of motor truck transportation is the same now as it was in 1937, in spite of war damages and lack of gasoline, which is produced in a still insufficient quantity by the Most synthetic plant. 37,000 trucks are now in use. It has been the relatively good condition of motor transport which has taken some of the excessive burden off the railroads. The future program for the building up of motor transport is very ambitious: 10,600 trucks are to be built in 1948, a 380% increase compared with the present rate of output, and a doubling of the prewar output.

Air transportation is also expanding. Weak in comparison with the U. S. systems, it is yet already superior to Czechoslovak prewar lines in passenger-miles, ton-miles, and number of flights. 20 Douglas 28-seaters have been bought, and one 45-Skymaster transoceanic plane ordered. Scheduled flights link Czechoslovakia with many European capitals, including London, Brussels, Moscow, and Scandinavia, and flights to New York are planned.

Agriculture has to contend with the serious question of manpower shortage. The removal of the Germans has been accompanied by the movement of Czech labor from the inland into the border regions. The total aim in agriculture is merely to reach pre-war levels of production. This means, however, that the present population of Czechoslovakia, without its former German components, is to produce on exhausted and over-worked fields, and with depleted stocks of cattle and seeds, a quantity of agricultural products equivalent to that produced by the 15-million republic in 1937. A rise by comparison with the present levels of production is planned as follows: beef, 35%, pork and pork fat, 10%, butter, 10%, milk, 75%, and eggs 50%. 100,000 Czech farming families are settling the 1 million hectares of land formerly occupied by Germans. The lack of manpower is to be compensated for by mechanization of agriculture. The electrification program mentioned above also will be of help. Most important of all, the following increase of tractors and farming machinery is planned:

	Tractors	Misc. machines
Number already in use	11,000	3-4 millions
Deliveries by end of 1946		
including UNRRA deliveries	3,000	116,000
Deliveries by end of 1947	7,000	150,000
Deliveries by end of 1947	9,000	173,000
Total in use by end of 1948	30,000	4-4½ millions

The increase in production of agricultural implements in terms of percentages is one of 140% in 1947 and 215% in 1948. In addition, 400,000 tons of phosphate fertilizers and 300,000 of nitrates will be needed.¹¹

The forests of Czechoslovakia have increased in area by 1 million hectares which have come into the possession of the government through confiscation of former German property, but German occupation and its excessive cuttings have laid bare 36,000 hectares of woodlands, rendered unusable 10,600 kilometres of forest paths and roads, neglected 70,000 hectares of plantations and nurseries of trees and cut out 13 millions of board meters. In this field also mechanization is to replace lost labor. An annual investment of 18 million Kčs is planned for afforestation, nurseries, and the planting of seedlings, and for the re-establishment of paths and forest roads.

The building and housing situation in Czechoslovakia is critical. There was a lack of adequate housing even before the war. Now, after a lapse of construction of civilian homes since 1939, and the destruction or damaging of 220,000 houses (3014 buildings were destroyed totally in Bohemia and 10,500 heavily damaged; in Moravia 11,900 totally damaged and 19,000 heavily damaged, and the rest in Slovakia) there is need for at least 125,000 new housing units. Prague alone is short 8000 units, Pilsen 900, Brno 10,900, and Moravská Ostrava 830.¹² It is planned to build these 125,000 units most urgently needed by the end of 1948, in two years. What a task that is is evident in comparison with the amount of house construction in pre-war years. In 1937, in the 38 large towns of Czechoslovakia, 12,400 units only were constructed.¹³ Many of the 125,000 housing units planned will of course be built of local materials, in small villages and farms. In the manufacture of cement, bricks, roofing, timber, and other construction materials, the production by 1948 is to reach the pre-war level. An investment of 5 billion Kčs is to be made in the building fields.

Czechoslovakia used to be famous for its exports of shoes and textiles. The Zlín Bat'a works, nationalized, are again producing on a large scale. In 1929, 34.4% of total Czechoslovak exports were made up of textile manufactures, and in 1937, 25%. The provisions regarding the output in these fields are interesting. No figures or set aims are given. On the

¹¹ Karl Brandth, *The Reconstruction of World Agriculture* (New York, 1945), pp. 384-387, discusses the problems confronting Danubian agriculture.

¹² *Lidová Demokracie*, Prague, July 24, 1946.

¹³ "The Economic Year 1937 in Czechoslovakia," Petschek & Co., Prague, 1938, p. 102.

other hand, production is to be such that it will, a. reach the level of production equal to consumption before the war, b. in addition, supply a surplus of such an amount of goods for export as to pay for the cost of importing the raw materials for the total production of the industry, (a) and (b) combined.

To sum up, the Two Year Plan calls for an average overall increase of 10% over the pre-war production, and this amount means a 40% increase over the present-day production. The chief concentration of effort is in the fields of soft coal mining, mechanization of agriculture, electrification, and the relocation of industries in new areas.

What are the differences between the Czechoslovak Plan and the Soviet Five Year Plan?

The chief distinction is the important one that whereas the Soviet plan regulates and sets the detailed levels of output of the entire field of economy, the Czechoslovak plan, while specific on some points, such as the location of sites for hydroelectric plants, and the soft coal production, merely sets the general task for other branches (textile, construction materials) and leaves the details to be taken care of partially by free competition and on a free market. Large segments of the national economy are left outside of nationalization and outside of the sphere of the plan—the whole field of distribution, for instance.

The Soviets, too, have had more experience in planning. They tried it during the period of "War Communism," and they have been practicing it again after the period of the N.E.P. in three successive Five Year Plans. They have more experience in planning, and the nationalization and collectivization of their country is much more extensive than that of Czechoslovakia: those are the reasons, perhaps, why they can plan in more detail and more comprehensively.

One important distinction, however, is a non-economic one. In Soviet Russia, the Communist Party controls the newspapers. In Czechoslovakia the newspapers of all political parties are at liberty to criticize, and they use their right freely. The problem of labor supply and of productivity per man-hour is the crucial one. As seen in the figures for coal, agriculture, and elsewhere in the plan, the difference between success and failure will be marked by the degree to which the population will respond to the **Two Year Plan**. If 400,000 additional workers can be recruited, and if they and all the present workers will increase their productivity, the plan will succeed. But in order to do this, the support of the population must be enlisted. For that reason whereas the Soviet plan goes into all the details of life, the Czechoslovak plan only affects those segments which it is con-

sidered must be planned in order to create prosperity. For public opinion would not allow the total control of all facets of life, and the government must follow the public opinion as long as free press and dependence on the general support of the people exists. There have been indications of the realization of this on the part of the Communists. On the question of nationalization, the twin-sister of planning, public opinion has made itself heard. The Communist head of URO (The Central Council of Labor Unions), Zápotocký, himself declared on June 20, 1946, that nationalization had gone far enough and that attempts to go further would be resisted.¹⁴

A few mnths after Zápotocký's statement, however, a new movement originated, advocating extensions of nationalization in such spheres as wholesale distribution, international freight forwarding, and the building industry. Exchanges of opinions and arguments in the press are going on concerning the exact limits to be set between private and nationalized enterprise.

The difference between the trend of tasks set by the Soviet Fourth Five Year Plan and the Czechoslovak Plan spring from the fact that the war affected many areas of Russia much more seriously than it did Czechoslovakia. Sugar beet production, for instance, in Russia has the aim of 26 million tons in 1950; in 1940, 31 million tons had been produced. Just as the devastation of the Ukraine has set back the output of sugar beets, so has the war affected other segments of Soviet economy. In the cattle market, while tremendous increases in stocks are contemplated, the final results in 1950 will in some cases be only slightly higher than those of 1938, and in other cases lower; and almost all will be below the 1940 level:¹⁵

	Horses	Horned cattle	Sheep and goats	Pigs
1929	34.6	67.1	147.0	20.4
1938	17.5	63.2	102.5	30.6
1945	10.5	47.0	69.4	10.4
1950	15.3	65.3	121.5	31.2
(all figures in millions.)				

One fourth of the horned cattle, more than half the sheep, and goats, and two thirds of the pigs have been lost through the war.

In grain farming Russian plans are very far-reaching. The newly acquired Baltic and Bessarabian lands will be a great asset, but even allowing for them, the agricultural output is to be doubled by 1950 in comparison

¹⁴ *News Flashes from Czechoslovakia*, Chicago, July 1, 1946.

¹⁵ From "Soviet Agriculture," in *The Economist*, London, July 20, 1946.

with 1946. The rehabilitation of the farming of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia will depend in both cases very largely on the capacity of the industries of the respective countries to restore, in the case of Russia, the mechanical basis of her agriculture which had been swept away by the war, and in the case of Czechoslovakia, to put it on a mechanical basis to make up for the insufficient labor supply.

In consumer goods the Soviet citizen will fare far worse than the Czech or Slovak. The target figures for cotton fabrics (4.6 billion sq. yards by 1940) and for woollens (160 million sq. yds.) are lower than those of any preceding plans. The production of shoes and socks and stockings will increase greatly, but still there will be only approximately 1 pair of shoes per person per year, and less than 3 pairs of socks or stockings. In heavy industries, gains are planned, but more significant is the emphasis on machining and engineering rather than on basic materials (steel, iron.) The Czechoslovak citizen can look forward to an increase in total production of his country by 10% in comparison with 1938. The Soviet citizen in 1950 will know that his country is stronger industrially, but the standard of living and the production of consumer goods will still be much lower than in western countries.

The Polish Three Year Plan was made law on September 21, 1946. It is officially termed "the Polish Economic System," and similarly to Czechoslovak economy it is a mixture of state capitalism, co-operatives and private enterprise. The circumstances to bear in mind in connection with the Plan are that Poland's population has decreased from 33 to 25 million, but that having taken over former German territories, her productive capacity is greater today than before.

Whereas Czechoslovakia concentrates on the increases of coal mining and also on electrification, industrialization of backward areas and mechanization of agriculture which will have an early effect on the nation's livelihood, Poland's plan aims mainly at the development of the heavy industries. It is intended to change Poland from a predominantly agricultural country into one about equally divided between agriculture and industry. In 1938 61% of the national income came from industry and service. In 1949 it will be 74%. A great heavy industrial plant has been acquired in formerly German territories. Taking the 1938 level of production as 100, Polish heavy industry in 1949 will stand at 166, and light industry, owing to its great damage through war and to its dependence on imported raw materials, will have gone down to 83. Thus whereas Czechoslovakia will

be mechanizing, and investing a great deal of capital in its agriculture, Poland will be transforming herself into a semi-industrial state.

Foreign trade, while important to both countries, will be far more important to Poland.¹⁶ Coal will be Poland's main export item, and while food will be the main import article during the first period of the plan, consumer and investment goods will predominate in the last year. Thus Poland will be dependent on foreign credits and food imports. The lack of a rationing and allocation system is also making the stabilization of prices and currencies difficult in Poland.¹⁷ It also increases the difficulty of financing investments. The problems of Poland's plan are moreover made more complicated by the task of uniting the western ex-German territories with the rest of the country.

The Czechoslovak citizens, then, can consider themselves fortunate in comparison with Poland and with Russia in having a relatively well preserved industry and agriculture, and in having a plan which seems to combine short-term with long-term objectives in a fairly even ratio. Nevertheless many criticisms have been leveled and voiced against the plan in Czechoslovakia.

An article discussing the Two Year Plan in the weekly journal of the People's Party (Catholic Party) *Obzory*,¹⁸ a publication often strongly critical of governmental action, mentions several objections to it. Most of these center around the question of labor supply. Is the plan excessively ambitious? Will it be possible to replace the Germans transferred to the Reich in order to achieve the goals of the Plan?

Many and diverse estimates have been made with regard to the amount of labor needed and available. According to one source¹⁹ 239,000 additional men will be needed by the various industries under the Plan. Another set of figures gives 300,000 to be the need of industry, 200-250,000 men in agriculture, 50,000 in construction industries. We are also told that in mining 30,000 new men will be needed, and that agriculture this year was short 600,000 men.²⁰ In 1937 the monthly average of persons employed in industry in the Czech provinces was 1,220,000. On August 1, 1946, it was only 873,000, a low figure despite the fact that it represents an increase of 100,000 in comparison with January,

¹⁶ *The Economist*, London, October 12, 1946, p. 587.

¹⁷ Dr. J. Goldman in *Hospodář*, Prague, September 26, 1946.

¹⁸ Issue of July 13, 1946.

¹⁹ *New Yorkské Listy*, October 18, 1946.

²⁰ *Obzory*, August 3, 1946.

1946.²¹ On March 26, 1946, at the time of the adoption of the budget for the next fiscal year, the unpleasant fact was disclosed reluctantly to the public that the governmental apparatus employed 70,000 more employees than before the war, despite the removal of the Germans and the far less significant cession of Ruthenia to the Soviet Union. Many of the governmental employees should be siphoned off into more productive work. It remains to be seen how successful the government will be in limiting its own personnel. The text of the Two Year Plan recognizes the shortage of labor. It states that especially in the fields of mining, construction, and agriculture must the number of workers be increased. Measures are to be taken also to increase the productivity of labor. At present 20 to 30% of all industrial labor are paid by piece-work. It is planned to increase the range of the incentive-wage system and to put one half of all industrial labor on such a basis.

The textile industry is a typical sample case of the labor problems involved. Before the war it employed 265,000; in May, 1945, only 60,000; in June, 1946, the number of textile workers increased to 143,000, but after the transfer of the Germans only 100,000 workers were left in textiles. Moreover, the workers are of the very high average age of 40 to 45. To remedy the situation, textile trade schools will open next year in 35 textile centers in order to prepare a new generation for textile labor, and plans are made for some of the students to work in textile mills on a half-time basis and to attend school at the same time.²² Three sources of additional labor exist: 1. reassignment of labor at present employed to other jobs where they would be better used and more productive, 2. increased production of labor working in the old jobs, 3. the employment of hitherto not employed labor.

Other valid criticisms of the Plan have been made. The steel and iron production will be lower than that of pre-war days but the manufacture of farming machines, of motor trucks, tractors, and locomotives will be sharply increased. It is not clear where adequate savings in the use of iron and steel are to be made in comparison with pre-war use in order to reconcile lower production of steel and iron and higher demand for it. Again, the present habit of frequent holidays has been scored. There are 100 to 106 holidays a year in Czechoslovakia. Each day without work means the loss of 10,000 freight-car loads of coal, and each week means the financial loss of 2 billion Kčs in production. Some omissions of the

²¹ Reports of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Trade, summer 1946.

²² *News Flashes from Czechoslovakia*, Chicago, September 15, 1946.

Plan have also been criticized. It is asked why the super-highways (Auto-bahnen), the construction of which was begun by the Germans, are not to be finished under the Plan. This objection loses sight of the fact that the Autobahn from Austria northward across Moravia, useful for the linking together of portions of the German Reich, is hardly necessary to Czechoslovakia. The second project, a super-highway running the length of Czechoslovakia from Eastern Slovakia to the west of Bohemia would be of great significance, but since its completion would not be possible for a long time, and in view of the shortage of building and construction materials and of labor, it is better to postpone this until the more urgent housing program is completed. Moreover, the cancelling of U. S. Surplus Property and Import-Export Bank credits to Czechoslovakia in October, 1946 meant the abandonment for the time being of Czechoslovak plans for immediate purchase of U. S. Army surplus goods, many of which consisted of construction and building materials.

It is also objected that the plan gives exact figures and tasks for some of the economy, but only rough directives for others. This mixed system, however, seems a proof of the elasticity of application of the plan, and seems to show understanding of the difference between essential internal industries, which can be regulated in detail, and industries such as the textile industry which cater to unpredictable and uncontrollable export markets, and must be left free to meet the demand as time passes.

Various segments of the Plan are questioned, such as the feasibility of the reconstruction of the country's chemical and agricultural production as projected.²³ A very solid objection is the comment that the plan specifies quantitative tasks, but puts little emphasis on, and fails to make provisions for, quality. In some recent months, for instance, Czechoslovak papers and other publications have jubilantly acclaimed the surpassing of pre-war output by certain coal mines. The shortage of coal at the consuming end persisted, however. The reason for this is that the coal at present mined is of poor quality, poorly sorted, and inadequately processed.²⁴ The larger production of poorer coal is an added burden on the transportation system. It is obvious that mere quantity is not a sufficient criterion unless standards of quality are improved or at least maintained.

The Plan also neglects to provide for the stimulation of smaller, locally situated industries. Especially small quarries, brick-kilns, lime, and starch plants, and agricultural distilleries should be aided in addition to

²³ *Obzory*, July 13, 1946.

²⁴ Inž. Dr. Štěpán Ješ in *Svobodné Zitřek*, Nov. 30, 1946.

the large ones, because they make use of locally available resources, relieve the burden on transportation, and use available local labor.

The absence of a provision for the building of the Oder-Danube-Elbe Canal has also been censured.²⁵ In view of the fact, though, that modest and sober aims are preferable to high and doubtful ones, and that harbor, dam, shipping and channel rebuilding is part of the Plan (necessary preparatory work before the Oder-Danube-Elbe Canal can be built), the absence of the canal construction from the Plan is a laudable one, showing a realistic realization of the country's limitations. To criticize the Plan for an omission of the Canal project seems to be a case of leaning over backward to find faults.

The Slovak reaction to the Plan is interesting. The criticisms are of a more fundamental nature: they attack the very basis of the plan, rather than individual tasks set. The "excessive tendency to Centralization, the strict sanctions, and the excessive power given to government" are objected to.²⁶ Slovakia is pleased with the industrialization and electrification which she will enjoy, but the more conservative elements are opposed to the great degree of government controls involved.

Many other details of the Plan have been criticized: 1. The attempt to build the foundation of the economy on synthetic gasoline made in Most. The point of this objection²⁷ is that the gasoline thus produced from coal could be more economically replaced by imported gasoline. The purchase of gasoline with funds gained by export of coal to Switzerland, for instance, could save manpower, and less coal would be needed than will be used in the manufacture of synthetic gasoline. The decision to base the motor transport on domestic, synthetic gasoline is an unhealthy attempt at uneconomical self-sufficiency. 2. The industrialization of Slovakia by transfer of plants is objected to because losses and sacrifices will be incurred in the process of moving the plants. Raw materials before the war were largely imported along the Elbe and Oder rivers. It is presumably planned, however, to replace some of these imports by imports from the Balkans and from the Soviet Union, moving along the Danube. The insufficient means of transportation between Slovakia and Bohemia will be taxed by the development of industries in Slovakia, and the influence of the Soviet Union is apparent in the concentration of industry in Eastern Slovakia. On the other hand, the sound motive and desire to bridge the differing standards of living of the Czech provinces and Slovakia by developing

²⁵ *Obzory*, August 3, 1946.

²⁶ *Svobodné Noviny*, October 12, 1946.

²⁷ Inž. Dr. Štěpán Ješ in *Svobodný Zvěřek*, Nov. 30, 1946.

Slovak economy will have a great place in Czechoslovak history if it succeeds in bringing about the political necessity of a closer union between the Czechs and Slovaks.

The manpower problem remains the crucial point of the Two Year Plan. The aims of the plan are sober and on the whole not excessive, and should not constitute too much of a burden on the resources of the country, if sufficient labor can be found. It is there that the main effort will have to be expended. Czechoslovakia will not employ the drastic Soviet methods of labor control, involving compulsory assignment of jobs, wages set for all classes of work; although a Czechoslovak law has been passed, providing for compulsory employment in agriculture of all adults, not working, with the exception of mothers with children, students, and invalids,²⁸ measures are not contemplated for such enforcement of labor duty as were used in the German *Totaleinsatz* with its raids on coffee-shops, and other public places, and checks on all persons not working.

The National Front government has already set up a Commission which is to coordinate the means of popularizing the program and providing publicity and public relations programs. The commission, composed of representatives of all political parties, held its first meeting October 11, 1946.²⁹ The degree of satisfaction and co-operation of the population will be decisive. By having staked itself on the success of a plan which depends on the increased labor of the population, the government has made itself dependent on the people's support. The Czechoslovak people is attempting a reconciliation of planning with a measure of personal freedom. As the London *Economist* has put it, "In their reaction to politics the Czechs frequently bridge the impassable at once and take only a little longer to reconcile the irreconcilable."³⁰ In the final analysis, the pivotal factor will be the question of whether the population will be satisfied that the government is working for the nation as a whole and preserving the civil freedoms, and whether the population will put its full weight and effort behind the Plan.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

²⁸ Law No. 121/1946, July 7, 1946.

²⁹ *Svobodné Noviny*, October 12, 1946.

³⁰ *The Economist*, London, June 29, 1946.

THE WAR AND THE AUSTRIAN ARCHIVES

by R. John Rath

DURING the course of the war many a historian interested in pursuing his studies in the Austrian state archives was disturbed by the thought that some of the contents of these archives might be destroyed. A few of the records of the Habsburg monarchy had already been lost before the beginning of the war. Some in the Viennese archives had been turned over to the Hungarians after the *Ausgleich* of 1867; others, to the Czechs, Yugoslavs, Rumanians, and Poles after the dissolution of the empire. Many of the records of the imperial chancellery, the ministry of interior, and the police authorities had been destroyed during the burning of the ministry of interior building in July, 1927. Nevertheless, in 1939 a vast bulk of valuable material was still housed in various archives in the Austrian capital. The *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv* alone, for example, contained about 60,000 parchment records, 150,000 file boxes of state papers, and 50,000 manuscripts, material which covered the period from 816 to 1939.

After the reorganization of the archival administrative system during the time of the Republic, the following state archives in Vienna existed under the direct control of the federal chancellery: the *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv*, the *Hofkammer Archiv*, the *Staatsarchiv des Innern und der Justiz*, and the *Kriegsarchiv*. Besides these, there were the *Archiv des Finanzministeriums*, the *Archiv des Unterrichtsministeriums*, and the *Archiv für Verkehrswesen*, which were under the direct supervision of the ministries of finance, education, and commerce and transportation, respectively. In 1918 all state records up to the year 1894 were made available to scholars.

After the annexation of Austria to Germany, several changes were made in the management of the Austrian archives. In 1938 the Austrian *Kriegsarchiv* was deprived of civilian status, was renamed the *Heeresarchiv Wien*, and was placed under the control of the high command of the German army. In 1940 the Austrian central ministries were liquidated. At the same time the *Archiv für Verkehrswesen* was put under the supervision of the *Reichsbahndirektion Wien*. All the other state archives in Vienna were made part of a newly created *Reichsarchiv Wien*, under the superintendence of the pro-Nazi director of the *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv*, Dr. Ludwig Bittner. He, in turn, was placed directly under the German Minister of Interior. After the destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic, some of the records taken away by the Czechs in 1918 were brought back to Vienna. The Viennese archives were left open to scholars

under the same regulations which had prevailed before the *Anschluss*, with the exception that Jews no longer had the right to visit them.

In 1942 the central government in Berlin ordered the evacuation of the *Reichsarchiv Wien*. Some archival treasures were hidden in various basements in Vienna. As there was not enough subterranean storage space in the city to house all the material, the German government directed the Viennese authorities to transport as many documents as possible to safe places in the country. Many were taken to castles, parsonages, and salt mines in Upper and Lower Austria and in Salzburg. Some were even transported to Bohemia. Between the fall of 1942 and the fall of 1944 some two hundred and fifty truckloads of records were conveyed to some fifty different hiding places outside Vienna, and about fifty truckloads were hidden in various basements in the city.

During the war none of the Viennese archive buildings except the one containing the records of the ministry of interior and justice was damaged. In the September 10, 1944, air attack, two bombs fell on that building. They destroyed the huge storage space in the center, but no significant documents were in the building at that time.

It was otherwise with some of the material stored in various localities outside Vienna. In April and May, 1945, actual fighting took place in many of the regions in which documents had been hidden. The damages to the records of the *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv*, although small insofar as the percentage of contents destroyed is concerned, were serious in that a few extremely valuable record collections were ruined. The building in which the *Staatsrat Akten* were temporarily housed was set on fire by artillery shells, and all the acts up to the year 1833 were totally destroyed. Hofrat Dr. Josef Seidl, the present director of the *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv*, told the writer in the summer of 1946 that he believed that the *Conferenz Akten* were also utterly spoiled. Whether or not this is the case can be determined only after all the records of the archives are checked. These losses are tragic ones for students of Austrian and Hungarian affairs between 1760 and 1848. All important matters concerning Austrian and Hungarian affairs were discussed in the *Staatsrat*, and, after the creation of the *Staats-Conferenz* in 1814, many of them were taken up in it. Furthermore, the contents of many documents ruined in the burning of the ministry of interior building in 1927 were summarized in numerous papers of these two advisory bodies. A few other important papers were also damaged. Allied troops destroyed a large part of the *Reichshofrat Akten* by throwing them out of the building in which they had been stored. Perhaps other

records were ruined in a similar manner; nevertheless, according to the present estimates of Austrian archivists, the losses resulting from the actions of the occupying forces are probably inconsequential.

A few very significant documents in the *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv* were thus destroyed. Other Viennese archives also suffered losses. According to Oberarchivrat Dr. O. F. Guglia, the present director of the ministry of education archives, a large percentage of the documents of the ministry have become unusable. Particularly the records of non-Catholic religious organizations prior to 1847 are in bad shape. According to Hofrat Dr. Wolfgang Kotz, now director of the ministry of interior and justice collection, probably less than one percent of the material under his superintendence was lost during the course of the war. The large number of *Hofkammer* documents which had been hidden in various basements in Vienna during the course of the war are safe. The attendants of the *Hofkammer* archives, however, do not know whether all of the large number of records which had been stored in Bohemia are still intact. Neither do they know at present whether the Czechoslovak government will give its permission to have them returned to Vienna. Apparently, the damage to other archival material was very slight.

Since the end of the war Austrian authorities have been working to restore the archives so that scholars will be able to study the material which is still intact. They have worked under tremendous handicaps, but, in spite of all difficulties, some progress has been made. All the archives formerly under the supervision of the *Reichsarchiv Wien*, along with the *Kriegsarchiv* and the *Archiv für Verkehrswesen*, have been incorporated into a new body, the *Österreichisches Staatsarchiv*, which is under the direct surveillance of the federal chancellery. According to present plans, the *Staatsarchiv* is to be subdivided into four branches. The first branch is to be the *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv*. The former *Hofkammer* and *Finanzministerium* archives are to be united to form a joint *Hofkammer- und Finanz Archiv*. The former *Staatsarchiv des Innern und der Justiz*, *Archiv des Unterrichtsministeriums*, and *Archiv für Verkehrswesen* are to be merged to form an *Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv*. The fourth of the *Staatsarchiv* is to be the *Kriegsarchiv*.

Putting a new plan of archival administration on paper is one thing; getting all the archives into shape for use by scholars is another matter and a task much more difficult to accomplish. None of the former directors of the Austrian archives is back on the job. One of them, Dr. Ludwig Bittner, former director of the *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv*, committed

suicide as the Russian army approached Vienna. Another, Dr. Glaise-Horstenau, the director of the *Kriegsarchiv*, became such a key member of the National Socialist hierarchy that he will probably be forever excluded from political life. Still others were killed during the course of the war or else have been prohibited from resuming their former positions because of active membership in the National Socialist party. There is no single trained archivist left in the *Hofkammer Archiv*. The former personnel of the ministry of interior archives is nearly all gone. In the *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv*, only one or two of the archivists who were there in 1937 are now on duty.

Just as great a handicap as personnel to the restoring of the Viennese archives is the great shortage of transportation. A vast number of vehicles were destroyed during the war; many others have been appropriated by the Allies. The little that remains is inadequate to bring basic necessities like food and fuel to the capital city. Much of the material that was hidden in Viennese basements was brought back to the archives in pushcarts. But only a relatively small part of the documents stored outside of Vienna has been brought back. Without Allied help the rest cannot be brought back within any reasonably short time.

In spite of all these difficulties, some of the archives are already open to the public. There is no trained personnel in the archives and much of the material is still away, but those documents which are at the *Hofkammer Archiv*, at Annagasse No. 5, have been available to scholars since last spring. The *Unterrichtsministerium Archiv* has a trained archivist as director and most of its former personnel is back on the job. Its doors were open to visitors last summer, even though a considerable amount of material was still not back in Vienna. Very little of the ministry of interior collection is back in the archives, not only because of the acute shortage of transportation but because of the need for repairing the large central storage space in the building. Nevertheless, Dr. Kotz, the director, told the writer that his staff would be glad to have visitors from America at any time to work on such records as are there. They would, furthermore, be glad to answer any requests for information on documents which are already available in the archives. The reading room of the *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv* is still closed because of the great shortage of staff and the fact that about half of the material is still missing. According to the director of the archives, it is planned to open the archives to visitors in the summer of 1947.

All the Austrian state archives are open or will again be opened to the general public up to the year 1894, as they had been before the *Anschluss*.

It is impossible at the moment to state just when all the archival materials not destroyed during the war will again be available to scholars. This writer ventures to guess, however, that practically all the records will be ready for general use by the time American visitors will be permitted to go to Austria in appreciable numbers.

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1910: AN UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENT¹

by William C. Askew

WHILE the full story of Nazi efforts to lull Americans into a sense of false security as Germany planned and initiated her schemes for conquest in Europe, Asia, and Africa may not be told in detail for some years, most Americans are somewhat familiar with the technique of terror and confusion by which the Nazis sought to destroy national unity, to play off capital against labor, race against race, religion against religion, to create mistrust of our allies, and to foster fear, doubt, and misunderstanding.²

The document reproduced below indicates the existence of a much earlier plan to influence Americans to stand aside or even lend support while Germany dealt with Britain, a power whose navy had done so much to make our Atlantic shores safe from European invasion. This propaganda scheme also reveals added evidence that by 1910 the German middle class considered a war with Britain highly probable. While some Americans have been quite honest in their belief until recently that a policy of isolation was possible toward Europe, it is interesting to note that many Europeans have been free from any such illusion for a long time.

On October 4, 1910, David J. Hill, the United States ambassador to Germany, sent to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox a confidential German plan to spread propaganda in the United States which was already in operation. The plan came to Hill through Alexander M. Thackara, the United States consul-general at Berlin. Although the United States ambassador was not at the time alarmed at the German propaganda efforts, he thought that it might be interesting to watch the development of the movement.³ No doubt the history of German efforts to spread propaganda in the United States between 1910 and 1914 will remain rather obscure until such time as the private papers of some of the leaders in the movement on both sides of the Atlantic become available to historians. But it is significant that on August 8, 1914 the German government printed treasury certificates in

¹ The writer discovered this document in the archives of the State Department while working on his study, "America and the Great Powers, 1871-1914," under a Southern Grant-in-Aid of the Social Science Research Council. Publication has been permitted by the Department.

² For a summary of German propaganda aims in Europe and America see Office of Facts and Figures, *Divide and Conquer* (Washington, 1942).

³ Hill to Knox, Oct. 4, 1910, confidential; No. 811, State Department, 741.62.

the amount of \$175,000,000 and sent them to the United States. They were never placed and were cancelled in the German embassy in Washington.⁴

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Freiburg, the summer of 1910.
Subject: "Germany and America"

CONFIDENTIAL.

Although Germany desires peace, particularly peace with England, it would nevertheless be fatal to lose sight of the possibility of a conflict being forced upon us. A temperate man like Balfour, a man who weighs his words, declared in January, 1910, that the opinion was widely prevalent in European diplomatic circles that a collision between Germany and England was sooner or later inevitable. The Conservative Party in England makes use of Germanophobia in the elections; it would not be easy for it in every eventuality to get rid of the spectres which it has invoked. England is exposed to the temptation to utilize its maritime superiority over us as long as it exists. Anyone who has travelled in England in the past few years knows that a feeling is taking hold there and spreading, which a prominent public man described in the words: "Just as once the Spain of Philip II, the France of Louis XIV, so today is Germany the opponent." The coming decade is the critical period, and occasional approaches do not alter the fact, approaches which have perhaps the purpose of retarding the construction of our fleet.

Such a war, in which France would not stand aside, would decide Germany's future. Germany's whole economic structure stands and falls with its connections in the world's trade, especially with its transoceanic relations. The devastations which an unsuccessful war would wreak in Germany's commerce, in shipping and banking, in trade and industry, are incalculable. Nor would agriculture be spared.

By strengthening our forces we seek to attain that impregnability which is the best protection against danger of war. But the possession of our own armament is not sufficient. In the crisis it is of the utmost importance to have certain first class foreign powers well disposed toward us. Among these powers the United States stands out. It suffices to put the following question. What money market is to place the immense amount of our war loans, if not the American market? The very prospect of benevolent neutrality towards us on the part of the United States should be enough to drive ideas of attacking us out of the heads of the English.

But above and beyond benevolent neutrality, a German-American under-

⁴ G. Stolper, *German Economy, 1870-1940: Issues and Trends* (New York, 1940), p. 102.

⁵ Enclosed in translation with dispatch No. 811, S.D., 741.62.

standing would be of great weight in favor of world peace. As against the American "brother," England is bound by political inanity. The situation is crystallized by the construction of the American fleet. Warships are machines, the most expensive of machines, and every nation can possess them to the extent to which it succeeds in gravitating the world's capital into its own territory. The United States are able to possess a fleet of the very first rank. A Roosevelt sees to it that this possibility becomes a fact. American friendship is all the more important for us Germans, whose future not alone, but whose present, in great part, lies on the sea.

In a democratic country like the United States every momentous decision depends on public opinion, which is made by the daily press and the great weeklies. Roosevelt rules the United States because he understands how to direct public opinion. Again, the cultivation of public opinion by the press in the United States has reached a high degree of technical perfection. The English are well aware of the importance of the American press, and of the means of influencing it. English funds and English jingoes work quietly but effectively in the American press. They endeavor, and with success, to depict Germany to the American people as the troublemaker, as a semi-barbarian power upon which England, in the interest of humanity, must force reduction of armament. In so doing they hide the fact that the two-power standard of the British fleet is directed not against the United States, not against Japan, but against Germany alone, and that maritime disarmament at the present time would deliver up our future to the good will, perhaps the ill will, of England.

To combat this is a question of informing public opinion in the United States regarding German affairs, and of winning it for German views. In our aid is the growing importance of the German-American element, which is beginning to look with pride upon its German descent and its connection with German culture. Just as Emerson once hitched his wagon to Germany's classical culture, so Roosevelt today points out with admiration to his countrymen modern Germany's scientific, commercial and sociological accomplishments. We shall however be unable to transpose these sympathies into political values unless we succeed in recoinning them through the American press into the small change of daily traffic.

Such an undertaking is in progress. A prominent German-American, for whose personality I can vouch on the ground of long friendship, has placed himself gratuitously in the service of the cause. I myself shall cooperate on this side of the Atlantic to the best of my ability. Under our direction a young force, schooled in political economy, is to be engaged. By taking advantage of the custom which the smaller American press has of reprinting the articles from the leading papers, we hope to publish some thousand articles, in the American press the first year, which are intended to aid German-American approach in an open and honorable way. Our articles are intended to find circulation through their own weight and interest as well as through personal connections. The undertaking, planned for three years to begin with, requires the amount of about 40,000 to 50,000 marks. This sum must be raised. That which is not done today

no amount of money or labor can make up in a crisis. With this idea I address myself to selected representatives of German property and German culture. If they deny us, who shall intervene?

Should you, valued Sir, be inclined to support this patriotic cause, which is at the same time the cause of world peace, I beg you to transmit the amount of your subscription to the "German-American" account at the Süddeutsche Diskontogesellschaft, Filiale Freiburg, Baden. Should you be unable to advance the undertaking financially you would aid it no less by furnishing addresses of suitable persons, who combine discretion with patriotic feeling and financial strength. A report on "Germany and America" will be rendered to the subscribers after a year. As a supplement to this letter I refer to my brochure "England und Deutschland," Berlin-Schöneberg, Verlag der Hilfe, 2nd Edition, 1908.

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NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

YUGOSLAVIA

Certain incidents at Trieste between American Military Police and a small detachment of Yugoslav Military Personnel on September 9, 1946, were the occasion for an exchange of notes between the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, Sava N. Kosanović, and the Department of State. The Yugoslav note has not been made available, but the reply of the Department of State, signed by Acting Secretary Clayton under date of September 27, 1946, was as follows:

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Ambassador of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, and has the honor to inform His Excellency that a full report has now been received from the American military authorities in Venezia Giulia regarding the arrests of six Yugoslav soldiers and the alleged detention of Captain Segota and his escort at Trieste on September 9, 1946, as set out in His Excellency's note Pov. Br. 1326 of September 16, 1946.

This report confirms that six soldiers from the Yugoslav Train Detachment, used for guarding UNRRA supplies, were arrested by American Military Police at 3:25 a. m. on September 9 at a point in Trieste near which a large explosion had just occurred.

These soldiers were searched and found to be carrying hand grenades concealed in their clothing, contrary to standing instructions that UNRRA guards were not to be armed, and were therefore handed over to custody of the Venezia Giulia Civil Police. Further investigation showed that the Yugoslav soldiers were apparently not connected with the large explosion, near the scene of which they had been arrested, and they were therefore escorted to Headquarters of the Yugoslav Detachment on September 11, with instructions that they be sent out of Zone A for violation of the standing orders against carrying weapons.

The Government of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia must have been aware, at the time its protest was addressed to this Government, that the six Yugoslav soldiers had been released to the Yugoslav military authorities in Zone A, despite their violation of Allied military orders, and this Government is therefore unable to see any basis for a Yugoslav protest in this case. Instead, it appears that this Government must protest once again the disregard shown by officers and men of the Yugoslav Detachment in Zone A for Allied military regulations in that area.

As regards the alleged arrest of Captain Segota and his escort, the Acting Secretary is pleased to inform His Excellency that as a result of Captain Segota's protest to XIII Corps Headquarters, the Commanding General, 88 Division, United States Army, appointed a Board of Officers to investigate the incident. This Board of Officers has ascertained that Captain Segota, accompanied by four Yugoslav soldiers, arrived at the American Military Police Station in Trieste at about 4:00 a. m. September 9 to demand the release of the six Yugoslav soldiers who had been arrested. He was informed

at once that the six soldiers were in custody of the Venezia Giulia Civil Police. In the ensuing discussion, made difficult by the lack of a common language and the absence of an interpreter, the American Desk Sergeant, who was alone in the room at the time of Captain Segota's arrival, became apprehensive when the attitude of Captain Segota became menacing and the latter's escort surrounded the Desk Sergeant. He therefore drew his pistol and held the group under guard while he telephoned for the American Provost Marshal of Trieste. Meanwhile, the Desk Sergeant called other Military Police sleeping in an adjoining room, and with their assistance Captain Segota and his escort were searched and their documents checked. The Provost Marshal arrived at about this time, and after further discussion informed Captain Segota that the six soldiers could not be released but that he and his escort were of course free to leave at any time they wished.

In its findings, the Board of Officers held that disrespectful remarks or profane language had not been used against the Yugoslav military personnel, and that certain statements quoted by both Americans and Yugoslavs could not have been known positively because of the language barrier. The Board also held that under normal conditions the acts of the American Military police would have been improper, but that against the background of the wounding of seven of their number by a hand grenade explosion on the previous day and the discovery during the preceding hour that Yugoslav soldiers in Trieste were illegally armed with hand grenades, and in the light of the Desk Sergeant's apprehensions over the suspicious behavior of Captain Segota's escort and the inability of the two groups to understand one another, the detention under armed guard of the Yugoslav group until the arrival of a superior officer was justified. The Board recommended that no disciplinary action be taken, and that constant instructions be given to Military Police to be firm but fair in all of their dealings in an endeavor to avoid similar incidents in the future. The findings and recommendations of the Board of Officers have the full support of this Government, which is confident that if Yugoslav military personnel in Zone A will evince an attitude of loyal cooperation towards their Allied comrades in arms in Venezia Giulia they will meet with a most full and friendly response on the part of American military personnel.

At the same time, this Government desires the Yugoslav Government to know that it resents the charges that Allied military authorities took no steps in this matter and that they inspired a "fascist" press to give a "false" account of the incident, and that it rejects these charges as mischievous propaganda without any foundation in fact.

HUNGARY

The Department of State released to the American press on September 24, 1946, a statement concerning United States assistance toward the rehabilitation of Hungary. The statement was necessitated by disagreements between the United States and the USSR concerning tripartite cooperative action in aiding Hungary toward a solution of her economic problems. The United States Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow had previously communicated to the Soviet Foreign Office,

on September 21, a formal note clarifying the position of the United States in the matter. The text of the United States note to the Soviet Foreign Office is found in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 6, 1946, pp. 638-639. The press release of the Department of State reads as follows:

On March 2, 1946 the Government of the United States in a note to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics asked for tripartite consideration of the economic situation in Hungary in accordance with the obligation undertaken by the heads of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the Crimea Conference. In a reply of April 21, A. Y. Vyshinsky rejected this proposal. The United States made a further approach in a note of July 22.

Notwithstanding the failure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to agree to tripartite cooperation in assisting Hungary, the United States has undertaken, within limits imposed upon it by the lack of such cooperation, to render such assistance as might be effective toward the rehabilitation of Hungary. The Government of the United States has already voluntarily returned to Hungary gold valued at approximately \$32,000,000. The Government of the United States has also granted Hungary a long-term credit amounting to \$15,000,000 for the purchase of surplus property. In addition, the United States commanders in Germany and Austria have been instructed to restitute identifiable displaced property removed under duress from Hungary. Despite the United States' endeavors to expedite action in this matter, return of such property to Hungary from Germany has been delayed by failure to obtain quadripartite approval of the restitution program in the Allied Control Council, Berlin, and the Soviet Government is one of the governments whose approval of this measure intended to help Hungarian economy has not been readily forthcoming. This concrete affirmative aid by the United States is designed to assist Hungarian rehabilitation directly; on the other hand Soviet aid mentioned in the Soviet Government's note of July 27 consists principally of partial postponement of economic drains on the Hungarian economy in the form of reparations. Meanwhile it is understood that requisitions and removals by the Soviet Army are, in practice, continuing.

POLAND

The Polish elections announced for January 19, 1947 have been the occasion for a number of communications from the Department of State to the Polish Foreign Ministry, as well as from the British Foreign Office. In general, the tenor of the American and British notes have been very similar, as both governments consider the obligations assumed by the four powers concerned: United States, Great Britain, USSR, and Poland, under the Yalta and Potsdam agreements guaranteeing "free and unfettered elections" to involve their continued interest in the effectuation of such elections. Both the British and the American Governments made no secret of the fact that the manner in which the Polish Referendum of June 30, 1946 was conducted indicated that the present Polish Provisional Government was careless of democratic procedures as under-

stood in the West. They therefore expressed to the Polish Foreign Office their concern lest the elections of January 19 be conducted in a way which could hardly be called "free and unfettered." The British notes have not been made public. For the United States note of August 20, 1946, see the *JOURNAL*, July, 1946, pp. 198-199. On November 22, the American Chargé d'Affaires at Warsaw, Gerald Keith, communicated to the Polish Foreign Office the following note, emphasizing the interest and concern of his government in the preparations for the coming elections:

Excellency:

I have been instructed to inform you that my Government has taken note of the announcement that the Polish Government of National Unity has fixed January 19, 1947 as the date on which general elections will be held in Poland. In this connection, my Government recalls that Ambassador Lane's note of April 24, 1946 stated that in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, which provided that elections would be held as soon as possible, elections would take place this year. Although my Government is surprised that the Polish Government would fail, without explanation, to fulfill this formal assurance, its chief concern is not with any particular date but with the discharge of its responsibility under the decisions taken at the Crimea and Potsdam conferences with respect to the holding of free elections in Poland.

The importance which the United States Government attaches to the carrying out of these decisions has repeatedly been brought to the attention of the Polish Government. In his note of August 19, 1946, to which no reply has been received, Ambassador Lane outlined certain points which the United States Government considers essential for the carrying out of free elections. In view of the disturbing reports which it has received concerning the preparations for the elections, my Government has instructed me again to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States expects that equal rights and facilities in the forthcoming election campaigns and in the elections themselves will be accorded to all democratic and anti-Nazi parties in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. My Government could not otherwise regard the terms of the Yalta and Potsdam decisions as having been fulfilled.

To the note of November 22, there was no answer from the Polish Foreign Office. The Government Polish press spoke of the note with some asperity as an "unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation." It appears that reports of continued repression of Mikołajczyk's Peasant Party, (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe—PSL) arrests of his candidates, the vigorous censorship of his newspapers and even the unexplained murder of leading members of his party, only confirm the previous "concern" of the British and American Governments. In circles close to Mikołajczyk, it was seriously debated whether his party, which all neutral observers agree commands the adherence of a considerable majority of the Polish people, should not boycott the elections completely. In 10 of the 52 electoral districts of Poland, the candidates of the Peasant Party

have been excluded from the electoral ballot. At last reports, Mikołajczyk had decided to have his candidates stand for election in the 42 remaining districts where, at least formally, they are being allowed to run. The United States Government was still concerned at reports of the preparations being made by the Government bloc to discourage the electorate from supporting the candidates of the Peasant Party or to see to it that such support should have no effective relation to the announced results of the election. The United States Government therefore appealed, in identical notes to the British Ambassador in Washington, and to the Soviet Foreign Office in Moscow, on January 5, for joint action of the three powers signatory to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, to insure a "free and unfettered election." The American note follows:

Excellency:

The Government of the United States (my Government) as a signatory of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, with particular regard to those sections of the two agreements which deal with the establishment of a representative Government in Poland through the instrumentality of free and unfettered elections, wishes me to inform you of the concern with which it views the pre-election activities of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. My Government is especially perturbed by the increasingly frequent reports of repressive measures which the Polish Provisional Government has seen fit to employ against those democratic elements in Poland which have not aligned themselves with the "bloc" parties.

According to information reaching my Government from various authoritative sources, these repressive activities on the part of the Provisional Government have now increased in intensity to the point where, if they do not cease immediately, there is little likelihood that elections can be held in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam agreement which call for free and unfettered elections "on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates."

On Dec. 18, 1946, Vice Premier Stanisław Mikołajczyk addressed a communication to the American Ambassador in Warsaw in which he called attention to the reprehensible methods employed by the Provisional Government in denying freedom of political action to the Polish Peasant party.

This communication pointed out inter alia that the methods used by the Government in its efforts to eliminate the participation by the Polish Peasant party in the elections include political arrests and murders, compulsory enrollment of Polish Peasant party members in the "bloc" political parties, dismissal of Polish Peasant party members from their employment, searches of homes, attacks by secret police and members of the Communist party on Polish Peasant party premises and party congresses, suspension and restriction by Government authorities of Polish Peasant party meetings and suspension of party activities in twenty-eight powiats (districts), suppression of the party press and limitation of circulation of party papers, and arrest of the editorial staff of the party bulletin and of the *Gazeta Ludowa*.

Authoritative reports from other quarters in Poland serve to substantiate

the charges brought by M. Mikołajczyk in the communication cited. It is understood that copies of this communication were also delivered to the Soviet and British Ambassadors at Warsaw as representatives of the other two Yalta powers.

In the view of my Government, what is involved here is the sanctity of international agreements, a principle upon which depends the establishment and maintenance of peace and the reign of justice under law. The obligations with respect to the Polish election which my Government assumed at Yalta and reiterated at Potsdam, together with the Soviet and British Governments, and the obligations subsequently assumed by the Polish Government and frequently reiterated, provide for the conduct of free and unfettered elections of the type and in the manner described above.

It is of no significance that the subject matter of this international agreement relates to elections in Poland. The essential fact is that it constitutes an international agreement on the basis of which all four nations concerned have acted. Therefore my Government believes that for any of the parties to this agreement to refrain from the most energetic effort to see to its proper execution would be to fail in a most solemn obligation.

For this reason, it is my Government's view that it is both a duty and a right for the three powers who are parties to the Yalta and the Potsdam agreements to call to the attention of the Polish Government in a most friendly, but in a most insistent, manner the failure of the Polish Government to perform its obligations.

It is a source of regret to my Government that its own efforts in this direction have not resulted in any change in the course which the Polish Provisional Government has pursued in connection with pre-election political activities. My Government feels that it would be failing in its duty if it did not make further efforts prior to the elections to ameliorate the conditions under which certain democratic elements of the Polish population are now struggling in an effort to take their rightful part in the national elections.

It intends, therefore, in the immediate future again to approach the Polish Government with a reminder of its obligations in connection with the elections and again to call upon it to provide those conditions of security which will enable all democratic and anti-Nazi parties to take full part in the elections.

I hardly need add that my Government is interested only in seeing that the Polish people have the opportunity to participate in a free and unfettered election and that my Government does not regard the results of such an election as being a proper concern of anyone other than the Polish people themselves.

It is the hope of my Government that the British Government, (U. S. S. R.) as a party to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, will associate itself with the American Government in this approach to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Similar communication is being addressed simultaneously to the Soviet Government (British Government).

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

After allowing sufficient time for telegraphic communications and reply to elapse, the United States Ambassador to Poland, Arthur Bliss Lane, in pursuance of the intention expressed toward the end of the identical notes printed above, communicated on January 9 to the Polish Foreign Ministry a note which outlined American interest in "free and unfettered elections." At the same time he reiterated that the results of such elections were a matter which concerned solely the Polish people. The text of the note delivered by Ambassador Lane follows:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's notes of Aug. 19 and Nov. 22, 1946, regarding the Polish national elections, to which no reply has yet been received, and pursuant to instructions from my Government to inform Your Excellency, as a signatory of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, with particular regard to those sections of the two agreements which deal with the establishment of a government in Poland, through the instrumentality of free and unfettered elections, of my Government's continued concern over the pre-election activities of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

My Government is especially perturbed by the increasingly frequent reports of repressive measures which the Polish Provisional Government has seen fit to employ against those democratic elements in Poland which have not aligned themselves with the "bloc" parties.

It is a source of regret to my Government that its previous efforts to call the attention of the Polish Provisional Government to its failure to perform its obligations under the agreements cited have not resulted in any change in the course which that Government has pursued in connection with pre-election political activities.

According to information reaching my Government from various authoritative sources, these repressive activities on the part of the Provisional Government have now increased in intensity to the point where, if they do not cease immediately, there is little likelihood that elections can be held in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam Agreement which call for free and unfettered elections "on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates."

It is the view of my Government that this matter involves the sanctity of international agreements, a principle upon which depends the establishment and maintenance of peace and the reign of justice under law.

The obligations with respect to the Polish elections which my Government assumed at Yalta and reiterated at Potsdam, together with the Soviet and British Governments, and the obligations subsequently assumed by the Polish Government and frequently reiterated, provide for the conduct of free and unfettered elections of the type and in the manner described above.

The fact that the subject matter of these agreements relates to elections in Poland is incidental. The essential fact is that they constitute an inter-

national agreement under which all four nations concerned have assumed obligations.

I need hardly say that my Government is interested only in seeing that the Polish people have the opportunity to participate in a free and unfettered election and that my Government does not regard the results of such an election as being a proper concern of anyone other than the Polish people themselves.

My Government would be failing in its duty if it did not again point out that the continuation of the present policy of suppression, coercion and intimidation as applied to political opposition in Poland constitutes a violation of the letter as well as the spirit of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.

U. S. ACCUSES POLES OF PACT VIOLATIONS BY VOTE COERCION

The elections were held on Sunday, January 19. They were closely observed by all the foreign diplomatic missions and representatives of the foreign press. Apparently there was unanimity among neutral observers as to the unusually large number of Polish militia, Security Police and volunteer militia who surrounded the balloting places. The figure of 500,000 was quoted. There were widespread reports of violence, intimidation, obstruction and outright falsification. Vice-Premier Mikołajczyk was obliged to stand in line over two hours before he was able to cast his vote. The Polish Government itself reported over 100 deaths arising out of riots and disturbances during the election.

The results were announced, at first unofficially and piecemeal, but the pattern of the Government Bloc's victory came immediately clear. It was evident that Mikołajczyk's Peasant Party was to be greatly reduced in its representation in Parliament (the new unicameral Sejm) and that Mikołajczyk was himself to be excluded from the new cabinet.

Before the polls closed Mikołajczyk, on a basis of reports of irregularities that had come to him throughout the day, presented a protest and a demand that, in accordance with the law, the elections be invalidated. No one labored under the impression that the protest would receive any serious attention. Speeches by leaders of the Bloc on the following days were jubilant in tone, and the Peasant Party leader was referred to as "the ex-Vice-Premier."

The British and American Ambassadors, who had previously and frequently declared the interest of their respective countries in the manner in which Polish engagements to conduct a "free and unfettered" election were carried out, made, it may safely be assumed, elaborate and documented reports to their governments. Apparently the tone of the American report, submitted by Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane, was so unequivocal that the Department of State gave a very prompt statement of the position of the American Government in regard to the elections. In a long statement made public in Washington on January 28, the history of the problem was reviewed; at the same time the statement specifies that the Polish Government has failed to live up to its solemn pledges, but that the United

States maintains its interest in Polish affairs and will continue to be informed of developments through its mission in Warsaw. The statement follows:

On January 19 a general election was held in Poland, the results of which are to be announced shortly.

The United States Government has followed the developments leading up to this event in accordance with the commitments it accepted at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. On numerous occasions it has expressed its concern over the course of events in Poland which increasingly indicated that the election would not be conducted in such manner as to allow a free expression of the will of the Polish people.

On Aug. 19 and Nov. 22, 1946, formal notes were addressed to the Polish Government on this subject.

On Jan. 5 this Government brought the situation in Poland to the attention of the British and Soviet Governments and expressed the hope that those Governments would associate themselves with the Government of the United States in an approach to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Government.

On Jan. 9 this Government delivered a further note to the Polish Provisional Government which stated among other things that if the repressive activities on the part of the Provisional Government did not cease immediately, there was little likelihood that elections could be held in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam agreement. The British Government has also protested to the Polish Provisional Government the violation of its election pledges.

The reports received from the United States Embassy in Poland in the period immediately prior to the elections as well as its subsequent reports based upon the observations of American officials who visited a number of Polish voting centers confirmed the fears which this Government had expressed that the election would not be free.

These reports were corroborated by the general tenor of the dispatches from foreign correspondents in Poland.

It is clear that the Provisional Government did not confine itself to the suppression of the so-called "underground" but employed widespread measures of coercion and intimidation against democratic elements which were loyal to Poland although not partisans of the Government "bloc."

In these circumstances the United States Government cannot consider that the provisions of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements have been fulfilled.

The United States Government has made it clear that it has no desire to intervene in the internal affairs of Poland. By virtue of the responsibility which devolved upon it as one of the principal powers engaged in liberating the countries of Europe from Nazi occupation, it undertook, together with the British and Soviet Governments, to secure for the long-suffering Polish people the opportunity to select a Government of their own choosing. It was in connection with this undertaking that this Government agreed to the decisions respecting Poland that were taken at the Yalta conference, including the decision to recognize the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

These decisions with respect to Poland, which were accepted by the

Polish Provisional Government in their entirety, formed part of a series of agreements between the United States, British and Soviet Governments. The United States Government considers that the Polish Provisional Government has failed to carry out its solemn pledges.

The United States Government firmly intends to maintain its interest in the welfare of the Polish people. While retaining full liberty of action to determine its future attitude toward the Government of Poland, this Government will continue to keep itself informed of developments in Poland through its diplomatic mission in Warsaw.

THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO POLAND

On January 10, 1947, the trial of four Polish citizens, charged with crimes against the Polish state, involving allegedly the transmission of state secrets to "a foreign ambassador" opened in Warsaw. In the course of the evidence it the British Ambassador, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck. The court warned the witnesses that they were not to name the foreign country in the case, but this warning was given after the British Ambassador had been named. The defendants were charged also with being active members of an "underground" organization, the "Wolność" group, which, it was further alleged, took orders from Gen. Władysław Anders, head of the Second Polish Corps, now in London. Several other trials were in session in Poland with similar if less sensational features. In the other cases, so far as reported, no foreign government was specifically named in the open evidence.

The following day (Saturday) Ambassador Cavendish-Bentinck left Warsaw for London on the regularly scheduled flight of the R.A.F. Embassy plane. After conferring with the Foreign Office in London he returned to Warsaw on Saturday, January 18, to be present during the elections on Sunday. It was public knowledge that he was deliberately snubbed by Polish Foreign Office officials and any request for conferences, routine or otherwise, was met with evasion or rebuff. Under such circumstances, there was little for him to do but to ask his Government to reassign him. This is apparently what happened. On January 30 it became known that Ambassador Cavendish-Bentinck was being assigned to another post, and it was made clear that his reassignment was in the nature of a promotion. Just what his next post might be was not at the moment made public. Of the high regard in which he is held in the British Foreign Service there is no doubt.

That same evening the Polish Security Police arrested Mrs. Marynowska, a trusted Polish employee of the British Press Service, attached to the Embassy, and held her incommunicado, in solitary confinement. The charges against her were not immediately published, but unofficially it was known that she was accused of being in close communication with some one or several of the "underground" groups. The Polish press headlined the story and published the text of the "confession" she was asserted to have made.

This is the first Polish employee of the British Embassy to have been

arrested and imprisoned, but it will be remembered that an employee of the American Embassy, a Mrs. Dmochowska, who claimed to be an American citizen, was arrested, tried and convicted on similar charges. Procedures in the Polish special military courts which try such cases differ somewhat from those generally in use in Western European countries in a number of ways.

It should perhaps be remarked that the term "underground" in the Poland of today is a term which admits of several interpretations. Mikołajczyk has often been accused by Government spokesmen of being in close and friendly contact with the "underground." He has always either flatly denied the charge or treated it as not worth replying to. He has also retorted that the Government Bloc classes as the "underground" anybody who disagrees with it. If one were to judge from the vehemence with which the present Government attacks its enemies of the "underground" it would be reasonable to say that a large proportion of the population must either be active in or sympathetic with the opposition. Open opposition to the Government, of course, is not encouraged. Logically therefore whatever opposition there is, in order to maintain itself, must go "underground." Foreign correspondents in Poland report that, in their judgment, 75% of the people are opposed to the Government Bloc. Some qualified observers put the figure substantially higher. But surely 75% of the people can not be in the "underground" in any exact meaning of the term.

The Provisional Polish Government, by these measures, seems to demand that diplomatic missions from Western countries avoid all contact with 75% of the Polish population. In accepted international usage, this is rather an unusual position to take.

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It is with considerable pleasure that we record the receipt of the first post-war issue of the *Przegląd Historyczny* issued by the Society of Friends of History (Towarzystwo Miłośników Historii) in Warsaw. This is the first of the series of Central European historical journals to be revived since the disorganization resulting from the war and German occupation. This number contains some necrologies and a considerable number of purely historical articles which are listed in "Recent Periodical Literature." There is also an account of what was done by this Society during the German occupation. Meetings were held regularly from 1940 till November, 1943, when Professor Kętrzynski was arrested, and after several months meetings were resumed under the presidency of Ludwik Kolankowski. The papers that were read are listed and will probably be published in subsequent numbers of the *Przegląd*. One of these papers, that of Dr. Gieysztor, concerning the origins of the Crusades, will be published in English in Fascicle V of *Medievalia et Humanistica*. Between August, 1944 and January, 1945 all of the equipment of the association was completely destroyed in bombardments at the time of the Warsaw insurrection. Thereafter the first meeting was held in May, 1945 in the buildings of the University. Regular meetings were resumed after the liberation of the country, at which scholarly papers have been presented. The

present officers of the Society are: President, Stanisław Kętrzyński; vice-president, Tadeusz Manteuffel; secretary, Alois Bachulski. The society should be particularly congratulated on both its courage and its enterprize and on the high quality of the articles in this issue.

S. H. T.

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It is with deep regret that the JOURNAL reports the untimely death, at the age of 55, of Professor Samuel Hazzard Cross, who has been on the Editorial Board since the founding of the JOURNAL. Professor Cross was the chairman of the department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Harvard University, for many years editor of *Speculum*, and since 1941, managing editor of the *American Slavonic and East European Review*. He had had a distinguished career in the diplomatic service and in the academic profession, was widely known in America and abroad for his wide interests, his energy, and his scholarship. His passing is a distinct loss to the cause of American learning and will be particularly felt in the field of Slavic studies in which he was so eminent.

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The Editor wishes to apologize for several unproofread pages at the end of the Book Review section in the October number. Most of the *errata* are easily self-correcting. An explanation, if not a palliation, lies in a temporary lack of correspondence between the editorial office and our printer. The corrected galley proof did not reach its destination until the whole number had gone through the press.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHADWICK, N. K., *The Beginnings of Russian History: An Enquiry Into Sources*. New York: Macmillan for Cambridge University Press, 1946. Pp. vii, 180. \$2.75.

Early Russian history has in the past depended, for its facts, on the Russian Primary Chronicle which was compiled at Kiev in the early part of the twelfth century. But echoes of the events there recorded are heard in the Norse sagas, in the works of Byzantine historians, of the annalists of western Europe and of Arab geographers, besides the miscellaneous literary products of other races on the periphery of Russia. Much of this material is less historical than literary but it enshrines traditions which, however distorted and misdated, rest presumably on a solid foundation of historical fact. To strip away the accretions of legend, of heroic epic, of more folklore and to discover the underlying facts and to bring them into the proper relation with one another and with what we already know, is the task to which Mrs. Chadwick has addressed herself.

The author has taken four of the great characters of the chronicle—Oleg, Vladimir I, Yaroslav the Wise and Vladimir II (Monomakh) and has reexamined the events with which the chronicle associates their names in the light of evidence drawn from other sources. She has made extensive use of the Norse sagas, pierced out with the works of various Arab, Persian, Jewish and Armenian writers to bring out certain phases of their careers in part hitherto neglected. Since many of the sagas were used by the chroniclers, they lend themselves particularly to this treatment. This calls for unconventional methods that might shock the orthodox historian. For instance, by showing the similarity of the stories associated with the names of Oleg (of the chronicle) of Örvar-Oddr (of the sagas) and of Onther (mentioned in King Alfred's translation of the *History of the World* by Orosius), she seeks to establish the common stock of folklore on which each drew and leads us to infer that the chronicle is not to be taken at its face value but is merely grouping around a historical character incidents drawn from the common stock.

Such methods to justify themselves must light up in a significant way historical events or persons. We are not sure that this has always been the case. Assumptions made are sometimes unsupported by evidence; for instance the highly developed stage of agriculture in the Dnieper valley in the tenth century; the ever-present need to purchase immunity from nomadic raids to permit the carrying on of this agriculture. Neither of these assumptions accords with commonly accepted views. Emphasis has hitherto usually been on the far-flung commercial network of which the "Varangian waterway" was a part, and of which the writer says little; nor do we feel the impact of the great social forces that were working a transformation of Europe, East and West, in the ninth and tenth century, leading to the introduction of feudalism.

Perhaps the book's greatest contribution is that it shifts the emphasis from the Norse element to the native Slavic, as the chief element in Russian civilization.

The writer admits the purely tentative nature of her results. The book was prepared under the adverse conditions of war-time England, some of the relevant material not being accessible. Moreover, archeological investigations undertaken in the Soviet Union, the results of which reach the outside world very slowly, are constantly modifying prevailing views on this obscure period.

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STUART R. TOMPKINS

DE MONTFORT, HENRI, *Le Drame de la Pologne—Kościuszko 1745-1817*. Paris: La Colombe, 1945. Pp. 382. Frs. 240.

Tadeusz Kościuszko, called by the Poles "a hero of two continents," has not so far enjoyed a definitive biography on either continent. A good many books have been written about him and still more special studies and serious articles in several languages, but there has not appeared a single biography that would tell the complete story. Neither does this one—which at best is a good story but of second-rate importance as a contribution to the literature on the subject.

To be sure a Polish historian, Tadeusz Korzon, did produce a biography of Kościuszko (*Kościuszko*, Warsaw, 1894, pp. lxxxv, 691), which fifty years ago might have been regarded as definitive but is now much out of date. A great deal of source material has since then accumulated in the United States that Korzon knew nothing about—and which now de Montfort has overlooked.

Monica Gardner's short biography of Kościuszko (*Kosciuszko, A Biography*, London and New York, 1920, pp. 211) was an English version in abbreviated form of what was already known, including some things that were not true. For example, she picked up one of Korzon's footnotes in which he inadvertently alluded to a Kościuszko School for Colored People at Newark. She elaborated upon it and concluded (p. 182) that it was "the first educational institute for negroes to be opened in the United States, and which bore Kościuszko's name." This has plagued the present reviewer for the past twenty-odd years as at frequent intervals people have written to him for more information about this school which never existed.

Henri de Montfort's book was obviously inspired by the situation of Poland during World War II. It seems that he started to tell the story of the Poles and of their historic struggle for independence since the first partition in 1772, down through the uprising under Kościuszko in 1794, the insurrections of 1830-31 and 1863, and the legions led by Piłsudski during World War I. However, Kościuszko arrested his interest and he decided to write a biographical story of this Polish national hero who "incarne pour la postérité la lutte du peuple polonais pour son indépendance."

It is obvious, even if the author did not tell us so himself (which he did, p. 363), that he leans almost entirely on Korzon in so far as biographical data are concerned. Neither in the historical background nor in biographical story is there anything new that was not already known. Being a Frenchman, we expected de Montfort to shed some light on at least one question, concerning which there has been some controversy: we know that Kościuszko received a

scholarship from the last King of Poland and studied military engineering in France, but where in France or Paris in particular did he study? The author says that Kościuszko studied at Mézières school of military engineering and artillery, then in a private military academy at Versailles, and finally in a school of engineering and artillery at Brest. But that is precisely what Korzon said over fifty years ago, only in terms of probability. Now de Montfort puts it as a fact without, however, producing any evidence for this assertion.

The author is well informed, the book reads easily, but in many details it is a slovenly job. E.g. the author makes Kościuszko land at Philadelphia (which he did), in July or August, 1776, but on May 31, 1776, (sic!) he was already entrusted by the Committee of Defense with the defense of Pennsylvania. By "New-Brunswick" it may be presumed the author meant New Brunswick, N.J. He refers to the Polish national anthem as *Jeszcze Polska nie umarła* (should be *Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła*).

To one of the most important experiences in Kościuszko's life, seven years in the American Revolutionary Army, which had a tremendous influence on his rôle in the uprising of 1794 in Poland and his democratic approach on social questions, the author devotes exactly 4½ pages. His bibliography is extensive, some 176 items, but not comprehensive; 166 entries are Polish and French works, 8 German, and only 3 in the English language—Father Lord's "The Second Partition of Poland," published by the Harvard (sic!) University Press, Dr. William J. Rose's "Konarski, Reformer of Education in 18th Century Poland," and Anderson Galleries (of New York) catalogue of Kościuszko's letters. The Catholic Historical Researches done in the United States and Mr. Haiman's many valuable contributions to our knowledge of Kościuszko in America were apparently not known to the author.

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STEPHEN P. MIZWA

Publications of the Navy Record Society, Volume LXXXIII. Russian War, 1854. Baltic and Black Sea: Official Correspondence. Edited by D. Bonner-Smith and Captain A. C. Dewar, R.N., London, 1943. Pp. 434. 21s. Volume LXXXIV *Russian War, 1855. Baltic: Official Correspondence.* Edited by Bonner-Smith, London, 1944. Pp. 414. 21s. Volume LXXXV. *Russian War, 1855. Black Sea: Official Correspondence.* Edited by Captain A. C. Dewar, R.N., London, 1945. Pp. 486. 21s.

Possibly no other conflict in history is so full of meaning as the Crimean War. To the popular mind it symbolizes almost unreasonable courage as portrayed by Tennyson's "Charge of the Light Brigade." To the specialist in Near Eastern history it represents the classic nineteenth century contest between England and Russia concerning the Turkish Straits. The humanitarian sees in it the activities of Florence Nightingale and the subsequent inauguration of the Red Cross. To the naval historian the Crimean War has a particular and special interest. It

was the dividing line between two great periods of naval warfare and naval architecture—the age of sail and solid shot and the age of steam and incendiary shell. Of the five great naval developments of the 19th century, steam motive power, the shell gun, the screw propeller, protective armor, and rifled ordnance, all but the last found their first application in the Crimean War. And even rifled ordnance was used as field artillery in the early Lancaster gun.

The shell gun, the invention of General Paixhans of the French Army, received its first test in combat in the naval battle of Sinope, November 30, 1853. The spectacular result obtained by a Russian squadron against the Turkish wooden vessels in Sinope Roads impressively demonstrated the power of the incendiary shell. The wooden ship of the line became obsolete and a new factor entered naval warfare. Protective armor was first used in naval warfare when a squadron of floating batteries, especially constructed for the operation in England, and armored with four inch iron plates, bombarded and silenced the Russian Fort Kinburn at the mouth of the Dnieper River, October 17, 1855.

These, and all naval aspects of the War against Russia, in both the Baltic and Black Seas, are presented in these volumes of the Navy Records Society: the 83rd, 84th, and 85th in the important series since the society was organized in 1893 and issued its first volume in 1894. The present volume consists entirely of official correspondence concerning naval operations as conducted during the War with Russia in 1854 and 1855. Many features add to the value of these volumes and indicate the thoroughness of the editorial work. There are illuminating introductions, convenient schedules of documents with a summary of their content, tables of relative naval strength, with the proportion of sail and steam vessels, and a complete index. Of special importance is the introduction to Volume LXXXIII, Part II, as it surveys the effect of the nineteenth century naval developments on the British navy which was just in transition between sail and steam. It should be noted that this introduction is not only a general account, but makes use of special studies of naval development, including J. P. Baxter's definitive *Introduction of the Ironclad Warship*. The same characterization applies to other introductions to the various sections in these volumes.

Although the Black Sea and the Crimea were the principal areas of operations, the British fleet was extensively engaged in the Baltic. Because of the somewhat dramatic character of various phases of the war in the Crimea and the relatively larger issues involved, particularly those connected with the future of Turkey, Baltic operations have been generally ignored. These volumes, particularly Vol. LXXXIV, present both theatres of war in proper perspective. Important material is revealed relative to an intensive naval campaign in the Baltic proposed for 1856. According to this plan, a formidable Anglo-French fleet was to enter the Baltic in the spring of 1856, blockade the Russian coasts, destroy the great naval base at Cronstadt, and attack St. Petersburg. Although most of the political aspects of this projected expedition have been long available in *The Panmure Papers* (London, 1908), Germain Bapst's, *Le Maréchal Canrobert* (Paris, 1904) and F. A. Wellesley's, *The Paris Embassy during the Second*

Empire (London, 1928), the complete extent and ambitious character of the naval expedition are now indicated for the first time. The difficulties of supply and of the maintenance of blockade, the detailed planning and estimate of the proposed attack on Cronstadt, to the final order from the Admiralty cancelling all operations, with the conclusion of peace, are all portrayed in detailed and vivid phraseology. Even though it goes by the title of "official correspondence," its value to those concerned with naval affairs is very great. The supplement to Vol. LXXXIV, "Remarks on the different Methods that may be adopted in conducting the Operations in the Baltic during the ensuing season," is of particular interest to all students of naval operations.

It is not necessary to indicate specific details of the extremely valuable material contained in these publications. They are indispensable and maintain the high standard of the Navy Record Society.

University of Colorado

JAMES G. ALLEN

SPIECKER, KARL, *Germany—from Defeat to Defeat*. Preface by R. W. Seton-Watson. "Cross Roads" Series. London: Macdonald, 1945. Pp. xviii, 159. 5s.

Professor Seton-Watson assures the reader of Dr. Spiecker's "enlightened and far-reaching views upon the fate of Germany and Europe" (p. VII). Some of Spiecker's interpretations Seton-Watson accepts, whereas he rejects his most important contention that every feature of the Versailles Treaty was blameworthy. All historians concede that Versailles was deficient from a number of aspects. But no German scholar or publicist has as yet presented a clear-cut substitute for it, which would entail retribution that a defeated nation has always been expected to pay. The tragedy of Versailles, then, lies in the fact that the onus of carrying out its provisions devolved upon the Weimar Republic, so that its belated *Erfüllungspolitik* could be exploited by German Rightists as an index of democratic impotence.

Spiecker reiterates the prevalent German contentions that the German people were ready to accept their niche in the European and world community of nations only to be disappointed by the abandonment of "Wilson's program" (p. 42) and the imposition of the Versailles Treaty. He admits that France throughout the 1920's never felt secure (pp. 47, 48). He enumerates "the defects and errors of the Republic" (pp. 55-78)—most of these defects being familiar to all. Yet Spiecker's work lays itself open to the inference that all of Germany's troubles stemmed from external forces.

One of the questions scholars of Nazi Germany will hereafter have to account for will be the extent to which the German people became Nazi. The judgment will often coincide with the scholars' preconceptions, personal experiences, or wishful thinking. He categorically denies that the German people became Nazi, "provided the youth is considered as a separate case" (p. 102). He is certain that the various pre-Hitlerite party adherents' "souls" had not

been conquered by Nazism (p. 111 sqq.) and that only the German people's "unwisdom, impatience, gullibility" led them to condone Nazi rule (p. 125). The reader may justifiably wonder whether palliating adjectives dispose of the fact of acceptance. To repeat the commonplace observations that Frederick the Great, Bismarck, Spengler, and Moeller van den Brück could not have accepted Nazism (pp. 141-143) does not mitigate against the contemporary situation.

In Spiecker's account the struggle of the Catholic Church against the Nazi régime emerges more heroic than that of the Protestant Churches (pp. 109-111). In years to come it should prove interesting if statistical data could be gathered and evaluated to see which of the churches acted more vigorously and consistently.

The author's contentions that Rathenau's "call for a *levée en masse* . . . probably accelerated" the collapse of Germany in 1918 (p. 36) and that the Centre Party and Prussia were mainstays of Weimar (pp. 83-90) are certainly disputable. Spiecker seems to be oblivious of any such possibility.

The only Germanism found in the book was the repeated reference to the the "Reichs Government" (obviously a literal translation of "Reichsregierung").

University of Houston

LOUIS KESTENBERG

MCCALLUM, R. B., *Public Opinion and the Last Peace*. London: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. x, 214.

Since there is no bigger problem to-day than the shape of the peace to come every book on the last attempt at peace-making must be welcome. The book under review is, so to speak, an intelligent man's musings on the peace at Paris. It is not interested in the problems as such which had to be solved by the statesmen of 1919 but with the political and psychological consequences. What makes it attractive reading is the fact that it is well argued—as well as we might expect from a typical Oxford don who allows himself the luxury of writing a book without any bibliographical hints or the indication of sources he might have used. He treats his subject unsystematically, repeats himself at times and appears quite unabashed when he contradicts himself.

In a book of this kind it is obviously of extreme importance to know where the author himself stands (since he gives pride of place to opinion as distinct from historical fact). "I would be glad," says Mr. McCallum, "that the reader should impute to me the errors common to the moderate men of the Left, Liberal and Labour." This sounds frank enough—and yet, it will mislead the reader utterly unless he be aware (as few Englishmen, not to mention others, are to-day) that a whole group of English men of letters and university dons still insist on calling themselves "Left" while, in truth, they have crossed the river and reached the extreme "Right." A. L. Rowse, an extreme nationalist, likes to label himself a left-wing Radical; Lord Elton, Ramsay MacDonald's young man—Mr. Geoffrey Elton in those days—still speaks of himself as a true Labour don while writing a new *Expansion of Britain* to show that British Imperialism was the highest form of man's political realization of God's will; and now comes Mr. McCallum. Having told the reader that he belongs to the "Left" he pro-

ceeds to reserve his fiercest attacks for Woodrow Wilson, for Gilbert Murray and Robert Cecil, for Joseph Wedgwood and Lord Strabolgi. Why did we lose the peace and offer so little resistance? "Who is responsible? I will answer that question plainly. The responsibility rests on the revolutionary socialists of France and of all other countries."

Left and Right, indeed, have become conceptions which need redefining, particularly at a time when so many men are searching their own past, blaming their own blindness and thus go to the other extreme without noticing it.

Mr. McCallum's thesis is simple: the Paris Peace having been as nearly perfect as we could make it ought to have been upheld. Whosoever attacked the Treaties of 1919 helped to bring about the war of 1939-45; whosoever backed the letter and the spirit of the Treaties of 1919 promoted peace and happiness throughout the world. This is the supposition of his case—which he takes for granted. Those who voted for the Treaty acted "patriotically" (p. 60) while the critics "fulfilled their traditional rôle of pleading the enemy's (sic) cause" (p. 100). In the spirit of true racialism Mr. McCallum states that "only two English members" voted against the Treaties, hastily adding: "But Kenworthy was the only Englishman. In *Who's Who* I read under Mr. Jack Jone's entry: "Born at Nemagh, Tipperary." Truly it is a long way to Tipperary, to a peace of the mind as well as of the letter.

Our author thinks "disgust" about Mr. Keynes's famous book to some extent justifiable; is ashamed of the attitude of the Friends; believes that the Treaty of Versailles "was a monument of hypocrisy" unless the exclusive war-guilt of Imperial Germany is a proven fact; holds that Britain entered into engagements with France which she failed to fulfill; is of the opinion that the Conservative Party in 1918 was on the side of the mass of ordinary people. In short, his book is filled with stimulating and irritating utterances the value of which can, I submit, only be found if the reader passionately argues with the author, scrutinizes every utterance (and, particularly, his premises). "If one has been so rash as to come to any conclusion at all," says McCallum, "one is in a dilemma." He certainly is. He believes in self-determination—and repudiates firmly and finally the vicious attacks on this democratic notion recently made by Professor E. H. Carr—but he forgets to watch its application. Instead of chasing the chimera of a textual fulfilment of the legal clauses and sub-clauses of the Paris Treaties with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey he might have considered the growth (and the withering away!) of their basic conceptions: free expression, self-determination, disarmament, collaboration all round, mandatory assistance, free access to raw materials etc., etc. He might then have discovered that public opinion in the democracies was not so wrong after all. That it was wiser even than some of their leaders, viz., the British demand to stop Italian aggression in time.

Mr. R. B. McCallum has written both an extremely clever and unsatisfactory

book. His premises are wrong—that is why he reached a dilemma instead of an answer. But his method of argumentation might help his readers to do better.
Charterhouse, Godalming, England F. W. PICK

SHOTWELL, JAMES T., LASERSON, MAX M., *Poland and Russia 1919-1945*. New York: King's Crown Press, 1945. Pp. xi, 114. \$2.25.

LASERSON, MAX M., *Russia and the Western World. The Place of the Soviet Union in the Comity of Nations*. New York: Macmillan, 1945. Pp. x, 275. \$2.50.

These two books may be reviewed together because they treat closely related subjects and represent a marked tendency in modern political science. The main interest of the writers of this school is to bolster up those diplomatic or political efforts which are devoted (really or pretendedly) to peace and some kind of world organization for maintaining peace. They are sometimes hushing up certain difficulties or overrating the significance of small tactical successes in their enthusiasm for international order. They work like diplomats of political science supporting the diplomats of the governments.

Even in a time when the bankruptcy of the League of Nations was obvious to cursory observers, most of them maintained their faith in the noble experiment and now they transfer their whole devotion, optimism and skill in analyzing legal and diplomatic documents to the United Nations, the new savior of mankind after the catastrophe of war. This school seldom asks whether the pre-suppositions upon which these institutions are based give a real guarantee for a stable international order, that is whether their principles are safe; they are more interested in the daily diplomatic negotiations and try to show that habit and good-will will smooth the tension and will make the future brighter.

This tendency is clearly visible in both of the books before us. Both are very useful, even indispensable, in regard to factual developments, but we miss a point of view from which the meaning of the international situation could be really grasped. The very involved and complicated Polish-Russian problem finds a complete and meticulous elaboration in the collective works of Professors Shotwell and Laserson, in which the Russian background of the latter, as a former professor at the University of St. Petersburg, was surely of considerable help. Unfortunately one cannot comprehend the veritable meaning of the struggles of the Poles and the moral issues involved in them are scarcely touched. What is right and what is wrong in the new equilibrium created by the Big Powers remains as obscure as in the controversies of the diplomats. *Faits accomplis* are generally acknowledged without further criticism. For instance the brutal practice of the compulsory transfer of national minorities, which were an obstacle to the greedy appetite of power politics, finds easy excuse under a small humanitarian disguise. The tragic story of the disappearance of Polish officers and the collapse of the Warsaw uprising of General Bor are still unexplained. The new Polish government imposed by the unrelenting pressure of the Soviet government finds a sympathetic appreciation under the promise of a "strong, free, inde-

pendent Poland." Of course, "anyone who was active in the Pilsudski-Beck régimes of 1926 to 1939, as well as members of the Government-in-exile and of its Foreign Office, will not be welcome in the new Poland." In the light of the recent "free elections" the picture given by the book will not satisfy the more critical readers.

The same spirit of optimism characterizes the comprehensive study of Professor Laserson which tried to demonstrate that the recent developments in the Soviet Union brought it far nearer to the Western world. The author thinks that both considerable changes in the Russian Constitution and in the system of law and an evolution towards Federalism will create a new spirit. "The combination of national Clemenceauism and international Wilsonianism is expressly declared in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. . . ." In this interpretation great importance is attributed to a speech of Mr. A. Gromyko.

This reviewer will not deny that the changes which occurred during the dictatorship of Stalin have been very real, but he thinks that these changes do not point towards a Westernization of Russia, but rather signify the growth of Soviet nationalism and imperialism. For instance the argument of the author minority, because everyone lacked it. In this collective need lies the genuine force of a future Russian democracy," seems to be more a hope than a reality. Also the comparison between certain Soviet institutions and those of Western democracies appears rather strained and misses the real essence of those institutions. For instance, treating Russian federalism as something analogous to the models of the United States and Switzerland is a misunderstanding of the fundamental nature of federalism which is a spontaneous co-operation of peoples and an act of military centralization. Or his optimism concerning the national life of the incorporated territories (something more than the use of their national idioms) or his belief that "this titanic state is not ready to take the risks involved in an indefinite growth which can lead it to the status of all typically imperialistic states—that of a minority commanding and leading a majority of subordinated nationalities and provinces of several denominations" will appear to many of us as a strained construction. In the same way many interpretations of the Russian Constitution are more interpretation of the text than of existing reality.

The real abyss between the Western world and Soviet Russia which is not so much a political and economic difference as a divergence of ideologic and religious values does not find sufficient explanation in the book.

There is however an important point which Professor Laserson emphasizes concerning the future of Russia. This is the following statement: "The long and persistent advances of the Soviet armies have given millions of common Soviet citizens the opportunity to observe at first hand the standards of Western living. Simple aspects of Western life which until the summer of 1941 were known only to a small number of members of Soviet legations or commercial agencies—or to a few scientists sent to Western Europe or America for research—have become common knowledge since the war. The cultivating and enlightening influence which the Russian military advances during the Napoleonic Wars exerted on the

Russian officers will be repeated and tremendously augmented by the millions of Soviet soldiers during the offensive and occupation of the West."

If this observation is correct, it may prove to have grave consequences in the whole ideologic structure of post-war Russia.

Oberlin College

OSCAR JASZI

RENNER, KARL, *Denkschrift über die Geschichte der Unabhängigkeitserklärung Österreichs und Bericht über drei Monate Aufbauarbeit*. Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1946. Pp. 115.

RENNER, KARL, *Österreich, Saint-Germain und der kommende Friede*. Vienna: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1946. Pp. 23.

RENNER, KARL, *Demokratie und Bürokratie*. Vol. I of *Studien zur Kultur- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Österreichs*, herausgegeben vom Institut für Wissenschaft und Kunst. Vienna: Universum Verlag, 1946. Pp. 39.

The above writings of the president of the Austrian Republic, who was also the first chancellor of the First Austrian Republic, give valuable information about the formation of the existing Austrian régime and the trying problems which have confronted it since its inception.

The first of these treatises, the *Denkschrift*, includes the contents of two pamphlets published by the Austrian State Printing Office in 1945; three proclamations to the Austrian people in April, 1945, which can also be found as Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of the 1945 issue of the *Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich*; President Renner's report to the *Nationalrat* at its opening session on December 19, 1945; and the text of a speech by the Swiss professor J. R. von Salis, given at Bregenz on November 24, 1945, on the contributions which small states like Austria can make to European civilization.

The *Denkschrift* takes up the attitude of the Austrian people towards National Socialism, depicts President Renner's rôle, under Russian supervision, in organizing a provisional government, and describes how the members of this government tried to cope with the multifarious problems which faced them in 1945. Prior to the *Anschluss*, the Austrian president insists, the great mass of Austrian peasants and workingmen and a majority of the bourgeoisie were genuine democrats (p. 22). Only the Dollfuss-Mussolini *coup d'état* caused the Austrian workers to accept without visible opposition annexation to Germany (p. 23). After March, 1938, it was too late for them to wage effective resistance to the National Socialist régime.

The provisional government which was set up in the liberated portions of Austria late in April, 1945, the author asserts, was formed as a result of Austrian, and not of Russian, initiative. The Red Army, he insists, supported this government as far as military operations permitted and usually confirmed the resolutions and appointments made by it (p. 34). The government was composed of leaders of all anti-fascist parties and had the full support of the Austrian people. The tasks with which it was confronted were enormous. It had to create a wholly new administrative set-up, provide the state with money, cleanse the adminis-

tration of Nazis, rehabilitate the economic life of the country, and out of resources which had been almost totally exhausted feed the population and hundreds of thousands of refugees.

During the three months of its existence, Dr. Renner argues, the provisional government performed its obligations in a creditable manner. The Austrian people, too, did their part. The high hopes of May, 1945, however, were not fulfilled, largely "because the world political constellation did not keep pace with the inner Austrian reorganization" (p. 6).

That most of the problems confronting Austria cannot be solved as long as the present division into four military zones exists and as long as the Allies insist on appropriating former German property in Austria in accordance with the Potsdam agreement is the underlying theme of the second of Renner's works. This pamphlet, taken from a speech delivered before the Austrian League for the United Nations on April 5, 1946, reflects Dr. Renner's growing disillusionment over the alleged "complete insecurity" arising from Allied interference in Austrian affairs (p. 18) and over the fact that the Allies have not yet indicated their willingness to negotiate a peace treaty with Austria.

Dr. Renner's *Demokratie und Bürokratie* is not filled with startling new political theories, but it is a concise and readable exposition of its author's ideas on what constitutes a workable democracy: a parliamentary régime in which legislators, bureaucrats, and political leaders are careful always to place the constitution, law, and human liberties above personal interests.

The above treatises are a basic contribution to the literature on the creation of the second Austrian Republic, even though they were written to make a plea to world public opinion to aid Austria in procuring that independence of action and economic security necessary for its existence. All three are, on the whole, well-written and quite objective, but they are, nevertheless, partisan accounts and as such, are open to some question. For example, contrary to the usual reports made in 1938 that about one-third of the Austrian people were National Socialists, one-third supporters of the Schuschnigg régime, and one-third critics of both factions, Dr. Renner asserts that at that time two-thirds of the people preferred Hitler to Schuschnigg (*Denkschrift*, p. 24). In the opinion of the reviewer, such an opinion is open to doubt. Likewise, although this reviewer's conversations with various Austrian officials in the summer of 1946 impressed him with the surprising amount of freedom given to Austrian officials in the Russian zone of occupation, he feels that the president's repeated assertions that the government was almost wholly independent of communist influence might possibly be challenged. He also wonders whether the future historian will praise the accomplishments of the provisional government as much does as the writer of the above tracts.

In spite of these defects, Dr. Renner's publications make a substantial contribution towards dispelling many unwarranted and distorted rumors which have been spread in various Allied countries about conditions in Austria. Renner's

works should be made required reading for everyone who has a hand in determining the fate of Austria.

University of Georgia

R. JOHN RATH

FRAENKEL, ERNST, *Military Occupation and the Rule of Law. Occupation Government in the Rhineland, 1918-1923*. Institute of World Affairs. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. 267. \$3.50.

This is a timely book, and students must be grateful to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the new Institute of World Affairs of New York for having sponsored this publication. Its original draft, we are told, was submitted to the American governmental agencies on whom the burden of a renewed occupation of German territory is now falling. The author, while obviously of the extreme left in politics, has contributed considerably to a clarification of the underlying problems and his legal argument appears sound and free from bias throughout.

Dr. Fraenkel is particularly sound about the vexed question of war criminals. He points out that the United States jurists were right in holding people responsible for their crimes irrespective of the place where the crime had been committed; he repudiates the view, advanced by both the French and the Germans last time, that the place ought to be taken into account and that the occupying power exercise *de facto* authority only. This territorial principle appears untenable. Armies moreover have the privilege of extra-territoriality as long as the privileged too is being submitted to the law. The German jurist Alfred von Verdross held no other view. "The punishment of war criminals," says Dr. Fraenkel, "is not an act of vengeance, but is rather the exercise of a judicial power which the hostile government has failed to apply to its own subjects." Thus, he says, equality before the law is being restored, the rule of law secured. One difficulty, however, the author shirks: the fact that the Nazi government did not only punish criminals but actually ordered them to commit the crimes in question. Clearly then, what we need is a set of rules, a standard of justice which can be applied anywhere and everywhere. This, I feel, is the greatest challenge of our century to the lawyers of the world.

The author is particularly illuminating when he speaks of the High Commission—in accordance with American wishes a civilian government. Yet, in practice, the United States were represented by a General who, moreover, acted as an 'observer' only. There were 14 Americans, 16 British, 20 Belgians and no less than 65 French officials at occupation headquarters. Similarly, the United States provided 2,000 soldiers, the British 10,000, the Belgians 3,000 and the French the rest, a total of 106,000 men for the occupying forces. Small wonder that the Central Organization worked badly, that the whole question dissolved itself more or less into a Franco-German tug-of-war. The lesson for the complete occupation of to-day appears obvious.

Last time, there remained a German authority outside the zone of occu-

pation, and the occupation itself was carried out in accordance with a special treaty, the Rhineland agreement. The Germans therefore argued that it was neither a 'Belligerent Occupation' under article 43 of the Hague Convention nor a 'Peaceful Occupation' but a mixture of the two. Nobody could blame them for trying to make the best of these two worlds and to invent what Strupp called a *Misch-Besetzung*. This time the occupying powers have secured for themselves a free hand. This may simplify things in the legal sphere, but it also increases the responsibility of the occupying power in the political field. Again, the need for a set of rules, for a guarantee of basic liberties throughout the world and applicable under all circumstances becomes the more urgent.

Dr. Fraenkel surveys the criminal proceedings taken during the Rhineland occupation and recommends an appellate body with a neutral chairman for cases involving the occupying forces. He is also very explicit about the judicial review of governmental action which, in a democracy, is based on the idea of one branch exercising a check over another branch of government—which is, clearly, meaningless in the case of occupations. He therefore once more hopes for third party judgement and pleads for an international supervisory body. "It is highly doubtful whether the courts of the occupied country are the proper agencies to review actions of the occupants. Considerations of reason as well as of legal philosophy suggest that this function can be properly fulfilled only by an independent international body." To which I would like to add that this holds true even if one of the occupying powers should disagree. All we can do is to live according to our own standards—and to say what those standards are.

This Dr. Fraenkel has done. His book is thus both useful as a piece of sound research on a most topical question and courageous in its frank directness. He probably would agree with this reviewer that there is little chance of such third party judgment being admitted. Yet he pleads for it:—he thus serves the Rule of Law.

Charterhouse, Godalming, England

F.W. PICK

PIPINELIS, M. P., *Caitiff Bulgaria*, London: Hutchinson, 1944. Pp. 61. 6s.

Mr. Pipinelis, who served as Greek Minister to Bulgaria during the early years of the war, has set down in this small volume his views regarding Bulgaria's policy towards his country during the past generation. It is his thesis, in what is a relatively moderate statement of the Greek point of view, that since the start of this century almost the whole range of Bulgarian public opinion and political parties has favored a policy of annexing Greek Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia. There is abundant documentary evidence to support this thesis, and the author has made good use of it. On the political side in particular, his case is well documented. To the economic aspects of the problem, Mr. Pipinelis has devoted less attention.

That the Bulgarian occupation of these Greek-inhabited territories in the recent war was part of a firmly established policy, can scarcely be denied. This

being the case, it was bold of Mr. Pipinelis to express the hope in his final paragraphs that a "change of heart" would occur in Bulgaria such as that which motivated Greece's reconciliation with Turkey after 1923. While there may have been some reason to express such a hope in the early months of 1944, subsequent events have shown that this optimism was premature. The Fatherland Front régime in Bulgaria withdrew its troops from Thrace and Macedonia in the autumn of 1944 only after the strongest representations had been made in Moscow, and at the Paris peace conference in 1946 the echo of these claims was again heard.

In presenting Greece's case against Bulgaria, which is all he is trying to do, Mr. Pipinelis is thus on very solid ground. An objective study of the problem, of course, would have had to concern itself with a much wider variety of evidence. Such a study did not, however, fall within the scope of Mr. Pipinelis' essay.

Princeton University

C. E. BLACK

DENNEN, LEON, *Trouble Zone: Brewing Point of World War III?*, New York: Ziff-Davis, 1945. Pp. 173. \$1.50

Mr. Dennen went to the Eastern Mediterranean in the spring of 1944 in connection with the work of the War Refugee Board, and has summarized here his findings regarding great power relationships in that region. He is strongly impressed by the conflicts of ideologies and interests in the Balkans and the Near East and, as his subtitle implies, sees in this area a potential breeding ground of war between Soviet Russia and the Western states. In particular, Mr. Dennen feels that at the Yalta Conference, in the Spring of 1945, Roosevelt and Churchill made unwarranted concessions to Stalin in Southeastern Europe. Instead of receiving the opportunity to practice democracy for which they had fought the war, the author claims, the Balkan states were cynically forced to submit to Soviet imperialism. The author concludes with a plea for a federation of democracies in the Trouble Zone.

Few readers will disagree with Mr. Dennen's contention that the Eastern Mediterranean is a crossroads of empires, and hence a potential source of friction. When he becomes impatient, however, because democracy was not promptly introduced upon the departure of the German troops, and then goes on to draw absolute contrasts between Western democracy and Soviet tyranny, one cannot help feeling that his facts were too hastily collected and his opinions set down without sufficient consideration of the larger framework. The chapter on Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Rumania, based in fact on scanty information gleaned at second and third hand from refugees and journalists in the coffee-houses of Istanbul and Cairo, will mislead the reader more often than they will instruct him. Moreover, when castigating Russian despotism the author fails to make any effort to explain the Soviet concept of democracy. While the great majority of the democratic leaders in the Balkans are certainly disciples of Western liberalism, one may well doubt whether the choice between freedom and tyranny appears as clearly to them as it does to Mr. Dennen.

It is easy enough, by piecing together miscellaneous anecdotes and incidents of Balkan politics, by placing a halo on the Western-oriented Balkan statesmen of the past generation and by skimming lightly over the considerations of high policy which motivated the statesmen at Yalta, to portray Roosevelt and Churchill as betrayers of Balkan democracy, and to make a good case for this trouble zone as a brewing point of a third World War. Such a treatment contributes only confusion to the public's understanding of these important problems, however, and does a grave injustice to the statesmanship of the Big Three. What is objectionable in such a treatment is not, of course, the general case which the author is pleading, which is sound enough, but rather its violent language, hastily formed opinions and exaggerated paradoxes. While it makes easy reading, its extravagant language is likely to lose more friends than it will win for the very policies which Mr. Dennen wishes to see adopted.

Princeton University

C. E. BLACK

KRAUSE, FRIEDRICH, ed., *Goerdeler's Politisches Testament. Dokumente des anderen Deutschland*. Herausgegeben von Friedrich Krause. New York: Verlag Friedrich Krause, 1945. Pp. 70.

Carl Friedrich Goerdeler was a German public administrator who rose to become *Oberbürgermeister* of Leipzig in 1930 and Price Commissioner of the Reich in 1931 under Brüning upon Hindenburg's suggestion. (It is intimated that he was a potential successor to Brüning as Chancellor). He remained in Germany until his execution in Sept. 1944 with the exception of a visit to the United States in 1937, on which occasion he supposedly entrusted the documents included in this publication to a confidant.

The "Testament" section of the book maintains that Nazism was not the desperate choice for Germany as a so-called alternative to Communism (p. 21). The author denies that the Prussian army was a threat of war, because for centuries it had been "unpolitisch" (p. 25). The remainder of the "Testament" reiterates how the Nazis prostituted public office and law, and how they had resorted to capital inflation, public extravagance and rearmament. That Nazi Germany was no longer a "Rechtsstaat" and that Christian education of the young was discouraged is emphasized by Goerdeler. A fair summary of his ideas may be deduced from the following: "Thus Germany finds herself in a condition of lawlessness, moral breakdown, economic phantasy and financial wantonness (p. 42).

After Munich Goerdeler composed "Ein Weltfriedensprogramm" with a preamble which analyzed the social and economic ills of the world. The "program" itself calls attention to the imminence of war, the urgency of settling financial and public questions peaceably, and the need for limitation and, finally, abolition of armaments. Laconically, the editor appends to the "Weltfriedensprogramm" the observation: "A year later began the second World War" (p. 52).

An insight into the innocuousness of Goerdeler's program, if his conspiracy had materialized, may be gleaned from the document, "Der grosse Irrtum." Two

fallacies prevail in our times, according to the author: (1) That States can provide for all contingencies of its citizens and (2) that the contemporary world is so engrossed in its own material welfare that it restricts the birth rate (pp. 53-55).

The final document, "Brief an einen amerikanischen Politiker," Oct. 11, 1938, is interesting because of Goerdeler's reactions to Chamberlain's rôle at Munich: "Only a good friend of the dictators or an inexperienced youth could have acted thus " (p. 59). Goerdeler seems bitter because the opportunity to overthrow Hitler was fumbled on this occasion.

Again the reader will find the typical German "explanation" for Germany's acquiescence to Nazism embodied in the one-word sentiment: "Der Friedensdiktat" (p. 43).

The authenticity of these documents by Goerdeler is obliquely verified by Franklin L. Ford's "The Twentieth of July in the History of the German Resistance" in the *American Historical Review*, July, 1946.

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"VERRINA" *The German mentality*. Second revised ed. London: Allen and Unwin, 1946. Pp. vii, 344. 21s.

This is an attempt to do what Edmund Burke declared could not be done: indict an whole people. The indictment has not been prepared from critical examination of pertinent documents—the book makes no pretence to the traditional scholarly apparatus—but is based almost exclusively on the personal experiences of the anonymous author. From internal evidence it would appear that "Verrina" is an elderly German who lived in his native land until 1939. A substantial landowner and a schoolmate of the late General Keitel, the author also seems to have been well-connected in German financial and legal circles.

The burden of his argument is that, with unimportant exceptions, all Germans, those abroad as well as those at home, are guilty in greater or lesser degree of the atrocities, perversions, and transvaluations which characterized the Nazi régime. Most of the book is in fact devoted to the misdeeds of the Nazis (a tale which has been better told in other places) but underlying the exposition is the thesis of German guilt. The Germans are guilty because Hitler, the eGstapo, and Pangermanism are typical and necessary products of the German mentality. The author's conception of this mentality is however nowhere presented as a totality; the reader is left to gather from widely dispersed passages that the typical German is servile towards his betters, boastfully arrogant toward his inferiors, intolerant and incapable of self-criticism, possessed of great organizing ability and a passion for detail, and dominated by a deep and insatiable inclination to bellicose adventures. While "Verrina" explicitly renounces the notion that these traits are inherent in the German people, he eschews any serious effort to ascribe to the German mentality an historical origin, regards the Nazi accession to power as on the whole quite unavoidable, and declares that the same characteristics are

readily discernible in Tacitus' account of the early German tribes or in the behavior of the Teutonic knights.

Thus the elaborate mechanism of the Nazi terror appears in "Verrina's" pages, not as a measure necessary to the elimination of a German opposition, but as a kind of horror sadism practised by a primitive and barbaric people on itself. The reader gets the feeling that German labor almost enjoyed the destruction of its union organizations and the lowering of its living standards. "Verrina" seldom refers to the "opposition"; it is always the "unreliables" who are eliminated.

Thus also the whole totalitarian movement tends to become an almost purely German matter: there are only scattered references to non-German fascists, and the betrayal of the Czechs is attributed solely to Allied failure to understand the German mentality. Anti-semitism is pictured as merely another form of German avarice. As if anti-semitism disappeared in Europe with the defeat of the Nazi power, or as if there had been no concentration camps in Spain or Italy, as if, indeed, the fascist uprising was not a general European phenomenon, or might not recur at a later date in other areas of western civilization.

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RICHARD V. BURKS

SHORTER NOTICES

BAGINSKI, HENRYK, *Poland and the Baltic*. Second, revised and enlarged ed. London: Polish Institute for Overseas Problems, 1946. Pp. 232. 21s.

The first English edition of the work was reviewed in this JOURNAL in the Jan., 1944 number (p. 479f.). Since that time the territorial frontiers of Poland have changed materially. Poland is now a full-fledged sea-power, with three spacious ports (Szczecin (Stettin), Gdynia, and Gdańsk (Danzig) instead of only Gdynia, as previous to 1939. Hence much of Bagiński's case has been won by the victory of the Allied armies.

In this second edition the first two parts, "The Geographical Unity of Poland," and "German Imperialism in the East (*Drang nach Osten*)" remain unchanged. In Parts III and IV some changes have been made, but mostly in the order in which sections appear. The present order must be said to have gained in logic. There are some few sections that have been written since the first edition was prepared for the press. From the historical point of view, the data and the arguments are exceedingly valuable. But one looks in vain for any estimate of Poland's place in world trade—sea or land—in the light of her changed geographical position, and in view of her acquisition of a new maritime neighbor—Soviet Russia. All the maps—in themselves excellent and instructive—are of pre-war Poland. It seems futile to say in 1946, e.g. that Danzig should belong to Poland. Gdańsk is now Polish—as is most of East Prussia, for whatever that may be worth in its present exhausted state. The western lands, from Silesia to the Pomeranian coast, are rich industrially and agriculturally, and alter radically the overall economic structure of Poland. It is certainly too early for anyone

accurately to assay the changes that have taken place, but enough is known for a helpful estimate to be made—at least to gauge the developments of the next few years.

S. H. THOMSON

LIGOCKI, EDWARD ELGOTH, *Poland* (Crossroads Series). London: Macdonald, 1945 (3rd impression). Pp. 168. 5s.

The volumes of this handy set have received a rather favorable reception in Great Britain. They are, in the majority, written by natives of the lands described. In days of sharp or gradual social revolution, it has not always been possible to find an author whose background and sympathies would agree with the governance of his native land as of 1945 or later. The difficulties of finding a qualified Yugoslav writer who would be able to give a fair and objective presentation of the development of the South Slavs up to the year 1946 would be very great. The same would certainly hold for Greece, for Poland, for Hungary, and indeed for Germany.

Mr. Ligocki, a prolific Polish poet and novelist, devotes his attention to the development of the Polish nation, with generous emphasis on the flowering of the national spirit in the period before 1939. It would appear doubtful if Mr. Ligocki would refuse to be called "romantic" in the traditional Polish sense. An illustration might suffice. He blames Henry of Valois for giving away so many royal prerogatives by the *pacta conventa* in 1572. But a non-Pole would regard that as quite insignificant beside the fact that it was the Polish magnates who insisted upon the renunciation before electing him to the throne. One gets the impression that Ligocki would have preferred Dmowski's thesis of a reunited Polish state under the Russian crown to the independent Poland which Piłsudski effectuated.

The chapter on literature and art is lively and informative, and, though summary and sketchy, written with verve and authority. We are not informed whether Mr. Ligocki is responsible for the English of this little book or not, but it is written deftly and with a clarity exceptional among Polish *littérateurs*.

The book ends with the death of General Sikorski, July 4, 1943, and there is therefore no judgment or apologia for the *nowa demokratyczna Polska* of 1945 and subsequent years.

S. H. THOMSON

NEWMAN, BERNARD, *The Story of Poland*. London: Hutchinson & Co., n.d. Pp. 201. 14 maps and illustrations. 7s.6d.

Throughout his many years of writing novels, travel books, and books of general and political interest, Mr. Newman has developed his own technique. He is adept at presenting solid facts, historical or economic, in a framework of intimate and warm human interest. He does not hesitate to recount personal adventures alongside a careful description of the architectural features of a cathedral, or a detailed account of the strategy of a battle. The critical reader soon adjusts to this conscious mingling of impression and science, particularly when he finds that the science measures up rather favorably to academic standards. At all events no one can accuse Mr. Newman of writing about Poland without

having been there, known the atmosphere, or talked with her people. I have travelled rather extensively and I trust observantly in Poland and confess to having gained much from Mr. Newman's description of Polish towns, the people, and the countryside.

Mr. Newman writes sympathetically of Piłsudski, without minimizing his mistakes or the fact that by his death his policies were out of step with Poland's inner progress. He holds that Beck's failures were largely those of inadequate stature, and Śmigły-Rydz was a fair soldier and a very childish politician. There is a fairly thorough study of the preliminaries to war and the German campaign in Poland in 1939. German espionage, even in high places in the Polish government, was uncannily effective.

The last chapter, "The Poland of Tomorrow," was written after the Soviet recognition of the Lublin Committee as the Provisional Government of Poland, but before the surrender of Germany. The matter of large territorial adjustments, the acceptance of the so-called "Curzon Line" in the east, the acquisition of Danzig and much of East Prussia, and the "Regained Lands" to the Oder and the Neisse, was by then clearly envisaged but not yet actualized. Mr. Newman, at the time of writing early in 1945, regarded this radical readjustment of territory with some misgivings, and, as events of the intervening two years have shown, with perfect justification. Some aspects of these territorial changes will certainly give rise to serious disputes in the years to come. Other features, such as Poland's acquisition of Danzig and East Prussia, should have been realized at the Paris Conference in 1919.

There is apparently a growing tendency among British publishers to omit the date of publication of their books. Such a stupid practice is difficult to condone.

S. H. THOMSON

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